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Ch. IINTR0DUCT10N 
The Unconscious Before Psychoanalysis 
Thanks to Freud the idea that our behaviour and life might be 
determined by unconscious mental factors has become a part of our 
intellectual heritage. But we are still quite unsure what precisely 
his contribution was, and there are still some who try to question 
that contribution. There are those who believe that the Freudian 
doctrine of unconscious mental processes has revolutionized our entire 
way of looking at ourselves. J. Margolis, who seems to share this 
view, writes 
"To appreciate what is new and what is not new in Freud, 
in this regard, one might think, for instance, of contacting 
an exotic tribe whose entire way of life seems remotely 
familiar and yet the details of whose life prove to be 
inexplicable - until some qualified anthropologist 
introduces us to the beliefs and conceptions, the 
interests, the rituals and myths, of these strange people. 
Suddenly, the bare events, the physical states - that 
we were tempted to assimilate to our own traditions and 
conventions of life - we see to have a new but related 
significance and order, in being legible in terms of a 
governing theory about their distinctive way of life. 
Freud is that field anthropologist addressing the 
natives themselves and instructing them in the 
conventions to which they actually subscribe and 
of which they remain oddly (but understandably) 
ignorant! The trouble is that it is no longer a certain 
subpopulation that is being examined by a more advanced 
or at least independent observer; it is the entire 
race of men that constitute the uninfforn: ed natives, 
and the observer himself "recognises" that he too is 
committed, by virtue of the same global - however 
subterranean and varied - processes of childhood 
indoctrination and training as his subjects. Therein 
liesthe audacity of Freud's conception and the sense 
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in which he imposes a new mythology on the world". 
' 
Others would agree with Margolis about the profound influence 
of Freud's ideas on our views, but unlike him wouldn't attribute it to 
a new mythology but to a scientific discovery, even if this discovery 
became later converted to a kind of mythology or ideology. According 
to P. Meisel, for example, 
"The writings of Sigmund Freud have become so decisive 
a factor in our culture, particularly in America, 
that it is more difficult than ever to attribute to 
them the stance of a dispassionate science that 
simply narrates those unconscious processes of mind 
discovered by its founder. It is probably more 
accurate to say that Freud's work has itself become 
an example of those unconscious determinations thaf 
influence us when we least suspect it. Surely the 
contemporary status of psychoanalytic thinking as 
ideological reflex or instinct of reason should alert 
us to the fact that psychoanalysis no longer speaks 
to us so much as for us, no longer answers or 
confirms our condition so much as it produces it 
from the start. Psychoanalysis looks so like the 
foregone truth about life that it is easy to forget 
that what truth it has belongs, in the final instance, 
to the written achievement of Sigmund Freud himsel f'j .2 
There are some who argue that Freud's insight into the unconscious 
determinants of our behaviour and experience wasn't anything new to us, 
rather we were familiar with it all along, and what he did is to provide 
us with a systematic account of the ways in which our minds work. 
This view, among others, was expressed by L. Trilling. 
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"The Freudian psychology is the only systematic account 
of the human min4 which, in point of subtlety and com- 
plexity, of inter est and tragic power, deserves to stand 
beside the dhaotic mass of psychological insights which 
literature has accumulated through the centuries. To pass 
from the reading of a great literary work to a treatise 
of academic psychology is to pass from one order of perception 
to another, but the human nature of the Freudian psychology 
is exactly the stuff upon which the poet has always 
exercised his art ". 
3 
And finally, there are those who question Freud's contribution altogether, 
usually on the ground that the notion of unconscious mental processes 
is conceptually inconsistent. For example, Laird in his attempt to 
assess the value of the concept of unconscious mental processes for 
psychology came to the conclusion that "The trouble about ideas and 
wishes and the like, however, is precisely that they do not seem to 
be anything at all, except when they are present conscious facts". 
4 
it is interesting to see what Freud himself thought about his 
contribution to our understanding of human nature and ourselves. On 
one occasion he compared his achievement with that of Copernicus 
and Darwin. 
"In the course of centuries the naive self-love of men 
has had to submit to two major blows at the hands of 
science. The first was when they learnt that our earth 
was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment 
of a cosmic system of scarcely imaginable vastness. 
This is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus, 
though something similar had already been asserted by 
Alexandrian science. The second blow fell when 
biological research destroyed man's supposedly 
privileged place in creation and proved his descent 
from the animal kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature. 
This revolution has been accomplished in our own days by 
Darwin, Wallace and their predecessors, though not without 
the most violent contemporary opposition. But human 
megalomania will have suffered its third and most 
wounding blow from the psychological research of the 
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present time which seeks to prove to the ego that it 
is not even master in its own house, but must content 
itself with scanty information of what is going on 
unconsciously in its mind". 
5 
But then he added that "We psychoanalysts were not the first and not the 
only ones to utter this call to introspection; but it seems to be our fate 
to give it its most forcible expression and to support it with empirical 
material which affects every individual". 
6 
Also, when on the 
occasion of the celebration of his seventieth birthday Freud was greeted 
as the "discoverer of the unconscious" he corrected the speaker by saying 
"The poets and philosophers before me discovered the unconscious. What 
I discovered was the scientific method by which the unconscious can be 
studied`. 
In order to see Freud's contribution in a proper light we should inquire 
briefly into how the notion of unconscious mental processes was formulated 
before the foundation of psychoanalysis itself. European literature is one 
obvious area to look at. Here, the idea that our behaviour and experience 
is influenced by unconscious motives is expressed from the earliest period 
and continues until the present time. But is the literary concept of 
unconscious mental processes really similar to that f ormulated by Freud? 
The comparison between the two suggests that they are very close indeed. 
We have learned from Freud, for example, that a phenomenon such as memory 
which we usually think to be accidental, is often not accidental at all 
but influenced by motives which we fail to recognise. As he wrote "Everything 
that had been forgotten had in some way or other been distressing; it had 
been either alarming or painful or shameful by the standards of the subject's 
personality. It was not impossible to conclude that that was precisely why it 
had been forgotten - that is, why it had not remained conscious". 
7 
Dante makes a similar point: 
0 
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"Therefore I answered: I remember not 
That ever I estranged myself from thee 
Nor there-in does my conscious bring remorse". 
"If now thou hast no memory thereof", 
Smiling she answered me, "Recall to mind 
How thou of Lethe e'en this day didst drink. 
As from the smoke the fire may be inferred, 
So thy forgetfulness doth clearly prove, 
Fault in thy will, that otherwhere was bent". 
(Dante, Purgaturio, Canto 33) 
Freud was convinced that it is possible for a person to be in a state 
of strong emotion, for example, being anxious and yet being unable 
to tell, under normal circumstances at least, how this came about and what 
it is that makes him so anxious. Of one of his patients, called Frau Emmy von N. 
he wrote "Her consciousness did not present her with the real cause of 
her anxiety; that only emerged - but now it did so without any hesitation 
when I questioned her about it in hypnobis". 
8 
And Shakespeare would agree with him entirely. 
His merchant of Venice, just like Freud's patient, completely fails to 
understand the origin of his emotion. 
"In sooth, I know not why I am so sad: 
It wearies me; you say it wearies you; 
But how I caught it, found it, or came by it, 
What stuff'tis made of, whereof it is born, 
I am to learn; 
And such a want-wit sadness makes of me, 
That I have much ado to know myself". 
(The Merchant of Venice, I, i, 
Freud's observation of neurotic behaviour made him believe that someone 
can have a motive for doing something but be entirely ignorant of it, 
i. e. he can behave in the same way "as a hypnotized subject whom Bernheim 
had ordered to open an umbrella in the hospital ward five minutes after 
he woke up. The man carried out his instruction when he was awake, but 
he could produce-no motive for his action". 
9 
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Dostoyevslýyin one of his novels describes vividly a similar piece 
of behaviour. 
"Iij came to one distinct conclusion - that is, that 
Pavel Pavlovitch certainly had meant to cut [my] throat, but 
that perhaps only a quarter of an hour before had not known 
that he would do it. The razor-case had perhaps merely 
caught his eyes the evening before, and, without arousing 
any thought of it at the time, had remained in his memory... 
"If he had long been intending to murder me he would 
have got a knife or pistol ready; he would not have 
reckoned on my razors which he had never seen till 
yesterday evening", was one reflection[II made 
among others .... 
"If it is settled that he tried to murder me 
accidentally", [Il went on pondering, "had the idea 
ever entered his head before, if only as a dream in a 
vindicative moment? " 
[1) decided that question strangely - that "Pavel Pavlovitch 
did want to kill me , but the thought of the murder 
had 
never entered his head". In short: `Pavel Pavlovitch wanted 
to kill me, but didn't know he wanted to kill me. It's 
senseless, but that's the truth". (F. Dostoyevsky, The Eternal Husband) 
Phenomena like dreams were always the subject of Freud's attention, 
due to his conviction that they can reveal, sometimes better than 
waking behaviour, the secrets of the dreamer's mental life. Dostoyevsky 
too believed that dreams can tell us something important about ourselves 
which we were quite unable to realize in our waking life, and are still 
reluctant to accept despite its expression in a dream. 
"These obvious absurdities and impossibilities with which 
your dream was overflowing ... you accepted all at once, 
almost without the slightest surprise, at the very time 
when, on another side, your reason was at its highest 
tension and showed extra-ordinary power, cunning,, ýsagacity and 
logic. And why, too, on waking and fully returning to reality. 
do you feel almost every time, and sometimes with 
extraordinary intensity, that you have left something 
unexplained behind with the dream, and at the same 
time you feel that interwoven with these absurdities, 
j 
-7- 
some thought lies hidden, and a thought that is real, 
something belonging to your actual life, something 
that exists and always has existed in your heart. It's 
as though some thing new, prophetic, that you were 
awaiting, has been told you in your dream". (F. Dostoy2vsky, The Idiot) 
When we succeed in understanding a symbolic meaning of a dream we 
learn that it usually expresses an unconscious wish of the dreamer, 
according to Freud. A similar idea could be found in folklore, as in the 
following folksong from the region of Silesia quoted by Freud himself. 
SONG OF THE EARTHWORM 
Asleep on the grass one day a young lass 
Susanna of passion was dreaming; 
A soft smile did play round her nose as she lay 
While she thought of her swain and his scheming. 
Then - dream full of fear! - it swift did appear 
That her lover so handsome and charming 
Had become as she slept a fat earthworm which crept 
Right inside. What could be more alarming? ' 
Full of dread in her heart she awoke with a start 
And swift to the village hied her 
And tearfully told all the folk young and old 
That an earthworm had crawled up inside her. 
Her wailing and tears came at last to the ears 
Of her mother who cursed and swore roundly; 
With bodings of gloom she repaired to her room 
And examined the maiden most soundly. 
For the earthworm she sought, but alas! could find nought - 
An unfortunate thing which dismayed her. 
So she hurried away without further delay 
To ask the wise woman to aid her. 
With cunning she laid out the cards for the maid 
And said: 'We must wait a while longer. 
'I have questioned the Knave, but no answer he gave; 
'Perhaps the Red King will prove stronger. 
"Tis the news that you fear which the Red King speaks clear: 
'The worm really crawled in the girlie; 
'But as everything bides its due times and its tides 
'To catch it 'tis yet much too early. ' 
When Susanna had heard the lugubrious word 
She went to her chamber full sadly; 
Till at last there appeared the dread hour that she feared 
And out crept the little worm gladly. 
- 8- 
So be warned, every lass: do not dream on the grass, 
But let poor Susanna's fate guide you, 
Or - as you too may know, to your grief and your woe - 
A fat earthworm will creep up inside you. 
We hardly need Freud to tell us what the 
"fat earthworm" and "little worm" 
10 
mean. 
Dreams or symptoms are not the only phenomena which, 
in Freud's 
view, can betray our mental states. Various errors, such as slips of 
the tongue, can reveal our motives, conscious or unconscious. 
"They 
are not chance events but serious mental acts; they 
have sense; they 
arise from the concurrent action - or perhaps rather, the mutually 
opposing action - of two different 
intentions" said Freud. 
11 
A slip of the tongue, which is subtly motivated, occurs 
in Shakespeare's 
Merchant of Venice. Portia, the merchant's 
daughter, at last found in 
Bassanio the suitor to her liking. She is afraid that he too, like the 
previous suitors, will choose the wrong casket. 
She would like to tell 
him that even so, he could be certain of her love but she 
is prevented 
to do so by her vow. However, she makes a slip of the tongue which betrays 
her real feelings towards Bassanio. 
I could teach you 
How to choose right, but them I am forsworn; 
So will I never be; so may you miss me; 
But if you do you'll make me wish a sin, 
That I have been forsworn. Beshrew your eyes, 
They have o'erlooked me, and divide me; 
One half of me is yours, the other half yours, - 
Mine own, I would say; but if mine, then yours, 
And so all yours". 
(Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice' Act III, Scene 2). 
On the basis of his particular insights into human behaviour 
influenced by unconscious motives Freud came to the conclusion that "it 
is coherent in human nature to have an inclination to consider a thing 
untrue if one does not like it, and after that it is easy to find 




A wonderful exemplification of this truth can be found in the work 
of Tolstoy. In The Death of Ivan Ilyic he describes a struggle of 
a man who cannot reconcile himself to the idea that he is going to die. 
Ivan Ilyich saw that he was dying, and he was in a 
constant state of despair. In his heart of hearts 
he knew he was dying, and it was not simply that he 
could not get used to the idea; he could not grasp 
it, could not possibly grasp it. 
All his life he had regarded the syllogism 
he had learned while studying Kiesewetter's 
Logics: "Caius is a man, men are mortal, and 
therefore Caius is mortal", as being true only in 
respect to Caius, not to himself. Caius was a 
man, a man in the abstract sense, and so the syllogism 
applied to him; but Ivan Ilyich was not Caius, and not 
a man in the abstract sense; he had always been quite 
different from all other men. 
"If I were doomed to die like Caius I would have 
known of it, some inner voice would have told me. 
But I have never been aware of anything of the sort; I 
have always known, and so have all of my friends, that 
I was not of the same stuff as Caius. And now, lo and 
behold! " he said to himself. "But it cannot be. 
It cannot be, it-Icannot be, and yet it is. How, is it 
possible? How is one to uriderstand it? " 
He could not understand it and tried to drive the 
thought away as being false, misleading, and unwholesome, 
and he tried to evoke true, wholesome thoughts to take its 
place. But the thought was more than a thought, it was reality 
itself, and it kept coming back and confronting him. 
(L. Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich. ) 
Freud himself was well acquainted with the literary ideas concerning 
unconscious mental factors and their role in human behaviour and 
experience, expressed both by writers and poets. Throughout his work 
we come across quotations from literature which are relevant to his own 
views. And of Dostoyevsky, who has been quoted here, he once said that 
"before genius, analysis lays down its arms", meaning that what the literary 
genius can create is-like life itself, while psychoanalysis can only 
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comment on it. 
Literature, however, is not the only area in which the idea of 
unconscious mental processes has been formulated independently of 
psychoanalysis. Several philosophers, such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche 
and others, put forward metaphysical doctrines which express similar 
views. A metaphysical notion of unconscious mental processes plays an 
important'role in Schopenhauer's philosophy, in particular. The cornerstone 
of his philosophy is the concept of will. By "will" he understands a 
blind force inherent in all natural phenomena, including human life. 
In fact a human being is a macrocosm in which all that is fundamental 
to reality in general can be understood best. And what are the most basic 
aspectzý ofe human being? On the one hand my outer experience tells me that 
I am an object, just like any other objects in nature, such as trees, stones, 
etc. But I also know that there is something more in me than in trees or 
stones. Namely, I am aware of myself as an active being whose behaviour 
directly expresses my will. This inner conviction that each of us has 
an active will is the most primitive and fundamental of our experience. 
Other philosophers, like Descartes, had also something important to say 
about the will. For Descartes will is a component of our intellectual 
faculty, a sort of instrument by which we control our actions in a rational 
manner. But Schopenhauer's concept of will is quite different. In his 
view, the operations of the will have nothing to do with the intellectual 
faculty. It is a mere illusion to think so, and many philosophers 
contributed to this illusion instead of unmasking it. The truth is that 
the real chvice, if it can be called "choice" at all, is made below 
the level of reflective consciousness and rationality. The primacy 
of the will over intellect and consciousness is revealed in our daily 
behaviour. In everyday lif e we are usually quite ignorant of what makes us 
behave in the way we. do. We believe ourselves to be acting on some moral 
or rational reasons, while the real factors influencing our behaviour 
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are in fact quite different. The reasons we quote to justify our 
behaviour are, therefore, an entirely unreliable guide to understanding 
of our behaviour. Human behaviour, according to Schopenhauer, is 
rooted in deep-lying biological tendences, while "Consciousness is the 
mere surface of our mind, of which, as of the eartfi, we do not know 
the inside but only the crust". An example of a biological tendency 
responsible for our behaviour is the sexual drive, which he calls 
"a focus on the will" and regards, apart from the instinct to survive, 
as the main motor of human behaviour. But instead of accepting this 
fact human beings produced another illusion, i. e. the drive become 
idealized and romanticized as love. Sometimes Schopenhauer seems 
to think that conscious choices never really determine our behaviour, 
and that our view to the contrary is due to our ignorance, which may 
itself have a motive which we don't admit. if we were able to recognize 
our real motives we would be shocked and embarassed by them, which 
suggests that there's something more to our ignorance than a mere 
failure to recognize what they really are. Another example of failure 
of this kind, quoted by him, is "failure" of memory. When the 
ignorance reaches the point at which the person loses touch with reality 
comple tely it becomes a form of insanity. 
13 
Even such a brief look at Schopenhauer's doctrine as this one, reveals 
a striking similarity between his ideas and those of Freud. Both 
stress the great importance of unconscious factors in human behaviour. 
Both look at these factors as irrational forces rooted in biological 
, tendencies. For 
Schopenhauer, just as for Freud, a failure to become 
conscious of one's own motives has to do with their shameful or 
painful character. They both show how man seeks to rationalize his 
behaviour, giving motives for his conduct which are not his real motives. Even 
more specific remarksby Schopenhauer, like that of memory failure being motivated, 
--12- 
echo remarks made by Freud on the same topic. Was Freud ever aware 
of this similarity of views? The answer is given by Freud himself. 
"The large extent to which psychoanalysis coincides with the philosophy 
of Schopenhauer - not only did he assert the dominance of the emotions 
and the supreme importance of sexuality but he was even aware of the 
mechanism of repression - is not to be traced to my acquaintance with his 
teaching. I read Schopenhauer very late in my life. Nietzsche, another 
philosopher whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most 
astonishing way with the laborious findings of psychoanalysis, was for a 
long time avoided by me on that very account; I was less concerned with 
the question of priority than with keeping my mind unembarrassed", we are 
told in An Autobiographical Study. 
14 
The idea of unconscious determinants of human behaviour was expressed, 
independently of psychoanalysis, in literature and philosophy, but what 
about psychology? Was Freud the first to introduce the concept of 
unconscious mental processes into this area at least? By no means, and 
Freud never tried to suggest otherwise. A French psychologist called 
Janet had spoken of "unconscious mental acts" before Freud, although 
in Freud's view, he meant by this phrase no more than a facon de parler. 
But for another psychologist, namely Fechner, this notion meant more. 
He used to compare mind with an iceberg which is moved by the winds 
of awareness as well as some hidden currents. His conception of a mental 
energy, of a topography of the mind and the principle of constancy in 
particular had an unquestionable impact on Freud's formulation of his 
metapsychological doctrine of the unconscious. In fact Freud himself 
admitted that he "was always open to the ideas of G. T. Fechner and have 
followed that thinker upon many important points". 
15 The: ýinfluence 
of Breuer on Freud's ideas, with whom he wrote Studies on Hysteria doesn't 
require any further comment. And there were other psychologists who spoke 
of the unconscious activities of the mind, even if what they meant by 
it wasn't exactly the same as the psychoanalytic concept of the uncons6ious 
-13- 
mental processes. According to the well known German physiologist and 
psychologist Wundt, the real activity of the mind is unconscious and 
what we are aware of are merely the results of those activities. "Our 
mind is so fortunately equipped, that it brings us the most important 
bases for our thoughts without our having the least knowledge of this work 
of elaboration. Only the results of it become conscious. This unconscious 
mind is for us like an unknown being who creates and produces for us, and 
finally throws the ripe fruits in our lap". 
16 
There is no doubt that Freud was aware of the various formulations of the 
notion of the unconscious mental activity in such diverse areas as 
literature, philosophy and psychology. Some of these formulations, by 
psychologists in particular, had certainly some impact upon his views. 
But what helped to shape his views most of all were the various phenomena 
he came across in his practice and his desire to understand them. What 
kind of phenomena were they, and what were Freud's reasons for applying 
to them the notion of the unconscious mental processes? We are told by 
Freud himself that it was the phenomenon of post-hypnotic suggestion that 
made him believe in the existence of unconscious mental processes. In 
The Unconscious he wrote "Incidentally, even before the time of psychoanalysis, 
hypnotic experiments, and especially post-hypnotic suggestion, had 
tangibly demonstrated the existence and mode of operation of the mental 
unconscious ". 
17 When Freud observed Bernheim's and Charcot's experiments 
with post-hypnotic behaviour he was struck by the following fact. People 
who woke up from an hypnotic trance will carry out orders given to them 
under hypnosis without realizing that they act in accordance with suggestions 
made to them earlier. He describes one of these experiments as follows: 
"The doctor enters the hospital ward, puts his umbrella in 
the corner, hypnotizes one of the patients and says to him: 
'I'm going out now. When I come in again, you will come to meet 
me with my umbrella open and hold it over my head'. The 
doctor and his assistants then leave the ward. As soon as 
they come back, the patient, who is no longer under hypnosis, 
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carries out exactly the instructions that were given him 
while he was hypnotized. The doctor questions him: 'What's 
this you're doing? What's the meaning of all this? ' The 
patient is clearly embarrassed. He makes some lame remark 
such as: 'I only thought, doctor, as it's raining outside 
18 
you'd open your umbrella in the room before you went out". 
Freud, therefore, concluded that the person's explanation of his behaviour 
after wakening from the hypnotic trance was "obviously quite inadequate 
and made up on the spur of the moment to offer some sort of motive for his 
senseless behaviour. It is clear to us spectators that he is in ignorance 
of his real motive (my italics). We, however, know what it is, for we 
were present when the suggestion was made to him which he is now 
carrying out, while he himself knows nothing of the fact that it is at 
work in him". 
19 
There was a striking analogy between the behaviour of the subjects 
under hypnotic suggestion and that of the hysterical patients Freud 
came across in his consulting room. Charcot and Bernheim in fact claimed 
that post-hypnotic behaviour was an artificial simulation of naturally 
occuriing hysterical symptoms. This analogy was further reinforced when 
Freud's collaborator Breuer realized that the amnesia characteristic of 
hysterical patients can be overcome in a hypnotic state. Breuer's patient 
Anna 0. was able to tell him about the origin of her symptoms while she 
was in a hypnotic state but she was ignorant of it in her normal waking 
state, One day she complained to him that a dress she was wearing looked 
blue to her although she knew it was in fact brown. Later that day, 
while in a hypnotic state, she recalled that a year before she had made 
a dressing gown for her ill father out of the same material as her dress 
except that the material was blue. H. er other symptoms had already been 
indicated to Breuer that her relation to her father, being of considerable 
emotional significance, was an important factor in Anna's illness. The 
mother's diary proved that her recollections produced in the hypnotic state 
were veridical. Soon Breuer's findings were confirmed by Freud himself. 
-15- 
By using hypnosis with his patient Frau Emmy von N., Freud was able to 
unravel the story of her disgust for food. Frau Emmy's disgust for 
food had its origin in her childhood. When she was a child her mother 
insisted on her later eating food which she had left over from her meals. 
Since the food was cold and tasted awful by that time, she did so with 
great disgust. Later on, although she was not longer subjected to this 
punishment, her feeling of disgust at mealtimes persisted. What was even 
more striking was the fact that in both cases the patient's recollections 
of her original experiences in hypnosis resulted in a complete removal 
of the symptoms. In the case of Frau Emmy, according to Freud's report 
of 20 the very next day she ate and drunk without making any difficulty". 
Freud's observation of post-hypnotic behaviour and its analogy with 
the hysterical symptoms was, therefore, an important factor in shaping 
his views concerning unconscious mental processes. -It opened his mind 
to the possibility that a person's behaviour can be influenced by factors 
he is not aware of but which he can recognize under special conditions, 
i. e. in a hypnotic state. His observation that the person's recognition 
Of his original experiences can in some cases produce a removal of his 
symptoms influenced in turn Freud's assumptions concerning therapeutic 
methods, which are based on the view that by making unconscious processes 
conscious it is possible to cure a neurotic patient. Although the notion 
of unconscious mental processes was originally introduced by Freud on 
the basis of his observation of post-hypnotic phenomenon and neurotic symptoms, 
he soon started to apply it to some entirely otdinary phenomena such as 
dream , various errors and even some 
forms of social behaviour. 
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B) The Status of the Notion of Unconscious Mental Processes 
What kind of notion is that of unconscious mental processes? There 
is a fundamental disagreement among philosophers about its logical status. 
According to one view, it involves a self-contradiction. If mental 
states, such as wishes for example, cannot exist except when they are 
presently conscious facts, as was suggested by Laird in the passage quoted 
earlier, it is logically inconsistent to say that a person can be unconscious 
of his wish. J. P. Sartre in Being and Nothingness takes a similar position. 
21 
People who take this view accept the Cartesian identification of the mental 
with the conscious. On this view a mental process or state, a wish for 
example, is something introspectable by the subject who has it. If we 
say that the wish is not known to the subject it seems to vanish into 
nothingness, and when we assert its unconscious existence we contradict 
ourselves. 
We should, however, look at this Cartesian doctrine more carefully, 
because, as D. M. Armstrong pointed out, it involves several different 
theses and not all of them rule out the possibility of unconscious 
mental processes. 
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One thesis is that of the indubitability or 
incorrigibility of introspective awareness. It says that any belief 
we have about our own current mental state is inevitably true. In other 
words it rules out the possibility of error. Suppose p is X's belief 
about his current mental state, then the thesis of incorrigibility can be 
defined as follows: 
W (X believes that p) logically implies (p). 
The notion of incorrigibility shouldn't be confused with that of jo AjEc! 1 1Z 
privileged access, which is a different notion, because even if we each 
had a priviliged access,. in the sense of a special first-person non- 
inferential awareness of our current mental states, we still could be 
mistaken about them. Suppose I believe that I am indifferent towards 
John. But when I examine my behaviour and feelings more carefully I see 
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that I am really in love with him. Thus one belief about oneself Can 
be used to correct another, so logically privilecýed access doesn't rule 
out the possibility of error. The thesis of logically privileged access can 
be defined as follows: (where p is a proposition about X's current mental 
state): 
(ii) Nobody except X can have non-inferential knowledge that p. 
A different thesis implied by the Cartesian doctrine is what Armstrong 
and Ryle call the self-intimation of introspective awareness. It says 
that we see everything there is in our mind. This thesis, therefore, 
rules out the possibility of ignorance about our current mental states. 
It can be defined as follows (where p is a proposition about X's present 
mental state): 
(iii) (p) logically implies (X believes that p). 
It is this last thesis that rules out the possibility of the unconscious 
mental states. It does so because it implies that it is logically 
impossible for us to be ignorant of our current mental states. Each of 
M-(iii) is logically independent of the others, but each is part of the 
traditional doctrine of the mind. But is this doctrine acceptable and is 
the thesis of self-intimation correct? 
Freud himself was convinced that the Cartesian doctrine, with its thesis 
of self-intimation, is wrong, for the following reasons. 
"This equation [i. e., mental with consciousj is either a 
petitio principii and begs the question whether all that is 
mental is also necessarily conscious; or else it is a 
matter of convention, of nomenclature. In this later case 
it is of course no more open to refutation than any 
other convention. The question remains, however, whether 
the. convention is so expedient that we are bound to 
adopt it". 
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His answer to this question was that it is not expedient at all, for 
firstly, 
"conscious acts remain disconnected and unintelligible 
if we insist upon claiming that every mental act that 
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occurs in us must also necessarily be experienced 
by us through consciousness; on the other hand, 
they fall into a demonstrable connection if we 
interpolate between them the unconscious acts which 
we have inferred. A gain in meaning is a perfectly 
justifiable ground for going beyond the limits 
of direct experience". 
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And secondly, "the assumption of there being an unconscious enables us 
to construct a successful procedure by which we can exert an effective 
influence upon the course of conscious processes". 
25 So Freud had reasons 
for rejecting the Cartesian doctrineand what made him doubt its 
plausibility most of all was his observation of neurotic and post- 
hypnotic behaviour. Take the case of post-hypnotic behaviour quoted 
earlier, when the subject was instructed to open an umbrella inside the 
room and hold it over the doctor's head, as soon as the doctor entered the 
room. If the thesis of self-intimation was true the subject couldn't 
possibly fail to believe that he was acting on the hypnotist's order, 
when later he indeed opened the umbrella and hel. d it over the doctor's 
head. In his waking state, however, when he was asked to justify his 
behaviour, he could only say that he thought it was going to rain and 
therefore he decided to open the doctor's umbrella for him. But the 
doctor had just come in and anyway it is a strange thing to do to open 
the umbrella inside the room and hold it over somebody's head, even if 
it is raining outside. The subject's own embarrassment with his behaviour 
suggested that it wasn't his usual way of behaving either. But the observer 
familiar with what went on during hypnosis, could see that he was in fact 
acting on the hypnotist's order without remembering it, whereas his attempt 
to justify his strange behaviour was a made-up story produced in order to 
cover his embarrassment. So the circumstances surrounding the subject's 
behaviour justify us in saying that he was acting on the order given 
to him under hypnosis, and yet he didn't believe in his waking life, as 
the thesis of self-intimation would imply, that it was precisely that 
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order which made him behave in the way he did. In other cases of post- 
hypnotic behaviour, and in some cases of neurotic behaviour, the person 
sometimes openly admits that he doesn't know why he behaves in a certain 
way. Acceptance of the Cartesian doctrine either commits us to saying that 
such behaviour doesn't really exist, which is empirically false, or else 
leaves us unable to explain it, which is not satisfactory either. So 
even if accepting such a narrow definition of the mental, as proposed 
by Descartes, doesn't involve any logical fallacy, it would nevertheless 
rule out the possibility of explaining a vast range of human behaviour 
in terms of mental factors and therefore, as Freud himself pointed out, 
such a definition would be totally inexpedient. Also many properties 
ascribed to people on the basis of their behaviour, such as ambition, 
vanity, intelligence, moodiness, reliability, selfishness, and others, 
very often haven't any particular experiences corresponding to them 
in the subjects in question. The mental character of such predicates would, 
therefore, be ruled out by the Cartesian definition of the mental. 
The next question we want to ask is whether the notion of unconscious 
mental processes is a useful one? People, like Broad, who don't regard 
the notion as problematic from a logical point of view, nevertheless 
think that it is dispensible as an empirical hypothesis, because the facts 
it is supposed to explain can be equally well explained in terms of 
physiological processes. 
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He argues this on the basis of the following 
example, which be believes psychoanalysts would explain by postulating 
an unconscious mental perception. A person was looking for his spectacles 
but failed to find them, although they had been staring him in the face 
in the very drawer in which be was looking. Afterwards, under hypnosis, 
the person was able to tell where the spectacles were. According to Broad, 
the explanation of this case, rival to any supposed psyýho. analytic 
explanation in terms of unconscious perception, was as follows. When 
stimuli from an object act on our nerves they usually give rise to two 
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results: an experience E and a trace T. But, under certain circumstances, 
only one of those results may happen. One possibility is that the 
relevant experience occurs but no trace is left. Alternatively, a trace 
is formed, although, no mental event accompanies it. But if this trace 
is afterwards excited, the resulting experience is exactly like, or very 
like, a memory of the experience E which normally accompanies the trace T. 
And also the resulting behaviour is very much like that which normally 
follows from a memory of experience such as E. In the case described 
above. ýwe can say, according to Broad, that the stimuli from the spectacles 
produced only a trace, which when stimulated under hypnosis gave rise 
to an experience resembling very much a memory of seeing the spectacles. 
So there was no unconscious perception, indeed no perception at all, just 
a physical trace. Broad thinks that similar arguments can be used against 
postulating other kinds of unconscious mental processes. 
However, Broad's argument should be rejected for the following reasons. 
Firstly, his example is quite different from cases to which psychoanalysts 
would usually apply the notion of unconscious mental processes. He 
is talking about perception of the external object, whereas psychoanalysts 
refer to internal states, such as emotions, and talk about the personts 
failure to recognize their influence on his behaviour. It is difficult 
to see, therefore, how the kind of explanation postulated by Broad could 
be used to account for the psychoanalytic cases. Secondly, psychoanalysts 
are often quite unable to provide a physiological account of some behaviour, 
as in the case of post-hypnotic behaviour discussed earlier, but can 
make good sense of it in psychological terms. As Freud himself pointed 
out 
As far as their [i. e. unconscious mental processes] 
physical characteristic is concerned, they are totally 
inaccessible to us: no physiological concept or chemical 
process can give us any notion of their nature. On the 
other hand, we know for certain that they have abundant 
points of contact with conscious mental processes; 
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with the help of a certain amount of work they can 
be transformed into, or replaced by, conscious mental 
processes, and all the categories which we employ to 
describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, 
purposes, resolutions and so on, can be applied to 
them. Indeed, we are obliged to say of some of these 
latent states that the only respect in which they 
differ from conscious ones is precisely in the 
absence of consciousness. Thus we shall not hesitate 
to treat them as objects of psychological research". 
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And finally, Broad's account of the person's failure to notice the 
Spectacles, staring him in the face, can be rejected on the basis of our 
current psychological theories, such as information-processing theory. 
Broad argues that in the case described by him there was no perception 
at all, whereas in the view of information-processing theory this would 
be a case of unattended perception, processed by the subject at a high 
level, which cannot be accounted for without appealing to mental terms 
(e. g. perception, not paying attention), contrary to Broad's beliefs. 
There is a widespread view that by introducing unconscious desires, 
feelings, etc., Freud made a radical shift in our ordinary understanding 
of these concepts. According to A. Goldman, for example, such a notion 
as that of unconscious desire "is one that violates one of the main 
criteria for the ordinary notion of desire ... It is part of our notion 
of an ordinary (occurrent) desire that an agent is aware of his desire". 
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But others, like Dilman, believe that the notion of unconscious mental 
processes have the same logical status as that of conscious mental processes. 
"What makes statements about unconscious wishes and motives explanatory 
is not different from what makes those about conscious ones explanatory", 
according to Dilman. 
29 As far as the first view is concerned we already 
came across it in Sartre and Descartes. We have argued Above that such 
a view is untenable. Now we want to show that the notion of the 
unconscious doesn't violate our ordinary usage of such terms as desires, 
feelings, etc. Common sense psychology, although it is based on the 
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assumption that on most occasions people do know what they want, how 
they feel, what motives guide their actions, etc., doesn't, however, 
exclude the possibility that on some occasions the subject of these 
processes and states might be unaware of having them. Whether this kind 
of unawareness is the same as that implied by the Freudian notion is of 
course a different story and needs a further argument. Let us, therefore, 
consider different circumstances in which a common man would be prepared to 
say that someone is unaware of his mental states. 
Firstly, such unawareness might be due to a lack of attention on the 
part of the subject. For example, people hold many beliefs on which they 
do not dwell all the time. And when they do not think about their beliefs 
we can say that they are not aware of them on those occasions. This 
applies not only to beliefs but to dispositional states in general, 
such as desires and traits of character. 
Sometimes people are unaware of their mental states because they 
do not reflect on them. Speaking of mental states such as feelings we 
sometimes say that although he nourished them for a long time a person 
didn't realize them until now. A boy, for instance, might be aware 
that he was enjoying the presence of a particular girl on several 
occasions, that he was annoyed when she was criticised by other people, 
etc., without realizing until now that he is in love with her. He 
has been aware of each individual state when he had it but he didn't 
reflect upon it in a way that allowed him to recognise the similarity 
between the mental phenomena in question and those which are commonly 
called 'love'. 
There are cases when we say of a person that he doesn't know what 
he really wants, because after desiring something for *a long time he is not 
happy or satisfied when he gets it. It could be the case that a person 
in question saw only the bright side and not the dark side of the desired 
object, so that reality didn't measure up to his expectations. We can 
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say that he was ignorant of the different aspects of his desired object 
and understood them only when the reality corresponding to it became true. 
Some people do not understand and therefore are not entirely 
aware of their mental states because they lack the skill to spell them out. 
And ability to descriýe one's feelings and other mental states is something 
which can be learned. Children, therefore, are less skilful in articulating 
their feelings-than grownups. There are also differences in this respect 
between grownups themselves; writers might be better at it than others. 
Would these be examples of the unconscious mental processes the 
psychoanalysts are concerned with? Certainly not. Freud didn't 
postulate this notion merely to fill the gaps or discontinuities of mental 
life, as is the case with dispositional mental states for example. In 
his view unconscious states can be active in the person, exerting their 
influence on his behaviour, like the hypnotist's order acting on the subject 
without the person being aware of their presence at the same time. The 
unconscious mental processes the psychoanalysts are talking about can 
be explained neither in terms of the subject's lack of skill to spell 
them out (as with children sometimes) nor in terms of not reflecting on 
one's feelings (which also happens to grownups). These two kinds 
of mental state do not require some special conditions for avowals 
by the subject in question, but unconscious mental processes cannot usually 
reach consciousness without some emotional changes taking place (of which 
we will learn more in due course), and sometimes psychotherapy is the 
only means to bring that about. We cannot also account for them in terms 
of graduation of awareness because, as Freud was able to show, their 
influence on the person's behaviour could be as strong as conscious 
ones and the persistence with which they occur, as in the case of phobias, 
could be even stronger than that of ordinary fear. All these cases, 
therefore, would not be regarded by psychoanalysts as uncon scious 
but as preconscious mental processes. 
30 
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But there are other cases of behaviour, however, which the 
psychoanalysts would certainly regard as expressions of unconscious 
mental states and processes. We have learned from writers and poets 
that it is possible for people to act on unconscious motives, and the 
situations they describe sometimes resemble very closely the kind of 
cases Freud and his followers were interested in. According to literature, 
people can fail to remember things which are shameful, fail to understand 
their own feelings when such understanding becomes disturbing and 
disconcerting, and don't see the motives for their behaviour which if 
clearly understood would frighten or shock them. Freudian ascriptions 
of unconscious mental processes, just like literary ones, don't 
concern trivial things but usually have to do with deeply personal 
situations, capable of provoking unpleasant feelings or even a threat 
to the personal integrity of the subject, if he was fully aware of his 
position. Both Freud and literary writers suggest that precisely 
because of the disturbing nature of such situations, the person fails 
to remember it, cannot understand his emotional reaction towards the 
circumstances he is in, or fails to see the significance of his behaviour. 
The experience such people are going through is reflected in their 
behaviour. There is often a kind of ambivalence about what they say 
and do. Pavel Pavlovitch, Dostoyevsky's hero, for example, doesn't 
behave at all in a way which would be characteristic of a man who wants 
to kill somebody in cold blood. He expresses affection towards his 
victim, shows genuine concern when he becomes ill, and yet other things 
he does suggest that he wants to kill him, and he has a strong motive 
for doing so, because the man he used to admire and respect, his best 
frierid, turned out to be the lover of his dead wife. Dostoyevsky's phrase 
"tried to murder accidentally" expresses very well the ambivalence of his 
behaviour and complexity of his motives. The behaviour of the neurotic 
subjects described by Freud, which is going to be analysed in detail 
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later on, often shows the same ambivalence. What they do and say in 
certain circumstances suggests to the observer that there must be a 
motive behind it, but when the subject hears about this motive he either 
seems to be genuinely surprised or denies it, as Pavel Pavlovitch probably 
would. 
Even a brief and restricted inquiry into literature, like the one 
presented above, makes it clear that there is a genuine similarity 
between Freud's attribution of unconscious mental processes and literary 
accounts of human behaviour. What are then Goldman's reasons for saying 
that the notion of unconscious desire or feeling violates our ordinary 
use of such terms? Does he want to exclude literary usage from what 
we mean by ordinary language? If he does he is wrong for the following 
reasons. Literature doesn't employ technical terms as psychology, including 
psychoanalysis, does. We don't have to learn any special vocabulary 
to understand literary works. It is also the case that writers and poets 
don't usually talk about phenomena which are new to us, such as post- 
hypnotic or neurotic behaviour which Freud himself refers to amongst 
many other things, but describe everyday life situations which all of us are 
familiar with. It would be wrong, therefore, to exclude literary vocabulary 
from ordinary language and in fact we don't do that. Goldman's thesis 
that the use of the notion of unconscious motives is a radical 
departure from ordinary language is false. What is wrong with some 
philosophical claims is that they are based on a restricted diet of 
relevant examples, as Wittgenstein once put it, and Goldman seems 
to suffer from this deficiency disease. 
Although ordinary language provides the foundation for the Freudian 
notion of unconscious mental processes, and his explanation of human 
behaviour has its roots in common sense psychology, there are, however, 
ways in which Freud diverges from them. Firstly, his account of 
unconsciously motivated behaviour is much more systematic. than that which 
-26- 
can be found in common sense psychology. Although poets and writers 
looked sometimes at phenomena, such as dreams and errors, as being an 
expression of motives, both conscious and unconscious, it took Freud 
to incorporate them with intentional behaviour, or as significantly 
linked to such behaviour, in a regular fashion. His reasons for doing 
this was his observation that a person's purposeful behaviour can have 
a significant connection with other events in his life. For example, suppose 
a person did everything to become a professor and then he had a dream 
in which he was already one, or made a slip of the tongue in which he 
refered to himself as professor, although he didn't possess this title 
yet. And it is in virtue of this meaningful relation that the notion 
of wish becomes applicable to the person's dream or slip of the tongue 
also. Any attempt to connect these phenomena with the rest of the person's 
behaviour in a systematic way should be taken seriously. That shouldn't 
exclude a critical approach to the particular cases of such incorporation 
and particular cases of extension of the usage of terms such as wishes, 
feelings, etc., if the justification provided is not sound enough. 
Secondly, the p6ychoanalytic application of the notion of unconscious 
mental processes has a wider range than that of ordinary concepts. 
Apart from applying it to ordinary behaviour and familiar phenomena, 
Freud also uses it to describe and explain some very peculiar phenomena, 
mentioned already, such as post-hypnotic behaviour and neurotic 
symptoms, about which the ordinary man knows nothing or very little. 
When faced with such phenomena we are often unable to understand them 
and have to appeal for help from an expert, including the psychoanalyst 
himself. Suppose we are faced with a hand-washing ritual performed by a 
neurotic person. Many of us would say, or at least people said so before 
Freud, that the person's reason for washing his hands is to keep them 
clean. But it is not the way the psychoanalyst would look at such behaviour 
and he certainly wouldn't stop his inquiry into person's motives at this point. 
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He would be interested to learn why the person is so preoccupied with 
hygiene that there is little time left for him to do obher, more 
important, things. And he might, for example, suggest that the person's 
washing ritual has more to do with his feeling of guilt rather than with 
his desire to keep his hands clean, despite what he himself says. So 
the motives the psychoanalyst is referring to could be quite different 
from those quoted by an ordinary man in similar circumstances. Other 
phenomena, quoted by Freud, such as hysterical paralysis of limbs, 
hysterical blindness, etc., again are something we are not really familiar 
with. But when we do come across such things we usually look at them 
as physiological phenomena and don't apply to them either conscious or 
unconscious motives. Freud's knowledge of physiology, however, enabled 
him to realise that the hysterical blindness or paralysis don't look 
at all like ordinary paralysis or common blindness and that we cannot 
explain them without appealing to certain psychological factors. By 
ascribing to people different motives, by looking at certain apparently 
somatic phenomena as being influenced by psychological rather than 
physiological factors, contrary to the common way of looking at 
these phenomena, Freud indeed behaves like the anthropologist from 
Margolis's picture, who brings a new order into the natives' perception 
of themselves. But this new order applies only to certain aspects of 
the natives'behaviour which they failed to recognise themselves, while 
other aspects had been anticipated by them quite well, so far at least, 
much better than Margolis seems to imply. 
What we have learned so far is that the Freudian notion of unconscious 
mental processes, contrary to some beliefs, doesn't violate the criteria 
of application for our ordinary concepts. When writers ascribe to 
people desires, feelings, etc., on the basis of their behaviour, despite 
their sincere denial of expressing any such thing, the strategy they 
use is very similar to that adopted by Freud. We have also observed 
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that by redescribing human motives and by extending the range of 
application of the concepts of desire, feelings, etc., Freud diverges 
from ordinary language, but there is room in ordinary language for 
such a divergence. We can say, therefore, that ordinary language provides 
a basis for the Freudian notion of the unconscious mental processes. 
But what Freud erects on this foundation goes far beyond ordinary language 
and common sense psychology. Suppose the following happens in a 
psychoanalytic session. An analyst gives his patient some interpretation 
of his behaviour to which he replies: "You offer your analysis with 
great circumcision". But immediately the patient apologizes and suggest 
that what he really wanted to say was: "You offer your analysis with 
great circumspection". In other words the patient made a slip of 
the tongue. Common sense psychology when faced with a situation of this 
kind may or may not proceed further. Those of us who are more inquisitive 
than others might feel that the word the subject happened to say is 
rather striking, given the circumstances, and would therefore look for 
some explanation of this fact. Others might not see anything striking 
in the subject's slip of the tongue and thus wouldn't pay any further 
attention to it. For Freud and his followers, however, the patient's 
slip of the tongue is only a starting point and they wouldn't rest as 
long as the slip itself is not explained. Why does a psychoanalyst 
think that there is a need for further explanation here? Because the 
context in which the slip occurrdd, the kind of slip made, the patient's 
expression of consternation, etc., all suggest 'to him that the slip 
couldn't possibly be accidental and that some motive must have contributed 
to its formation. Since the patient is unaware of any such motivation 
the psychoanalyst calls it an unconscious motive. What he has to do 
now is to find what this motive was. From other responses of the subject 
in the psychoanalytic session, from the kind of free associations he 
produces, etc., the psychoanalyst might further conclude that it was 
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an unconscious fear of being castrated by the father, which influenced 
the subject's slip of tongue. The fact that the slip occurred during 
the session in which the patient's attitude towards men, including the 
psychoanalyst and his father, was a predominant theme might suggest to 
the psychoanalyst that his patient was undergoing what is called a 
transference situation. The analyst became for him a kind of father 
figure and the patient's childhood fear of his real father came to life 
again, producing his slip of the tongue. The next step the psychoanalyst 
takes is to explain why the motive which influenced the subject's actual 
response is not known to him. To do that he postulates a process or 
an act which prevents the subject from realizing his real motive, i. e. 
an act of repression, which is itself an unconscious process. According 
to him, it is the act of repression which is responsible for producing 
a compromise-formation between two motives. The intention to say "You 
offer your analysis with great circumspection" was something the person 
was aware of. But another motive, i. e. an unconscious fear of being castrated, 
which became active in him at that time, disturbed his intended verbal 
re9ponse and produced the slip, whose content expressed this very fear. 
We do not have to follow the psychoanalyst's account further to see what 
he is doing when faced with the behaviour of his patient. To explain 
that behaviour he makes inferences which go far beyond what he directly 
observes in the consulting room and employs concepts (repression, 
compromise-formation, transference situation) which are not ordinary 
concepts at all. What he is doing is, therefore, very similar to what 
scientists do when they try to explain phenomena in terms of theories. 
The analyst appeals to a theory of human behaviour put forward by 
Freud. Since the notion of the unconscious mental processes is a part 
of that theory, its status cannot be judged in isolation from other 
concepts and hypotheses of that theory. As MacIntyre in his book 
The Unconscious put it: 
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"Freud's psychoanalytic technique no less than his 
doctrine of the mind depends on certain key 
theoretical concepts which can only be understood 
in terms of each other. This mental inter- 
dependence of concepts in the elosely woven fabric 
of a general theory is nothing new in the history 
of science. The interrelation of 'mass', 
'velocity' and 'force' in Newtonian mechanics 
springs to mind immediately. But clearly, a 
comprehensive theory whose concepts are thus 
interwoven stands all the more in need of 
justification as a whole. And the whole concept 
of the unconscious stands or falls with this 
general theory". 
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What we have to do now is to look, therefore, at Freudian theory and 
see how the notion of unconscious mental processes functions in it. 
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Ch., e FREUD'S EXPLANATIONS OF SYMPTOMS, DREAMS AND ERRORS 
IN TERMS OF UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL PROCESSES. 
Before Freudian theory is discussed, however, it is important to notice 
that it has certain peculiarities which are relevant to its viability as 
a scientific theory, but which were unnoticed or misunderstood by its 
critics. When we talk of scientific theories we usually mean a unified set 
of general propositions which can be tested by deducing some empirical 
consequences from them. This picture applies to many physical theories, 
such as the theory of relativity for example, but not to various theories 
in psychology, for instance. And it is certainly not true of Freudian 
doctrine, which has quite a different structure altogether. Firstly, 
as B. A. Farrell pointed out, psychoanalytic theory is not unified, but 
consists of a collection of parts. 
1 
These parts are often referred to as 
theories or subtheories. Psychoanalysts talk of the Freudian theory 
of personality and its formation, the theory of psychopathology, the theory 
of the unconscious and others. There is some connection between these 
subtheories, for example an understanding of the structure of personality 
and its development is relevant to understanding psychopathology i. e. 
what goes wrong in the psychological development of some individuals, 
but it is not the case that if the psychopathological hypotheses, for example 
that paranoia is a defence against homosexuality, turned out to be false, 
that would immediately upset all developmental hypotheses. Thus questions 
as general as "Is psychoanalytic theory true? ", or "Is psychoanalytic 
theory testable? " are entirely misconceived. But similar questions can 
and should be asked about the particular parts of Freudian doctrine. 
Secondly, there is a further peculiarity of the psychoanalytic theory, 
often unnoticed, but again very important to its viability as a scientific 
doctrine, namely, its hierarchical structure. The psychoanalytic 
generalizations appear on two levels. Psychoanalysts themselves often 
refer to them as Freud's Clinical Theory and Metapsychology. Since what 
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is called "Clinical Theory" doesn't deal exclusively with pathological 
behaviour, (though hypotheses about such behaviour form an important 
part of it), it is rather misleading to call it by this name. B. A. Farrell 
talks of Low Level and High Level theories, and I am going to follow his 
usage. 
2 
The former, although it contains some theoretical terms, such as 
"repression", and hypotheses which go beyond what is directly observed 
in a consulting room, nevertheless makes some reference to the observable 
behaviour. The High Level theory on the other hand is concerned with the 
machinery of the mind. It tells us, for example, that the mind functions 
according to a principle of inertia, i. e. that it tends to keep the total 
quantity of excitation within the system as low as possible, and this can 
by no means be inferred from the behaviour of people during analysis. 
In other words the two theories differ in their subject matter. One is trying 
7 
to explain human behaviour, while another is preoccupied with the mabhinery 
of the mind. They also employ a different vocabulary. In the High Level 
theory we come across such terms as "psychic energy", "discharge", I'drive`, 
etc., which look like physical terms of the natural sciences. Low Level 
theory, on the contrary, often employs intentional terms such as "unconscious 
motivation", "anxiety", etc. That means that they require quite different 
methods of validation. The Low Level theory! uses a method of verbal 
interpretation of the patient's behaviour and the techniques of free 
associations, which are unique to psychoanalysis, whereas, the High Level 
theory might be validated by neurophysiological or similar methods, as 
Freud himself seemed to think at one stage. 
Unfortunately, in Freud's writings the two levels and the terminology 
corresponding to them is often confused, hence certain misunderstandings 
of his doctrine by many of his critics. They reached their conclusion 
concerning the scientific status of psychoanalysis on the basis of High 
Level theory alone and then applied it to the whole of Freudian doctrine, 
as K. Popper did for example. According to him, the psychoanalytic doctrine 
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is closer to a myth than to a scientific theory because "as for Freud's 
epic of the Egos, the Super-Egos, and the Ids, no substantially stronger 
claim to scientific status can be made for it than for Homer's collected 
stories from the Olympus,,. 
3 
But even if Popper's conclusion could be 
proved right as far as High Level doctrine is concerned, it is neither 
justifiable nor true about Low Level theory. To avoid such misunderstandings 
some contemporary psychoanalysts try to keep the two kinds of terminology 
apart and are more explicit about. their different jobs within Freudian 
doctrine. 4 
The distinction made above applies also to the Freudian doctrine 
of the unconscious and unconscious mental processes, which is our main 
interest here. The part of High Level theory which is most relevant 
to the doctrine of the unconscious is the so called topographic point 
of view which provides us with the "structure" of the mind. Here Freud 
divides the mental apparatus into three systems: Unconscious, Preconscious 
and Consciousness. The mode of functioning of each system is discussed. 
We are told, for example, that the system of the Unconscious operates 
according to primary process formations. Freud is also interested in the 
mechanism responsible for this kind of functioning. As far as Low Level 
theory is concerned, it is the doctrine of repression which is directly 
relevant to the considerations of the unconscious mental processes. 
This doctrine tries to show why certain mental processes cannot reach 
consciousness or why they become unconscious. Like the whole of Freudian 
theory the doctrine of unconscious metital processes suffers from the same 
confusion between two different levels and two kinds of terms. It is worth 
noticing, however, that when Freud is talking about mental topography 
the notion of the unconscious has usually the grammatical form of a noun, 
whereas it is used in an adjectival form when it appears in empirical 
hypotheses concerning different aspects of human behaviour, i. e. Low Level 
formulations. But even when the grammatical difference fails us in keeping 
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the distinction clear, which it often does, we should still be able to make 
the distinction between these two kinds of propositions on the basis of 
their job within Freudian doctrine. 
The foundations of the Low Level theory, and of the whole of psychoanalysis 
in fact, consist in the interpretations of behaviour in certain situations. 
As Kubie, a contemporary follower of Freud, observed "Analysis stands 
or falls by the validity of its specific interpretations in specific 
instances". 5 By interpreting many instances of the patient's behaviour, 
whom he observes for months or even years, the psychoanalyst can reach 
some conclusions about what sort of person he is, how his personality 
was developed and what is the nature of his problem. In other words on 
the basis of his interpretations of the patient's behaviour the psychoanalyst 
can make some generalizations about a particular individual he is confronted 
with. Observation of more individuals and their case histories enables 
him in turn to reach some conclusions about people in general, i. e. how 
they function, what goes wrong with them, etc., and thus to formulate 
general hypotheses about the structure and development of personality, 
psychopathological hypotheses and others. This seems to be the way in 
which Freud himself formulated his doctrine and how his followers still 
proceed when they apply his hypotheses to the cases they themselves are 
confronted with. It is important, therefore, to examine how sound this 
foundation is, before even looking at the structure of generalizations that 
has been erected on its basis. Freud's interpretations of human behaviour, 
as we were able to learn already, concern very diverse and heterogeneous 
phenomena, extending from the interpretation of dreams at one end to certain 
forms of social behaviour at the other, with interpretations of symptoms, 
errors, jokes, etc., in between. Instead of concentrating on all these 
phenomena, we will concentrate on the interpretations of symptoms, dreams 
and errors, which are the most specific to psychoanalysis. What interests 
us here is what kind of interpretations Freud gives for these phenomena, 
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how these interpretations are reached and whether there is a reliable 
procedure available to us for testing them. 
(A) Interpretations of Symptoms 
In Freud's view "neurotic symptoms have a sense, like parapraxes and 
dreams, and, like them, have a connection with the life of those who 
produce them. " 
6 
He also wrote "The sense of a symptom lies, as we have 
found, in some connection with the patient's experience. The more individual 
is the form of the symptom the more reason we shall have for expecting to 
be able to establish this connection. " 
7 To substantiate these views 
Freud appeals to various examples of symptoms. Before we look at these 
it is useful, however, to draw'a distinction between various kinds of symptoms. 
Firstly, there is a group which can be called somatic. Hysterical paralyses 
of limbs, hysterical vomiting, etc., -are examples. Secondly, there are 
symptoms which have to do with the person's feelings or thoughts. Some 
patients suffer from a pathological feeling of jealousy. Others are 
preoccupied with obsessional thoughts, as in the case of the Rat Man, who 
sufferred from obsessional thoughts that the rat torture might happen 
to his father and fiancee . In other words these symptoms affect the 
states of the person's consciousness, his feelings in particular. We can 
refer to them as symptoms of states of consciousness. And lastly, symptoms 
can manifest themselves in the person's behaviour. Some neurotic patients 
endlessly wash their hands, others perform strange rituals before going to 
bed, or other strange things. These can be called behavioural s)Mtoms. 
Apart from the term "somatic symptom", this terminology is not used 
by Freud himself; he doesn't make such a sharp distinction between these 
different kinds of symptoms. There is some reason for this, for in practice 
symptoms usually do not appear in such pure forms. If a person has an 
obsessional thought that something awful might happen to his father, as in 
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the case of the Rat Man, he usually does something strange in order to 
prevent it. Thus various kinds of symptoms often appear together. Also 
despite their different manifestations, they can have similar aetiology, 
which is a further reason for not making a sharp distinction between them. 
Such a distinction is, however, important for logical reasons. To say, 
for instance, that compulsive hand-washing has a sense is quite different 
from saying that hysterical vomiting has a sense. Hand-washing, even if 
it is compulsive, is very similar to an intentional action. And if so, 
we can ask what is the person's reason or motive for washing his hands. 
And to understand the motive or reason for some behaviour is to understand 
its meaning, according to Freud. But to talk about hysterical vomiting, 
as having sense, sounds paradoxical. Vomiting or other somatic symptoms 
do not look like actions at all. We usually explain such phenomena in 
terms of physical causes. So the claim that somatic symptoms have meaning 
cries out for justification. Let us see then what justification can be 
given in their case. 
Somatic Symptoms 
As an example of a somatic symptom having sense, Freud quotes Frau 
Cacilie's case of a facial neuralgia. It appeared suddenly two or three 
times a year, lasted for from five to ten days, resisted any kind of 
treatment and then ceased abruptly. It was limited to the second and third 
branches of one trigeminal. When it appeared Frau Cacilie'suffered 
from pain in her face which was made worse by opening the mouth and 
chewing but not by talking. 
8 
What sense could this symptom possibly 
have? We know nothing about facial neuralgia but we are convinced 
that its explanation can be given in terms of physiological ciuses. Unlike 
us, however, and fortunately for him and his patients, Freud knew something 
about facial neuralgia and was able to notice an interesting thing about 
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Frau Cacilie's symptoms. He was struck by the fact that her neuralgia 
was restricted to the second and third branches and that it was made worse 
by opening the mouth and chewing though not by talking. In other words 
he noticed that her Symptoms were rather unusual, in the same way as some 
hysterical paralyses are. In the case of hysterical paralysis the following 
interesting thing was revealed. If an hysteric has a paralysis of the arm 
it usually corresponds to that part of it which is unclothed by a sleeveless 
dress. If she has a paralysis of the leg it extends as far as its insertion 
into the hip. This is a very striking phenomenon because the hysterical 
paralysis doesn't correspond to the anatomy of the nervous system but 
behaves in accordance with our ordinary concept of the body. As Freud 
put it "hysteria behaves as though anatomy did not exist, or as though 
it had no knowledge of it. " 
9 
This revelation that hysterical paralysis 
behaves in accordance with the common sense concept of the human body 
enabled Freud to discover a psychical factor in its formation. Since 
Frau Cacilie's symptoms, like hysterical paralysis, had some unusual 
features about them it made Freud suspect the presence of the psychic 
factor behind them too. His suspicion was soon confirmed. The patient 
reported the following traumatic scene she went through. She 
$'saw herself back in a period of great mental 
irritability towards her husband. She described 
a conversation which she had with him and a remark 
of his which she had felt as a bitter insult. Suddenly 
she put her hand to her cheek, gave a loud cry of pain 
and said. 'It was like a slap in the face. "'10 
We are told that after she reported the scene to Freud, her pain and attack 
were both at an end, although it came back later on. 'According to Freud 
"There is no doubt that what had happened had been a symbolization. She 
had felt as though she had actually been given a slap in'the face. " 
11 
He called the mechanism responsible for her symptom formation conversion. 
Such conversion consists, in Freud's view, in a transformation of a mental 
pain into a somatic symptom which may be either motor (e. g. paralysis) or 
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sensory (e. g. localised anaesthesia or pain). What is specific to 
conversion symptoms is their symbolic meaning, i. e. somatic symptoms 
having a symbolic relationship to the subject's traumatic experience. It 
needs explaining what Freud means by 'symbolic' here. The phrase 'slap 
in the face' can be used to describe a real event when the person is 
actually given a slap in the face. In such case it bas literal meaning. 
But on other occasions it might not refer to the actual event, e. g. in 
"What he said was like a slap in the face to me", but to some insulting 
words. Since in the second phrase the meaning is not literal, we can call 
it symbolic. And because Frau Cacilie's pain wasn't produced by the actual 
slap in the face but by insulting words from her husband that is why Freud 
wants to say that her symptom had symbolic meaning. If we don't like the 
word 'symbolic' here we can simply say that her symptom took a form which 
expressed her feeling as if she had been given a slap-in the face. 
A further example of a somatic symptom of this kind is that suffered by 
a twelve-year-old boy, who came home from school feeling unwell. He 
suffered from anorexia, vomiting and difficulty in swallowing. We are told 
that in response to strong appeals from his mother to tell why he became ill 
so suddenly, he burst into tears and reported the following traumatic 
experience. 
"While he was on his way home from school be had gone 
into a urinal, and a man had held out his penis to him 
and asked him to take it into his mouth. He had run away 
in terror, and nothing else had happened to him. But he was 
ill from that instant. " 
12 
As soon as the boy made his confession his symptoms disappeared completely. 
What is the meaning of this somatic symptom? We read 
"In order to produce the anorexia, the difficulty in 
swallowing and the vomiting, several factors were required: 
the boy's innate neurotic nature, his severe fright, the 
irruption of sexuality in its crudest form into his childish 
temperament and, as the specifically determining factor, the 
idea of disgust. " 
13 (my italics). 
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In this case too there is a connection between the person's feelings and the 
form of his symptoms, i. e. his feeling of disgust was expressed by his 
vomiting and difficulty in swallowing. It is interesting to notice that in 
ordinary language we have phrases like "It makps me sick" or "I cannot 
swallow that" to express our feeling of disgust. They do not stand for 
actual sensations but are used metaphorically or symbolically, yet the boy 
was behaving as if he was taking them literally. Freud wrote 
"In taking a verbal expression literally and in feeling 
the 'stab in the back' or the 'siap in the face' after some 
slightingremark as a real event, the hysteric is not taking 
liberties with words, but is simply reviving once more the 
sensations to which the verbal expression owes its justification". 
14 
We could stop our discussion of the examples of the somatic symptoms 
at this point. There are, however, some interesting differences between 
them. Not all of them are produced by traumatic experience for which something 
external, usually other people, has to be blamed, as in the examples 
discussed so far. Not to miss the differences and also to understand 
better Freud's general claims let us look at further cases of somatic 
symtoms. An interesting somatic symptom was exhibited by another 6f 
Freud's patient, called Frau Emmy von N. Among other things she suffered 
from a tic in the form of a clacking with the tongue, which occurred over 
a period of many years whenever she felt excited. In her waking state 
she knew nothing of the precipi-tating cause of her clacking. "I don't know; 
oh, a very long time" was her reply to the Freud's inquiry about her symptom. 
But under hypnosis, however, she was able to recall the circumstances in 
which the clacking sound of her tongue had first occurred. Many years agp 
she was sitting by the bedside of her younger daughter who was very ill. 
After a long period of wakefulness the child at last; had fallen asleep. 
She tried her utmost to keep quiet in order not to wake the child, but 
just in consequence of this resolution her tongue started making the 
clacking noise. Freud's explanation of this symptom runs as follows. 
"Our hysterical patient, exhausted by worry and long hours 
of watching by the bedside of her sick child which had at last 
fallen asleep, said to herself: 'Now you must be perfectly still 
so as not to awaken the child. ' This intention probably gave 
rise to an antithetic idea in the form of a fear that she might 
make a noise all the same that would wake the child from the 
sleep which she had so long hoped for. Similar antirhetic ideas 
arise in us in a marked mariner when we feel uncertain whether 
we can carry out some important intention. " 
15 (my italics) 
And then he adds 
"It appears that a conflict (my italics) had occurred between 
her intention and the antithetic idea (the counter-will) and that 
this gave the tic its discontinuous character and confined 
the antithetic idea to paths other than the habitual ones for 
innervating the muscular apparatus of speech. " 
16 
So the mechanism responsibie for her symptom-formation was that of conversion, 
as in the previous two examples. In those cases conversion consisted in the 
transformation of the person's strong emotions, the feeling of disgust 
in the boyý, s case and the feeling of being insulted by the husband in Frau 
Cacilie's case, into a'ýsomatic reaction. Here too we have a somatic 
reaction influenced by the person's mental state but Freud is at pains 
to specify that state precisely. He talks about an antithetic idea or 
counter-will, by which he means a feeling of anxiety that one's intention 
is going to fail. So what was responsible for Frau Emmy's conversion, 
in Frau's iiew, was her fear that her intention to keep quiet, which she 
tried to carry out to her best, was not going to be successful. And to 
her astonishment it wasn't. 
This explanation is an example of Freud's doctrine of counter-will 
which represented one stage in the evolution of his views concerning 
symptoms. Let us say a few words about this stage. Many cases of somatic 
symptoms he came across could be explained in terms of traumatic experience, 
for whLch some external factors were responsible. But there were also 
cases, like this one, where he couldn't appeal to any external trauma. 
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To account for such cases Freud tries to appeal to an internal conflict 
experienced by the person in question. It was usually the conflict between 
the subject's intention to bring something about or prevent something 
from happening, and his anxiety that he is not going to succeed in doing 
so, just as in Frau Emmy's case. But this doctrine oCcounter-will failed to 
explain how the antithetic idea, i. e. the fear that one is not going to 
succeed in the attempt, comes about. Because of this and other difficulties, 
this doctrine was soon abandoned and replaced by what can be called Freud's 
mature doctrine. His mature view is in some ways a reversal of the 
theory of counter-will. An antithetic idea or counter-will became the 
repress d wish or feeling beyond the ego's control. In the light of his 
later views, therefore, Frau Emmy's tongue clacking wouldn't be 
explained by Freud in terms of the antithetic idea but in terms of the 
repressed wish or feeling. We have enough material to try to reconstruct 
what his later explanation of this symptom would be. We are told 
that the patient expressed a lot of grievances against her daughter during 
analysis. 
" And there now followed in chronological order her grievances 
against this child, which she threw out rapidly with an angry 
look on her face, in the way one would speak of someone who 
had become a nuisance. This child, she said, had been very 
queer for a very long time; it had screamed all the time and 
did not sleep and it had developed a paralysis of the left 
leg, which there had seemed very little hope of curing. When it 
was four it had visions; it had been lAte in learning to walk 
and to talk, so that for a long time it had been believed 
to be imbecile. " 
17 
She only stopped her grievances against her daughter when Freud pointed out 
to her that this same child was today a normal girl and in the bloom of health. 
On one occasion she also said "I have told you that I was not fond of the child. 
But I ought to add that one would have not have guessed it from my behaviour. 
I did everything that was necessary. Even now I reproach myself for being 
fonder of the older one". 
18 Given this information it is not difficult 
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to make the connection between the patient's symptom and her feeling of 
hostility towards her child. When she was looking after her ill 
daughter she was probably trying very hard to suppress her hostility towards 
her. So it was not just an innocent antithetic idea that she might not 
succeed in keeping quiet in order not to wake her child, but her anxiety 
that she might not be able to control her hostile feelings. Freud was right 
to say that she experienced an internal conflict. But again, it wasn't 
just conflict between her intention and the antithetic idea, but the 
conflict between the hostile feeling towards her daughter and the desire 
to be a good mother after all, as she herself put it "to do everything 
that was necessary" so that "one would not have guessed it from her behaviour". 
We can say, therefore, and probably the later Freud would not disagree 
with us, that the Frau Emmy's symptom was produced by her feeling of anxiety 
that she might fail to control her hostility towards her daughter. 
The next symptom we are going to look at is Dora's abdominal pains. 
In her case Freud doesn't appeal to his doctrine of counter-will but tries 
to explain her symptom in terms of a repressed wish. The patient complained 
of the abdominal pains, had not been able to walk properly and had dragged 
her right foot. The doctors whom she had consulted at her father's desire 
had been very muchiastonished at this most unusual after-effect of an 
appendicitis, especially as the abdominal pains had not recurred and did 
not in any way accompany the dragging of the foot. This unusual character 
of her symptoms made Freud suspect that he was faced with another hysterical 
phenomenon. He also became convinced that her symptoms could have some 
connection with Dora's experiences with Herr K., as with other problems 
of this patient he was already able to throw some light upon. Herr K. 
was a friend of Dora's father and the husband of his mistress. Herr K. 
himself was interested in Dora and expressed his interest quite openly. 
Dora's father, however, in order to continue his relationship with Frau K. 
closed his eyes to Herr K. "s behaviour towards his daughter. During 
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the analysis the girl confessed to Freud that at one stage she was in 
love with Herr K., but that she didn't love him any more. She also 
disclosed that there were several occasions on which he made advances to 
her and one of them took place while they were on a walk after a trip upon 
the lake. On that occasion he made an 'immoral' proposal to her to which she 
reacted by giving him a slap in the face. It needs explaining why Dora 
reacted to Herr K. 's proposal in such a way if she was in love with him, 
at least had been in love at some stage as she had claimed. It was revealed 
later on that the girl had learned from K. family's governess that Herr K. had 
previously had an affair with her too. although she was abandoned by him at 
the end. The governess told Dora that Herr K. had made advances to her at 
a time when his wife was away; he had made violent love to her and had 
implored her to yield to his entreaties saying that he got nothing from 
his wife. So when, during the scene by the lake Herr K. used the words 
"I get nothing out of my wife" to her - which were the same words he had 
used to the governess - Dora felt that he was going to treat her in the 
same way as he treated the governess. But how is all this relevant 
to Dora's abdominal pains? To see the connection let us hear from 
Freud what further information was given to him by Dora. 
"I therefore asked Dora when this attack of appendicitis 
had taken place; whether it had been before or after the 
scene by the lake. Every difficulty was resolved 
at a single blow by her prompt reply "Nine months later. " 
The period of time is sufficiently characteristic. 
Her supposed attack of appendicitis had thus enabled 
the patient with the modest means at her disposal 
(the pains and the menstrual flow) to realize a 
phantasy of childbirth. Dora was naturally aware 
of the significance of this period of tine. " 
19 
In Freud's view, then, Dora's abdominal pain expressed her unconscious wish 
to give birth to a child by Herr K., and her symptom represented her wish 
as fulfilled, just as some dreams do. And for this reason, as in the case 
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of dreams, Freud talks about symptoms being the fulfillment of wishes. 
But what about an unusual after-effect of Dora's appendicitis, namely, 
her difficulties with walking and dragging of the foot. According to Freud, 
they could mean "she had made a 'false step'; which was true indeed if she 
could give birth to a child nine months after the scene by the lake. " 
20 
What was Dora's reaction to this interpretation of her symptoms? We are 
told that she disputed it no longer. Although Freud himself didn't do it, 
it could be interesting to colapare Dora's symptoms with the phenomenon 
of a phantom pregnancy. Some women who have a strong desire to have a 
child, although they know, for instance, that they cannot have one or who, 
like Dora, hadn't been even deflorated, exhibit the symptoms of being 
pregnant, including morning sicknesses, growing of the belly, etc. I suppose 
this phenomenon too could be explained in terms of the woman's strong desire 
to become pregnant and have a child. 
Let us see in more detail what we can learn from these-examples so far. 
We said at the beginning that somatic symptoms are phenomena which are 
usually explained in terms of physiological causes. Freud doesn't deny 
that the majority of somatic symptoms, including some cases of paralysis, 
vomiting, etc., can be indeed explained in anatomical terms. Why does 
he think that some somatic symptoms can be explained in physical terms alone, 
whereas others cannot be understood without appealing to psychic or mental 
factors. Suppose we come across some somatic symptoms which have-unusual 
features, like the case of hysterical paralysis already mentioned. If we 
are familiar with the anatomy of the nervous system we know Vhat part of 
the body should be affected by it. But we observe that the person's 
paralysis doesn't correspond to the anatomy of the nervous system but to 
his common sense conception of his body. How are we to explain this 
paradoxical fact in anatomical terms alone? Nobody has succeeded 
in doing so and I doubt whether we can do so in principle. But if we 
appeal to psychic factors, as Freud did, the phenomenon ceases to be 
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paradoxical even if at the moment we are unable to explain in detail 
how it is that the person's subjective idea of his body influences the 
form of his paralysis. In other words some somatic symptoms would 
remain totally unintelligible to us if we do not appeal to the mental states 
of the person who exhibits them. Some philosophers suggest that by trying 
to describe and explain somatic phenomena in intentional terms Freud has 
revolutionized our conception of the mental. Freud indeed has changed 
our way of looking at some somatic symptoms. But it is not true to say 
that what he did was entirely new to us. There are some somatic phenomena 
which we also explain in psychological terms. Take for instance vomiting. 
When people vomit we usually blame such things as rich food, tainted 
meat or some other such things, i. e. we explain it by appeal to physical 
factors. But we also know very well, sometimes from our own experience, 
that vomiting can be induced by the mere idea of having partaken of any 
unusual food, as of an animal which is not commonly eaten; although 
there is nothing in such food to cause the stomach to reject it and it 
didn't do so before we learnt what we have eaten. In such cases vomiting 
is excited by the mere idea of disgust at having eaten something unusual. 
We also hear stories about orthodox Muslims having violent attacks of 
vomiting not only when they have learned that what they have been eating 
was some pork but even when they saw other people eating it. We do not 
need to know much about anatomy to understand that their vomiting is produced 
by their feeling of disgust which they have acquired from early childhood 
by being told that pork is not edible. So we do look at some somatic 
symptoms as Freud did. The reason why we didn't perceive hysterical 
paralysis or-some cases of facial neuralgia in that way is because we are 
less familiar with them. 
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What we have learned from Freud so far is that some somatic symptoms 
can be produced by the person's feelings and the form they take usually 
expresses these feelings. We also talk of intentional actions as being 
expressions of people's feelings. That seems to suggest that there is some 
similarity between intentional actions and somatic symptoms. Let us look 
more closely at what this similarity might be. One of the criteria by 
which we identify an intentional action is its being voluntary. But is 
hysterical vomiting or paralysis voluntary? They do not seem to be under 
the person's control at all and if so they cannot be voluntary. Freud 
sometimes talks, however, as if somatic symptoms were something the person 
can choose and control, as in the following passage. "I could not help 
thinking that the patient had done nothing more nor less than look for a 
symbolic expression of her painful thoughts and that she had found it in 
intensification of her suffering. " 
21 , Had done", "look for" are voluntary 
terms. But we shouldn't be misled by Freud!, s use of metaphorical language 
here. In fact there are several passages where he explicitly asserts 
that somatic symptoms of this kind are not voluntary acts. He said, 
for instance, 
"It is my opinion, however, that when a hysteric 
creates somatic expression for an emotionally- 
coloured idea by symbolization, this depends less 
than one would imagine on personal or voluntary 
factors" 
He also wrote 
"I cannot, I must confess, give any hint of how a 
conversion of this kind is brought about. It 
is obviously not carried out in the same way as an 
intentional and voluntary action'122 (my italics). 
This implies that somatic symptoms are not voluntary, in Freud's view. 
But let us not accept this conclusion without qualification. It is 
possible to argue that somatic symptoms of this kind, although out of 
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the person's control when they take place, can nevertheless be brought 
under his control in the longer term, i. e. the person can somehow learn 
how to prevent them from happening. This is of course one of the main 
assumptions behind psycho-analytic therapy. Freud was convinced that 
by making the patient realize the significance of his symptoms, i. e. how 
they are influenced by his mental states, it is possible to help him get 
rid of his symptoms. And on some occasions the person. s understanding 
how they were brought about does indeed result in their disappearance, 
It happened in Frau Cacilie's case, although it wasn't permanent. In 
the boy's case the symptoms disappeared completely as soon as he made 
the confession of his traumatic experience. But this doesn't happen with 
ordinary somatic symptoms. The person's confession, for example, that his 
vomiting was produced by eating rich-food will not stop him vomiting. 
It is also unlikely that the person's understanding how his facial 
neuralgia came about, if it is non-hysterical, will make any difference 
to her symptom. So the somatic symptoms discussed by Freud can be brought 
under the subject's control even if he was unable to control them 
originally, in some cases at least. Some of us know from our own 
experience that it is also the case with vomiting induced by eating 
an unusual animal, e. -g. frogs in France - when we realized on the first 
occasion what we were eating we couldn't stop ourselves vomiting, but by 
being persuaded by other people or by ourselves that what is thought 
to be edible is due to cultural indoctrination we might learn how to enjoy 
eating the very animal which first produced vomiting. All this suggests 
that although the somatic symptoms described by Freud are not full-blown 
intentional actions, they are nevertheless not so far away from them as 
we might first have thought. 
I think, however, that the best phenomena somatic symptoms can be 
compared with are not intentional actions but laughter and crying. Consider 
laughter first. Some cases seem to be merely physical reactions, as with 
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laughter produced by having one's foot tickled by someone else. Such 
laughter is obviously involuntary. But we also laugh when we hear something 
funny, a joke or some ludicrous idea. In this second case, some people say 
that they couldn't stop laughing when they heard something funny, so this 
kind of laughter can be involuntary too. It is arguable, however, that 
although both kinds are involuntary, there is an important difference between 
them. Laughter produced by tickling is the reaction of the person's body, 
whereas that produced by jokes is the reaction of the person himself. 
-To laugh at the joke, even if involuntarily, the person has to understand 
what was said, to see the point of the joke, even perhaps to share some 
cultural experience with the teller of the joke. But when the laughter 
is produced by tickling, there needn't be any such understanding involved, 
and it can perhaps be explained in physiological terms alone. To explain 
laughter at a joke requires appeal to intentional terms. This distinction 
is very similar to that made by Freud, between ordinary somatic symptoms, 
e. g. vomiting produced by eating over-rich food, and hysterical symptoms, 
e. g. vomiting produced by disgust. 
Crying, although an opposite reaction to laughing, is a phenomenon 
very similar to it. Like laughter it can be a reflex reaction when produced 
by severe pain, but crying produced by psychological distress, for instance 
being told that one's father has been killed, is not a reflex reaction, 
even if involuntary, and cannot be explained in physiological terms alone. 
So laughter and crying, when not produced as reflex reactions, are very 
similar to the somatic symptoms which interest Freud. Given this 
similarity, we can adopt the same way of talking about some somatic 
symptoms as we have in the cases of laughing and crying. We ask, for 
instance, "What was the person's reason for laughing? " or "What was his 
reason for crying? ". Can we ask, by analogy, "What was the person's 
reason for vomiting? " and then reply by saying "His feeling of disgust", 
as in the case of the boy described by Freud? 
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There is no logical incoherence in offering reasons for hysterical sympt- 
OMS The notion of reason here is of course different from that which is used 
in the context of intentional actions. An action done for a reason 
is done because of a desire and a belief that by doing what he does that 
agent can satisfy his desire. Thus when we try to explain why somebody 
goes to a library we can do so by appealing to his desire to have a certain 
book and his belief that he can satisfy this desire by going to the library. 
To say that an action is done for a reason is, therefore, another way of 
saying that it is done with some purpose or end in mind and what the person 
does is in his view an appropriate means to bring about his end. And to 
ask a person about the reason for his action is to ask him for what purpose, 
with what intention, to achieve what end, did he do what he did. But we 
don't ask people who laugh or cry 
( For what purpose or to achieve what end 
did you do tha?? A person might laugh simply because he finds something 
amusing or cry because he hears something sad. Thus laughter and crying 
are a person's reactions to something he hears or sees and which he finds 
funny or sad. So while actions are performed with some end in mind, reactions 
such as crying and laughing are not done for any purpose. For this reason 
we don't talk about successful or unsuccessful laughing or crying, although 
we can talk about actions as being successful or unsuccessful. 
This difference can be spelled out further in the following way. 
When a person performs an intentional action there is usually a relevant 
belief involved. This belief is about the means to a certain end, such 
as a belief that by going to the library the person can get the book he 
wants. A person who cries or lauqhs usually knows what it is that he is 
crying or laughing about. Thus when one cries because one's friend was 
killed in an accident it is because one knows or believes that this has 
happened. But the person can also react to somethina, for instance lauqh' 
at a funny joke, without believing that what the joke describes is the case. 
So reactions of this kind might or might not involve beliefs. But even 
if beliefs are present they are not beliefs about the means to satisfy 
one's desire or bring about one's end, as in the case of the intentional 
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action, but about the relevant states of affairs, such as a belief that 
one's friend is dead for example. Of course, most beliefs about states 
of affairs, for example, a belief that New York is bigger than Edinburgh, 
don't make people laugh or cry. These reactions occur only when the person 
has also a certain attitude to the state of affairs he believes to be the case. 
Thus the person who cries over his friend's death does so because he would 
like his friend to be alive. is this attitude, i. e. a wish or regret, similar 
to the desires involved in intentional actions'ý, It doesn? )t have to be, 
for the following reasons. When a desire leads to an intentional action 
it is because of the agent's belief, true or false, that he can do 
something to satisfy it. In other words he thinks that there are means 
available to him which can be used to bring about his end. But when 
somebody has a wish, fox instance, a wish that he was several years younger 
than he is, he is aware that there is nothing he can do to change his age. 
So such a wish cannot become the end of his action. Similarly, the person 
who reacts to his friend's death by crying doesn't believe that there is 
something he can do to change the state of affairs he feels unhappy about. 
Thus he cries because he is unhappy about his friend's death and not because 
of his belief that crying can make his wish to have his friend alive come 
true. So crying cannot be said to be a means to an end. 
But suppose that somebody who agrees with this can still argue that it 
can have the function of bringing a relief from unhappiness. Whether this 
claim is true or not we don't know. But let us suppose that one day 
psychologists provide us with a plausible theory that shows that crying 
has indeed some such function. Can we then say that people cry in order 
to find a relief from something, i. e. that their crying has this very reason? 
To say that is to confuse functions with reasons. Many things which we do 
have some functions, but these functions are not necessarily our reasons 
for doing them. For instance, making love can have the biological function 
-Ke 
of propagating uman species. But propagating the species isn't my reason 
for making love. I do it, for example, because 1 want to gratify my sexual 
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desire or want to satisfy my partner. And even when I do it because I 
-want to have a baby. prppagating the Eýciep still isn't my reason for doing it. 
I want to have my baby, not just a human baby. Thus something can be an 
intentional action under one description but not under anotherand the description 
under which it is intentional is precisely that given by the agent himself. 
To be sure ma'king. love can have the effect of propagating the human species, 
but bringing about such an effect isn't my reason for making love. Similarly, 
when I cry it is not because I believe that crying can have the effect of 
relieving my unbappiness, even if it can indeed have some such effect; 
I cry because I feel unhappy about samething. And it is precisely this 
latter description under which my crying has a reason. 
Thus reactions of this kind aren't means to scme ends, as intentional 
actions are. In order to explain them we have to appeal to the person's 
belief that something is the case and his attitude towards it. This 
explanation is different from the explanation of both intentional actions 
and bodily movements. Unlike explaining a bodily movement it doesn't require 
appeal to some general law, and it is doubtful whether there are such 
relevant laws anyway. In this respect it is more like the explanation 
of intentional actions. However, in contrast to the latter, it doesn't 
require appeal to beliefs about the means of bringing something about, but 
to beliefs about states of affairs. To understand such reactions we also 
have to learn about the person's attitudes to what he believes to be the 
case. But the attitudes involved in reactions of this kind cannot be 
regarded as the person's ends, because he doesn't believe that by reacting 
in the way he does he can satisfy them, as the person who performs an 
intentional action belives that what he does is the way to satisfy his desire. 
The somatic symptoms Freud is referring to, such as facial paralysis, vomiting 
0 
out of disgust, etc., are similar reactions whichcan also be explained 11 
by appealing to the person's beliefs, conscious or unconscious, about 
some states of affairs and his attitudes towards them. For examp: e, a 
teenage boy's attack of vomiting after a scene of seduction in a public 
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urinal can be explained by his belief about what had happened and his attitude 
of disgust bowards it. His vomiting, like crying but unlike intentional 
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action, is not a means to an end. It is possible that4vomiting might 
have some function, for example the function of relieving disgust, but it 
still wouldn't be his reason for vomiting. His reason for vomiting is his 
feeling of disgust towards what had happened in the urinal, as the person's 
reason for crying can be his feeling of unhappiness over his friend's death. 
Symptoms of States of Consciousness 
Let us concentrate now on symptoms which affect feelings and thoughts, 
i. e. the sympt6ms of states of consciousness as I have decided to call them. 
Many of Freud's patients complained to him about being preoccupied by 
thoughts and feelings which they themselves couldn't understand but which 
made a misery of their lives, as in the following example. A young 
girl suffered from an obsessional fear that she might be unable to control 
her bladder in public places. She was afraid of being overcome by the 
need to urinate, and wetting herself. By degrees this! )phobia had made 
her completely incapable of going into society and enjoying herself. 
She only felt secure if she knew that there was a W. C. near at hand 
which she could reach unobtrusively. Since people can usually control 
their bladders, at least to a degree that doesn't stop them going to 
public places, it was rather puzzling why the girl had such a deep fear. 
We know, however, that there are some organic disorders of the bladder 
which results in inability to control urination. If the girl suffered 
from such a disorder her fear would be perfectly intelligible; to us. 
But we learn from Freud, however, that in her case there was no question 
of any organic complaint. When she was at home, in quiet conditions, 
or at night, the desire to urinate did not arise and she wasn't then 
troubled by the fear of being unable to control it. Since there wasn't 
any objective justification for her fear it looks unintelligible to us 
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and, therefore, cries for explanation. 
What was the origin of the girl's problem? Freud was able to establish 
that her desire to urinate, and her fear connected with it, occurred 
in the following circumstances. Once when she was in the concert hall 
Ila gentleman to whom she was not indifferent had taken 
a seat not far from her. She began to think about him 
and imagine herself sitting beside him as his wife. 
During this erotic reverie she had the bodily sensation 
which is to be compared with an erection in a man, 
and which in her case -I do not know if this is always 
so - ended with a slight need to urinate. " 
23 
As a result she was obliged to leave the theatre before the end of 
theoperformance. There was, therefore, a clear connection between this 
original scene and her general phobia. During the original circumstances 
she experienced the desire to urinate, and the fear that she might not 
be able to control it had obliged her to leave the theatre. Now she was 
afraid that she might be unable to control her bladder in public places 
in general. But there is something more to be learnt about this connection. 
During the original scene she also experienced an erotic sensation, 
and the desire to urinate was just the accompaniment of it. Could 
it be the case, therefore, that this erotic impulse played some role in 
the origin of her anxiety? Freud was convinced that it was indeed the 
case. But before we look at his explanation let us'learn from him 
what kind of girl she was, which is relevant to understanding her anxiety. 
"In*her ordinary life she was so prudish that 
she had an intense horror of everything to do 
with sex and could not contemplate the thought 
of ever marrying. On the other hand, she was so 
hyperaesthetic sexually that during every erotic 
reverie, in which she readily indulged, the same 
voluptuous sensation appeared. , 
24 
Given this fact about the girl it wasn't difficult for Freud to understand 
what happened during the scene in the concert hall. 
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"She now became greatly frightened by the sexual 
sensation (to which she was normally accustomed) 
because she had resolved within herself to combat 
this particular liking, as well as any other she 
might feel; and next moment the affect had become 
transferred into the accompanying need to urinate 
and compelled her after an agonizing struggle to 
,, 25 leave the hall . 
So what this prudish girl was afraid of, in Freud's view, was the erotic 
sensation which was aroused in her in the original circumstances by 
having phantasies about the man sitting not far from her, but which 
her negative attitude towards sex made unacceptable to her. This 
revelation led to an almost complete control over her phobia. The 
mechanism responsible for her symptom formation was that of displacement. 
The erotic wish was replaced by the desire to urinate and the girl's 
mistrust in her bladder was substituted for her fear of being unable 
to control her erotic sensation. 
Another example of symptoms of this kind is the delusional jealousy 
suffered by a fifty-three old lady. She was happily married and could 
not give enough praise to her husband's affectionate solicitude. Her 
marriage had been a love-match thirty years ago and there had never 
been any trouble until she received an anonymous letter informing her 
about her husband's affair with a young girl. The letter became the 
source of her jealousy, which made her life so miserable that she was 
obliged to seek help from Freud. To understand her case'it is important 
to learn about the circumstances in which she received the letter. The 
lady had a housemaid with whom she used to have intimate talks. She 
heard from her all sorts of malicious stories about another girl who, 
although from the same background as the housemaid, had done much better 
for herself in life than her. The lady was aware of the housemaid's envy 
of the success of this girl. One day 'the lady had a conversation with 
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the housemaid about a gentleman who had been staying with them. While 
they were talking about this gentleman having an affair, the lady suddenly 
said "The most dreadful thing that could happen to me would be if 1 were 
to--learn that my dear husband was having an affair too". The next day, 
as though by magic, she received the anonymous letter which made this 
very allegation. The lady guessed that the letter was written by the 
malicious servant, since it specified as her husband's mistress the girl 
whom the housemaid pursued with hatred. The lady's husband denied having 
any such affair. As a result of this accident the housemaid was dismissed. 
But instead of forgetting about the whole thing the lady's suffering began. 
Whenever she met the girl, described in the letter as the mistress of her 
husband, or heard her name being mentioned the feeling of jealousy 
would burst out in her again. She couldn't also help reproaching her 
husband. Freud became convinced that what he was faced with was delusional 
jealousy. He calls it "delusional" for the following reason. 
"She knew that this document had no evidential 
value and she was able to give a satisfying 
explanation of its origin. She ought therefore 
to have been able to tell herself that she had 
no ground whatever for her jealousy, and she did 
tell herself so. But in spite of this she 
suffered as much as if she regarded this jealousy 
as completely justified. Ideas of this kind, which 
are inaccessible to logical arguments based on 
reality, are by general agreement described as 
,, 26 delusions . 
In everyday life we come across feelings of jealousy very often too. 
Sometimes such jealousy is perfectly justifiable if, for instance, a wife 
has good evidence to believe that her husband is unf aithf ul to her. But 
it can also happen that she is jealous because she thinks she has good 
evidence, although an impartial observer can see that it is unjustified. 
So although her jealousy is unjustified by reality, given her false 
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beliefs we can understand why she feels in that way. But the lady's 
case is different because she herself thought that there wasn't any ground 
for her jealousy, since she was convinced that the letter was the work 
of the malicious housemaid, but despite all that she couldn't stop 
feeling jealous. The lady's emotional reaction is, therefore, very 
puzzling and cries out for explanation. 
Before discussing Freud's explanation of this case of delusional 
jealousy we have to appeal to some further information, revealed by Freud 
during psychotherapyabout this lady. We are told that 
"She herself was intensely in love with a young 
man, with the same son-in-law who had persuaded 
her to come to me as a patient. She herself knew 
nothing, or perhaps only a very little, of this love; 
in the family relationship that existed between them 
it was easy for this passionate liking to disguise 
itself as innocent affection. " 
27 
Unfortunately Freud doesn't tell us how he has arrived at this conclusion. 
Let us however pay more credit to him than he deserves at this point 
and suppose that the lady was indeed in love with her son-in-law. Given 
all this information Freud was able to arrive at the following explanation 
of her delusional jealousy. 
"Being in love like this, a monstrous and impossible 
thing, could not become conscious; but it remained in 
existence and, even though it was unconscious, it 
exercised a severe pressure. Something had to become 
of it, some relief had to be looked for; and the easiest 
mitigation was offered, no doubt, by the mechanism 
of displacement which plays a part so regularly in the 
generation of delusional jealousy. If not only were she, 
the old woman, in love with a young man, but if also 
her old husband were having a love affair with a young 
girl, then her conscience would be relieved of the 
weight of her unfaithfulness. The phantasy of her 
husband's unfaithfulness thus acted as a cooling 
- 
compress on her burning wound. Her own love had 
not become conscious to her, but its mirror- 
reflection, which brought her such an advantage, 
now became conscious as an obsessional delusion. 
No arguments against it could, of course, haveý 
any effect, for they were only directed against 
the mirror-image and not against the original 
which gave the other its strength and which lay 
hidden, inviolable, in the unconscious. " 
28 
There was a close connection between the lady's situation and the content 
of her delusion. 1n the real situation it was she herself, an old woman, 
who was in love with a young man, whereas in her delusion it was her 
husband, an old man, in love with a young girl. The only thing which 
was distorted by the delusion was the subject of the situation, instead 
of her it was her husband who was in love. The anonymous letter no doubt 
had a big share in shaping the content of her delusion. But Freud 
seems to suggest that there was already a disposition towards it, even 
before she received the letter (compare with Othello). We remember 
her saying to the housemaid that the most dreadful thing that could 
happen to her would be her husband's unfaithfulness, despite the fact that 
he never gave her grounds for thinking so. It seems, therefore, that she 
was already entertaining the idea of her husband's unfaithfulness, and 
the letter she provoked undeliberately, had confirmed it. 
It is interesting to compare Freud's approach with our ordinary 
way of looking at feelings. In everyday life we make reference to feelings 
in explanation of our own and other people's behaviour. For instance, 
in order to explain why Ann is making critical remarks about Mary we 
appeal to Ann's jealousy. Or in order to understand why Peter doesn't 
speak to John, although they used to be good friends, we appeal to his 
anger with John. But sometimes anger and jealousy themselves call for 
an explanation. We might wonder why Ann is jealous of Mary or why Peter 
is angry with John. Suppose we are told that Ann and Mary are in love 
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with the same boy and that Ann is convinced that it is Mary of whom the 
boy is fonder. Given this information we can understand her feeling 
of jealousy. Peter's anger with John would become intelligible to us 
if we were told, for instance, that a few days ago they had a violent 
argument. So in order to explain the person's emotions we appeal to 
the situation or circumstances he is in and his beliefs about the situation. 
There are cases, however, where an appeal to the circumstances the person 
is in, and his beliefs and desires doesn't solve our puzzle about his 
emotions. It happens when the person's emotional reaction seems to be 
incongruous or inappropriate to the situation and his beliefs about it. 
We usually call such feelings irrational and what Freud is trying to 
explain in the two cases given above are precisely such irrational feelings. 
Since irrational emotions play a very important role in Freud's 
explanation of the neurotic behaviour it is worth elaborating what sort 
of irrational affects he is talking about. In everyday life we also 
talk about irrational, unreasonable, inappropriate or unjustified emotions. 
Do we mean by these terms what Freud meant by calling an affect irrational 
or anomalous? Some of these terms do indeed cover emotions he was 
interested in, but this is not always the case. It could be interesting, 
therefore, to compare Freud's with our ordinary use of such terms. By 
saying that an emotion is unreasonable or inappropriate a common man 
might mean several things. Firstly, he might mean that it is morall 
. 
inappropriate, as in the following case. A person hears about the 
misfortunes which happened to his neighbours but instead of feeling pity 
for them he feels joy. We think that feeling joy in such circumstances 
is morally inappropriate. The psychoanalyst might agree with us about 
that, but he wouldn't regard the person's emotion as anomalous and it 
is not a kind of emotion which is the subject matter of his examination. 
Secondly, an emotion can be called unjustifiable because, it is based 
on a false belief. For instance, a man might feel a great joy because 
I 
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a girl he is fond of smiled at him which he interpreted as a sign of her 
love towards him, while it was mere friendliness, which she expresses 
in this way towards other people as well. We call the man's joy 
unjustified because it is aroused by his false impression and doesn't 
correspond to the real situation. Whether such a mistaken emotion would 
be of interest to the psychoanalyst depends on whether or not it ceases 
when the subject realizes his mistake. If it doesn't, the 
psychoanalyst would not rest until he is able to provide some explanation 
of the person's feelings. Thirdly, when we say that an emotion is 
unreasonable we mean that it is unjustified by the person's beliefs. 
For example, a person is afraid of a dog although he knows that it is a 
harmless creature. Or someone feels annoyed with his friend because he 
refused to lend him a book on the ground that he has to use it himself. 
We regard such emotions as unreasonable because they are unjustified by 
the circumstances and the person himself would agree, although he cannot 
help feeling in this way. Such emotions might become of interest to the 
psychoanalyst, especially if they are quite intense, if the person, 
for example, becomes so afr4iid of dogs that he cannot face going out, 
i. e. he develops a phobia of dogs. These examples give us some idea 
of what a common man might call irrational or unreasonable emotions. 
Let us look now at what Freud regards as anomalous affects. Firstly, 
an absence of affect or affectlessness, when it is appropriate, would be 
regarded by him as anomalous. For example, one of Freud's patients, whom 
he calls the Wolf Man, didn't feel any sorrow when the news of his 
sister's death reached him, despite the fact that he was quite strongly 
attached to her. Usually when people are faced with the death of the loved 
ones they feel grief or sorrow, so the Wolf Man's lack of emotional 
reaction seemed puzzling and cried for explanation. Secondly, many 
neurotics often experience feelings which could be called ob ectless. 
They might feel quite unspecified chronic anxiety, what Freud calls 
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free-floating anxiety, or chronic nervousness and yet insist quite 
sincerely that there is nothing in their situation which justifies 
such emotional reaction. When a non-neurotic person experiences anxiety 
or nervousness he is usually aware of some specific factor responsible 
for his reaction. For instance, when he feels nervous he knows that it 
is an examination that is making him feel nervous or that what makes him 
feel anxious is a poor state of his health. Neurotic objectless feeling 
is puzzling because we cannot understand his reasons for feeling in the 
way he does. Thirdly, the affect can be anomalous because it is too 
strong a reaction to the situation the person is in. Various kinds of 
phobias are examples of such affects. For example, Little Hans who onee 
saw a horse falling down had become so afraid of horses that he refused 
to go out in order to avoid seeing them. We can understand that the sight 
of a horse falling down might be sometimes frightening to a small child 
but the boy's fear seemed to be too exaggerated and, therefore, puzzling. 
We also hear of people being so afraid of spiders, sometimes quite small 
ones, that they wouldn't face entering a room in which they suspect there 
might be a spider. We regard their fear as irrational or anomalous 
because, although many of us don't like spiders, we do not react in such 
an extreme way. What's more, such people themselves often think that their 
fear of spiders is too exaggerated and look for help to overcome it. 
Fourthly, the neurotic feeling might be incongruous with the situation 
he is in and his beliefs about it. The feeling of jealousy experienced 
by the lady from our example is an instance of such incongruity. We 
remember that she herself was convinced that the letter, which gave 
rise to her feeling of jealousy, was the work of the malicious housemaid, 
so that there wasn't any ground for her feeling in this way, but despite 
all that she couldn't help feeling jealous nevertheless. Her jealousy seems 
to be incompatible with her beliefs, and that is why it is puzzling. 
We can see now that what Frcud regards as anomalous emotions are something 
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more specific than what a common man calls unreasonable, irrational 
or inappropriate emotions. He is not interested in moral inappropriateness, 
emotions based on false beliefs or other unreasonable emotions we often 
come across and experience in our daily lives. What he is interested 
in are affects which seem to deviate from the normal response to a 
situation. When faced with anomalous emotional reactions of the kinds 
described by Freud in everyday life we usually find it quite difficult 
to make sense of them and often seek help from an expert, whether a 
psychoanalyst or a behaviouristically oriented psychologist. 
How do we account for emotions in general, and what is the nature 
of the Fre4idian explanation of such anomalous affects? Suppose we 
learn that somebody is depressed. Being told that he is depressed because 
of his failure to be promoted in his job, for example, although helpful 
in understanding the man's emotional reaction, still doesn't take us very 
4ar. Another person who also fails to be promoted might not react in 
this way at all. So what is it that makes one person react to the failure 
by becoming depressedwhile another might be entirely unaffected by it? 
It might be because they are different in some other ways. For instance, 
they might have different expectations about promotion. Thus one person 
might have a strong desire. to be promoted, while another couldn't care less 
whether he is promoted or not. And there could be other differences as well. 
Somebody might be quite keen on promotion, but because he knows that he 
doesn't deserve it, the lack of promotion doesn't depress him. But it is 
different with a person who strongly believes that because of his hard 
and conscientious work he deserves to be promoted. So differences in beliefs 
can also affect the ways in which people react to certain situations. 
Thus we can understand why the person becomes depressed about his failure 
to be promoted by appeal to his beliefs and/or his attitudes. And to 
learn about the person's relevant beliefs and attitudes is to learn about 
his reason for his emotion. 
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But there are also other things, apart from beliefs and attitudes, 
which can make people feel depressed. We are told by psychiatrists that some 
people feel depressed because of a deficiency in their brain-chemistry. 
Psychoanalysts also inform us that whether the person reacts to certain 
situations by becoming depressed or not might sometimes depend on his 
early upbringing. Subh factors might shape the person's disposition to feel 
depressed whenever his strong wishes are frustrated. But these factors, 
which include physiological as well as mental causes, contribute to 
depression irrespective of the person's relevant beliefs and attitudes. 
So they do not provide the person with a reason for his depression. When 
depression is caused in such a way we cannot explain. it only by appealing 
to the person's beliefs and attitudes, we have to appeal also to some 
physiological or psychological laws, if the knowledge of such laws is 
available to us. 
The way in which feelings, such as depression, are brought about, 
i. e. whether they are influenced by the person's beliefs and attitudes 
or such factors as brain-chemistry, is reflected in our way of talking 
about them. We talk, for instance, about emotions being reasonable or 
unreasonable, rational or irrational, etc. And what is it that makes 
emotions reasonable or unreasonable? An emotion can be said to be 
unreasonable, for example, if the person's belief that something is the 
case is mistaken. Thus the man is depressed because hd thinks he deserves 
a promotion, but he is entirely mistaken in thinking so. Sometimes the 
attitudes involved in emotions can be said to be unreasonable too. 
For instance, the person becomes angry because somebody criticized him 
and he is very sensitive to any criticism, even when it is just. People 
might call his anger unreasonable, because the man's sensitivity to criticism 
seems to be out of proportion. Thus what makes emotions reasonable or 
unreasonable are the relevant attitudes and beliefs. But depression such 
as that caused by brain-chemistry, for example, cannot be said to be reasonable 
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or unreasonable because it affects the person irrespective of his relevant 
attitudes and beliefs. So although we can criticize people about their 
reasons for their emotions we cannot criticize them about the causes of 
their emotions. For we expect that people should know what the reasons 
for their emotions are, while we wouldn't be surprised if they were 
entirely ignorant of the causes. The person who knows little or nothing 
about his brain-chemistry, as is often the case, might only realize that 
it affects him in this way when he is told by a doctor, for example. 
But he doesn, 't have to be told by another person to realize what his 
reason for emotion is. A person usually knows what he believes and wishes, 
and thus he knows his reason for feeling in the way he does. 
This distinction between reasons and causes of emotions looks like 
the analogous distinction between reasons for intentional actions and causes 
of bodily movements, and their respective explanations seem to be analogous 
too. To understand a man's reason for doing something we also have to appeal 
to his relevant beliefs and desires. But there are two kinds of reasons 
involved here and they shouldn't be confused. Reasons for emotions are like 
reasons for crying and laughing, but unlike reasons for intentional actions, 
because although they involve certain beliefs, for instance the belief that 
one deserves a promotion, these aren't beliefs about the means bo achieve 
some ends, but about something being the case. Of course a mere belief 
that something is the case doesn't necessarily make the person depressed 
or unhappy. He is depressed because he also has some attitude to what 
he thinks is the case, such as a strong wish to be promoted. However, 
this attitude isn't the end or purpose of the person's emotion, as 
satisfying one's desire by performing the relevant action is. The person 
cannot satisfy his wish to be promoted by feeling depressed about the lack 
of promotion, and he doesn't believe that he can. Similarly, the 
person who cries over his friend's death, for example, doesn't believe 
that he can satisfy his wish to have his friend alive by crying either. 
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For this reason predicates such as $successful$ or 'unsuccessful', which 
apply to actions, but which aren't used in the context of reactions such 
as crying, cannot be applied to emotions either. A man cannot be 
successful or unsuccessful in feeling depressed, although he can succeed 
or fail in buying a car, for example. 
Although reasons for emotions are thus different from those for 
intentional actions, in order to understand them we still have to appeal 
to the person's beliefs and attitudes, even if these beliefs and attitudes 
are different. But the feeling of depression brought about by such factors 
as brain-chemistry doesn't require any such appeal to beliefs and attitudes 
and can be exiblained in the same way as we account for bodily movements, 
i. e. in terms of causes. Some philosophers argue that a reason for emotion 
is also its cause, as the reason for an action is its cause too in their view. 
Whether we accept this view or not wouldn't affect, however, the difference 
between the logic of explanation of emotions in terms of reasons on the one 
hand and in terms of ordinary causes on the other, as it doesn't undermine 
the difference between the explanation of intentional J)ehaviour in terms 
of reasons and of bodily movements in terms of causes, either. What interests 
us here are mainly the different ways in which emotions can be explained, 
because of its relevance to understanding the kind of explanation Freud 
attempts to give in his account of the emotions responsible for neurotic 
symptoms. 
Does Freud in his account of neurotic affects refer to causes or reasons? 
We remember the girl who was afraid to go into society because of her anxiety 
that she would be unable to control her bladder in public places, whereas 
to explain this conscious emotion Freud appealed to her unconscious 
fear of being unable to control her sexual impulses, which were disagreeable 
to her because of her prudish attitude towards sex. Thus to account 
for conscious feelings Freud still appeals to the subject's attitudes 
and beliefs, even if these are unconscious. And the same can be said of his 
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account of delusional jealousy too. He also talks about the subject's 
emotion as being unjustifiable, just as in the case of the girl who was 
afraid of being unable to control her bladder in public places, but who could 
control it perfectly well at home. And what is unjustifiable or unreasonable 
is the reason for emotion, not its cause, at least not the kind of cause 
that affects the person irrespective of her beliefs or attitudes, either 
conscious or unconscious. So what Freud appeals to in his accounts of 
emotions are quite clearly the person's reasons for them. 
But when people have reasons to feel what they do they usually 
know what these reasons are. Thus when I am angry, afraid, jealous, etc., 
I usually know why I feel that way. But Freud's account of emotions allows 
room for the subject to be mistaken about his reasons for them. By 
doing so he seems to depart from our ordinary conceptual scheme, in the view 
of some of his interpreters. But is it indeed the case that our ordinary 
conceptual scheme leaves no room for mistaken identification of this kind? 
In the case of intentional actions we do allow sometimes for the person 
to be mistaken about his reasons for doing what he does. A man, for example, 
says that his reason for going to a theatre was to see a play, whereas 
the observer might suggest that his real reason for going there was in 
order to see a girl whom he fancies. Why shouldn't we allow for a similar 
mistake about the reasons for emotions (even if these reasons are different)? 
According to common sense wisdom, often expressed in popular jokes, 
people can indeed be mistaken about their reasons for emotions or even 
their emotions themselves. Since Freud himself pays attention to jokes 
it wouldn't be out of tune with psychoanalysis to quote some of them here. 
There is a joke about a lady who when she heard about the enemy's soldiers 
coming closer and raping the woman, hid under the bed; but when nothizlg 
happened after a lorig time she went out and asked her neighbour in a 
disappointed tone of voice "When does the raping begin? " Another lady, 
according to a different joke, who was full of disgust for her neighbour's 
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bedroom behaviour, when asked how she knew about it replied that she saw 
it from her house through binoculars. 
How can a person be mistaken about his reason for emotion or even 
his emotion itself, and not be making a merely verbal error, and what is 
our justification for saying that he is mistaken? An error about emotion 
can be made in several ways. Firstly, the error might lie in a belief that 
constitutes the cognitive core of the emotion. We often feel pleased 
or depressed about alleged facts which are not facts at all. The subject, 
for instance, might feel pleased because he believes he got a degree, 
when that is not really the case. His pleasure is based on a false belief. 
Plato calls such pleasure a false one. I wouldn't like to follow this 
usage, however, because what is false here is the person's belief, not 
his experience of the pleasure itself. Mistaken pleasure seems to be 
a more appropriate term for it. Pleasure or any other emotion such as 
depression, anxiety, etc., based on misinformation will belong to this 
category of error. How do we decide that a particular emotion is 
mistaken? It would be decided by seeing whether or not it ceases when the 
person realizes his mistake. If it does, then it really did depend on a 
false belief. If it continues, however, then it didn't depend on a false 
belief of this kind but on something else. 
Secondly, the subject might make a mistake about the object of his 
emotion, i. e. he is convinced that he feels the way he does because of some 
particular thing, whereas in reality it is something else that makes 
him feel in that way. Such subject can be said to be mistaken about the 
origin of his emotion, as in the following example. A person says he feels 
depressed because of the death of his distant relative. The relative 
was an old man, so the death wasn't any surprise. What's more he wasn't 
particularly close to this relative and in fact didn't see him for years. 
Given these facts it is rather surprising that he reacted to the news of 
the old man's death in such a way. His wife might suggest, however, that 
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the real reason for his depression is the fact that the relative 
failed to mention him in his will; much earlier there was some talk 
about inheriting some money from this relative, and the person expressed 
a hope that the old man would be generous to him. We can say that the 
real reason for his depression was the will, not the death of the relative 
as he originally thought. What would reinforce this claim? His wife 
OL 
may point out to him that on 4 different occasion when another distant relative 
of his had. died, from whom he didn't expect to inherit any money, he didn't 
feel depressed. The pepson himself could realize that and the fact that 
he failed to do so could be explained in terms of his moral self-esteem 
being at stake. It is an immoral thing to be preoccupied with money 
when somebody dies. But of course people do have such immoral thoughts, 
of which they might be perfectly aware, while others fail to recognize 
that it is the case, as the man did. 
And thirdly, the person can be mistaken about the content of his 
emotion itself. He believes he is experiencing one feeling but his 
experience is different from what he thinks it is. What are our reasons 
for saying that somebody experiences a different emotion from what he 
sincerely says he does, and he is not making a merely verbal mistake? 
Sometimes our correction is based on his behaviour, as in the following 
example. The person says the sight of people injured in an accident makes 
him feel very frightened. Many people are frightened by such scenesso 
we are not surprised to hear from him how frightened he is. But while 
other people try to avoid the scene of the accident he watches it with 
facination. When a person is afraid of something he usually avoids, if 
he can, the thing which makes him feel frightened. So when we come across 
a person who instead of avoiding it, watches it with fascination, we are 
justified in saying that he is not really frightened but attracted by it. 
He might be a sadist, without realizing that the sight of injured people 
gives him pleasure. 
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What category of error then was involved in the girl's anxiety about 
her bladder getting out of control in public places? Was her erroneous 
emotion based on her false belief about her bladder, for instance? It 
didn't seem to be,, because as we remember she was perfectly capable of controlling 
it while at home so she must have been aware that it was functioning properly. 
What's more she was also reassured by Freud that it'was in perfect order. 
But despite all that her emotion didn't cease. So it wasn't just a mistaken 
anxiety based on her false belief about her bladder. What the girl seemed 
to be mistaken about was the origin of her emotionand her error is more 
like the second kind. She said her phobia started immediately after 
the scene in the concert hall. On that occasion she was phantasizing 
about the man sitting not far away from her. Her phantasies gave rise 
to the sexual sensation and the need to urinate which obliged her to leave 
the hall. She claimed that the real object of her phobia was her anxiety 
of being overcome by the need to urinate and yet she knew she could 
control it at home. It is, however, plausible for Freud to suggest that 
the real source of her anxiety was her experience of the sexual sensation 
during the original scene, and not the anxiety connected with urination 
which was a mere accompaniment of the erotic sensation on that occasion. 
We can also understand why she would fail to recognize the real origin 
of her emotion. For a prudish person like her, with a negative attitude 
towards sex, it would be a dreadful thing to admit that the sexual sensation 
aroused by her erotic reverie was the core of her problem. Thus her 
conscious emotion can be accounted for in terms of her unconscious fear 
of being unable to control her sexual impulses and her prudish attitude 
towards sex. 
. 
What would help to reinforce Freud's claim about her case? As in the 
case of the man depressed about his relative's will, it would be her behaViour 
and feeling on a different occasion. Suppose on another occasion, while 
listening to a concert, she also has experienced the need to urinate, 
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but this time without experiencing any sexual sensation, which too obliged 
her to leave the hall and yet she didn't suffer from any phobia then. 
Unfortunately, unlike experimental settings, life itself doesn't usually 
provide us with such test situations. Freud, however, can always appeal 
to the patient's reaction to the explanation offered by him. We are told 
that she not only agreed with his interpretation of the origin of her anxiety 
but that his explanation had also led to an almost complete control over 
her phobia. If she accepted his explanation that the real source of her 
anxiety wasn't her bladderit wasn't surprising that she wouldn't be afraid 
to go out any more. She could still feel afraid of experiencing sexual 
sensations but that she could control by not 'indulging' herself in 
sexual reverie. 
The lady's case is more complicated. Freud's claim that the real 
object of her emotions was her love towards her son-in-law while the 
thoughts of her husband's unfaithfulness had the function of relieving 
her bad conscience, although plausible enough, requires some further comments. 
It is still puzzling how the final outcome of the psychological process 
involved here, i. e. the lady's alleged feeling of jealousy towards 
her own husband, could be brought about. Independently of this case, 
we know from experience that when a person has a guilty conscience, for 
example because he cheated his friend, learning that his friend cheated 
him too can help to relieve his feeling of guilt. He might even ask himself 
"Why should Ifeel guilty if my friend has done the same thing to me? " 
So learning that one has been cheated by one's friend, although upsetting 
and unpleasant in normal circumstances, can be welcome news when it helps 
to relieve one's feeling of guilt. So if the lady had a bad conscience 
too, it is plausible to suggest that her husband's unfaithfulness could 
be something she actually wished, even if it would otherwise have 
been undesirable to her. This is precisely what Freud argues when he 
writes "It [i. e. the husband's unfaithfulnessl itself was smething desired, 
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a kind of consolation". 
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So in this lady's case a feeling of guilt 
gave rise to a wish that something which could help reduce her guilt 
were true. 
However, the lady's husband was in fact quite faithful to her, and she 
had no good reason to believe otherwise. Thus her bad conscience couldn't 
be relieved by any real event. So what happens when a person's guilt 
cannot be relieved in any normal way, and whenshe cannot come to terms with 
it? Freud suggests that the woman was trying to relieve her guilt 
by phantasizing about her husband being in love with a young girl. 
But unfortunately he doesn't tell us what kind of phantasizing it was. 
Was it similar to that which takes place in daydreaming, when a person who 
is in love imagines kissing his sweetheart, for example, and then 
experiences some sexual excitement as a result? Such a daydreamer is 
usually aware of why he imagines what he does. But that cannot be said 
about the lady, however. Her wish that her husband were unfaithful 
to her was clearly something she was unconscious of. Such an unusual wish 
couldn't be conscious, of course, because if it were she would have to know 
why she had it, and thus she would have become aware of her own illicit 
love. So this wish had to be repressed, just as she repressed her own love. 
When a wish of this kind becomes unconscious it can appear in consciousness 
as its opposite or reversal, thanks to the mechanism of reaction formulation. 
That is why the lady was saying to her maid that the most dreadful thing 
that could happen to her would be her husband's unfaithfulness, even if 
that was the very thing; she wished for unconsciously. Thus as a result 
of the wish being repressed the lady was entirely unaware of why the jealous 
thoughts were preying on her mind. she didn't even seem to be asking 
herself why she should have them, despite not being liven any evidence 
for her suspicions of her husband. In this respect she was more like 
a real dreamer, than a daydreamer. The former also finds himself having 
certain thoughts, for example, a thought that he is refreshing himself 
with cool water, and he neither knows nor asks himself why he has 
these thoughts. Only when he wakes up might he realize that what made 
him have these thoughts while he was asleep was his being thir8ty. 
But when a dream is instigated by an unconscious wish such a realization 
wouldn't be possible, however, just as the lady was ignorant of the wish 
behind her waking thoughts. 
We know so far that the lady's jealous thoughts were caused by the 
unconscious wish with the relevant content. The next question which 
arises is whether this kind of thought can bring relief from guilt. 
In daydreaming, imagined gratification might sometimes give a person 
an experience of pleasure. But since a daydreamer is normally aware that 
his daydreaming doesn't correspond to any reality, his pleasure, if he 
experiences it at all, cannot be the same as that provided by the real 
thing. That's why people usually prefer a real satisfaction of their desires, 
and only when such satisfaction is not possible does daydreaming usually 
take place. It can also happen that imagining something, instead of 
giving a person some kind of pleasant experience, can have the opposite 
effect. Some people report that if they imagine eating when hungry, 
their hunger becomes more intense. For this reason they might try 
to concentrate their mind on something else, in order to forget about 
hunger. So mere thoughts about gratifying the object of one's wish are either 
not very successful in providing pleasure, or actually produce the 
opposite effect. It is questionable, therefore, that in the lady's case 
the mere thoughts of her husband's unfaithfulness could bring relief from 
guilt. 
It is possible, however, that such thoughts could have better effects 
if they were believed by the person. Thus if the hungry person actually 
believes that he is eating food his feelings of hunger might diminish, even 
if his need for food is left unsatisfied. Although such belief doesn: l, t 
normally occur in daydreaming, it seems to occur in real dreaming. It 
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can indeed be said that the dreamer believes that what he is dreaming 
is the case. So believing in thoughts caused by a corresponding 
wish is possible, at least in dreams. But there is also a waking 
state where a similar thing seems to take place. Freud was able to show 
that a mere wish can cause a relevant belief in a person who suffers 
from a paranoic disorder. What is responsible for the paranoia, in his 
view, is a homosexual love of which the person himself is not aware, 
as was the case with the paranoic patient called Schreber, whose case- 
history was reconstructed by Freud on the basis of the patient's own diary. 
A homosexual love, which a paranoic person cannot come to terms with, 
becomes repressed and there are usually two kinds of defensive mechanisms 
involved. Firstly, "I love him", a proposition which describes the person's 
real state of mind, becomes transformed into "I hate him", thanks to the 
mechanism of reaction formulation. This in turn is changed into another 
one "He hates (persecutes) me, which justifies me in hating him", for which 
the mechanism of projection is responsible. As a result of all this, a 
person who was once loved and admired by the paranoic is now perceived by 
him as an object of his hatred and is feared for being his persecutor. 
This shows that an unconscious wish, at least a homosexual one, can cause a 
certain belief, in this case that the loved person is one's persecutor. 
Such a belief is often referred to as a delusion, because unlike ordinary 
beliefs which are caused by the subject's perception of what is the case, 
this one is produced by a mere wish. To understand how such belief is 
possible we have to understand the primary mode of functioning of the nervous 
system, in Freud's view, the discussion of which has to wait until later, 
however. At present it is enough to point out that such a belief is a kind 
of-hallucination, similar to that which takes place in dreaming. 
It is true that the lady in question wasn't suffering from paranoia, 
because she wasn't a homosexual to start with and also because the total 
distortion of external reality characteristic of the paranoic patients 
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didn't occur in her case, but despite these differences it is still possible 
that the delusional belief of a relevant kind could also occur in her case. 
The reasons for ascribing to her the belief that her husband was unfaithful 
to her are the following. There were occasions when she used to reproach 
him for being unfaithful to her, and she seemed to be genuinely suffering 
from jealousy. And how could she behave in this way without really 
believing in his unfaithfulness? But suppose we ascribe to her this very 
belief. If we do so how are we to reconcile this claim with other facts 
about her? She was able to give a satisfactory account of the origin 
of the anonymous letter, namely that it was the work of a malicious 
servant, and herself admitted that the idea of her husband's unfaithfulness 
was really quite absurd; that's why she was looking for help from Freud. 
Nowl' if the person can give us a satisfactory account of reasons, as an 
impartial observer would do, for not believing that something is the case, 
it doesn't seem sensible to ascribe to her a belief to the contrary. 
This difficulty which faces us here doesn't occur in the paranoic cases. 
When the paranoic subject believes that he is persecuted he is convinced 
that he has good reýLsons for believing what he does. So as long as this 
difficulty isn't explained away we cannot claim that the lady had a 
delusional belief, like paranoic subjects. 
Can we solve this difficulty by suggesting that although the lady 
didn't believe in her husband's unfaithfulness consciously, since she 
herself gave good reasons for not holding such a belief, she nevertheless 
believed in his unfaithfulness unconsciously, since unconscious beliefs 
are usually not influenced by reasons such as those which influence 
conscious beliefs? If we could do this we could then argue that her 
feeling of jealousy was influenced by the relevant unconscious belief. 
But can such an unconscious belief really be ascribed to her? What is 
unconscious in a dynamic sense is usually repressed. And what was 
repressed, and therefore unconscious, in this lady's case was her own love 
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for her son-in-law and her wish that her husband were unfaithful to her. 
However, what the alleged belief in his unfaithfulness was supposed to 
bring about, in Freud's view, was precisely the gratification of her 
unconscious wish and thus give her relief from quilt. But if the belief 
were pepressed, for some unknown reason, her feeling of jealousy would 
have been repressed and thus unconscious too. For it is not possible for 
a person to be aware of her feeling of jealousy, and reproach her husband 
for being unfaithful without realizing the relevant belief. That is why 
when a feeling, such as fear of being castrated by one's father, is repressed., 
it becomes a conscious fear of being bitten by some animal, as happened 
in Little Hans's case. Since in the latter case the subject is consciously 
convinced that he is afraid of an animal, he can remain unaware of his 
unconscious fear of his father. That's why such a subject doesn't normally 
talk about his fear of his father but complains about his fear of the 
animal. But what the lady in question was complaining about was her 
obsession with jealousy, hot something else. Thus her alleged feeling 
of jealousy was definitely conscious and Freud never claims it was 
otherwise. So it doesn't make sense to suggest that her relevant belief 
was unconscious either, and that way out of the difficulty, i. e. trying 
to explain her strange behaviour by postulating the relevant unconscious 
belief, isn't possible. 
There is a difference, therefore, between the lady's case and real 
paranoia. The paranoic subject's behaviour, i. e. what he says and does, 
unambiguously expresswhis belief that he is persecuted by someone, and it 
doesn't matter here that his belief isn't based on any evidence. But the 
ladyýz behaViour doesn't give us a good justification for ascribing 
to her either a conscious or an unconscious belief of the relevant kind. 
Since there is a problem in attributing to her the belief, we are in doubt 
whether to ascribe to her the relevant feelings as well. In normal 
circumstances when a person feels jealous or threatened it is usually 
because of her belief, conscious or unconscious, that something is the 
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case. Because the lady didn't seem to hold the relevant belief it is 
questionable whether the experience she was going through was like the one 
that takes place in normal jealousy, where the relevant belief is present. 
It is possible to argue that what her unconscious wish that her husband 
were unfaithful to her led to in her case was merely obsessional 
thoughts about his unfaithfulness, in which she didn't really believe. 
Independently of her case we know that obsessional thoughts of a 
similar kind are not unusual. We hear about people who have obsessional 
thoughU that they failed to lock a door, for example. A person suffering 
from such thoughts might after leaving a house go back again and again 
in order to check whether the door has been locked. Does he do that because 
he believes that he has failed to lock the door on the first occasion? 
The person's own description of his experience doesn't seem to suggest 
the presence of any such belief. He himself says that the idea of him 
failing to lock the door is really quite absurd. Because he knows very 
well that he did it very carefully on the first occasion and himself 
saw that the door didn't open when he tried to open it then, so that 
he hasn't any reason whatsoever to think that he has failed in his first 
attempt, yet he still cannot resist going back. If we tried to ascribe 
to such a person a real belief in his original failure to lock the door, 
how could we explain at the same time his own admission that there aren't 
any reasons for thinking that he failed, and that what he does is really 
quite absurd. The one who acts on his beliefs doesn't regard Us own 
behaviour as absurd and usually gives some reasons for his beliefs; 
it doesn't matter whether such reasons are good or not. This shows 
that ordinary criteria for ascribing a belief to a person on the basis 
of his behaviour entirely fail us in a case like this. And if we still 
want to attribute to the person, a relevant belief,, we have to change our 
usual criteria for doing so. But why insist on ascribing the relevant 
belief in the first place? Is it not possible that obsessional thoughts 
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alone can influence the person's behaviour, just as beliefs do? I don't 
see any reason for thinking that they couldn't. So the lady's 
behaviour too can be explained without appeal to the relevant belief. 
Her unconscious wish that her husband was unfaithful to her produced 
her obsessional thoughts of the same content. Since she was unaware 
of her wish she couldn't understand why such thoughts were bothering her. 
And although she herself regarded them as quite absurd, because she hadn't 
any reason for doubting her husband's loyalty to her, she still couldn't 
heýp acting on these thoughts, as the person suffering from obsessional 
thoughts of failing to lock the door couldn't either. There is no 
doubt that such obsessional thoughts can be a source of as much suffering 
as real jealousy instigated by an appropriate belief, as we know from 
the testimony of people who go through such an experience. And it is not 
impossible that subjectively such suffering might be similar in both cases. 
Freud's own account of this case is somewhat different. He seems 
to suggest that she was wavering between believing and disbelieving in her 
husband's unfaithfulness, as in the following passage: "Since then the 
patient had repeatedly been pacified to the point of no longer believing 
the content of the anonymous letter, but never thoroughly and never for long". 
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It is quite possible that the delusion characteristic of paranoic patients 
had occurred in her case too, although it wasn't present in her all the time. 
When such delusion did occur, she no longer appreciated the reasons for not 
believing in her husband's disloyalty, because the psychological changes 
characteristic of the delusional process destroyed her capacity for judging 
objectively the evidence available to her, as happens in real paranoia. 
But when she could still grasp the evidence confronting her, as she seemed 
to be able to do on other occasions, her belief in his unfaithfulness 
tended to disappear, even if she retained obsessional thoughts about his 
affair. In order to decide whether the lady's case is closer to paranoia, 
as Freud seems to imply, than to that of a person suffering from obsessional 
r -- 
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thoughts, as suggested earlier, we need some more information . about 
the details of her behaviour, which Freud's description of her behaviour 
doesn't provide us with, unfortunately. But whatever line of explanation 
might be a better way of looking at her behaviour, it is still the 
case that she wasn't a straightforward paranoic, and Freud never said 
she was. For this reason her delusional belief in her husband's 
unfaithfulness, if it can be attributed to her at all, can only be 
ascribed to her with some restrictions, dependent on whether or not she 
could still judge the force of the evidence confronting her. Thus Freud's 
claim that the delusional process had in her case the function of bringing 
relief from guilt should be qualified too. It couldn't have been a permanent 
relief from guilt if the delusion itself wasn't permanent, as happens 
in real paranoia. But even if the psychological process. Wýi-k 
takes place in paranoia is more successful than in her case in bringing 
such a relief, it does so at the price of the total distortion of 
external reality exhibited by paranoic patients, while the lady 
in question had still some sense of reality, enough to realize that it 
wasn't the external world that was the source of her suffering but that 
she herself-was in need of help. 
We have learned that in everyday life in order to understand the person's 
reasons for feeling in the way he does we have to appeal-to his beliefs that 
something is the case and his relevant attitudes. This is exactly what 
Freud does in his account of the two cases of emotions discussed here, 
even if the beliefs and attitudes he appeals to aren't always those the 
subject herself is aware of. This approach enables him to make puzzling 
emotional reactions more intelligible to us and to the subject hCrself 
as well. But although we can now understand both the women's feelings 
much better than we did originally, that doesn't mean that they had good 
reasons to feel in the way they did. Their emotions are still irrational 
even if intelligible. An assumption is sometimes made that by explaining 
puzzling emotional reactions Freud is able to show that feelings which 
F- 
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appeared to us as irrational are now shown to have good reasons. 
But this assumption is wrong, because to make irrational emotions 
intelligible isn't to make them rational yet. An unconscious fear 
of being unable to control one' s sexual impulses, and a prudish 
attitude towards sex, the factors which enabled Freud to explain the girl's 
conscious fear about her bladder, didn't give her a good reason to be 
afraid of her bladder getting out of control, when she knew it was in 
perfect order. And the same can be said of the lady's jealousy too. 
Her guilt over her own love and her unconscious wish that her husband 
were unfaithful to her couldn't be said to be good reasons for her feeling 
jealous, even if these factors helped to explain her way of reacting 
to the situation she was in. These emotions are unreasonable or irrational 
because the beliefs or attitudes they involve are totally unjustified. 
A wish that one's husband were unfaithful, whether conscious or unconscious 
wish, doesn't justify one in believing that he is. Neither does an 
unconscious fear of sexual sensations getting out of control, because 
of one's prudish attitude towards sex, give one a good reason to be afraid 
of one's bladder getting out of control. 
The point of making the subject herself aware of why she reacts 
in the way she does, which is precisely what Freud tried to do with these 
two patients, is to help her realize that her emotional reactions are 
unjustifiable and unreasonable and are in need of modif-ication. This 
might be difficult, because emotions are not under immediate voluntary 
control. If I become angry when I think that somebody has lied to me, 
for example, I cannot help feeling in the way I do, even if I wished 
not to. But that doesn't mean that there isn't any control over emotions 
available to us. We can control our expressions of emotions, for instance. 
A person might be very angry with his parents but might decide not to 
express his anger and might be successful in doing so. But what about 
emotions themselves -are we in a potition to influence them too? Sometimes 
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it seems to be possible, even if difficult. When I am frightened 
because my husband is dangerously ill)I can try to diminish my fear 
by trying not to think about his condition. I can also try to persuade 
myself that although his chance of recovery is very small, there is 
still some chance nevertheless, which might help to reduce my fear. 
Freud too was convinced that he could help his patients to influence 
their emotions, or at least to be able to live with them, by making 
them understand what was responsible for their feelings. Because the problem 
with the patients he came across was that they themselves couldn'-t 
understand their emotional reactions. By making them aware of the 
origin of their feelings, he could help them transform their neurotic 
fears into common ones. That might help, because at least the person t-Ken 
knows why he is afraid or why he is jealous. Such knowledge might not 
give the person full control over his feelings, but might help him 
influence it in the way nonneurotic people can do. What we have sAid 
here applies not only to feelings but also to obsessional thoughts, which 
could be irrational in a similar way. 
Behavioural Symptoms 
A third kind of symptoms are behavioural, of which Freud gives the 
following example. A lady of about thirty years exhibited among other 
things, the following obsessional behaviour. She would run from her room 
into a neighbouring one where there was a large table, then ! she would 
take up a particular position beside the table standing in the middle 
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of the room and ring the bell for her housemaid. When the servant came 
she would send her on some trivial errand or would let her go without one, 
and the lady then run back into her own room. She would repeat this 
peformance several times a day. An interesting thing was that there 
was a big stain on the tablecloth, and the lady would always take up 
her position in relation to the table in such a way that the maid who had 
been sent for couldn't fail to notice the stain. Although the woman 
had been carrying out this obsessional action on countless occasions 
for a long time, she hadn't the slightest idea why she was doing it. 
Whenever Freud asked her "Why do you do that? What sense has it? ". 
she answered: "I don't know. , 
34 One day, however, she was suddenly 
able to throw some light on her incomprehensible behaviour. She said 
it-was connected witb her experience on her wedding night. More than ten 
years before, she had married a man much older than herself who proved 
to be impotent. During their wedding night he had several times come 
running from his room into hers to try once more, but each time without 
success. Next morning he said that he would feel ashamed before the maid 
(who would expect to find evidence of success on the bed linen), took 
up a bottle of red ink that happened to be in the room and poured its 
contents over the sheet, *although not exactly in the place where a blood 
stain would have been appropriate. When the lady camt for treatment to 
Freud she had already been separated from her husband for several years 
on account of his sexual deficiences. We are told, however, that despite 
their separation she had taken every precaution, real and imaginary, 
to remain faithful to him and would not put anyone else in his place. 
In other words she still exhibited a strong affection for him. 
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The lady's behaviour is very strange indeed. She herself seemed 
to be puzzled by it as much as we are. The only thing which she could say 
about it was that it was somehow connected with her traumatic experience 
during the wedding night. But this doesn't take us very far, and we 
still feel very puzzled about her behaviour. It is important to spell 
out precisely the nature of our puzzlement. Usually when faced with a 
piece of intentional behaviour we expect the agent to be able to tell us 
what he is doing, i. e. what he is trying to achieve. The person might 
tell us his desires, and also his beliefs about the means to satisfy 
them. Given his beliefs and desires we can understand his reasons for 
doing what he does. Sometimes an action is performed not in order to 
achieve some further end but for its own sake, because the person finds 
pleasure or interest in doing it. But the lady's case is different; we 
cannot understand what she could achieve by performing her strange ritual, 
and she herself is not able to tell us either. She'is obviously not 
doing it for the sake of pleasure; on the contrary she finds it rather 
distressful, and it is one of the reasons why she seeks help from Freud. 
So her behaviour is puzzling because it doesn't fit with our idea of an 
intentional action. It looks like intentional behaviour but doesn't seem 
to satisfy the basic criteria for being intentional. What is Freud's 
solution to this problem? 
Freud gives the following explanation of her ritual. 
"The obsessional action had a sense; it appears to have 
been a representation, a repetition, of the significant 
scene" and "the patient was identifying herself with her 
husband; she was playing his part by imitating his 
running from one room into the other. Further, to 
carry on the analogy, we must agree that the bed and 
the sheet were replaced by the table and the tablecloth. 
This might seem arbitrary, but surely we have not studied 
dream-symbolism to no purpose. In dreams too we often 
find a table which has to be interpreted as a bed. 
-- 
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Table and bed together stand for marriage, so that 
one can easily take the place of the other.,, 35 
So in Freud's view the lady was repeating the events which took place 
during the wedding night by imitating her husband's behaviour. There 
is indeed a close similarity between her behaviour and that of her husband. 
The events which took Let us look more closely at these similarities. 
place during the original scene could be brbken down into the following details. 
(1) During the wedding night the husband runs from his bedroinn into 
that of the patient. 
(2) He repeats his action several times in order to try once more. ý 
(3) He expresses his anxiety that the maid will learn about his impotence, 
and makes a mark with red ink on the sheet, although in a wrong place. 
(4) The red mark is on tne sheet and the maid is supposed to believe that 
it is produced by the blood of the deflorated wife. 
The lady's behaviour can be in turn broken down into the following elements. 
W) She runs from her room into the neighbouring one and rings for the maid. 
(2') She repeats her behaviour several times a day. 
(3') She takes up a certain position in relation to the table in order 
to enable the maid to see a certain spot. 
(4') The spot is a mark on the tablecloth and the lady makes sure that 
the maid cannot fail to notice it. 
When we look at the details of their behaviour it indeed looks as if the 
lady was reproducing the events of the wedding night and was imitating 
the behaviour of her husband, as Freud suggests. Like her husband, she 
runs from one room into another. Like him, she repeats this action several 
times. She also tries to arrange things in such a way that the maid 
cannot fail to notice the stain in a certain place, just as her husband 
did. So the similarity is indeed very striking, but there is one difference. 
The husband wanted the maid to notice the mark on the sheet whereas his 
wife wanted her to notice the mark on the tablecloth. Freud claims, 
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however, that the table can be a symbolic rcpresentation for the bed. 
He claimed to reveal such symbolism in dreams. In the case of dreams 
the psychoanalyst arrives at his knowledge of the meaning of a given 
symbol independently of the particular dream under scrutiny. He can 
learn-about symbolism from fairy tales and myths, folklore and jokes, 
poetic and popular linguistic usage, etc. But is there any independent 
way of learning that a table can stand for bed, apart from the case 
we are interested in? Freud appeals to a linguistic usage here. In 
several languages, including German, "bed and board" stands for "marriage". 
In law there is the following Latin phrase for a legal separation: 
11separation a mensa et toro" which means "separation from table and bed". 
So there is independent evidence that "bed" and "table" can stand 
for marriage. Given this linguistic usage and Freud's revelation that. 
a table represented a bed in several dreams he came across, it is plausible 
to suggest that in the lady's case too the table could stand for the bed, 
and the tablecloth for the sheet. And if so, the analogy between the lady's 
and her husband's behaviour might go even deeper than originally appeared 
to us. 
So far so good. We are willing to accept Freud's suggestion that the 
woman was reproducing the events of the wedding night by imitating her 
husband's behaviour. Butwhy on earth was she trying to reproduce something 
which was so distressful to her? Freud's answer to this is as follows. 
"If we examine the relation between the two more closely, 
we shall probably obtain information about something that 
goes further - about the intention of the obsessional action. 
Its kernel was Obviously the summoning of the housemaid, 
before whose eyes the patient displayed the stain, in contrast 
to her husband's remark that he would feel ashamed in front 
of the maid; accordingly the stain was in the right place. 
We see, therefore, th at she was not simply repeating the 
scene, she was continuing and at the same time correcting 
it;, she was putting it right. But by this she was also 
correcting the other thing, which had been so distressing 
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that night and had made the expedient with the 
red ink necessary - his impotence. So the obsessional 
action was saying: "No, it's not true. He had no need 
to feel ashamed in front of the housemaid; he was 
not impotent. it represented this wish, in the manner 
of a dream, as fulfilled in a present day action; 
it served the purpose of making her husband superior 
to his past mishap". 
36 (all italics are mine) 
Thanks to Freud's account, the lady's ritual looks less puzzling. 
But we are still left unsure how to describe her behaviour more precisely. 
Was it an intentional action or rather something closer to a dream? 
Freud's way of trying to account for her behaviour shows some ambivalence. 
On the one hand he uses such terms as 'intention' and 'purpose' to 
refer to her behaviour, which seem to imply that in his view she was 
performing an intentional action for "the purpose of making her husband 
superior to his past mishap". On the other hand he also makes an analogy between 
, her ritual and dreaming, and suggests that it 
"represented her wish as 
fulfilled in the manner of a dream" but not in the way in which intentional 
action can bring about the satisfaction of a desire. Is there a way 
of deciding which terms are more appropriite for describing and explaining 
the lady's behaviour? 
Suppose we look at it-as an intentional action performed for some 
further end. Are we in a position to say what that end was, independently 
of what the lady herself could tell us? Like her husband she was trying 
to arrange things in such a way that the maid couldn't fail to notice 
the stain in a certain place. For her husband the stain was a means to 
communicate to the servant that he was virile. By anal9gy we can suggest 
that her activity of displaying the stain in front of the maid served the 
. same purpose, i. e. communicating to her that her husband's masculinity 
wasn't under doubt after all. Also, independently of her ritual, we 
know that it was a reasonable thing for her to form such an intention. 
We remember that despite their separation the lady still had a strong 
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affection for her husband. She remained faithful to him and couldn't 
imagine somebody else taking his place. Even without psychoanalytic 
insight we know that when a woman is in love she reacts very strongly 
when the value of her sweetheart is at stake, usually by denying that 
what is alleged is the case. What was at stake with her husband was 
his virility and it is understandable that she would do something 
in order to save his image in the eyes of the servant who was in a 
position to discover his failure. Certain characteristic features of her 
behaviour and what we know about her situation gives us some justification 
for talking about her intention or pirpose, just as Freud does. 
However, there are other aspects of her behaviour which suggest that 
to talk about the intention or purpose of her ritual is to attribute 
more to it than there is in it in fact. If the lady was indeed trying 
to communicate something to the servant, why on earth did she choose 
such an inpýppropriate means to achieve her purpose? She could, for 
instance, have made up some story to persuade the maid that everything 
was all right with her husband, whether the servant would believe her 
story or not is another matter, but at least it would have been a better 
strategy to pursue, given her end. The way the lady was trying to 
communicate something to the servant was however entirely incomprehensible 
to the latter. She not merely chose an ineffective means but failed 
to satisfy the convention of expression appropriate to the occasion. And 
how are we to reconcile these incompatible claims? On the one hand we 
want to say that she was pursuing a certain end, but we also have to agree 
that the means used by her to achieve that end were not merely ineffective 
but entirely inappropriate for obtaining it. In normal circumstances when 
we ascribe to people certain intentions or purposes, we also take 
into account the means used by them, not necessarily the best available 
to them but at least appropriate means to achieve their ends. When this 
conceptual connection between ends and means breaks down, as in this case, 
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it is questionable whether the notion of purpose or intention is applicable 
to the person's behaviour any longer. There is also some difficulty 
about ascribing an end to her as well. Originally she seemed to be entirely 
confused and puzzled by what she was doing, although later she was able 
to point to the connection between her ritual and what happened during 
the vedding night. We can even imagine her acknowledging some such aim 
as Freud would like to ascribe to her, although this may be just an 
admission that she wished it, not that she did such-and-such in order 
to obtain it, because she was rational enough to see that the end couldn't 
possibly be brought about by doing what she did. For these reasons it 
is better not to talk about the intention or purpose behind the lady's 
ritual. 
Is there a different way of looking at it then? Freud himself makes 
an analogy between her ritual and a dream. Some dreams, especially those 
accompanied by sleepwalking when the dreamer behaves as if he was indeed 
trying to achieve something, come to mind immediately in the context 
of the lady's behaviour. But unlike the dreamer, who after waking up 
feels surprised that he is out of bed and usually doesn't know what has 
happened to him, the woman knew what she was doing, although she was 
puzzled by why she was doing it. So if there is an analogy between her 
behaviour and that in a dream, it has probably to do with the expressive 
character of both phenomena. Her ritual expressed her wish that things 
were different, as the dreaming man pictures to himself a situation as 
he wishes it to be. But dreams are not the only phenomena which can 
express the person's feelings or wishes. There is also waking behaviour 
which has a similar function, and Which seems to provide a better anal9gy 
for her behaviour. There are various ways in which one's emotional 
or other mental state can be expressed by one's behaviour. Firstly, an 
expressive behaviour ran be performed for some further end. A person 
might express his anger or fear in order to obtain a desired response 
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from someone else. For instance, he might express his fear, either 
verbally or non-verbally, because he doesn't want to be left alone. 
Thus his reason for expressing his fear is his desire not to be left 
alone and his belief that by doing what he does he can achieve his 
end of making somebody stay with him. Secondly, expressive behaviour 
might be directed to no further end other than that of self-expression. 
An example could be a woman carefully and deliberately writing an 
angry letter to her friend simply in order to express her feelings. 
Although what she does isn't directed to some further goal, her behaviour 
can still be an intentional action. Her reason for writing the letter 
is her desire to express her emotion and her belief that writing the 
letter is a way of doing so. 
But there are also cases of behaviour which can express a person's 
emotions, but which are not intentional actions, as in the following 
examples. A person overwhelmed by sorrow might clutch his head, throw 
his arms about or do other similar things. All these activities resemble 
very closely other manifestations of emotions such as a worried look, 
a worried tone of voice, shaking of the hands, etc. It seems more 
appropriate to call them bodily reactions rather than intentional 
actions, for the following reasons. The person might not even 
realise that he has a worried look, that his hands are shaking, or 
that he is clutching his head. But even if he is aware of his reactions 
it is not the case that he desires to react in the way he does. He 
might even wish that his hands were not shaking, for instance; but he 
cannot help reacting in this way. This kind of reactions are more like 
crying or even like somatic symptoms described by Freud, but not like 
intentional actions, because they are not undertaken with any end in mind. 
We can still talk about the person's reasons for reacting in this way, 
although this kind of reasons are quite different from those involved 
in intentional actions. They are not based on beliefs about the means 
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to some ends, although they involve beliefs about certain states of 
affairs, such as a belief that one failed to pass one's exams, 
for instance. This belief combined with a feeling of disappointment 
or sorrow over what had happened can make the person clutch his head, 
or make his hands shake, but these aren't means to any ends, and the 
subject doesn't believe that they are. Thus reasons for these reactions 
are like reasons for crying, and although neither of them is an 
intentional expression of feelings, they still do express the person's 
f eelings. 
Expressive intentional action, undertaken either for some further 
end or for its own sake, and nonintentional reactions expressing the 
person's emotions and other attitudes,, are the opposite ends of the spectrum 
of expressive behaviour. But there is also a further kind of expressive 
behaviour which seems to be different from both of them. The following 
example can illustrate it. Suppose a person is humiliated by his boss, 
which makes him feel very angry. However, his fear of losing his job 
prevents him from attacking his boss directly. But when he happens 
to pass his boss's car he kicks it spontaneously. Of course, he 
might have done that with the intention of making his boss aware of 
hia, anger. But suppose it wasn't his intention to do even that, because 
he knew that if the boss learned about it his situation could become worse. 
Why then did he kick the boss's car if it wasn't the car he was angry 
with but the boss himselfj It is possible to suggest that his original 
desire to attack the boss gave rise to a wish to attack his car when 
he happened to notice it. In attacking the car he was acting on his wish 
to do just that and his behaviour is intentional under this description. 
But even if his kicking the boss's car is intentional it doesn't 
necessarily follow that his expression of anger with the boss is 
intentional too. Whether it is depends on how the person himself 
looks at his behaviour. If he, for example, had a desire to express his 
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feeling in this way and believed that it was the best way to do so, 
given his situation, than his behaviour was an intentional expression 
of his anger. He could even say that he did it in order to express 
his anger, because he couldn't do so directly. But it was possible 
that there wasn't any such desire to express his anger with the boss 
involved in what he did. He kicked the car because he felt like doing 
it, and not as a means of expressing his feeling, even though it did 
express his feeling. Thus emotions, like anger, might make the person 
perform a certain kind of action, but this action is not undertaken 
because of the belief that it is the way to satisfy one's desire. 
This latter kind of expressive behaviour seems to provide the closest 
analogy to the table-cloth ritual. The lady's feelings over her 
wedding night made her also do certain things, but . not 
because 
of and belief that by doing what she did she could bring about some end. 
In order to understand this kind of behaviour we have to appeal to the 
persons's relevant attitudes. Thus learning about the lady's feelings, 
such as being disappointed with her husband, feeling a9hamed of his 
impotence (the feelings she was likely to 4 experience4during 
the traumatic wedding night), and her wish that her wedding night 
were different, we can understand why she behaved in the way she did. 
The man's behaviour with his boss's car also becomes intelligible when 
a6c-ýt 
we learnkhis feeling of humiliation and his wish to answer the boss 
back by attacking him. So what both of them do is connected with their 
feelings and wishes, and their behaviour expresses their states of mind. 
But the form such expression of attitudes takes in both cases 
has something peculiar about it. About the lady's ritual Freud said 
that it represented her wish in a fulfilling manner, because her ritual 
represented her wedding night in the way she wished it had been. And 
of the man's behaviour we can also say that it represented his wish 
to attack the boss as fulfilled too, because it found an expression 
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in attacking something which represented to him the boss, ije. his car. 
Freud often refers to such representation as symbolic, because what 
the person does represents something else for him. Such symbolic 
expression of the person's attitudes seems to be different from a 
simple expression of feelings, because unlike the latter, it involves 
some kind of link between the content of his wish and what he does. 
In this respect it looks more like an intentional action, where there 
is also a similar connection between what somebody does, for instance 
reaching for a piece of food, and the content of his desire, which is to 
eat some food because he feels hungry. 
Does this mean that behaviour that represents wish-fulfilment is 
a category of intentional action under this very description? Although 
it is tempting to take it as such, and some people have indeed taken 
it that way, we should be careful not to overlook an important difference 
between the two. In the case of intentional action what the person 
does is connected not merely with his desire but also with his relevant 
belief that by doing what he does he can bring about a real satisfaction 
of his desire. Thus the hungry person when he reaches for food does so 
because he also believes that this is the way to satisfy his hunger. 
But in the two cases under consideration such a link with belief 
seems to be missing. The man who attacked his boss's car couldn't 
possibly believe that by doing what he did he could satisfy his wish 
to attack the boss himself, even though attacking the car symbolically 
expressed his wish to attack the boss as fulfilled in some sense. The 
lady too, even if she was confused about the meaning of her ritual at 
first, was rational enough to see that by doing what she did she could 
neither change the course of her wedding night nor make her servant 
believe that it was different from what it was (which is what she 
really wished). So she couldn't possibly hold the relevant belief either. 
But somebody might reply that although we cannot ascribe to her the 
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relevant conscious belief we can still ascribe to her an unconscious one. 
But it is doubtful whether we can do even that. There should be some 
constraints on ascribing unconscious beliefs, because otherwise anything 
would pass as an unconscious belief. Thus it is possible to argue 
that if something cannot pass as an intelligible conscious belief 
it cannot pass as an intelligible unconscious belief either. Since a 
belief that by running from one room to another and taking a certain 
position in relation to the table standing there. one could satisfy 
one's wish to have one's wedding night over again except for the fact 
that things were right this time, couldn't be ascribed to the lady 
in question as an intelligible conscious belief, it is questionable, therefore, 
whether it could be ascribed to her as an unconscious belief. Since 
the person doesn't believe that she or he can satisfy the relevant 
wish - by performing some ritual in one case, or by attacking the boss's 
car in the other - such behavlour cannot be Intentional under this 
description, even if it can still be intentional under some other description. 
And although wish-fulfillment representation isn't intentional, it can 
still express the person's wishes as well as feelings. So it doesn't 
belong to the category of intentional action but to that of nonintentional 
expressive behaviour, such as that as described earlier, and can be 
explained in a similar way. 
(B) Interpretations of dreams 
Dreams were always of great interest to Freud and his followers, 
Freud was convinced that a dream can tell us a lot about the dreamer 
himself, sometimes even more than his waking behaviour can. In a famous 
sentence, he declared "The interpretation of dreams is the royal road 
to ýt knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind". 
37 
To justify 
this claim Freud put forward a theory of dreaming in sharp contrast 
to the prevailing theories of his time, and indeed to some contemporary 




My presumption that dreams can be interpreted at once puts 
me in opposition to the ruling theory of dreams and in fact 
to every theory of dreams with the single exception of 
Schrener's; for 'interpreting' a dream implies assigning 
a 'meaning' to it - that is, replacing it by something 
which fits into the chain of our mental acts as a litik 
having a validity and importance equal to the rest. As 
we have seen, the scientific theories of dreams leave 
no room for any problem of interpreting them, since in 
their view a dream is not a mental act at all, but a 
somatic process signalizing its occurrence by 
indications registered in the mental apparatus. 
38 
Freud here expresses the kernel of his theory. Firstly, dreaming is not 
a mere somatic process but a mental phenomenon; and secondly, dreams have 
meaning which can be revealed by interpretation. 
In what sense is dreaming a mental phenomenon, according to Freud? 
He invites us to look at some typical dreams, such as many of us are 
familiar with, to understand this claim. 
There is a dream that I can produce in myself as often 
as I like - experimentally, as it were. If I eat 
anchovies or olives or any other highly salted food 
in the evening, I develop thirdt during the night which 
wakes me up. But my waking is-preceded by a dream; 
and this always has the same content, namely, that I 
am drinking. This simple dream is occasioned by the 
thirst which I become aware of when I wake. The thirdt 
gives rise to a wish to drink, and the dream shows 
me that wish fulfilled. 
39 
We can say, therefore, that "The dream represented a particular state 
of affairs as I should have wished it to be. Thus its content was the 
f ulf illment of a wish and its motive was a wish. , 
40 So in saying that 
dreams are mental phenomena Freud means that there are motives behind them, 
in this particular case the wish to drink. What kind of motives are 
expressed by other dreams? Are thpy invariably wishes or could they 
be all sorts of things including feelings, attitudes, etc? In Freud's 
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view "Dreams are psychical acts of as much significance as any others; 
their motive force is in every instance a wish seeking fulfillment". 
41 
In other words, wish-fulfillment is a universal characteristic of-ldreams. 
Is Freud's assertion that every dream is the fulfillment of a wish 
another way of saying that the dream represents a wish as fulfilled, or 
is it to be taken literally? The following quotation from Isaiah is used 
by Freud to suggest the former. Isaiah says "It shall even be as when 
a hungry man dreameth, and, behold, he eateth; but he awaketh, and his 
soul is empty: or as when a thirsty man dreameth, and, behold, he drinketh; 
but he awaketh, and, behold, he is faint, and his soul hath appetite. " 
42 
But Freud also wrote "Unluckily my need for water to quench my thirst 
cannot be satisfied by a dream in the same way as my thirst for revenge 
against my friend Otto and Dr. M.,, 
43 (expressed by Freud's own dream). 
This passage seems to imply that although my dreaming of drinking cannot 
satisfy my thirdt! there are nevertheless wishes which can by fulfilled by 
dreams, such as a wish for revenge. But Freud doesn't explain, however, 
what makes satisfaction or fulfillment possible in one case and impossible 
in another. Is it due to some difference between these two wishes? There 
is some difference indeed. Thirst, or the wish to drink, is connected 
with a bodily need which can only be satisfied through the specific action 
which procures an adequate object, i. e. water or some other drink. The 
wish for revenge is not connected with any bodily need and, therefore, 
doesn't require such specific action. But it requires some-action 
nevertheless, and because the dreamer himself when he wakes up doesn't 
believe that such an action took place, it is hard to imagine him being 
satisfied and his wish for revenge fulfilled. So it seems more plausible 
to interpret Freud's theory as saying that dreams represent wishes as 
fulfilled, rather than really fulfilling them. Perhaps such representation 
whether in dreams, daydreams, or other fantasies - is in some sense 
satisfying to the subject, but precisely because it is mere representation 
- 
it is not literally the fulfillment of his wishes. (With this qualification 
understood, I shall continue to follow Freud's talk of dreams as 
fulfilling wiihes. ) 
This doctrine provokes an immediate question, namely, how could all 
dreams be fulfillments of wishes? Many dreams do not seem to express any 
wishes, and some have distressing contents, so there are some apparent 
exceptions to Freud's general claim. He suggests, however, that in some 
dreams wishes are expressed in a disguised or distorted manner and it is due 
to this that such dreams do not appear to be wish fulfillments. But 
when this distortion is unmasked the true nature of such dreams is revealed 
to us again. To give expression to the fact that some wishes appear in 
disguised form he sometimes modifies his general statement by saying 
that "a dream is a (disguised) fulfillment of a (suppressed or repressed) 
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wish" . 
But the source of the distortion in dreams has to be explained, and to 
do this Freud put forward his doctrine of. dream-work.. An essential part 
of this doctrine is the famous distinction between the 'manifest and 
latent' content of a dream. The manifest content, also called the 
'dream-content', is what constitutes the subject of the dream-report, i. e. 
the narrative told by the dreamer when he wakes up. The latent content, 
sometimes referred to as 'dream thoughts', is what gives the dream 
its-sense or meaning. The 'dream-work' is the process supposedly responsible 
for the transformation of the latent content into manifest content. 
It operates through various methods or mechanisms such as condensation, 
displacement, representation and secondary revision. Let us explain briefly 
what Freud means by these terms. By condensation, he wrote, we "understand 
the fact that the manifest dream has a smaller content than the latent 
one, and is thus an abbreviated translition of it". 
45 
Thus condensation 
might result, for instance, in the total omission of certain latent 
elements. It can also happen that latent elements which have something 
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in common become fused into a single unity. As far as displacement 
is concerned 
"It manifests itself in two ways: in the first, a latent 
element is replaced hot by a part of itself but by something 
more remote - that is, by an allusion; and in the second, 
the psychical accent is shifted from an important element 
on to another which is unimportant, so that the dream 
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appears differently centered and strange" . 
Displacement then takes a big share in the distortion of dreams. 
Representation "consists in transforming thoughts into visual images ". 
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To make his point clearer Freud draws an analogy between the mode of 
representation in dreams and in visual art, in some forms of primitive 
painting in particular. In such painting the hierarchical position of 
a person can be expressed by the size of his body. Dreams too make use 
of such images. For instance, a "highly placed person" can be represented 
in-a dream by a high tower. The last mechanism of dream-work, secondary 
revision, "fills. - up the gaps in the dream-structure with shreds and patches. 
As a result of its efforts, the dream loses its appearance of absurdity 
and disconnectedness and approximates to the model of an intelligible 
experience ". 
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The dream-work, with its various mechanisms, is not the only factor 
responsible for the distortion of latent content. Another factor which 
produces a similar result is dream-symbolism. According to this doctrine, 
certain objects and activities find a regular form of expression in many 
different dreams. Male genitals, for example, are often represented 
by things which resemble their shape, such as sticks and other long objects. 
Although the symbols discussed by Freud and. his followers are very 
numerous, the range of things they symbolize is very narrow: the body, 
parents, blood relations, birth, death, nudity, sexual organs and acts. 
Some of these symbols are common to all human beings regardless of their 
divexsity in culture or race. The existence of a symbolic mode of 
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representation of such universal character invites the following questions. 
How did humanity acquire these symbols in the first place, and how are 
they passed on to individuals? To cope with this problem Jung, put forward 
his theory of the "collective unconscious" which is based on a hypothesis 
of phylogenetic inheritance. Freud, however, never committed himself 
completely to such a hypothesis, although he toyed with it in his 
account of primal phantasies. 
Dream-symbolism confronted Freud with yet another difficulty, nam ly, 
how to spell out a precise relationship between dream-work and dream- 
symbolism. Dream-symbolism can be responsible for the distortion just 
as dreaur-work is, yet it cannot be explained by the mechanisms of dream- 
work alone because it seems to suggest a more general capacity of the 
human mind, which finds expression in many other phenomena, apart from 
dreams, for similar symbols appear also in fairy tales, poetry, myths, 
jokes, etc. To solve this difficulty Freud suggested the following compromise. 
Although dream-symbolism is an independent factor in the distortion of 
dreams alongside dream-work, the latter can make use of the symbols 
nevertheless. It is interesting to notice in this context that the doctrine 
of dreaur-symbolism was a late addition to Freud's theory of dreams. 
The section concerning symbolism was not inserted into The Interpretation 
of Dreams, his major work on the subject, until as late as 1914 and Freud 
himself acknowledged the profound influence of Wilhelm Stekel in this respect. 
That explains his uncertainty about dream-symbolism, which stands in sharp 
contrast to his bold formulation of dream-work. 
To persuade us, even provisionally, that dreams are wish-fulfillments 
and that his doctrine of dream-work is not an empty claim, Freud has to 
show that wishes which instigate dreams and are expressed by them as 
fulfilled are capable of being identified., either by the dreamer or somebody 
else. When Freud wrote "The aim I have set before myself is to show that 
dreams are capable of being interpreted" he accepted this challenge. 
49 
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He also provided us with a method of interpretation. To be strict, there 
are in fact two methods available to the psychoanalyst: based on dreamer's 
associations and on symbolic dream interpretati . The former is not 
peculiar to dreams but is used in psychoanalysis in general, for interpreting 
errors and symptoms as well. In the case of dreams it relies on what 
the dreamer himself says, what occurs to him in connection with his dreams 
and how he arrived at it. Since dreams have usually a multiplicity of 
elements, the psychoanalyst might ask the subject to produce associations 
to each element of his dream until they reach some significant point. 
How this method works in practice should become clearer when some examples 
of interpretations are discussed. At this stage it is important to notice 
that the task of interpretation is imposed upon the dreamer himself as 
far as possible. As Freud wrote 
I pointed out to you at the time (i. e. in his discussion 
of parapraxes) that this piece of information (i. e. 
information given by the person who made the error) 
was the model of every psychoanalytic investigation, 
and you will understand now that psychoanalysis follows 
the technique of getting the people under examination 
so far as possible themselves to produce the solution 
of their riddles. Thus, too, it is the dreamer himself 
who should tell u's what his dream means. 
50 (my italics). 
The symbolic interpretation of dreams is quite different. The 
psychoanalyst here reveals the meaning not by questioning the dreamer himself 
but by appealing to his own knowledge of the meaning of the symbols, 
which he arrives at independently of the particular dream under scrutiny. 
We are told that the psychoanalyit learns about dream symbolism "from 
very different sources - from fairy tales and myths, from buffoonery and 
jokes, from folklore (that is from knowledge about popular manners and customs, 
sayings and songs) and from poetic and popular linguistic usage" .51 Take, 
for example, a symbol which can stand for parents. In fairy tales parents 
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are often represented by a-royal couple. Thus a fairy tale may begin: 
"Once upon a time there were a King and Queen", which usually means there 
were a father and mother. The King can also be referred to as the father 
of his country, and his subjects are often called his children. The fact 
that the royal couple can be a symbol for parents is learned from such 
sources and then applied to dreams by analogy. Or consider an interesting 
symbol for dying, which is often represented by a journey or departure. 
Even in everyday life we sometimes speak of dying as "the last journey" 
or as a poet speaks of death as "the undiscovered country from whose 
bourn no traveller returns". (Hamlet, Act 3, sc. 1). Ancient religious 
books (e. g. The Book of the Dead) also speak*of a journey to the land 
of dead. Children too are sometimes told that a dead person has gone on 
a journey. Such linguistic usage can teach us that journey and departure 
are symbols of death, and this knowledge is then used in the interpretation 
of dreams. 
What is the relationship between these two dif ferent methods for 
interpreting dreams? Although Freud uses both of them, it is the method 
of free associations which is more important to him, as he himself said. 
I should like to utter an express warning against 
overestimating the importance of symbols in dream- 
interpretation, against restricting the work of 
translating dreams merely to translating symbols 
and against abandoning the technique of making 
use of the. dreamer's associations. The two 
techniques of dream7-interpretation must be 
complementary to each other; but both in practice 
dnd in theory the first place-continues to be held 
by the procedure which I began by describing and which 
attributes a decisive significance to the comments 
made by the dreamer, while the translation of symbols, 
as I have explained it, is also at our disposal as 
an auxiliary method". 
52 
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The symbolic technique cannot be more than an auxiliary one, for the reason 
that no dream symbol can be separated from the individual in whose dream 
it appears. The same symbol can have a different significance for different 
people. To hope, therefore, that we can produce a ready-made systematic 
guide with fixed meaning for particular symbols is an illusion in Freud's view. 
We are ready now to look at some of Freud's own examples of dream 
interpretation. It is good to start with simple examples first (as he 
himself did) where the meaning of the dream can be revealed on the basis 
of its manifest content alone, as in the following case. The dreamer was 
an eight-year-old girl. One day she was on a walk with her father and 
several other children. They intended to visit a place called Rohrer Hutte. 
It was getting late, however, and they had to turn back, but the father 
promised the children to make up for the disappointment another time. 
On their way home they passed the sign-post to another place called Hameau; 
but once again the children had to be consoled with the promise of visiting 
it on another occasion. Next morning the girl told her father in a 
satisfied tone: ' 'Daddy, I dreamt last night that you went with us to the 
Rohrer Hu'tte and Hameau. " 
53 There is a clear connection between what 
happened during the walk and the content of the girl's dream. But while 
during the walk her desire to visit both places had been frustrated her 
dream represented the whole situation as she wished it to be. "In her 
impatience she had anticipated the fulfillment of her father's promise" 
said Freud. 
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Most dreams are not so straightforward, however. Their meaning 
is usually represented in a disguised form, as in the following example. 
Freud's patient,. who was a young girl, reported this dream. "I saw Karl 
lying before me dead. He was lying in his coffin with his hands folded 
and with candles all round in fact just like little Otto, whose death 
was such a blow to me. , 
55 It needs explaining that Otto and Karl were the 
names of her sister's children. Otto, who was her favourite, died(to her 
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sorrow)but his brother Karl was alive, contrary to the content of her dream. 
The dreamer also reported that in her dream she felt neither pain nor grief. 
The girl wasn't sure what was the meaning of her dream. To interpret it 
we need some more information about the dreamer. We learn from Freud that 
The girl had early been left an orphan and had been 
brought up in the house of a much older sister. 
Among the friends who visited at the house was a 
man who made a lasting impression an her heart. 
For a time it had seemed as though the scarcely 
acknowledged relations with him would lead to 
marriage; but this happy outcome was brought to 
nothing by her sister, whose motives were never 
fully explained. After the breach the man ceased 
to visit the house; and shortly after the death of 
little Otto, on to whom she had meanwhile turned 
her affection, my patient herself set up on her own. 
She did not succeed, however, in freeing herself 
from her attachment to her sister's friend. Her pride 
bade her avoid him; but she was unable to transfer 
her love to any of the other admirers who presented 
themselves later. Whenever it was announced that 
the object of her affections, who was by profession 
a literary man, was to give a lecture anywhere, she 
was invariably in the audience, and she took every 
possible opportunity of seeing him from a distance 
on neutral grounds. 
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How is all this related to her dream? On the day before her dream, she 
disclosed to Freud an interesting fact. The professor with whom she was 
in love was going to a concert, and to enjoy a glimpse of him once more 
she had bought a ticket as well. And this event was going to take place 
in the, evening of the day she reported her dream. Freud became convinced 
that there must be some connection between these two facts, since (he assumed) 
dreams are usually concerned with what preoccupies us strongly in our 
waking life. He asked the girl to produce some associations and the 
following thing occurred to her in connection with little Otto's death; 
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"Of course; the Professor came to see us again after a long absence, 
and I saw him once more beside little Ott6's coffin. " On the basis of this 
and what he was told on the previous day, Freud was able to produce the 
following interpretation. 
If now the other boy were to die, the same thing would 
happen. You would spend the day with your sister. -and 
the Professor would be certain to come to offer his 
condolences, so that you would see him again under 
the same conditions as the other time. The dream means 
no more than yo!! r wish to see him more (my italics), 
a wish which you are inwardly struggling against. 
I know you have a ticket for to-day'd concert in your 
pocket. Your dream was a dream of impatience: it 
anticipated the glimpse you are to have of him to-day 
by a few hours. 
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We learn once more that a dream is an expression of the dreamer'. s 
mental state, in this case the wish to see the man of her heart, which she 
was aware of in her waking life but was disguised in her dream. 1n contrast 
to the first example, the wish is expressed in a distorted form. Freud 
claims that it is dream-work, with its various mechanisms, which is 
responsible for the dream distortion. Which mechanisms, then, were 
operating in this particular case? Firstly, there was a displacement. 
We remember that displacement can be responsible for a replacement of 
the mental state by an allusion. The scene of Karl lying dead, just like 
his brother Otto, at which time the professor came to offer his condolences 
and she had a glimpse of him once more, was an allusionto her wish to see 
him during the evening concert. But although the picture of Karl's death 
in her dream was a replica of his brother's death in real life, one 
important element was missing in the manifest content. The dream didn't 
say that the professor came again to offer his condolences as he did 
when Otto died. We remember that when certain elements in the manifest 
content are missing, sometimes central to the understanding of its real 
- 04- - 
meaning, there is a mechanism of condensation at work. So the important 
omission in the girl's dream can be explained in terms of condensation. 
The fact that the dream had the form of a visual image is due to the mechanism 
of representation, responsible for transformation of thoughts into visual 
images. But there was one thing in the manifest content, however, which 
escaped distortion. She said that the sight of Karl's death in her dream 
produced neither grief nor pain on her part. According to Freud, since 
it affect had to be in tune with her wish and not with its disguise there was 
thus no occasion for grief. " 
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The dreams discussed so far were expressions of a wish the dreamer 
was aware of in waking life, even if there was some distortion in the second 
case. Let us look now at an example of a dream being an expression of an 
unconscious motive. A lady who had been married for many years, though she 
was still young, had the following dream. 
She was at the theatre with her husband. One side of 
the stalls was completely empty. Her husband told her 
that Elise L. and her fiancg had wanted to go too, but 
had only been able to get bad seats - three for I florin 
50 kreuzers - and of course they could not take those. 
She thought it would not really have dog-eany harm if they had. "59 
The first thing the lady told Freud in connection with her dream was the fact 
that on the previous day she received news that a friend of hers, 
Elise L., who was her contemporary, had just became engaged. Her dream 
was a reaction to this information. Both Elise'L. and her fiance appear 
in the manifest content of her dream. But what about other elements 
in her manifest dream? The dreamer was able to produce the following 
associations to them. The detail about one side of the stalls being empty 
reminded her of a real event from the previous week. She wanted to go to 
a particular play, and being afraid that the tickets might be sold out she 
bought them so early that she had to pay a booking fee. On arrival at 
the theatre she noticed, however, that one side of the stalls was empty, 
just as in her dream. Her husband had kept on teasing her for ha, ýing been 
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in too much of a hurry and paying the extra fee unnecessarily. The sum 
of 1 fl. 50 kreuzers reminded her of yet another event. She was told on 
the previous day that her sister-in-law had been given a present of 150 
florins by her husband and had been in a great hurry - the silly goose - 
to rush off to jewellers' and spend the whole sum-on a piece of jewellery. 
In connection with the word "three" in her dream the only thing she could 
think of was that Elise, her newly - engaged friend, was only three months 
her junior, though she herself had been married for nearly ten years. But 
she wasn't able, however, to produce any associations to the absurd idea 
of taking three tickets for only two people. What struck Freud in this 
case was a large number of references to things being done in a hurry, too 
early, etc., in her associations to the dream, although not in its manifest 
content. "She took the theatre tickets too early, bought them over-hurriedly 
so that she had to pay more than necessary; so too her sister-in-law had 
been in a hurry to take her money to the jewellers and buy some jewellery 
,, 60 with it, as though otherwise she would miss it. By putting together 
this idea of things done in a hurry with the news that her friend, though 
only three months her junior, had nevertheless got an excellent husband, 
the news to which her dream was a reaction, Freud was able to reach the 
following interpretation. "Really it was absurd of me to be in such a burry 
to get married! I can see from Elise's example that I could have got a 
husband later too., '61 Freud reports that the lady agreed to this inter- 
pretation'of her dream but was surprised by it. He makes some further 
comments about this dream but stresses, however, that they should be taken 
with caution because the dreamer wasn't able to produce the relevant associations 
We remember that she couldn't comment on the fact that according to her 
dream, three tickets were bought for two people. Freud suggests that this 
absurdity could be an ingenious piece of representation of the absurditv of 
getting married so early, expressed by the latent content of her dream. 
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The relation between two sums of money (150 florins is a hundred times 
more than 1 florin 50) could mean "And I could have got one a hundred 
times better with the money! " The money in her dream could be a reference 
to her 'dowry'. 
In this dream, as in the second example, we are faced with various 
distortions, and different mechanisms of dream-work responsible for them 
could be traced out. But the structure is even more complicated. There 
isn't any simple relation between the manifest and latent elements but 
"a group-relation between the two layers, within which one manifest element 
can replace several latent ones or one latent element can be replaced by 
several manifest ones. , 
62 This dream gives us a glimpse of the enormous 
difficulty of the task of interpretation and provides a warning against 
any simple approach. Freud wrote 
In interpreting a dream moreover, we find that the 
associations to a single manifest element need not 
emerge in succession: we must often wait till the 
whole dream has been interpreted. Thus the dream- 
work carries out a very unusual kind of trans- 
cription of the dream-thoughts: it is not a word- 
for-word or a sign-for-sign translation; nor is 
it a selection made according to fixed rules - as 
though one were to reproduce only the consonants in 
a word and to leave out the vowels; nor is it what 
might be described as a representative selection - 
one element being invariably chosen to take place 
of several; it is something different and far more 
complicated. , 
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This fact makes the task of interpretation impossible in some cases and 
Freud himself admits explicitly that not all dreams are capable of being 
interpreted. 
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The first question Freud's theory of dreams provokes is as follows. 
He claims that dreams are invariably fulfillmentsof wishes and yet his 
analy'sis shows that there are also other motives. Anxiety dreams with 
distressing contents are the most obvious exceptions to Freud's general 
claim. In their case Freud used various strategies to argue that they 
are wish fulfillments after all. He suggested, firstly, that there are 
people with masochistic tendencies who might derive pleasure from painful 
experiences and this might also be the case with dreams. We read "It will 
at once be seen that people of this kind can have counter-wish dreams 
and unpleasurable dreams, which are none the less wish-fulf illments since 
they satisfy their masochistic inclinations. " 
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Secondly, he argues 
that a painful dream may be 'wishful' in the sense that "distressing dreams 
do in fact contain something which is distressing to the secondary agency 
(i. e. superego), but something which at the same time fulfills a wish 
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on the part of the first agenty (i. e. id)". If we do not like Freud's 
talk about different agencies in this context, his point can be made in a 
different way. One might suggest that a person can have a wish which he 
doesn't like, and if such a wish is fulfilled the man might still be left 
unsatisfied. And thirdly, it is possible that some. painful 'day-residues' 
which constitute the manifest content of the dream might serve as a disguise 
for the dreamer's repressed wish. Despite the ingenuity of all these 
arguments it is not clear that all distressing dreams could be explained 
in some such way, and as we shall soon see, Freud came to abandon this 
general claim anyway. 
Why, l. despite apparent evidence to the contrary, does Freud neverthe- 
less want to maintain that all dreams are wish-fulfillments? An answer 
to this question can be found in the following passages. 
But all this has not brought us a step nearer to solving 
the riddle of why it is that the unconscious has nothing 
else to offer during sleep but the motive force for the 
fulfillment of a wish. The answer to this question must 
throw light upon the psychical nature of wishes, and I 
propose to give the answer by reference to our schematic 
picture of the psychical apparatus. 
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which he does in the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams. 
From. his considerations there it follows that 
it is self-evident that dreams must be wish-fulfillments, since 
nothing but a wish can set our mental apparatus at work. 
Dreams, which fulfill their wishes along the short path of 
regression, have merely preserved for us in that respect 
a sample of the psychical apparatus' primary method of 
working, a method which was abandoned as being inefficient. 
What once dominated waking life, while the mind was still 
young and incompetent, seems now to have been banished 
into the night. 
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What becomes evident from these passages is the fact that the notions of wish 
and wish-fulfillment are used here by Freud in a technical sense. As 
technical or theoretical concepts they are connected with other terms of 
his metapsychological theory such as "primary process" mode of functioning 
of the mental apparatus, "regression", etc. Whether this concept of 
wish-fulfillment can be elucidated by means of its connections with other 
concepts of his metapsychological theory ddesn! )t interest us at the moment. 
What is important to realise at this stage is the fact that all these concepts 
are to be explained in terms of Freud's theory of the mind and not in terms 
of experiences of the person i. e. the states or processes he can report. 
Freud may be justified in using technical terms, but if he does so he cannot 
at the same time claim that "the dreamer himself should tell us what his 
dream means", because people are not in a position to observe the unconscious 
processes postulated by Freud's metapsychology, to which the technical 
notion of wish-fulfillment is referring at the end. In other words Freud 
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cannot have it both ways, i. e. use the notions of wish and wish-fulfillment 
in a technical sense only and also claim that a person is in a position 
to understand the wish behind his dream. 
In his later works Freud was in fact prepared to admit that there are 
some exceptions to his general claim about dreams, and he didn't try to 
rescue his thesis by appealing to the technical notions of wish and 
wish-fulfillment. Consider firstly the case of traumatic neurosis. People 
suffering from it experienced a severe trauma in their life, caused by 
a war or other catastrophic incident. Such people very often reported 
recurring dreams in which their traumatic experience was repeated again 
and again. Faced with such phenomena, Freud had to admit at the end that 
"In their case the dreams regularly end in the generation of anxiety. 
We should not, I think, be afraid to admit that here the function of the 
dream has failed. , 68 By saying that their function has failed Freud means 
that they failed to gratify a wish. Later on his departure from his 
wish-fulfillment thesis included yet further cases of dreams. We are 
told that 
Actual experiences of the day are sometimes simply repeated 
in sleep; reproductions of traumatic scenes in "dreams" 
have led us only l. ately to revise the theory of dreams. 
There are dreams which are to be distinguished from 
the usual type by certain special qualities, which are, 
properly speaking, nothing but night-phantasies, not 
having undergone additions or alterations of any kind 
and being in all other ways similar to the familiar 
day-dreams. 69 
Freud is saying in effect that such dreams can express a variety of motives, 
not merely wishes. It is clear, therefore, that the notions of wish 
and wish-fulfillment are too narrow to encompass all the dream phenomena 
N 
Freud came across, and he was prepared to admit as much, on some occasions 
at least. 
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So far so good. Freud provides us with an interlting story about ýs 
dreams which has certain attractions, even if we are not prepared to 
swallow all the details of it such as the wish-fulfillment generalization 
discussed above. Dreams do seem to have something interesting and yet 
puzzling about them, and we feel that they call for interpretation. In 
fact people from various cultures and different periods have tried to 
interpret dreams. It is understandable, therefore, that Freud's suggestion 
about the possibility of interpreting dreams would be found attractive. 
But however attractive it looks, it Might be an illusion after all. The 
task of interpretation, whether of a dream or something else, requires 
that there should be some intersubjective data we can appeal to in arguing 
for the correctness of an interpretation. Without such data we wouldn't 
be able to distinguish between correct and incorrect interpretations. 
In the case of dreams such intersubjective data seem to be unavailable. 
The only thing we can rely an seems to be the dreamer's own report, and 
this is unfortunately very untrustworthy. We know all too well how 
easily we forget our dreams. And what guarantee do we have that our 
apparent recollections of dreams areri't in fact stories made up by us when 
we wake up? Freud himself was aware of these dangers when he wrote: 
If anyone gives an account of a dream, has he any 
guarantee that his account has been correct, or 
that he may not, on the contrary, have altered his 
account in the course of giving it and have been 
obliged to invenf some addition to it to make up 
for the indistinctness of his recollections? Most 
dreams cannot be remembered at all and are forgotten 
except for small fragments. And is the interpretation 
of material of this kind to serve as the basis of a 
scientific psychology or as a method for treating patients? 
70 
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Being aware of all these problems how could Freud still attempt to erect 
his theory on such unreliable data? He was convinced that there is a 
solution in the suggestion that the dreamer's report of the content 
of his dream should be taken at its face value. We read "We can help 
to overcome the defect of the uncertainty in remembering dreams if we decide 
that whatever the dreamer tells us must count as his dream (my italics), 
without regard to what he may have forgotten or have altered in recalling it. " 
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The question whether the dreamer's report is a veridical recollection of 
his dream is not of great importance to Freud, because according to 
his doctrine the dreamer's narrative, i. e. the manifest contenty is 
usually distorted anyway. To arrive at the true meaning of the dream Freud 
has to appeal to its latent content. And what is evidence for the latter 
is not so much the original report but the dreamer's waking reactions, e. g. 
how he feel's about it. The dream might remind him of some events from 
the previous day or even things from early childhood. In other words 
the psychoanalyst asks the dreamer to produce a substitute for his dream, 
which still belongs to the original report in a way. This substitute 
is then used as a basis for interpretation. And since it is produced 
by the subject when he is awake it is as capable of intersubjective 
observation as the rest of his waking behaviour. Freud's reliance on the 
report of the dreamer can be compared with N. Malcolm's view that whatever 
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the person tells sincerely upon waking counts as his dream. 1n opposition 
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to Freud, for whom "Dreaming is evidently mental life during sleeo" , 
Malcolm claims, however, thfat dreaming is not to be conceived of as a process 
temporally preceding dream reports. But because this difference hasn't 
any implications for the actual interpretation of dream-contents (as Malcolm agrees, 
we aren't going to discuss it, here. 
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Freud's attempt to base the interpretation of dreams on the dreamer's 
waking reactions to his dream, or free associations as he calls them, looks 
a sensible strategy. Some critics of Freud do not believe, however, 
that it could be successful. In Wittgenstein's view what it enables 
Freud to achieve are at best "wondrous representations". 
Freud remarks on how, after the analysis of it, the 
dream appears so very logical. And of course it does. 
You could start with any of the objects on this table - 
which certainly are not put there through your dream 
activity - and you could find that they all would be 
connected in a pattern like that; and the pattern would 
be logical in the same way. 
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So dream interpretation is said to be analogous to arranging objects on a 
table into some pattern. What. is this analogy supposed to show? It shows, 
in Wittgenstein's view, that although free associations eýable Freud to 
produce some logical patterns, these patterns are unrelated to the dream 
just as the objects which happened to be on the table could be arranged into 
a pattern in no way determined by their original arrangement. However, 
Wittgenstein's analogy fails for the following reason. A dream is produced 
(even if unintentionally) by the dreamer, whereas the objects on the table 
may not have been put there. by any one person, as Wittgenstein himself 
said "certainly are not put there through your dream activity. " So there 
is some kind of internal connection between the dreamer and his dream 
which is absent in Wittgenstein's example. And if so, there was no need 
for the person who found some objects on the table to arrange them into 
a pattern, unless he wanted to do so for fun. But if the dreamer produces 
something he himself is puzzled about, there is a need to make it 
intelligible. In other words, the arrangement of objects on the table 
does not call for interpretation whereas dreams do, and so it*is reasonable 
for people from different places and periods to try to interpret them. 
-lJ3. ý 
Wittgenstein gives several such analogies of dream interpretations. 
Let us look at one more. 
Suppose we were to regard a dream as a kind of game 
which the. dreamer played. There might be a game in which 
paper figures were put together to form a story, or at 
any rate were somehow assembled. The materials might 
be collected and stored in a scrap-book, full of 
pictures and anedotes. The child might then take 
various bits from the scrap-book to put into the 
construction; and he might take a considerable 
picture because it had something in it he wanted 
and might just include the rest because it was there. 
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It is not entirely clear what Wittgenstein means by saying that some bits 
and pieces were included by the child in the construction just "because 
they were there". He seems to suggest that there might be no logical or 
meaningful connection between them and the rest of the picture. And if 
we think of a dream as a kind of game then not everything the dreamer 
reports has to be meaningful or logical, as "Not everything in the story 
is allegorical. , 
76 If this is what he meant, he is not yet critical of 
Freud. Freud never said that every element of the dreamer's narrative 
is meaningful. From his discussion of the mechanisms of dream-work, secondary 
revision in particular, it follows very clearly that some elements of 
the manifest content are merely shreds and patches produced to fill up the 
gaps in the dream-structure, without any other meaning than that. In his 
interpretation of particular dreams Freud doesn't try to ascribe a meaning 
to every element of the dreamer's narrative either. In the second case 
above, for instance, the dreamer reported that in her dream the boy's 
coffin was surrounded by candles. And although candles are regarded by 
Freud as an important phallic symbol he didn't try to interpret them thus 
in this particular instance because in his view they were just patches 
produced by secondary revision to make the whole scene look more realistic. 
This second analogy of dream interpretation seems to be better than the first, 
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because the games can express the child's phantasies as dreams do, and 
they are in fact used in some cases of child analysis. However, 
Wittgenstein's example as it stands might not be the best analogy of dream 
interpretation. He doesn't tell us whether the selection from the scrap- 
book was assembled by the child himself or somebody else. Suppose it was 
assembled by somebody else in such a way that bits and pieces fitted 
each other. And if that was the case then the reason why the child put 
them together was just because they fitted each other. Such a construction 
can give us some information about the child's intelligence or ability 
but wouldn't be a good guide to his phantasies. But if the bits and 
pieces were assembled by the child himself because he wanted to produce 
some story, the psychoanalyst can try to interpret his story as he interprets 
dreams, and such'interpretation might teach us something about thi child's 
phantasies. This is in fact one of the ways in which psychoanalysts 
coping with children proceed. 
From these and other remarks of Wittgenstein it follows that In his 
view when Freud tries to interpret dreams what he is aiming at is some 
"logical pattern". But is it indeed the case that Freud's dream interpretation 
is merely concerned with producing a logical pattern? It depends, of 
course, what we mean by a "logical pattern. " Freud himself sometimes 
talks about dreams being "logical". By that he means that the narrative 
produced by the dreamer is perfectly consistent and intelligible, like 
narratives produced in waking life. But there are also dream narratives 
which have gaps and inconsistencies in them. In some, strange mumbles 
occur, which sound like words but which do not belong to any dictionary. 
Such dreams are entirely unintelligible and we wouldn't even try to compare 
them with waking narratives. But in Freud's view intelligible or 
"logical" dreams call for interpretation as much as unintelligible ones do. 
So a logical pattern of this kind is not what Freud is aiming at when 
he tries to interpret dreams. What is his dream interpretation about then? 
-14!; -- 
The analysis of dreams discussed above makesit very clear. In the 
first case (the little girl) he connects the dreamer's narrative with 
her waking life, i. e. what happened on the previous day while she was 
on a walk with her father and friends, namely, how she was disappointed 
at not being able to visit Rohrer Hutte and the Hameau and how her expectations 
were aroused by her father's promise that he would take the children to 
both places on another occasion. The second example was also connected 
with the dreamer's waking experience and behaviour, i. e. what she told 
Freud about her feeling towards the professor, what she did in order to 
see him and how she anticipated the evening when she was going to have a 
glimpse of her beloved once more. And the same is true in the other 
cases. For Freud, therefore, to interpret a dream is to connect it with 
the person's waking life, his wishes, feelings, expectations, etc., and 
it is because of this connection that the interpretation becomes acceptable, 
not just because it arranges the dream into some logical pattern, as 
Wittgenstein suggests. 
Secondly, if Freud was merely concerned with a logical pattern he 
wouldn't: insist, again and again, on the importance of the dreamer's 
associations in the interpretation of dreams. "But dream interpretation 
of such a kind, without reference to the dreamer's associations, would in the 
most favourable case remain a piece of unscientific virtuosity of very 
doubtful value. " 
77 He also wrote 1. 
"Even if, owing to one's own experience, one is in 
a position to understand many dreams to the 
interpretation of which the dreamer has contributed 
little, one must always remember that the certainty 
of such interpretations remains in doubt and one 
hesitates to press one's conjectures upon the 
patient. " 
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Why is the dreamer's reaction to his dream such an important element in its 
interpretation in Freud's view? Because to understand the meaning of the 
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dream is also to understand bow it came about, i. e. what was responsible 
for its production. "We not only want to know what a dream says, if it 
speaks clearly, as it does in these examples of ours, we also want to know 
why and for what purpose this familiar material, only recently experienced, 
has been repeated in the dream". 
79 The questions what does the dream say 
and why did the person dream it are two aspects of the same problem, because 
according to him, the experience which led to a dream manifests itself 
in a form which is somehow related to its cause. The person's reaction 
to his dream is another expression of his experience. So by asking the 
subject to associate to his dream Freud is looking for independent evidence 
pointing towards some motive behind the dreamer's original narrative. 
All that suggests that the interpretation of dreams is unlike many other 
interpretations we come across. 
Take, for instance, the interpretation of poetry. In order to 
understand a poem we do not have to appeal to the poet's intention or 
motive even if there was some such motive. Suppose the poet was in love 
with a woman and his poem expresses his love. This information might be 
interesting, but is not essential for the understanding of his poem. 
Quite often a reader gives an interpretation of a poem which surprises 
its author, and although such an interpretation might be quite different 
from what the poet had in mind when he was writing he might still accept it. 
Somebody else can give yet another interpretation of the same poem, and 
all these different interpretations might be peifectly acceptable. This 
is possible because in the case of poetry what matters is whether an 
interpretation is interesting or original and not whether it is correct 
or incorrect according to the author's states of mind. I suppose we could 
look at dreams as a kind of poetry and ask whether they are interesting, 
original, etc. But it is certainly not the way Freud wants to look at them. 
What he expects from the interpretation of a dream is some information about 
-1(7 
the dreamer himself, namely, what wish, feeling or other mental state 
made him have this particular dream. So what matters is not the 
originality or cleverness of the interpretation but whether it describes 
the dreamer's motives correctly or incorrectly. All that doesn't exclude 
the possibility of dreams having more than one meaning, as Freud himself 
suggested. This can happen when two or even more wishes instigate one 
dream. But the criterion of correctness is still applicable here, unlike 
in the case of poetry. 
Let us look in turn at a case of interpretation where correctness 
or incorrectness does matter, as in the case of dreams. An interpretation 
of a jig-saw puzzle would be an example. Suppose a picture is cut into 
a large number of fragments of irregular shapes. As a result each fragment 
has an unintelligible piece of drawing upon it. All the fragments are 
then mixed up. Suppose a person who produced this jig-saw puzzle (or 
somebody else) is asked to solve it. If he succeeded in putting each 
fragment into the right place so that all the fragments fit into each other 
and there is no gap anywhere in the picture we can say that he solved 
the jig-saw puzzle correctly. But if there are some gaps, or some fragments 
do not fit into each other, his solution is incorrect. So the notions of 
correctness and incorrectness are applicable here. But is this kind of 
interpretation similar to dream interpretation? Certainly not, because 
what matters in the jig-saw puzzle is a logical pattern and not the motive 
of the person who cut the picture up. Suppose one person produces the 
jig-saw puzzle because he feels bored and wants to kill time in this way, 
while another does it just to prove that he can do it. The solution 
to the jig-saw puzzle is correct regardless of the motive for the 
production of the puzzle. But if two dreamers happen to produce similar, 
or even identical, dream narratives, their interpretations could still 
be very different. 
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The interpretation of dreams is not like that of poetry, or indeed 
any work of art, nor is it like the solution of a jig-saw puzzle. It is 
more like the ifiterpretation of puzzling and unintelligible behaviour, 
such as neurotic symptoms, where in order to understand the meaning of 
the person's products we have to find his motive. We have already learnt 
about the ways in which Freud arrives at understanding of the various 
neurotic symptoms. In order to establish a motive behind a particular 
symptom he connects its content with the rest of the subject's behaviour 
and his situation. When such a connection is not clear he asks the 
subject himself to suggest a possible connection, as in the case of the 
table-cloth lady's ritual. So what the subject himself says in connection 
with his symptoms provides an important clue for understanding his motive. 
Some further information provided by the person himself, or acquired in some 
other way, can also be important. In the table-cloth lady's case, for 
instance, it was quite important to learn that she was still in love with 
her husband despite his impotence. In other words, the motive ascribed 
to the person has to be consistent with the rest of his behaviour and the 
kind of person he is. Similar requirements have to be met in the case 
of dreams. If to interpret a dream is to connect it with the person's 
waking life, as Freud does, there should be a consistency between the 
motive ascribed on the basis of the dream and that indicated by waking 
behaviour. Does Freud's interpretation of dreams, discussed here, satisfy 
these. conditions? 
When the wish to visit Ruhrer Hu"tte and Hameau was ascribed to the 
little girl on the basis of her dream, Freud took into account the content 
of the dream. itself as well as the girl's expression of her wish, prior 
to the dream, when during the walk she asked her father to take her to 
these both places. In this case it was easy to establish the'motive 
behind the dream, because the wish was expressed by its manifest content 
and the person's own avowal of her wish was available to the observer. 
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What Freud did in this particular case is very similar to the common 
sense interpretation of motivated behaviour. We hear, for example, a 
person expressing his anger with somebody and then he does something that 
reflects his anger, which justifies the observer in ascribing this very 
motive to his behaviour. In cases like that the subject himself is 
usually quite aware of the motive for his behaviour, just as the dreamer 
would be able to understand quite easily the motive for his dream, when it 
is expressed in an undisguised form. When I go to bed hungry and then 
dream about eating a large quantity of'food I don't need a psychoanalyst 
or anybody else to tell me what my dream is an expression of. 
However, most dreams are not like that at all. In order to understand 
their meanings we cannot appeal to their manifest contents because they 
express wishes or other motives in a disguised form. How does Freud 
arrive at the meaning of this kind of dream? First of all he asks the 
dreamer himself about the meaning of his dream. This is always a good 
strategy to try, because what is puzzling and unintelligible to the 
observer, who might not be very familiar with the details of the dreamer's 
life, might be much clearer or even obvious to the dream r himself, as 
the following case shows. A lady reported that when she was a child she 
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very often dreamt that "God wore a paper cocked-hat on his head" . 
Freud's reaction was as follows: "What can you make of that without the 
dreamer's help? It sounds completely nonsensical". It doesn't make any 
sense to us either, but the dreamer could make sense of it. Qhen she was 
a child, she used to have a hat of that kind put on her head at meals, 
because she could never resist taking furtive glances at her brothers' 
and sisters' plates to see whether they had been given larger helpings 
than she had. She said "As I had heard that God was omniscient aild 
saw everything, the dream can only mean that I knew everything and saw 
everything, even though. they tried to prevent me. "81 Now we can appreciate 
even more Freud's suggestion that people should be made as far as possible 
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to produce the solution to their riddles themselves. This applies 
not only to dreams but other riddles as well. We remember Frau Cacilie's 
case of facial neuralgia which puzzled Freud because of its unusual 
nature, but which Frau Cacilie herself could connect quite easily with 
the insulting remark from her husband, which she felt as a slap in the face. 
In every-day life when we come across some puzzling behaviour we use 
the same strategy as Freud does, i. e. we ask the subject himself what is 
the motive or reason for doing what he does, and his answer might remove 
our Puzzlement. Suppose we observe somebody removing all the books from 
his study, except those which have yellow and brown covers; which looks 
strange to us. His information that he does so for an aesthetic reason, to 
make the colour of the books fit with the rest of the room, helps to 
remove our puzzlement, even if we ourselves don't share his aesthetic 
tastes or wouldn't care about the aesthetic details of our surroundings 
as much as he does. 
But there are also some dreams, just as there were cases of neurotic 
symptoms, where the subject is as puzzled by what he himself produces 
as an independent observer of his behaviour would be. The young girl's 
dream about her little nephew being dead, discussed earlier, could be an 
example. When asked about the meaning of her dreamoriginally she was 
unable to make any sense of it. What Freud did in her case was to try to 
use the information about her situation, which was available to him 
independently of the dream, and then apply it to her dream. He knew 
that she was in love with the man, whom she was going to see on the s 
day as she reported her dream. It was easy to see that what preoccupied 
the girl's mind at that time was her expectation of seeing her sweetheart 
and that her dream could be influenced by this frame of mind. However, 
the manifest content of the dream didn't make any reference to the man she 
loved. But when she was asked to produce free associations to her dream 
she said that the little nephew's death has reminded her of his brother's 
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real death wnen the professorýcame to see them again and she was 
enjoying the sight of him once more. This unmistakable connection between 
her associations to the dream and what the dreamer was going to do in her 
waking life enabled Freud to say that her dream anticipated her desire 
to see the man she was in love with. 
Although this interpretation of the dream satisfies the criterion of 
consistency, which is a necessary condition for the correctness of the 
interpretation, it might not meet the sufficient condition however. We 
can imagine a different interpretation of the same dream also consistent 
with other aspects of her experience and behaviour, but rival to that 
given by Freud. We have learned from the girl's own account that of the 
two nephews it was Otto who was her favourite and she was less fond of 
Karl, who appeared dead in her dream. We can suggest, therefore, that 
the motive behind her dream was the wish that Karl rather than his brother, 
of whom she was much fonder, were dead. This interpretation, different 
from Freud's, is also consistent with our knowledge of the dreamer. How 
are we to decide between these two different interpretations? One way 
is to accept the interpretation offered by the dreamer herself. After 
reporting her dream the girl said "Now tell me, what can that mean? ... 
does the dream mean that I-would rather Karl were dead than Otto whom 
I was so much fonder of? , 
82 But she didn't feel it was the right way of 
interpreting her dream and was happy to accept the interpretation offered 
by Freud. Although this acceptance was important for Freud, he had some 
further reasons not to choose the second line of interpretation. What 
preoccupied the girl at the time of her dream was the professor and her 
desire to see him on every possible occasion. She reported her dream in 
the morning and on the same day in the evening she was going to see him. 
So although both interpretations were consistent with our knowledge of 
the dreamer. that given by Freud was more relevant to her behaviour and 
experience at the time. If her dream had occurred soon after Otto's death, 
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when she was still in deep mourning, the second line of interpretation 
would have been more plausible. The fact that the girl experienced neither 
grief nor pain in her dream also suggests, according to Freud, that it was 
a pleasant wish connected with seeing the professor rather than with her 
dead nephew, which found expression in her dream, and thus there was no 
occasion for grief. The way in which the meaning of this dream was 
understood reminds us of Dora's understanding of hir symptom.! Like the girl 
from this example, who couldn't see the meaning of her dream at first, 
Dora couldn't understand her abdominal pains. But when Dora reported to 
Freud that her pains started exactly nine months after the erotic scene 
by the lake. she at once understood the sijanificance of this Deriod of 
time, and without much help from Freud could grasp the meaning of her 
symptom. The girl too, when she suddenly said with 'Conviction "Of course, 
the professor came to see us again after a long absence, and I saw him 
once more beside little Otto's coffin", was probably close to grasping 
the meaning of her dream by herself, if not actually knowing it already, 
before Freud's interpretation of her dream was given to her. 
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Other cases of interpretations of dreams provided by Freud are less 
convincing, and the justifications given for them aren't satisfactory, 
as in the dream about going to the theatre, for example. What struck 
Freud about that particular case was a large number of references tb things 
being done in a hurry, too early, etc., in the dreamer's associations. 
to her dream, although no such things occurred in its manifest content. 
There was also one element of the dream which reminded the dreamer of the 
fact that her friend, onlv three months junior, had just became engaged, 
though she herself had been married for nearly ten years. By connecting 
these two things together Freud came to the conclusion that the 
woman's dream was an expression of her regret at having married so early. 
Unlike the previous cases, however, the dreamer never expressed any such 
motive in her waking life, neither are we given any examples of her 
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behaviour which would suggest that some such motive was actually preselit. 
We cannot say, therefore, that in this case Freud succeeded in connecting 
the dreamer's alleged motive with the rest of her behaviour, which makes 
his interpretation rather doubtful. However, Freud tries to appeal to her 
acceptance of his interpretation and suggests that this was a sign that 
his guess was correct. But although the woman accepted his interpretation 
she was at the same time surprised by it. And because ot this element of 
surprise her acceptance should be taken with caution, and anyway it is 
not enough to show that the interpretation provided was in fact correct. 
It is possible to argue that her surprise could be a sign of not being 
really convinced by what she was told, although she didn't want to disagree 
with Freud. Or she might have been sincerely impressed by the ingenuity 
of his argument without being sure that what was ascribed to her was really 
the case, or perhaps she accepted it. for some other such reasons. We 
haven't, therefore, good grounds for accepting Freud's interpretation of 
this dream. But we can imagine a situation which would make his claim about 
the lady's motive look more plausible. Suppose on some occasion she was 
criticizing young girls for being too keen to accept a first proposal 
of marriage without learning more about men and life, just because of the 
fear that the chance might not turn up again. She herself was such a girl, 
without realizing that what she said applied to her own case. But as it 
stands, Freud's interpretation of this dream is not sufficiently proven. 
(C) Interpretations of Errors 
Various "parap-raxes" (Freud's term for errors) such as slips of 
the tongue, mislaying things, failures of memory etc. are another kind of 
N 
phenomenon to which Freud and his followers paid a lot of attention. 
Freud was convinced that parapraxes, together with dreams and symptoms, 
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can teach us interesting things about mental processes, and about 
unconscious processes in particular. He also regarded parapraxes as 
the best preliminary material for presenting his views to those whose 
interest in psychoanalysis wasn't professional. Parapraxes are phenomena 
with which all of us are familiar, for we make them and observe other 
people making them. Neurotic symptoms are usually not so familiar to us 
in this way. Dreams, like parapraxes, are common phenomena but, on the 
surface at least, they seem to be more difficult to understand. Parapraxes, 
therefore, are a good way of learning about Freud's ideas and particularly 
his views concerning unconscious mental processes. 
Let us start with some examples given by Freud himself. It is important 
to appeal to his own examples, because he usually selects them to make 
it easier for the reader to follow his argument. In Introductory Lectures 
on Psychoanalysis he gives the following examples of slips of the tongue. 
The President of the Lower House of the Austrian Parliament once opened 
the sitting with the words: "Gentlemen, I take notice that a full quorum 
of members is present and herewith. declare the sitting closed". 
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A 
lady commenting on her holiday said: "It is certainly not at all pleasant 
if one has been tramping all day in the sun and has perspired right through 
one's blouse and chemise". In this sentence she had to overcome a slight 
hesitation at one point. Then she continued: "But then when one gets 
"nach Hose" [drawersJ (instead of "nach Hause [home)) and can change... 
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A different example of parapraxes is the forgetting of'an intention, 
as in the following case, A person for reasons unknown to him, left a 
letter lying on his desk for several days. At last he decided to send it 
off, but he had it returned to him by the Dead Letter Office since he had 
forgotten to address it. After he had addressed it he took it to the 
post, but this time it had no stamp. And then at last he was obliged to 
admit his reluctance to sending the letter off at all. 
86 
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What Freud calls a "faulty act" is a further kind of parapraxes. 
The following faulty act was performed by Freud's colleague, with whom he 
was conducting a series of complicated experiments. One day this 
colleague complained to Freud about losing so much time on the experiment, 
while he had so much else to do at home. Referring to an incident the 
week before he added: "Let us hope that the machine will go wrong again 
so that we can stop work and go home early". On the same day the following 
thing happened. In arranging the work he was given the regulation of 
the valve of the press. His task was to stop the Valve when the right 
pressure was reached, which was indicated by a loud call "stop" from the 
person conducting the experiment. But when the call "stop" came instead 
of stopping the valve he seized it and turned with all his might to the left. 
This caused the full pressure of the accumulator to come suddenly on the 
press, a strain for which the connecting-pipes were not designed, so that 
one of them immediately burst. As a result the experiment had to be 
suspended for the day. 
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Psychologists of non-psychoanalytic persuasion, if they deal with these 
phenomena at all, usually try to explain them in terms of lack of attention, 
excitement, nervousness, fatigue, etc. In other words they perceive them 
as being caused by some pýysiological states of the person. Such a view 
is in sharp contrast with the psychoanalytic understanding of these 
phenomena, at least in some cases. What is exactly the psychoanalytic 
view of parapraxes? Firstly, Freud doesn't deny that certain parapraxes 
could be explained in terms of lack of attention, fatigue, etc. He wrote 
"When we are excited, .... we often make mistakes 
over words - and over things as well, and a 'bungled 
action' follows. Intentions are forgotten and a 
quantity of other undesigned actions become 
noticable if we are absent-ininded - that is, 
properly speaking, if we are concentratod on 
something else. A familiar example of this 
absent-mindedness is the Professor ... who 
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leaves his umbrella behind and takes the wrong 
hat because he is thinking about the problems 
88 he is going to deal with in his next book" . 
But not all parapraxes can be explained in these terms, according to 
Freud, and it is those which cannot which attract the psychoanalysi's 
attention. We should be able to understand why later on. Disturbance 
of attention, fatigue, etc., might play some role, but these factors 
cannot be necessary conditions for parapraxes, in Freud's view. As he said, 
"The influence on the production of slips of the 
tongue by physiological dispositions brought about 
by slight illness, disturbance of the circulation 
or states of exhaustion, must be recognized at once; 
daily and personal experience will convince you of it. 
But how little they explain. Above all, they are not 
necessary preconditions of parapraxes (my italics) ... 
These somatic factors only serve therefore, to 
facilitate and favour the peculiar mental mechanism 
of slips of the tongue. " 
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What then are necessary conditions for parapraxes? Freud gives the 
following answer: "All we have done is, in certain cases, to add a motive 
to the factors that have been recognized all along as being able to bring 
about the forgetting of a name". 
90 
Sometimes instead of talking about the 
motives behind parapraxes, ' Freud talks about their sense or meaning. He 
wrote "We may take it as the outcome of our efforts so far and the basis 
of our further investigations that parapraxes have a sense (my italics). 
91 
By saying that a slip of tongue; for instance, has meaning he doesn't 
suggest merely that the product of it, i. e. the sentence produced by 
the speaker, has meaning. He explains that by the "sense" of parapraxes 
he understands "nothing other by it than the intention it serves and its 
position in a psychical continuity. In most of our researches we can 
replace 'sense' by 'intention' or 'purpose'. 
92 That suggests 
%. 
that for 
Freud to say that a parapraxis has a sense is a way of saying that there 
is a motive behind it. Ais use of these terms resembles our ordinary 
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use of them. We sometimes ask what is the meaning of some action, a 
symbolic action in particular, and then reply by quoting people's motives 
for its performance. 
All this suggests that Freud views parapraxes as we view intentional 
actions. For him they are not accidental phenomena but outcomes of our 
desires, intentions, etc. Such a view inevitably invites several questions. 
Firstly, did Freud really regard parapraxes, like the slip of the tongue 
for example, as intentional actions of a person, and if so how can he 
justify this view? Secondly, if there is a motive behind a parapraxis 
how can we establish what it is? In other words, what are the grounds for 
ascribing to people motives for their parapraxes? 
Let us concentrate on the former question first. Freud's interpreters 
disagree entirely about what is the right answer to this question. Some, 
like F. Siegler, believe that he regarded them as intentional or intended 
acts of a person. In his paper "Unconscious Intentions" Siegler says: 
"Freud considered himself to be engaged in a scientific 
enterprise in which he attempted toacHuce evidence in 
support of a -conclusion that errors such as slips 
of the tongue are intentional (my italics), although 
the intention is unconscious". 
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Others, like R. K. Shope, are convinced that 
". Even though Freud does believe that phenomena 
; 
uch 
as slips of the tongue sometimes result from 
intentions, he does not say that such errors are 
intentional. In fact, he affirms the opposite, 
saying that these are 'unintentional' or 
'purposeless' actions and that the art of 
interpretation frees 'the pure metal of the 
repressed thoughts from the ore of the 
unintentional ideas"". 
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What Freud said about parapraxes on some occasions seems to lend 
itself very well to Siegler's interpretation, i. e. that they are 
intentional acts. He said, for instance, that "you will see from these 
-12.? - 
examples that even obscurer cases of slips of the tongue can be explained 
by aconvergence, a mental 'interference', between two different intended 
speeches" (my italics). 
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Describing faulty acts, like that of the person 
who hoped that the machine would go wrong and who contributed to its 
disarrangement, Freud also said "The actions described so far, in which 
we recognized the carrying out of an unconscious intention, made their 
appearance in the form of disturbances of other intended actions and 
concealed themselves behind the pretext of clumsiness" (my italics). 
96 
. 
But other remarks about parapraxes invite the opposite interpretation, 
i. e. that they are not intentional acts. In The Psychopathology of Everyday 
Life he wrote "In discussing the examples of slips of the tongue we found 
it necessary to go beyond the content of what was intended to be said (my 
italics), and were obliged to look for the cause of the speech-disturbance: 
in something outside the intention". 
97 Each interpretation seems to fit 
some of Freud's remarks, but we cannot accept both of them because they 
contradict each other. It is important to notice, however, that when Freud 
makes some general remarks in passing, like those quoted above, his i. 
language can be quite loose and full of metaphors, and if so these remarks 
cannot be taken as the basis for interpreting his views. We have to look 
rather at the passages where he discusses some specific problems, because 
he is usually more precise then,. as in the following passage concerning 
the mechanisms of the slips of the tongue, where he writes 
- "Let us consider for a moment what it is that unites 
the three groups, what it is that the three mechanisms 
of slips of the tongue have in common. It is 
fortunately unmistakable. In the first two groups 
the disturbing purpose is recognized by the speaker; 
furthermore, in the first group that purpose announces 
itself immediately before the slip. But in both cases 
it is forced back. The speaker decides not io put 
it into words, and after that the slip of the tongue 
occurs: after that, that is to say, the purpose which 
-OS- 
has been forced back is put ii 
the speaker's will, either by 
of the intention which hebas 
with it, or by actually takin 
is the mechanism of a slip of 
nto words against 
altering the expression 
permitted, or by mingling 
g its place. This, then, 
the tongue". 
98 
Here, Freud is saying explicitly that the slip of the tongue expresses 
something against the speaker's will, something he decided not to put 
into words. And if so, it cannot be an intentional act. The same conclusion 
is implied by a passage where Freud makes a contrast between the slips 
of the tongue and intentional distortions of words. We read 
"Many people as we know, derive some pleasure from 
a habit like this of deliberately distorting 
innocent words into obscene ones; such distortions 
are regarded as funny, and when we hear one we must 
in fact first inquire from the speaker whether he 
uttered it intentionally as a joke or whether 
it happened as a slip of the tongue". 
99 
If Freud regarded slips of the tongue as intentional acts he wouldn't 
make such a contrast. Also, careful examination of Freud's actual 
interpretation of particular slips of the tongue suggests that he didn't 
regard them as intentional acts. Take, for instance, the President's slip 
of the tongue. "I declare the sitting opened, but I should prefer it to 
100 be already closed'! is the sense of the slip, according to Freud. 
So the President intended to open the sitting, although he wished it to be 
already closed. And it was this wish which interfered with his intention 
and produced the slip. Freud's comments on the lady, who instead of saying 
nnach Hause" said "nach Hose", also make it clear that what she happened 
to say wasn't intended, although it expressed her original intention which 
she decided not to carry out. As he said 
(30- 
"The lady's intention had obviously been to give 
a more complete list of her clothes: blouse, chemise 
and Hose [drawers]. Reasons of propriety led her to 
omit any mention of the 'Hose'. But in the next sentence, 
with its quite independent content, the unspoken work 
emerged as a distortion of the similar-sounding 'nach 
Hause' [homel". 101 
Freud is. saying, therefore, that the lady suppressed her original intention 
to mention drawers but this original intention interfered with her later 
intention and produced the slip of the tongue. All this implies that, 
contrary to some interpretations of him, Freud didn't regard slips of the 
tongue and other parapraxes as intentional acts, although he was convinced 
that the person's intention, wish, etc., which he decided not to carry 
out can interfere with his intended action and produce the parapraxis. 
some 
W)%efk, -v-k behaviour is an intentional action or not is quite often 
clear from the context in which it occurs. When the President said 
"I declare the sitting closed" we knew from the context that he didn't 
really intend to close it, for the simple reason that ithad not yet been 
opened, and neither President nor anybody else could intend to do some- 
thing impossible, although he could wish it could happen. It is also 
quite clear that what the lady said, namely, "But then when one gets 
'nach Hose' [drawers] and can change... ", wasn't intended by her either, 
because this sentence isn't even coherent. If their behaviour wire 
intentional actions, they would be using very inept and inappropriate 
Means to the supposed ends. Since the notion of an intentional action 
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presupposes some coherence between means and ends we would be in trouble 
if we decided to regard these two slips of the tongue as intentional actions. 
In other. - cases it might be more difficult to tell whether some piece of 
behaviour is an intentional action or a mere error, as in the case of the 
terminated experiment, for example. What the experimenter happened to do 
could also be done if he wanted to end the experiment intentionally. 
True, it wouldn't be the best means available to him, but still appropriate 
to achieve his end, unlike the two previous cases. However, to prove that 
the distinction we are looking for can be made, it is enough to show that 
it can be made systematically on some occasions, even if we are unable 
to make it clearly in all cases. 
Let us concentrate now an the second question, namely, how can we 
establish what is the sense of a particular parapraxis, i. e., what is the 
nature of the motives which contributed to its formationZ Sometimes 
Freud seems to suggest that there are cases where the parapraxis itself 
can tell us its own sense, as in the President's slip of the tongue. He 
wrote "The*sense ... of his slip was that he wanted to close the sitting. 
'He says so himself' we are tempted to quote: we need only take him at 
his word". 
102 It is true 'that in his slip the President happened to utter 
a sentence very close to one that could be used explicitly to state his 
wish if he had one. But are we already justified in ascribing it to him? 
No, for we also know that the President intended to open the session. And 
if so, it is reasonable to ascribe to him the desire opposite to that 
suggested by his slip. Confronted with such a conflict, we cannot decide 
arbitrarily that what the slip tells us has more weight and not the other 
way round. To decide the case we need, therefore, some further information. 
Freud in fact provides us with such information. He wrote 
"When the President of the Lower House with his 
first words closed the sitting instead of opening, 
it, we feel inclined, in view of our knowledge 
of the circumstance in which the slip of the 
tongue occurred, to recognize that the parapraxis 
-132- 
had a sense. The President expected nothing good 
of the sitting and would have been glad if he could 
have brought it an immediate end. " 
103 
It is clear, therefore, that when Freud ascribed to the President the wish 
that the session were closed he had independent reasons, apart from the 
slip, to suppose that he had such a wish. 
In the other examples quoted above we also have some independent 
reasons, apart from the parapraxis, to ascribe the relevant motive to the 
person. Take, for instance, the faulty act of the person who contributed 
to the disarrangement of the machine during the experiment. Even before 
the error took place, he himself admitted what his desire was. We remember 
him saying "Let us hope that the machine will go wrong again so that 
we can stop work and go home". The person who failed to send the letter, 
despite several attempts to do so, eventually admitted his reluctance to 
send it off at all. Avowal of his,., /*ikh or desire, independently of the 
parapraxis, gives us another justification for ascribing it. In fact, 
all the examples of parapraxes given so far are regarded by Freud as the 
product of an intention ot wish the person was aware of and, therefore, 
his avowal was (in principle) available to us. Freud didn't appeal to 
actual avowal in some cases, because he was convinced that the circumstances 
in which they occurred and the kind of parapraxis made could speak for 
themselves, as in the President's or lady's slips of the tongue. 
So far, our attention has been concentrated on the cases of parapraxes 
where the person was aware of his intention or wish, although he decided 
not to carry it out, i. e., he suppressed it. In order to establish the 
sense of parapraxes in these cases Freud appeals to three factors: the 
kirid of parapraxis made, the circumstances in which it occurred and the 
person's avowal of his intention or desire. When the circumstances were 
pointing to the person's desire or intention, and the kind of parapraxis 
made was connected in a significant way with the circumstances, Freud had 
-1.93- 
usually no problem in establishing its sense. If there was some doubt, 
he could in principle appeal to the person's avowal of his wish or intention. 
We can agree with Freud that in these cases parapraxes have sense because 
we can establish what it is. 
But it is not, however, the whole story Freud wants to tell us about 
parapraxes. He also wants to persuade us that they can have sense even 
if the agent denies any such sense. In other words he wants to show that 
not only conscious intentions, wishes, etc., but also unconscious ones can 
be responsible. We can see now that his discussion of parapraxes produced 
by conscious mental states wasn't accidental, but an important stage in his 
argument. This argument is meant to show that if parapraxes can have sense 
in some cases they might also have it in others, even if we were not 
previously prepared to look at them in this way. But there is an important 
difference between these latter cases and the previous ones. We are told 
by Freud that in the latter, when an interpretation of the disturbing 
wish, for instance, is given to the person it is usually "vigorously 
rejected by the speaker, he not only denies that it was active in him before 
104 
he made the slip, but seeks to maintain that it was entirely foreign to him" . 
But surely, this must make a big difference to the interpretation of his 
behaviour, because the criterion of personal avowal, a very important one, 
is not available any more. Deprived of this criterion, can we still establish 
the sense of the particular parapraxis? Let us then examine in detail 
how Freud might cope with these latter cases. 
In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life we are given the following 
example of a parapraxis which is supposed to be produced by an unconscious 
motive. It was-reported by Stekel, who himself happened to make a slip 
of tongue which he describes as follows. 
It 
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"It was with a woman patient to whom I was giving 
medical attention in a period of convalescence after 
a serious illness. We had been through hard days 
and nights together. I was happy to find her improved; 
I painted a picture for her benefit of the delights 
of a stay in Ablazia, and concluded by saying "If as I 
hope, you will not leave your bed soon... , 
105 
This intention was of course to say "If as I hope, you will leave your bed 
soonol. Stekel himself was convinced that his slip of the tongue was produced 
by the following unconscious motive. 
"This obviously owed its origin to an egoistic motive 
in the unconscious, namely that I should be able to 
continue treating this well-to-do patient some time 
longer -a wish that is entirely foreign to my 
106 
consciousness and which I would indignantly repudiate". 
We cannot, however, take for granted Stekel's own avowal of his unconscious 
wish, because he was already converted to Freudian doctrine about unconscious 
mental processes, whereas, we are still examining its plausibility. Let 
us, therefore, replace Stekel in this example, which has the virtue of 
being clearer and simpler than many other examples given by Freud, by 
a neutral person and see what we can do with it. 
The first question we want to ask about this case is why, despite the 
person's denial of having the wish that his patient wouldn't recover so soon. 
the psychoanalyst wants to ascribe such a wish to him? One reason is that 
the doctor's slip points towards the presence of such a wish and secondly, 
the psychoanalyst can also understand why he might deny its presence even 
if he had it. Why does he think that the doctor has a motive for denial 
of his wish and wouldn't admit it either to himself or anybody else? 
Freud's discussion of symptoms has taught us that neurotic subjects 
fail to recognise the motives behind their symptoms because if they did 
they would often be ashamed, frightened or distressed by: -them. The same 
might be true about the doctor's case too. If the doctor cares about his 
- 1,5- 
image as a respectable person, and probably he does (like anybody else), 
admitting such a wish either to himself or others, would damage his image, 
for the wish that his patient wouldn't recover so soon is unworthy of a 
respectable doctor. To accept what he says at its face value and proceed 
no further wouldn't be a wise thing to do in such a situation (for the 
psychoanalyst any more than it is in general). Freud suggests that the 
psychoanalyst should behave like a judge, i. e. 
"When someone charged with an offence confesses his deed 
to the judge, the judge believes his confession, but if 
he denies it, the judge doesn't believe him. If it 
were otherwise, there would be no admininstration of 
justice, and in spite of occasional errors we must allow 
that the system works. " 
107 
Suppose we agree with the psychoanalyst so far that the doctor's 
denial shouldn't be taken at its face value, but we are not yet persuaded 
that he had such a wish, so to convince us the psychoanalyst has to prove 
much more. Can he do. it in the same way as the judge does; i. e., by 
appealing to some relevant facts about the circumstances? In the cases 
of parapraxes produced by conscious motives Freud indeed used such 
circumstantial facts and he was quite successful then in establishing 
their sense. Can he be equally successful now? In the example considered 
here neither Freud nor Stekel give us a full knowledge of the circumstances 
in which the slip occurred. We are only told that the patient was a well- 
to-do person and that the doctor was doing pretty well out of her treatment. 
This is useful information, but it doesn't take us very far. We are, 
however, quite free to imagine some further details of the circumstances 
surrounding the doctor's slip. Suppose we learn the following new fact 
about his situation. He is in serious financial trouble because there is 
an urgent debt for him to pay and without his wealthy patient's money it would 
be difficult for him to do so. Given this situation it is understandable 
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for the doctor to have the wish that his patient wouldn't recover so 
soon, as it would be understandable for any person in his position. 
However, although it is more plausible now, than it was originallyý 
to ascribe to him the motive Freud attributes to him, to agree with the 
psychoanalyst already is to jump to the conclusion too fast. Because from 
the fact that it was reasonable for the doctor to have such a wish given 
his situation, it doesn't follow yet that he in fact had it. Suppose 
we can also agree that it is reasonable or understandable for people 
who were insulted, for example, to seek revenge. But even if the majority 
of them would do, there still might be a person who wouldn't react in this 
way. That implies that although certain situations arouse in people 
certain motives, some of them might not act on these motives. I might have 
a motive to deceive my friend, bvt that doesn't mean that I Vill intend 
or desire to deceive him. We can also imagine a person who doesn't 
even acquire a motive even if it is understandable for him to have it, 
given his condition. For oxample, a wife who has been insulted by her 
husband might understand that he was acting out of anger and neither seek, 
nor have a motive for. revenge. By analogy, we can suggest that the doctor 
from our example might not have had the wish that his patient shouldn't 
recover, ever if it was understandable for him to have it. He might have 
bepan one of those doctors for whom the patient's interests always come first. 
But let us not give up yet; let us look for further information 
concerning the doctor's case, as-a psychoanalyst would do. Suppose, 
on some other occasion, we hear the doctor giving the following advice 
to his colleague who is faced with a moral dilemma. His colldague has a 
patient whom he was treating for a long time. He has done everything 
he could for him and there seems to be nothing more he can do. His patient, 
however, doesn't want him to end the treatment. But the doctor has some 
moral reservations about whether he is justified in making the patient 
spend so much money on treatment unlikely to improve his condition further. 
Suppose our doctor advises him to continue the treatment, because even 
if it doesn't help the patient, it wouldn't do him any harm; the worry 
about putting his patient to the large expense is misplaced, since he is 
a well-to-do person and such expense wouldn't make much difference to his 
financial position. On the basis of what the doctor in this case said 
to his colleague we can ascribe to him the belief that as long as the 
treatment doesn't do any harm to the patient and he is a well-to-do person 
there is nothing wrong in putting him to a large expense. But there is a 
clear analogy between his colleague's case and the case he himself is 
involved in, But then the belief ascribed to him on one occasion can also 
be ascribed on another, even if he didn't express it then. Given his situation 
we can reasonably ascribe to him the wish that his patient wouldn't 
recover too soon, because otherwise the profitable treatment would cease. 
Suppose the psychoanalyst, or any other observer, puts all these 
facts in front of the doctor and invites him to consider them for himself. 
Some of Freud's patients when confronted with similar facts about themselves, 
such as their'behaviour and what they themsel-4es said, couldn't dispute 
any longer the conclusion which was suggested by these facts. Dora, for 
example, when she has fully realized what she had herself told Freud, i. e. 
that her symptom started exactly nine months after the scene by the lake, 
agreed that her abdominal pains had a motive, although she denied it 
originally. In everyday life we too sometimes succeed in persuading 
people that they were wrong about their motives or that they failed to 
recognise them, as in the following example. Suppose a mother is convinced 
that her son is a very intelligent child and that his teachers are biased 
against him and underestimate his abilities, as mothers often tend to be 
unobjective about th eir offspring. An impartial observer can see, however, 
that her beliefs are shaped by her wish that her son were a very intelligent 
boy, whereas in fact he has quite average abilities. We can point out to her 
that there isn'; t any reason why the teachers should be biased against her 
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son. We can also draw her attention to the fact that her son's marks are 
as good as his friend's, whom she regards as equally capable and in whose 
case she doesn't believe the teachers to be biased. When the mother 
realizes the full implications of her beliefs she might agree at the end 
that she indeed overestimated her offspring's ability, for which her wish 
to see her son as a more intelligent boy than he is in fact was responsible, 
and she might stop accusing teachers of being biased against him. A 
similar thing might also happen in the dQctQr's case, After reflecting on 
what he said to his colleague and how he felt about his situation he might 
admit at the end that the psychoanalyst is right, he indeed has a wish 
that his patient wouldn't recover SO soon. 
Although pointing out the implications of the person's behaviour, 
i. e., what be said and did in certain circumstances, might be quite 
helpful in changing his beliefs about himself, it is not always effective, 
and we can understand why. When the person failed to recognise his 
motive in the first place it is not just because he happened not to reflect 
on his behaviour and feelings, he was rather frightened to learn something 
about himself which could be shameful, disturbing, etc. And precisely 
because of this fear he might still be unable to look objectively at what 
his behaviour points to, when an independent observer invites him to 
reflect on it, a difficulty Freud was very well aware of. To cope with it 
he introduced into his therapeutic method (of which we are going to hear 
more soon) a procedure often referred to as 'moral reassurance', which 
together with the interpretation of the patient's behaviour, enables the 
subject to reflect on his behaviour and experience with less fear and anxiety. 
We hear that many of Freud's'patients suffered from a feeling of guilt, 
not because they had committed some awful deeds or crimes but because 
they recognised in themselves some feelings, wishes, etc., which they 
regarded as unworthy and therefore were abhamed of them. In order to help 
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them the psychoanalyst had quite often to reassure them that a feeling 
or a wish isn't wrong in itself, and if people were judged not by their 
deeds but by their feelings or thoughts all of us would be moral wrecks 
or criminals. Such reassurance might help the person to accept himself 
as he is and not to look at his feelings or thoughts with disgust any 
more. Suppose our imaginary doctor, apart from being asked to reflect 
on his behaviour and experience, is also given some such reassurance. 
The psychoanalyst tells him that even if he had a wish that his patient 
wouldn't recover so soon, as long as he didn't act on it he is not an egoist 
and wouldn't be regarded as such. Since as a matter of fact he was doing 
his best to help his patient, and thus was keeping up to the moral requirements 
of his profession, which is what he really counts, he shouldn't be ashamed 
of himself even if some such wish entered the back of his mind. After 
such reassurance we can imagine our doctor admitting at the end his wish, 
both to himself and the psychoanalyst. If the doctor's wish could be 
established independently of his slip of the tongue, in some such way 
as described here, the psychoanalyst would have had good grounds for 
explaining the person's error in terms of it as well, even if in the actual 
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Ch. 3 VARIOUS METHODS OF VALIDATION OF INTERPRETATIONS IN TERMS OF 
UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL PROCESSES 
We have examined in the previous chapter the kind of explanations 
which Freud provides for phenomena such as symptoms, dreams and errors. 
The question whether such explanations can be justified by what we can 
observe about people's behaviour had inevitably to be raised. Some 
explanations given by Freud were rejected on the ground of not being 
sufficiently proven, e. g. the dreamer's alleged regret for having 
married so early, where Freud failed to justify his claim by connecting 
the motive for her dream with her other motives and beliefs. Other 
explanations were accepted as plausible, because the person's alleged 
motive could be established independently of the particular piece of 
behaviour under scrutiny as in the case of the table-cloth ritual 
performed by the wife of the impotent husband. Are we in a position to 
say that these latter cases provide a good enough test for the psychoanalytic 
hypotheses of unconscious mental processes? It depends of course what 
kind of test we are looking for. 
In everyday life we can validate a lot of our claims about motives 
and reasons behind other people's behaviour. Suppose I ascribe to my 
friend a wish to visit India. To support my claim I can appeal to 
such factors as her reading books about India, inquiring about the flights 
to this country, her own avowal of her wish, etc. I can also point to 
the fact that some of her ancestors came from the Indian continent 
and she is interested in tracing their exact origin, an interest she has 
expressed on several occasions. Thus it is possible for me, as for 
any other observer, to substantiate the claim about my friend's wish 
to visit India. Suppose I also make a similar claim about another friend 
of mine on the ground that she too readsýa lot of books about India. 
Although this second friend has never told me that she would like to 
visit India, I assume that she wouldn't be reading the books with such 
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passion if she didn't plan to visit that country. But a common 
acquaintance might disagree with me on this matter. He could point 
out that she never went abroad before, and that he heard her saying 
that she wouldn't take the risk of catching some tropical disease. 
In order to settle our disagreement we put the question to our friend 
herself, to which she replies that she ha6 no wish to visit India, the 
country she is genuinely interested in, but is afraid to visit because 
of the discomfort and dangers of such a trip. In the light of all that, 
I have no choice but to withdraw my original claim about my second friend's 
wish. So in everyday situations we are usually in a position to validate 
or disconfirm, our claims about other people's motives or reasons for doing 
something. We can do so according to J. Hopkins, by 
"taking each interpretive explanation as liable to 
confirmation or disconfirmation through coherence or 
dissonance with other explanations of the same kind. 
Each such explanation involves the attribution of desires 
and beliefs. Each of these, moreover, is associated with 
many others, which cohere with it and help to fill out its 
content. Where desires and beliefs in one explanation 
cohere and overlap with those of others, the explanations 
are mutually confirming. (Where they contradict or fail 
to cohere they are mutually disconfirming). - Since 
explanations by reasons are thus confirmed (or 
disconfirmed) by relation to others, giving the 
best account of an agent's actions requires fitting the 
pattern of his actions to the pattern of his motives 
as a whole, so as to achieve the greatest coherence". 
11+5 -fi - 
Some of Freud's interpreters argue, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that this model of the explanation of actions by reasons 
can also be applied to phenomena such as symptoms, dreams and errors. 
In their view, and sometimes in Freud's, these phen6mena are intentional, 
even though they are products of unconscious intentions, while typical 
actions are products of relevant conscious intentions. It took Freud, 
they argue, to show that what we thought for a long time to be something 
that merely happened to us is aitov aU intentional behaviour, and thus 
thanks to Freud we have had to modify our view of ourselves. But even 
if )we did change our way of looking at ourselves, this change 
cannot consist in showing that phenomena such as symptoms are 
intentional. I don't think Freud was able to show that, even though 
he was able to show quite convincingly that they can have reasons or 
motives. To say that symptoms can have reasons and yet to deny that 
they a re intentional is to commit an inconsistency in the view of the 
philosophers who take the opposite position, because reasons on their 
model cannot be other than reasons for intentional actions. What they 
fail to realize, however, is that there could be different kinds of 
reasons involved in human behaviour, and that reasons for symptoms 
are unlike reasons for intentional actions. ' For although symptoms 
can be related to the subject's beliefs and/or attitudes, the relevant 
beliefs are not about means to some ends, and the relevant attitudes 
are not desires he tries to satisfy, but rather his feelings about 
what he thinks to be the case or his wishes that things were different 
from what he thinks they are. Thus the attitudes and beliefs involved 
as reasons for symptoms are quite different from those involved in 
intentional actions. 
The case for nbt taking the phenomena Freud is refering to as intentional 
actions should be clear from what we have said already, but it would be 
useful to summarize it again briefly. Firstly, when Freud succeeds 
in making his patients aware of the attitudes. such as wishes behind 
their symptoms, they might agree with him that they had them, but this 
wouldn't be an admission that they did such and such in order to 
satisfy them. Thus we can imagine the table-cloth lady acknowledging 
some such wish behind her ritual as Freud suggested to her, but this 
wouldn't be an admission that she did it in order to satisfy her wish, 
because she couldn't possibly realize it by doing what she did, and 
she was rational enough to see that. Similarly, the person who 
happened to make the slip of the tongue in which he said to his patient 
It If as I hope, you will not leave your bed soon" could also acknowledge 
at the end that he had a wish to continue the treatment of his well-to-do 
patient, revealed by this slip, but not that he said what he happened 
to say in order to satisfy his wish, because it couldn't be realized in 
this way and he didn't believe it could. 
But apart from what the subjects themselves say about their symptoms, 
etc. in the end, there is a further reason for not regarding them as 
intentional actions performed with some end in mind. If we came to regard 
them as means to some ends we would have to ascribe to people absurd 
and unintelligible beliefs. Thus if the table-cloth ritual were taken 
as an intentional action performed with the end of satisfying the 
lady's wish that her wedding night was different from what it was 
and that her servant believed that it was different, a belief that 
she could satisfy it by running from one room to another, taking a 
certain position in relation to the table, etc., had to be ascribed to her. 
But I don't think we are justified. in ascribing to her such an absurd 
belief, either conscious or unconscious. Although it is possible to say 
that her ritual. expressed her wish as fulfilled, as Freud says, we cannot 
say, however, that she performed her ritual in-order to realize her wish. 
If these phenomena are not intentional actions, the model of 
explanation used for the latter cannot be used in their case. But 
the model for explaining intentional actions and the different model 
for explaining bodily movements are not the only alternatives available 
to us. If they were, then a whole range of human behaviour and status, 
such as emotions, crying, laughing, vomiting, in disgust, clutching 
one's head in sorrow, shaking of the hands, etc., which cannot be 
accounted for very well by either of these models, would be left 
unexplained. But in everyday life we are quite successful in 
explaining them. We usually do so by appealing to the person's 
beliefs about relevant states of affairs and his attitudes towards 
them. And this is also how Freud explains phenomena such as symptoms, 
dreams and errors. This interpretative scheme is somewhat different 
from that used for explaining intentional actions, but because it is 
similar to it in appealing to beliefs and/or attitudes of some kind, 
the constraints imposed by the requirement of coherence with other 
beliefs and attitudes apply here too a 
Wke-, \ discussib3 his interpretations, we akked whether Freud's ascriptions 
of particular mental states to people could be established independently 
of the given dream or error under scrutiny, we were looking for precisely 
such a coherence. In cases where the dreamer'6 alleged motive for his 
dream was connected with his waking motives and beliefs, or the patient's 
motive for his symptom was connected with the rest of his behaviour, 
etc., Freud's interpretations were regarded as confirmed in this sense. 
Such an approach could be as successful as that achieved by commonsense 
psychology. Thus if psychoanalytic hypotheses of unconscious mental 
processes are judged by the standards of validation of commonsense 
psychology they could be regarded as successfully tested in some cases 
at least. 
This is not the way in which scientists, especially adherents of 
physical theories, try to test their theories. The structure of a 
physical theory is quite different from the interpretative scheme 
characteristic of commonsense psychology. It usually consists of a 
network of universal propositions, i. e. laws of nature, which given 
various initial conditions enable the scientist to deduce precise 
empirical consequences from his theory. As far as the scientific 
observation of the relevant phenomena is concerned, the way it is conducted 
could be also quite different from ordinary observation of phenoinena. 
Sometimes scientists, especially astronomers, have no choice but to wait 
for the right phenomenon to occur naturally in order to make their crucial 
observations. But often scientists are able to introduce controlled 
conditions for observing the phenomena they are interested in. Thanks 
to these deliberately prearranged conditions, and the general. laws of 
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his theory, the scientist is in a position to predict exactly what is 
going to happen. Experiments are not of course necessary conditions 
for testing scientific theories, but because they enable us to conduct 
observation in a systematic and repeatable way, they are highly desirable, 
and scientists try to arrange them whenever possible. 
Is this kind of test available for the psychoanalytic hypotheses of 
unconscious mental processes? Can explanations involving unconscious 
motives be somehow assimilated to explanations using laws such as those 
found in physical science? Let us see first whether such assimilation 
is possible in the case of conscious intentions and motives. Suppose 
a man wants to inform his friend that he has just became ingaged, and 
does so by writing a letter to him conveying this very information. 
Are we in a position to connect his desire and beliefs with his action 
in a law-like manner by specifying the conditions in which his desire 
finds appropriate behavioural manifestation? Et doesn't seem possible, 
for the following reason. This combination of desire and beliefs hasn't 
any fixed behavioural manifestations. Given the same desire and beliefs 
he could still perform a different action. He could, for example, 
inform his friend about his engagement by ringing him, by announcing 
his engagement in a local newspaper 6f which he knows his friend 
is a regular reader, by asking his brother to convey this news to his 
friend, or in some other way. The same is true about unconscious wishes. 
Like a conscious desire, an unconscious wish doesn't manifest itself in 
a fixed behaviour. It can express itself in a somatic symptom, a behavioural 
symptom, a dream, or a slip of the tongue. So mental dispositions, 
unlike physical ones, haven't any fixed behavioural manifestations. Because 
of this, explanations involving motives', conscious or unconscious, cannot 
be assimilated to the explanation involving laws which are characteristic 
of physical science. But the fact that psychoanalytic hypotheses about 
unconscious mental processes might not be testable by the methods of 
I-: 
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advanced scientific inquiry doesn't mean, however, that they can,, t 
be supported or undermined by observation in some other way, such as the 
one described earlier. For this reason we shouldn't dismiss them 
as empirical hypotheses. 
But we should also ask whether the method of observation and validation 
of unconsciously motivated behaviour can be improved in some ways. Are 
there, for example, some experimental methods available for studying 
such behaviour, similar to those used in other areas of psychology? 
Freud himself never used experimental methods, but he was convinced that 
it is indispensable to create special conditions for observing the 
phenomena he was interested in, and he used special procedures for 
investigating them. He regarded psychoanalytic therapy not merely 
as a method of treatment, but also a method of research. Once he described 
psychoanalysis as follows: 
"Psychoanalysis is the name (1) of a procedure 
for the investigation of mental processes which 
are almost inaccessible in any other way, (2) 
of a method (based upon that investigation) for 
the treatment of neurotic disorders, and (3) of a 
collection of psychological information obtained 
along these lines, which is gradually being 
accumulated into a new scientific discipline". 
2 
He was also convinced that the results achieved by the employment of 
psychoanalytic procedures, such as cure or improvement of the patient's 
conditions, are relevant to the validation of claims about the porsonality 
of that patient and his behaviour. This might not be analogous to the 
ways of testing of advanced scientific theories, but it is certainly 
some departure from commonsense waysof*validating interpretations, and 
looks like an attempt to improve upon the latter. Since some of 
Freud's interpretations, discussed earlier, were also arrived at in this 
way it is important to ask how good is the psychoanalytic therapy as 
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a method of observation, and of validation of the hypotheses of the 
unconscious mental processes. 
(A) Psychoanalytic Therapy as a Method of Observation and Validation 
of Interpretation in Terms of Unconscious Mental Processes. 
Why is psychoanalytic therapy so indispensable for observing and 
investigating unconscious processes? For the following reasons, we are 
told: 
"The psychoanalyst learns many facts about his patient 
which other people, as a rule, will not get to know. 
Among them are facts of conscious life which people are 
not eager to relate to others, not even to psychological 
interviewers, or about which they do not have to tell 
the truth, or the whole truth, or of which they do not 
normally think, but which will occur to them and which 
they will relate in the psychoanalytic interview, because 
of its peculiar climate mixed of relaxation and discipline, 
of intimacy and personal aloofness. To this, one must 
add the thingswhich are not conscious or preconscious 
but can send derivatives into consciousness under the 
conditions of the psychoanalytic situation. The 
psychoanalyst learns not only about all such data but 
also about the configurations in which they appear. 
3 
All these form what may be called the level of observation" 
In other words the analytic situation enables the analyst to elicit from 
his analysand-a certain kind of behaviour which is relevant to the 
investigation of the unconscious mental processes but which might not be 
accessible in any other ways., It does so in virtue of a special climate 
created during the session, specific relationships established b#tween 
the analyst and h is patient, but more importantly in virtue of some 
technical procedures employed by the analyst. Let us look more closely 
at these procedures. 
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During psychotherapy the analyst uses certain techniques such as 
free associations, and methods such as interpretation of the analysand's 
behaviour. These methods and techniques were developed by Freud and his 
followers quite gradually from a number of different angles. The technique 
of free associations, a psychoanalytic tool for the investigation of the 
deep-seated unconscious motivations, was preceded by the use of hypnosis. 
But soon it became clear to Freud that the hypnotic method had serious 
limitations. Only some proportion of the subjects could be hypnotized 
deeply enough to revive buried wishes and feelings, not every person 
could become a skilful hypnotist, and more importantly, the hypnotic 
method was not good enough to produce a permanent change in the patient. 
Despite its shortcomings, however, it enabled Freud to realize the 
following important fact. A subject who was unable to recall certain 
things in his waking life would do so under the conditions of the hypnotic 
trance. Freud became convinced that if such a recollection was possible 
in the dissociated state of deep hypnosis it should be also possible to 
restore the forgotten traumas in the dissociated state of hysteria. 
In order to achieve this he at first adopted Berpheim's "pressure" 
technique by asking the patient to try hard to recall certain things. 
Despite some limited succesel Freud gave up this techniVe 
in the end, because it was too laborious and exhausting to 
serve as a permanent method. As a result he adopted 
a more passive technique, in which the patient relaxed and said whatever 
came into his mind. In this way tree association has become 
a permanent technique of the psychoanalysis. 'Free' doesn't mean that 
associations are undetermined but that they are free from interference 
of a certain kind, i. e., deliberate selection by the subject. It is 
worth mentioning that Freud wasn't the first person to use free associations 
in psychological research. Psychologists like Cattell and Wundt 
experimented with it before him, but he was the first to extend its use 
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to clinical work. Freud also devised certain rules for free associations. 
The patient, was instructed to relate everything that came to his mind, 
however improbable it was, for many memories which appeared at first 
inconceivable often turned out to be true. He was asked to say everything, 
however irrelevant it seemed to him, because again what seemed at first 
irrelevant was proved quite relevant later on. And. finally, he was 
instructed to report things however painful or unpleasant. they were to him, 
because precisely these are usually things which tend to be repressed 
and therefore unconscious. A more technical method of free associations, 
the so called word association test, was develdped later by Jung on the 
basis of Wundt's experiments. These experiments consisted in the 
study of the kind of reaction, and the time taken to react, as a function 
of the stimuli words. Jung was using a similar procedure to reveal 
the affective "complexes' of his patients. By a complex he understood 
an organized group of ideas and memories of great affective force which 
are either partly or totally unconscious. If a word given to the subject 
touches his latent complex his emotions are aroused which in turn affects 
his reply to that word. These "complex indicators", as they are sometimes 
referred to, can reveal the affective state in a variety of ways. For 
example, a long silence before answering, replying with an unusual word, 
a repetition of similar words, an inability to reply at all, etc., can 
serve as indications. that the subject's complex has been touched. This 
list of words can be given twice over and the answers in each case compared. 
Difference in response is another way of detecbing the complex. What 
is behind both Freud's less formal and Jung's more technical procedure 
of free associations, is the assumption that certain manifestations of 
the mental processes would come into light, of which the subject himself 
might be entirely ignorant. Now, although free associations 
% 
express the 
subject's mental states they don't always do so in a straightforward 
manner, so their significance might not be obvious to the subject. 
FE- 
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In other words they require interpretation by the analyst. The 
interpretation can also serve as the stimuli for further associations 
by the subject. Thus to the technique of free associations was added 
interpretation by the analyst. 
What is the nature of the psychoanalytic interpretation? A layman 
is often convinced that the task of the analyst is to give the "translations" 
of the patient's allusions as soon as he understood to what they alluded. 
But as L. I. Saul pointed out "the analyst does not say to himself 
'psychoanalysis is making the unconscious conscious' and, therefore, 
say to the patient 'you hate your father'. This would be naive, clumsy 
and a form of wild analysis. " 
4A 
mere transmitting of knowledge 
concerning the unconscious motives to the patient as soon as it was 
acquired by the analyst is not an analysis. It wouldn't be effective 
either in producing desirable changes in the patient or in eliciting 
from him further relevant responses. The psychoanalyst has to know 
what to interpret, how and when, i. e. the interpretation has to have a 
certain structure and logic in order for it to do its job. Firstly, 
in interpreting his patient's behaviour the analyst concentrates on 
certain specific themes, such as feelingsof guilt, anxiety, depression, ý 
sexuality, fear of castration, etc. These themes or contents are influenced 
by what happens during the session and also by the psychoanalyst's 
theoretical convictions, for instance, that sexuality is an important 
factor in shaping the personality and behaviour of the human being. By 
analogy, a historian who is interested in a particular historical period 
also concentrates on s9me specific themes, such as the economic and 
political structure of the society, predominant religious beliefs, etc., 
which according to his assumptions, are important factors in shaping 
that society. Thus an interpretation in general, whether it concerns 
an individual or a society, doesn't operate in a void but is influenced 
by the interests and the theoretical assumptions of the interpreter. 
a- 
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In psychoanalysis the interpretation of the specific themes is also 
put into some framework. One framework concerns the relationships between 
the patient and the analyst established during the sessions. From very 
early times of his practice Freud realized that the patient develops 
a specific attitude towards his analyst. He, namely, transfers upon 
him intense feelings which are neither justified by the analyst's 
behaviour nor by the situation that has developed during the treatment. 
Freud called this phenoTenon 'transference' and made a distinction 
between a positive transference, characterised by strong feelings 
of affection, and nega*tive transference, characterised by the opposite 
feelings. Originally, transference was regarded by Freud as an obstacle 
to the treatment. However, as soon as its nature was fully understood 
it turned out to be a great advantage. In the process of transference 
the original conflicts, which had led to the onset of the patient's 
neurosis, began to be re-enacted in the relation to the analy§t producing 
artificial neurosis referred to as 'transference neurosis'. Thanks to 
transference, therefore, instead of having to deal with the conflicts 
of the remote past, conflicts concerned with vanished circumstances 
and frozen personalities, the analyst can involve himself in an actual 
and immediate situation in which he and his patient are the principal 
characters, i. e. a situation which at least to some extent is; under his 
control. Since in the transference the analyst comes to be attributed 
the roles of the significant figures from the patient's past its analysis 
can also throw some light on his past. Classically, the transference 
interpretation meant pointing to the patient's past. Nowadays, many 
analysts stress 'heTe-and-how' interpretation, i. e. what is actually 
happening during the session itself. Despite these different emphasizes 
the analysis of transference was and still is a vital part of the 
psychoanalytic interpretation. Another framework concerns the analysand's 
relationships with other people in his environment, i. e. what happens 
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outside the consulting room. The analyst is interested in the pattern 
of the analysand's behaviour and his attitudes towards people in general. 
Since these patterns are repeated by the patient in the consulting room 
as well, the similarity between the two is pointed out to him. 
And finally, in his interpretation of the patient's behaviour the analyst 
makes references to his childhood experiences and events which influenced 
them. This is known as a "genetic interpretation". It usually concentrates 
on such events from the past as an appearance of a new sibling, first 
sexual experiences, etc., their influences on the patient's personality 
and behaviour, and the connection of all that with his present situation. 
The aim of all these interpretations is to enable the subject to understand 
himself and his relations to others and his grasping of his relationship 
with the analyst is the quintessence of such understanding. 
Apart from the content of the interpretation and its framework what 
is also of great importance is its timing. There are a number of 
11technical formulas" transmitted by tradition from Freud which concerns 
the problem of timing. One is "Work always where the patient's affect 
lies at the moment". If the analyst interprets what preoccupies the 
subject at the moment and what he feels strongly about he is more likely 
to get an emotional response from him. If, on the other hand, he waits 
with his interpretation, for some reason, until the next occasion, the 
patient's emotion might vanish meanwhile and his interpretation would 
elicit a mere intellectual reaction. An emotional response is more 
desirable than an intellectual one, because it is more effective in 
producing real changes in the patient. Another formula relevant to the 
problem of timing is as follows: "Interpretation of resistance goes 
before interpretation of content". Freud has found many times in his 
practice that however clearly the unconscious material manifests itself 
in the patient's behaviour and however much one might expect its 
significance to be as obvious to him as it is to the independent observer, 
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there are deep obstacles in the subject which prevent this material 
from becoming conscious. These obstacles are called resistances and their 
presence is explained by the disagreeable and painful character of the 
repressed material. It would be useless then to confront the patient 
with the interpretation, however true it might be, as long as his 
resistances are not removed. The resistance might be overcome by various 
reassurances from the analyst. For example, the analyst's general 
attitude of non-moralizing neutrality might serve as such reassurance 
to some patients. 
The way in which the patient is confronted with the interpretation, 
i. e. "how" of the interpretation, is as important as its timing and 
content. The wording of the interpretation, so that it is understandable 
to the subject, is obvious and. needs no comments. But there are more 
important issues involved here. In order for the interpretation to be 
more Acceptable to the patient he should be able to understand the way 
in which it has been reached. Thus if the analyst wants to demonstrate 
something to the patient, he doesn't simply assert it, but puts the 
evidence for it so clearly before him that he sees the steps which led to 
the conclusion. Freud has always suggested that people should be made 
as far as possible to produce the solution to their riddles themselves. 
To achieve this end the analyst tries to make the patient reflect on his 
behaviour step by step. The first step is to make him fully aware of 
what he is saying and doing without any references to the unconscious 
motives yet. This constitutes a preparatory stage of the interpretation, 
and is known as "clarification". Such clarification can take various 
forms. The analyst might, for instance, reflect on the patient's behaviour 
by specifically describing what he is doing and saying. ThVs he may 
tell his female patient "Today you are talking a lot about the untrust- 
worthiness of men. " By doing so he organizes her attention over the 
predominant theme of the session. He may also enumerate- multiple' 
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instances of a certain behaviour of the patient by saying "On several 
occasions you have said that men are untrustworthy", in order to make 
her to reflect on the ways she is relating to the members of the 
opposite sex. A--further strategy might consist in correlating several 
instances of behaviour or expressed attitudes. He might point out to 
the patient that she has not only expressed her distrust of him but of 
her father as well. Thus clarification is usually concerned with the 
behaviour which the subject himself is aware of or preconscious behaviour 
which can be easily brought into his awareness. The end it is trying 
to achieve is to direct the patient's attention to a 
certain pattern of his behai. iour, make him reflect on it, draw some 
inferences on the basis of what he has observed so far and make him see 
what the analyst has observed too. The statements which have this 
clarificatory function are referred to by some analysts as interpretations. 
Louis Paul, for example, calls them noncausal interpretations. 
5 
The 
term 'interpretation' doesn't seem to be right for them in our view, 
since reflecting on the subject's behaviour by telling him what he is 
doing or saying, as in the first example, doesn't involve interpreting 
anything, and the same is true about other examples of such statements. 
Theycan simply be called clarifications. 
But clarification paves the way to the next step, i. e. to the 
interpretation proper, a step which is quite different from the previous 
one. lt usually suggests an inference which might be entirely new to 
the subject, at least at the moment of the interpretation, as in the 
following example. "You don't trust your father because you feel that 
he has betrayed you". The first part of this statement designates 
what is known to the patient, i. e. what has been clearly established 
in the process of the clarification. The second part refers to something 
she is ignorant of, i. e. usually an unconscious feeling or wish, which 
the analyst was able to infer from her behaviour. The interpretative 
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statement connects the two in a causal manner. It might be quite 
far from clear to the patient, of course, how the analyst has reached 
his conclusion about her unconscious feeling that she was betrayed by 
her father. He can point out to her free associations concerning the 
birth of her younger sister and complaints that the father became 
more interested in his younger daughter, than in her, from that time on. 
Thus the interpretation of this kind is normally a causal statement 
connecting that which is known to the subject with something he is 
unconscious or ignorant at the moment of the interpretation. More 
rarely, it can state an unexpected causal relation, unexpected to the 
patient of course, between the two bbservables, as in the following 
example. "Your distrust of me is transferred from your distrust of your 
father".. The fact that the interpretation proceeds step by step, 
starting from what is clear to the subject and what she would agree 
with, then passing to something she is less aware of in order to connect 
it with factors she is entirely ignorant about, enables the analysand 
to understand the way in which the interpretation of her behaviour 
has been reached, and, therefore, makes it more acceptable to her. It 
can be also helpful to her in her own efforts to understand her motives. 
In creating special conditions for observation and employing specified 
techniques and strategies, the psychoanalyst behaves like psychologists 
of other persuasions, or indeed scientists in general. Psychologists 
representing other schools also create special conditions for making 
observations. for example, experimental setting$, and use various methods 
such as questionnaires. Despite this general analogy, 
however, psychoanalysis as a method of research has certain unique 
features, which in some ways make it very different from other methods 
of psychological research. Let us look at those features and ask how 
good is psychoanalysis as a scientific tool for observing and investigating 
psychological phenomena. We remember that in psychoanalysis, research 
m 
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and treatment go hand in hand. Unfortunately, therapeutic and research 
aims are not always compatible. Freud himself was well aware of this 
when he wrote the following. 
"One of the claims of psychoanalysis to distinction 
is, no doubt, that in its execution research and 
treatment coincide, nevertheless after a certain 
point, the technique required for the one opposes 
that required for the other. " 
6 
In other words psychoanalysis faces a dilemma between clinical penetration 
and scientific rigour. Psychoanalysis as a treatment requires full 
confidentiality and therefore it has to exclude an independent observer 
who might generate anxieties and sensitivities in both the patient and 
the analyst, and thus have an inhibitory effect upon the conduct of 
the analytic work. That means that the basic observation-data in 
psychoanalysis are not ordinarily public. The privacy of the psychoanalytic 
data has the following limitations. It excludes check of the data, 
independent evaluation of them and the possibility of reproducing a 
forever vanished-process. There is also another faýtor in psychoanalysis 
which is required by treatment but which handicaps it as a research 
method, namely, the fact that the study of the case-material can be 
reconstructed by the analyst after the analytic session only, or even 
after the completion of the case. Trying to record the observation 
during psychotherapy, by taking notes for example, can have an 
inhibitory effect upon the patient and it introduýes a goal in addition 
to the therapeutic aim, so that the treatment becomes not a primary 
goal, but a clinical retrospective method makes the analyst as a 
researcher limited by memory. And further, in scientific research it is 
often desirable to pick out a single variable and treat it in isolation, 
since a single variable can be more easily controlled and manipulated 
and therefore much easier to test. In psychoanalysis such a procedure 
can become an obstacle to clinical penetration. We remember how important 
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is the timing of the interpretation, i. e. concentrating on a problem 
which preoccupies the patient and which he feels strongly about at the moment, 
for the interpretation to be effective. From the point of view of clinical 
aim, therefore, it is the subject who should determine the theme of the 
session and the timing of the interpretation. An analyst's attempt to 
control a sinRle variable will easilv come into conflict with this 
therapeutic requirement. For this reason concentration on an isolated 
variable, desirable from the point of view of scientific rigour is not 
always possible. All that implies that psychoanalysis as a method 
of observation and investigation has serious limitations. Does this 
disqualify it as a scientific procedure altogether? Fortunately, 
the traditional informal case-study method can be significantly improved 
in. order for it to become a more respectable scientific procedure. 
A first step towards such improvement was the introduction of tape 
and visual recordings of the psychoanalytic sessions, or even allowing 
an independent observer using a one-way screen. Such strategies eliminate 
the privacy of the psychoanalytic data and make possible their independent 
check and assessment. A still further improvement of psychoanalysis as 
a method of research is the replacement of the informal case-stUdy 
method by more formalized and systematic research, which at the moment 
is more of a progr e than a practice. 
We have learned so far about the technical procedures employed by 
the analyst in the course of the ps . ychoanalytic session, the ways in 
which they are implemented, i. e. how and when the patient is confronted 
with an interpretation which has some specific content and belongs to 
a certain framework. We were told that thanks to these procedures 
the psychoanalytic session is invaluable as a method of research into 
human behaviour, as well as a method of treatment of the neurotic disorders. 
As a method of research it provides the analyst with a realm of material 
which is unavailable or at least very difficult to elicit under some 
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other conditions. This material in turn serves as ground for making 
hypotheses concerning human behaviour and inspired Freud in formulating 
his doctrine. Thus the psychoanalytic therapy has enormous heuristic 
value. According to Freud and some of his followers, the psychoanalytic 
session apart from its heuristic value is also a good ground for testing 
psychoanalytic hypotheses, i. e. it has a probative value. This latter 
claim is what we are going to examine here. Before the general question 
of the appraisal of Freudian theory in terms of its psychotherape-etic 
effectiveness is raised, however, some qualifications have to be made. 
As has been frequently pointed out, not all components of the Freudian 
doctrine have the same connections with the psychoanalytic technique. 
Firstly, there are some aspects of the psychoanalytic theory with no 
technical counterparts. The so called metapsychology belongs to this 
class. According to metapsychological doctrine, for example, the function 
of the unconscious mental processes is determined by the pleasure 
principle, i. e. they tend towards immediate and complete discharge 
of energy. There is nothing in the interpretation of transference, 
resistances and, other phenomena occurring in the analytic session which 
has a clear bearing on this claim. Secondly, there are aspdcts of theory 
having no direct link with the clinical findings, for instance the 
hypothesis that the function of dreams is to preserve sleep, but which 
are connected with a hypothesis which does have a direct link with the 
psychoanalytic technique, in this case the claim that dreams are wish- 
fulfilments. Thus in order to account for the sleep-preserving function 
of dreams Freud appeals to their wish-fulfilling character, and the 
material presented by the patient during the session is directly relevant 
to the identification of the wishes responsible for dreams. In other 
words the doctrine about the sleep-preserving function of dreams has an 
indirect link with the clinical findings. Contrasted with these is the 
class of hypotheses which have a direct correspondence with the 
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psychoanalytic technical procedures. These hypotheses are used by the 
psychoanalyst to describe and explain what happens during the session 
and are invoked to account for the changes within the patient and his 
behaviour as a result of the therapeutic intervention. The hypotheses 
of unconscious mental processes belong to this class. Since the patterning 
of the symptoms, for example, the kind of unconsciously determined 
behaviour the analyst is mostly preoccupied with, reveals important 
elements of the patient's inner conflicts and the ways he is trying 
to cope with them, as well as their origin in his early childhood 
experiences, the interpretation of the clinical material has a direct 
bearing on the psychoanalytic theory of personality and its formation. 
All this implies that the question concerning the probative value of the 
clinical data cannot be raised in relation to the Freudian theory as a 
whole but only in relation to those aspects of his theory or sub-tbeories 
which have some connection with the technical procedures employed during 
the session. Since the hypotheses of the unconscious mental processes 
form a foundation on which the psychoanalytic theory of personality 
has been erected we can confine our question to validation of the identity 
of the unconscious determinants of human behaviour by the clinical data. 
In what way precisely is the clinical material relevant for testing the 
hypotheses of the unconscious processes? We are told that the method 
of interpretation, which is the supreme agent in the hierarchy of 
techniques used by the psychoanalyst, enables the patient to achieve 
self-knowledge or insight into the unconscious factors responsible for 
his neurosis. Throughout Freud's writings we are reminded again and 
again that the patient's learning the truth about his motives and himself 
is the main task of psychoanalysis. In Lines of Advance in 
Psychoanalytic Therapy, for example, he says 
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"We have formulated our task as physicians thus: 
to bring to the patient's knowledge the unconscious, 
repressed impulses existing in him, and, for that 
purpose, to uncover the resistances that oppose this 
extension of his knowledge about himself". 
7 
Why is self-knowledge so important, according to Freud? For the 
following reason: 
Ifif 
, however, you will look at the matter from our 
point of View, you will understand that the trans- 
formation of this conscious material in the mind of 
the patient into conscious material must have the 
result of correcting his deviation from normality 
and of lifting the compulsion to which his mind has 
been subjected". 
8 
Thus insight is important because it leads to a significant change within 
the patient, i. e. his cure. However, for insight to be effective it 
has to provide the patient with a veridical reconstruction of the causally 
relevant factor in his current and early life. A reconstruction which 
only seems true to the patient, but isn't really true, wouldn't do according 
to Freud. He wrote 
"If the construction is wrong, there is no change 
in the patient; but if it is right or gives an 
approximation to the truth, he reacts to it with an 
unmistakable aggravation of his symptoms and of 
his general condition. "9 
On another occasion he also said 
"After all, his conflicts will only be successfully 
solved and his resistances overcome if the anticipatory 
ideas he is given tally with what is real in him. 
Whatever in the doctor's conjectures is inaccurate 
drops out in the course of the analysis; it has to 
be withdrawn and replaced by something more correct" 
10 
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Thus if the analysis of a patient was therapeutically successful 
the psychoanalyst thinks he has good grounds for saying that his 
reconstruction of the unconscious mechanisms by the means of interpretation 
was veridical or correct. in h-js paper on "The Unconscious" Freud 
explicitly asserts the probative value of therapeutic success for 
the testing of the hypotheses of unconscious rental processes. We read 
"When, in addition, it turns out that the assumption 
of there being an unconscious enables us to construct 
a successful procedure by which we can exert an 
effective influence upon the course of conscious 
processes, this success will have given us an 
incontrovertible proof of the existence of what we have 
assumed. " 
11 
Since the idea that significant change can come about only as a 
function of veridical insight is the hallmark of the psychoanalytic 
approach, the notion of insight deserves our careful attention. Why 
should insight matter at all, a layman might ask. Often learning the 
truth about oneself, especially an unpleasant one, destroys the blissful 
peace of one's mind and only makes one unhappier. That this and other 
similar questions have indeed preyed on the mind of Freud's patients 
we learn from the following passage. 
"When I have promised my patients help or improvement 
by means of a cathartic treatment I have often been 
faced by this objection: "Why, you tell me yourself 
that my illness is probably connected with my 
circumstances and the events of my life. You cannot 
alter these in any way. How do you propose to help me, 
then? " And I have been able to make this reply: "No 
doubt fate would find it easier than I do to relieve 
you of your illness. But you will be able to convince 
yourself that much will be gained if we succeed in 
transforming your hUsterical misery into conmon 
unhappiness. With a mental life that has been restored 
to health you will be better armed against that 
unhappiness". 12 
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So although self-knowledge might not make one happier it certainly 
makes one more rational and, therefore, in long terms at least "better 
armed" against unhappiness or indeed neurosis. A justification for 
insight is implicit in Freud'sviews about the nature of the mental 
illness itself. The neurosis, according to him, is not a suffering 
produced by some foreign intruder, analogous to a bacteria, but is a part 
of the patient's character. He explains the aetiology of the neurotic 
symptoms as follows: 
"This therapy, then, is based on the recognition that 
unconscious ideas or better, the unconsciousness of 
certain mental processes are the direct cause of the 
morbid symptoms. We share this opinion with the 
French school (Janet) who, by the way, owing to 
excessive schematization, refer the cause of 
13 
hysterical symptoms to an unconscious idee fixe". 
If what are behind neurosis are unconscious items, such as wishes and 
emotions, we can begin to grasp why understanding what they are and what 
kept them from reaching awareness should help. Thus for a wish, for 
example, to be unconscious and distorted is for it to be prevented from 
interacting with the rational beliefs of the subject. Such a wish 
cannot, therefore, be modified according to the requirements of reality. 
It also makes it impossible for the subject to choose realistic means 
to satisfy it. The best result availAble to him is a gratification of 
it in an illusory way, like the thirsty man dreaming that he is drinking 
water, but such dreaming doesn't satisfy his real need. In contrast 
with ignorance, the awareness that one's wish or emotion is unrealistic 
can help to modify it. For example, the knowledge that a fear is only 
an imaginary one may help to reduce it. Similarlý, an understanding 
that one's attempt to satisfy one's desire was illusory, like that of the 
dreamer, can make one look for a better means to satisfy it. Thus 
awareness is central to rationality. In Freud's view it is also central 
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to our freedom. 
"For conscious will-power governs only conscious 
mental processes, and every mental compulsion 
is rooted in the unconscious ... It 
is only by the 
application of our highest mental functions, which are 
bound up with consciousness, that we can control all 
our impulses". 
14 
Freedom doesn't come, of course, like a sudden jump, due to understanding 
of some isolated wish or feeling. It is a cumulative process in which some 
modifications in the structure of the personality itself take place. 
As Freud himself put it: "Where -id was, there ego shall be". 
15 His 
conviction that self-knowledge is essential for cure resembles closely 
certain philosophical or even rel6gious claims. It can be compared with 
the Buddhist faith that true knowledge leads to elevation above suffering, 
with the Socratic claim that knowledge is virtue (arete), and most of 
all with Spinoza's doctrine that self-knowledge and freedom are inseparable. 
The particularly close similarity between Spinoza and Freud has been 
noticed and discussed by several writers, such as S. Hampshire and 
J. Neu. 16 Comparing these similarities, however illuminatirgit might 
be, unfortunately would take us far away from our main concern. 
We know that insight matters. However, insight can mean various 
things dependent on what kind of self-understanding it provides and how 
this understanding is reached. Firstly, it can refer to any belief 
true or false, which enables týe person to make sense of his experience 
and behaviour. Religious, astrological and other doctrines all compete 
in their attempt to provide such insight. The "insight" given by a 
shaman to a sick person can be quoted as an example. In order to cure 
his patient the shaman explains his illness in terms of a mythology 
they both share. Levi . -Strauss 
describes such explanation as follows. 
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"The sick woman believes in the myth and belongs 
to a society which believes in it. The tutelary 
spirits, the supernatural monsters and magical 
animals, are all part of a coherent system on 
which the native conception of the universe is 
founded. The sick woman accepts these mythical 
beings or, more accurately, she has never questioned 
their existence. What she does not accept are the 
incoherent and arbitrary pains, which are an alien 
element in her system but which the shaman, calling 
upon myth, will reintegrate within a whole where 
everything is meaningful. , 
17 
We think that the interpretation given by the shaman doesn't correspond 
to any objective reality, and the "insightl' his patient is provided 
with is based on entirely false, beliefs. What matters in such "insight" 
is that the patient believes the story to be true and it makes sense of 
his otherwise alien experience. Such beliefs can in turn make some 
difference to his mental states, for example, he might find his pain 
more tolerable or cease to feel it altogether. Do we want to regard 
all this as insight? If the notion of insight is used in a very broad 
sense including any kind of interpretation, even the most mythical 
one, which gives a subjective sense to the person's experiences, the 
shamanistic story, would count as insight. I want to suggest, however, 
that the term 'insight' like the word 'knowledge' should be restricted 
to beliefs which have some correspondence to objective reality (in this 
case the truth about oneself), while the system of beliefs which falls 
short of this requirement constitutes a pseudo-insight. 
By 'insight' we mean, therefore a true belief about oneself, or 
at least a belief which has some approximation to the truth. Freud and 
his followers claim that what they are trying to provide their patients 
with are such veridical insights. Freud, as we saw, says again and 
again that only true insight is a real solution to the patient's problems. 
The critic might argue, however, that the shaman's intention was to give a 
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veridical insight too, even if his result fell short of his goal. 
So the mere intention to provide genuine insight doesn't guarantee I 
that what has been reached is not a pseudoinsight. Since the truth of the 
Psychoanalytic interpretations is what is under scrutiny here we are 
unable to say at the moment whether psychoanalytic "insights" are 
genuine or not. But what, we can already do, is to point out some 
important differences between the alleged "insight" given by the shaman, 
astrologer or other such "authority" and that provided by the psychoanalyst. 
In order to account for the problems of his patient, the psychoanalyst 
appeals to unconscious factors, such as an unconscious emotion, for instance. 
Thus he might suggest to his patient "You don't trust your father because 
You unconsciously feel that he has betrayed you". In this interpretative 
statement the psychoanalyst connects in a causal manner something 
the patient is aware of (the patient herself said that she doesn't 
trust her father) with something of which she is ignorant (so far). 
The unconscious feeling postuldted*by the psychoanalyst can be argued 
for or against in the light of further observation. As has been suggested 
earlier, the psychoanalyst might point to the patient's free associations 
concerning the birth of her younger sister, and to her complaints that 
her father thereafter became more interested in his younger daughter 
than in her, in order to support the claim about the patient's 
unconscious feeling of being betrayed by her father. So what the psychoanalyst 
appeals to, in his attempt to provide the patient with the relevant 
"insight", are clearly empir. ical facts, even if their evidential support 
for his claim is not sufficient to establish it beyond reasonable doubt. 
Can we say the same of. the shaman, i. e. that he too appeals to some 
empirical facts to account for his patient's problem? Unlike the psy- 
choanalyst, the shaman makes references to various ppirits, monsters 
and other creatures of this kind. Thus he may tell his patient 
"Your pain is produced by a harmful spirit which has entered your body". 
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And then the curing may revolve around a "battle" performed by the shaman 
against this harmful spirit. We are tempted to say that, although 
the psychoanalyst might be wrong, he at least appeals to empirical 
facts, while the shaman fails to do even that but invokes mythical entities 
instead. But our criticism of the shaman and his procedure is likely 
to be dictated by our Western prejudices. Just like the psychoanalyst, 
he too can point out to some further 'manifestations' of the evil 
spirit, which is supposed to be responsible for his patient's disease. 
What the shaman and his patient observe is incorporated into their 
system of beliefs about disorders and how to treat them, and the observations 
they appeal to in particular instances seem to justify these beliefs. 
As P. Winch pointed out "their (he is talking about ZahdeJ mystical 
notions are eminently coherent, being interrelated by a network of logical 
ties, and so ordered that they never too crudely contradict sensory 
experience but, instead, experience seems to justify them". 
18 
It is, 
therefore, wrong to say that while the psychoanalyst tries to back up 
his "insight" by observable facts, the dhaman ignores the facts entirely, 
for they both try to appeal to observation, although the facts they 
invoke to support their claims are entirely different as their systems of 
beliefs are themselves quite different. 
But there is, however, one crucial difference beteeen the system 
of beliefs shared by the shaman and his patient, And those advocated 
by the psychoanalyst. What the shaman and his patient believe about 
diseases and how to cure them is usually an integral part of their 
whole conception of reality. This conception is in turn determined 
by the structure of their language and how they use certain terms, 
such as 'illness', 'spirit', 'harmful forces', etc. To ask the shaman 
to revise his views about the nature of disorders and accept some different 
view instead, is to ask him to abandon certain concepts which are an 
organic part of his language; he would have to revise his conceptual 
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scheme, and probably his way of life too. The psychoanalytic view of 
mental disorders and how to cure them is not such an integral part of 
our Western system of beliefs, even if they have become quite 
influential 
in certain quarters. We are familiar with alternative views about mental 
disorders and their treatment, such as that advocated by behaviouristically 
oriented psychologists, or that based on a physical model of mental 
disorders. For this reason we are not compelled to accept the 
psychoanalytic view in the same way as the shaman and his patients are 
compelled to stick to their beliefs? through absence of any alternative 
in their culture. This is a vital difference, because whatever the 
Psychoanalysts' own attitude towards their system of beliefs, it can be 
questioned by others, including those who are treated by the psychoanalytic 
methods, because unlike. sha-anistic patients; psychoanalytic ones don't 
share all their concepts with their psychotherapists. The shamanistic 
system of beliefs can only be questioned, if at all, from outside the 
culture. For this reason, the psychoanalyst when he fails to cure his 
patient cannot get away with blaming his failu're on such factors as 
It the extraordinary strength of unconscious impulses", parallel to the 
extraordinary powers of the evil spirit blamed by the shaman, but owes 
a more satisfactory account both to his patient and the critics of his 
method. Thus a possibility of critical questioning of the psychoanalytic 
"insight" makes it easier for us to look at it from a scientific point 
of view, which is what we in fact do, but which is more difficult in the 
case of shamanistic "insight", especially from the insider's point of view, 
The alleged "insight" provided by astrology is quite a different 
case. Some people in our own culture believe in astrology, and we are 
more familiar with this particular system of beliefs than we are with 
that held by the shaman. But familiarity is not as important as the 
fact that the astrologer's "insight" is now parasitic on other concepts, 
such as "significant correlation", "statistical data", etc., which seem 
- IV- 
to be perversions of our scientific concepts. But this is not what the 
astrologer himself thinks. He is convinced that his "insight" is achieved 
in a scientific way by, appealing to observable data, such as correlations 
between the cbnstellation of heavenly bodies and the person's life and 
problems. Thus in order to account for the subject's difficulties with 
his boss, for example, the astrologer appeals to a specific constellation 
of the stars at that time, arguing that there is a meaningful correlation 
between these two observables. The psychoanalyst too sometimes postulates 
a causal connection between two observables. He might suggest that the 
patient's fear of his boss is transferred from his fear of his father. 
Thus there may seem to be a parallel between these two kinds of explanation 
and no reason to take one more seriously than the other. But this analogy 
is rather superficial. The psychoanalyst when he postulates a causal 
connection between the patient's fear of his boss and his father, ean 
appeal to a psychological mechanism called projection, to account for it. 
We are told that projection consists in attribution of certain features 
of one object or person into another, if there is some subjective 
similarity for the subject between the two. In this particular case the 
similarity might consist in the fact that both boss and father represent 
for the subject an authority to which he has to submit himself. So 
the psychoanalyst gives us some account of how in his view there is 
a causal connection between the two observables, even if this account may 
be rejected by a behaviourist on the ground that there is a simpler 
explanation of the same phenomena in terms of a conditioned response. 
Can we say the same of the astrologer's explanation? If he postulates 
a significant connection between the constellation of the stars and 
our lives he owes us some account of how there could be such a connection$ 
because it is quite far from obvious. S6me astrologers argue that there 
is a statistically striking correlation between the two factors. This 
is doubtful, but let us agree with them provisionally and suppose that 
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there is such a correlation. But a "statistical correlation" can be of 
two quite different kinds. The phenomena may be causally connected, 
like the changing of the seasons and birds' migration, which is interesting 
from the point of view of science. But sometimes concomitance b-etween 
two phenomena could be purely accidental, as in the following example. 
Whenever certain shops are closed in London certain shops are also closed 
in Paris, a correlation which doesn't interest scientists because it 
is not explained by any laws of nature. The astrologer is at pains to 
persuade us that the supposed statistical correlation between the two 
phenomena he is interested in is more than accidental coincidence. So 
although we are not obliged to accept either astrologer's or psychoanalytic 
"insight", the latter is at least worth some attention, because it gives 
us a plausible story, true or false, why we should look at two 
phenomena as being connected in a causal way, while the former fails to do 
even that. 
Nothing would count as insight unless it is based on some true 
belief. However, a true belief can be acquired in various ways. It can 
be accepted on authority from someone who has a privileged access to a 
certain area of knowledge, or by the subject's own awareness of the 
. vidence for his belief. Quite often the man in the street believes in 
current scientific theories not because he really understands the 
justification for accepting them but merely on the authority of the 
scientists who formulate these theories. The scientists themselves 
can justify the theories they stick to, or at least they should be able 
to do so. We usually feel that a belief, however true, accepted on 
authority alone, even if this authority is reliable, is inferior 
to a belief which the subject himself can justify. Suppose somebody 
wants to attack my belief - if I am unable to justify it myself I am 
left almost defenceless, the only defence left to me is to suggest that 
the authority I am appealing to is reliable. However, being able to 
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to justify all the beliefs one holds, an altogether impossible task, 
is not usually necessary for carrying out our daily tasks. As far as 
self-Tsnowledge is concerned, however, the ability to justify one's beliefs 
is more important, if not actually indispensable, for the following 
reasons. Self-knowledge is closer to moral knowledge-r, &t4or than knowledge 
about the external world. A moral man is not one who merely knows 
what is good or bad, right or wrong, but one who knows how to choose 
between these alternatives, i. e. how to live morally, And if there is a 
moral authority, it cannot teach us how to live morally, although it 
can serve as an inspiration and an example to folaow. When faced with 
a moral choice, for example, whether to die or to stick to one's 
principle of telling the truth, one has to decide for oneself. The 
example of those ready to die in defence of truth, like Socrates or 
Ciordano Bruno, can help to make the choice, but the choice has to be 
made by the person himself. Self-knowledge too, is not merely the 
knowledge of certain objective facts about oneself, for instance, that 
one is an insecure person. It is also an awareness how this insecurity 
affects one's life. An awareness, for example, that when one is presented 
with an interesting challenge one is unable to face it, that one avoids. ý 
people who are more successful than oneself, etc. Sometimes the person 
might be unaware that all these problems are connected with him having 
an insecure personality and the psychoanalyst or some other expert can 
help him realize that, but in order to understand what it is really 
to be an insecure person the subject has to experience it for himself, 
just as the moral man has to make the choice himselfv and cannot be instructed 
by the authority. Also self-kn. owleclge is not something the person can 
acquire once and for all. It is a continuous process which only ends 
with life itself. The psychoanalyst might help me to realize how 
my present problems are affected by events from the past, but the future 
will face me with new situations and I cannot expect the authority 
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to be there and help me whenever I feel bewildered by a new experience. 
I suppose the authority can help the person in learning how to be open 
and sensitive to certain things, but this sensitivity can only be 
exercised by the subject himself. All this implies that insight accepted 
on authority is not only inferior but simply might not do. For this 
reason we wouldn't ascribe great value to the insight provided by the 
religious authority, such as the shaman, even if it were in fact true, 
because such insight is accepted on the basis of faith rather than 
critical self-examination. But what about the acquisition of insight 
in psychoanalysis? Does the psychoanalytic patient accept certain truths 
about himself simply because the psychoanalyst says so or is he actually 
encouraged to examine these truths critically? Freud himself was 
convinced that if the patient is confronted with a "ready made" inter- 
pretation without being able to understand h6w it was reached, it wouldn't 
have any significance to him and would thus leave him indifferent, if not 
actually producing the opposite effect. He wrote 
"As a rule we put off telling him of a construction 
or explanation till he himself has so nearly arrived 
at it that only a single step! ýremains to be taken, 
though that step! )is in fact the decisive synthesis. 
If we proceeded in another way and overwhelmed him 
with our interpretations before he was prepared for 
them, our information would either produce no effect 
or it would provoke a violent outbreak of resistance 
which would make the progress of our work more 
diffic&lt or might even threaten to stop it altogether. "19 
We also remember that Freud was always guided by a principle that 
people should be made as far as possible to produce the solution to their 
riddles themselves. So in theory at leastý if not in practice, Freud I 
rejects insight accepted on authority, even if this authority is 
himself. But how is this principle put into practice in psychoanalysis? 
We remember that one of the formulas of the psychoanalytic therapy 
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is to proceed step by step, so that the analysand can understand bow 
the psychoanalyst reaches his conclusion. All the problems concerned 
with the "how" of the interpretation, discussed earlier, are relevant 
here. To remind ourselves once more, the psyeboanalyst proceeds in 
the following way. He begins with the clarification of the patient's 
behaviour first. The patient is invited to pay more attention to what 
he himself said and did. The next stepýconnects the factors made 
explicit in the process of clarification with the factors the subject 
is less aware of. If the patient doesn't see the connection the 
psychoanalyst points to his free associations or another instance 
6f his behaviour which suggest such a connection. If this new factor 
is accepted by the analysand, it becomes in turn a basis for making a 
still further inference, often concerned with the unconscious item, the 
subject was originally ignorant about, but which became clearer to him 
after grasping the steps leading to it. How a particular psychoanalyst 
puts this principle and rule into practice may vary a lot and leave 
much to be desired in some cases, but the principle and rule is there. 
That much at least distinguishes psychoanalytic insight from the 
shamanistic one, or any insight based on faith in general, which doesn't 
formulate such rules and principles even to start with. 
Is true belief about oneself, which one is able to justify, enough 
to produce the therapeutic change which counts? What Freud said on 
some occasions seems to suggest that self-knowledge is a sufficient 
condition for cure, as in the following passage. 
"The psychoneuroses are substitutive satisfactions 
of some instinct of which one is obliged to deny 
to oneself and others; Their capacity to exist 
depends on this distortion and lack of recognition. 
When the riddle they present is solved and the 
solution is accepted by the patients these 
diseases cease to be able to exist. There is 
hardly anything like this in medicine, though in 
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fairy tales you hear of evil spirits whose power is 
broken as soon as you can tell them their same - 
20 
the name which they have kept secret" . 
If neurosis disappears as soon as the patient is able to understand its 
origin, then insight is sufficient for its elevation. Freud's later 
writings, however, put a greater and greater distance-between the 
gaining of self-understanding and the automatic remission of symptoms. 
In the paper on The Unconscious he observes "If we communicate to a patient 
some idea which he has at one time repressed but which we have discovered 
21 in him, our telling him makes at first no change in his mental conditions" . 
Elsewhere he is even more explicit. 
"Informing the patient of what he does not know 
because he has repressed it is only one of the 
necessary preliminaries to the treatment ... 
Since,. however psychoanalysis cannot dispense 
with giving this information, it lays down that 
this shall not be done before two conditions have 
been fulfilled. First the patient must, through 
preparation, himself have reached the neighbourhood 
of what he has repressed, and secoridly, he must 
have formed a sufficient attachment (transference) 
to the physician for his emotional relationships 
to him to make a fresh flight impossible". 
22 
Here FReud is explicitly saying that although true belief about oneself 
is a necessary condition of the psychoanalytic cure it isnota sufficient 
one, however. What more is needed, apart from telling the patient 
the truth about him, in order to change him in a desirable way? Only 
understanding accompanied by an emotional reaction could be effecýtive we 
are told. As Karen Horney puts it, insight "means gaining information 
about ourselves which we feel in our guts,,,. 
23 The same point is made 






to an "intellectual" one, is capable of producing a desirable change. 
Although the contrast between intellectual and emotional insight is 
repeatedly stressed we are not always given a clear account why some 
cognitions can precipitate an emotion while others not. The most 
interesting attempt to give such an account was made by J. Richfield 
in his paper "An Analysis of the Concept of Insight". 
24 He connects 
the constraints on insight with B. Russell's distinction between knowledge 
by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Let us see then what Russell 
meant by these terms. 
"I say that I am acquainted with an object when 
I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i5e, 
when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I 
speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the 
sort of relation which constitutes judgement, but 
the sort which constitute presentation. , 
25 
In turn 
"An object is 'known by-description' when we know that it 
is 'the so-and-so'. i. e. when we know that there is 
one object, and no more, having a certain property; 
and it will generally be implied that we do not 
26 
have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance" . 
Suppose one person knows the effect of a chemical substance called LSD 
by acquaintance, whereas another by description only. They both 
know that it produces visions. But the similarity between their 
knowledge ends at this point. The person acquaitited with effects 
of LSD experienced this very effect upon himself, whereas the other 
formed his judgement about the effects by observing the behaviour of 
those effected by it or in another such way, but not by actually experiencing 
it. Thus an essential part of the knowledge by acquaintance is a direct 
x 
experience of an object, which is absent in the knowledge by description. 
Experiencing something, especially in a personal context, can make a 
big difference. Some popular sayings, such as "the satiated man cannot 
I- -_--__-- -- - -_: r:: v-,. ____ 
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understand the hungry man", express this point. Freud himself, 
although he never used Russell's words, had something similar in mind 
when he wrote the following. 
"If knowledge about the unconscious were as 
important for the patient as people inexperienced 
in psychoanalysis imagine, listening to lectures 
or reading books would be enough to cure him. 
Such measures, however, have as much influence 
on the symptoms of nervous illness as a 
distribution of menu cards in a time of famine 
has upon hunger". 
27 
Of course, knowledge of the unconscious was always important in his 
view, what he is undermining here is the knowledge by description which 
transcends the direct experience, because reading books or listening 
to lectures can only give you such knowledge. In contrast, a 
therapeutic situation provides a context for experience. Freud's 
followers were never ignorant of the value of experience in psychotherapy, 
and made a direct connection between the interpretation leading to experience 
and its effectiveness. Otto Fenichel, for example, observed "The fact 
that pathogenic conflicts, revived in the transference, are now experienced 
in their full emotional content makes the transference interpretation so 
much more effective than any other interpretation. , 
28 
What are the features 
of the psychoanalytic therapy which make it such a good climate for the 
patient not merely to talk about his problems but actually to experience 
them? The factors which go into the proper timing of the interpretation 
are relevant here. We remember that one of the formulae of the 
psychoanalytic therapy says "Work always where the patient's affect 
lies at the moment". If the psychoanalyst interprets what preoccupies 
the patient at the moment, he is more likely to get from him not just 
a mere verbal response but an emotional reaction which is more significant 
in experimental terms. If the issue of timing is ignored, however, 
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the patient, says Freud, 
11 may think to himself: 'This is very interesting, 
but I feel no trace of it'. We have increased his 
knowledge but altered nothing else in him. The 
situation is much the same as when people read 
psychoanalytic writings. The reader is "stimulated" 
only by those passages which he feels apply to him - 
that is, which concern conflicts that are active 29 
in him at the moment. Everything else leaves him cold" 
Our daily experiences confirm that too. I might be strongly concerned 
with something but if this very thing is raised at the moment when 
something else is preying on my mind it is most likely to leave me 
unmoved. Other factors, discussed earlier, such as the fact that 
interpretation should proceed step by step, are also of great importance. 
If thelýpatient is confronted with a "ready made" interpretation without 
being able to understand how it was reached it wouldn't have any 
significance to him and thus might leave him indifferent or even produce the 
opposite effect. These and other factors which contribute to the 
effectiveness of the interpretation are often referred to by the' 
psychoanalyst as "working-through". In Freud's later writings working- 
through was stressed more and more and insight was no longer considered 
sufficient for producing the desirable change in the patient. The con- 
clusion which follows from all this is that self-knowledge is not 
powerless, but it is not omnipotent, and to make it effective requires 
more than just telling the truth, however convincing it might be. 
In the passage quoted earlier Freud has said that informing the 
patient about the nature of his problem, although not enough, is 
nevertheless an indispensable part of the psychoanalytic therapy. 
Thus insight was regarded by him as a sine qua non of psychoanalysis. 
%. i 
This idea that insight is a necessary condition for cure requires some 
further comments. We remember that originally, in ot4der to help the 
________ 
1 
-- - --- - 
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patient to overcome his SYMPtOmss Freud followed the French school 
(Janet) and then Breuer in their use of the hypnotic technique. This 
technique hadl. little to do with providing the patient with self-knowledge 
and a lot with influence by means of suggestion, and yet Freud claimed 
that he had some success then. But if that is the case he cannot argue 
at the same time that self-knowledge or insight is a necessary condition 
for the relief of neurosis. But let us do justice to him. In tracing 
the history of Freudian therapy it is important to realise a deep shift 
in understanding of the mental illness itself. In his early period 
Freud tended to identify it with the symptoms themselves, whereas in 
his latter works symptoms came to be regarded as a mere manifestation 
of the illness. The shift in understanding of the nature of neurosis 
and other mental disorders led to a shift in the goal of psychotherapy 
and evaluation of its outcome. A mere disappearance of symptoms, 
without some deeper changes in the structure of the personality, ceased 
to be regarded as a successful outcome of the therapeutic intervention. 
But let Freud speak for himself. 
"Hypnotic treatment seeks to cover up and gloss 
something in mental life; analytic treatment seeks 
to expose and get rid of something. The former acts 
like a cosmetic, the latter like surgery. The former 
makes use of suggestion in order to forbid the symptoms; 
it strengthens the repression, but, apapt from that, 
leaves all the process that have led to the formation 
of the symptoms unaltered. Analytic treatment makes 
its impact further back towards the roots, where the 
conflicts are which gave rise to the symptoms and uses 
suggestion in order to alter the outcome of those 
conditions. " 
30 
So what was originally regarded by Freud as cure turned out to be an 
apparent improvement only and further practice convinced him that it was 
indeed the case. A mere removal of symptoms, without treating 
-1001- 
underlying causes, usually resulted in either reappearance of the 
original symptoms or their substitution, i. e. other forms of maladaptive 
behaviour. This was a reason, says Freud, why 
"I gave up the suggestive technique, and with it 
hypnosis, so early in my practice because I despaired 
of making suggestion powerful and enduring enough 
to effect permanent cures. In every severe case I 
saw the symptoms which had been applied crumple 
away; after which the disease or some substitute 
for it was back once more". 
31 
In other words successful cure couldn't be achieved, in Freud's view, 
by a hypnotic or other method which dispenses with insight, and thus he 
implies that insight is a necessary condition for the therapeutic change 
which counts. There is one occasion, however, on which Freud suggests 
that it might be possible to attain recovery by the use of kinds of 
influence different from the psychoanalytic one or even spontaneously. 
But these are what he calls the "slighter, episodic cases" only. 
32 
In severe cases psychoanalytic method is still indispensable and insight 
is still a necessary condition for cure, according to him. 
We have learned enough about insight and the procedures of 
psychoanalytic therapy to be able to formulate now a precise form of 
Freud's argument about the evidential value of therapeutic sucess for 
the validity of psychoanalytic interpretations. It can be formulated 
as follows: 
Premise 1: The analysis of the patient x was therapeutically successful. 
Premise 2: Veridical insight is causally necessary for the relief of the 
patient's neurosis, and only psychoanalytic interpretations 
can mediate such insight. 
Conclusion: The psychoanalytic interpretations given to the patient x 
were veridical. 
We can refer to this inference as the Argument from Insight. Adolf 
p 
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GrUnbaum calls it "The Tally Argument" (because of Freud's formulation 
that interpretations should "tally with what is real" in the patient), 
and apart from referring to Premise 2 for short as "the Necessary 
Condition Thesis", his formulation of it is similar to ours. 
33 We often 
hear psychoanalystssaying that nothing counts as insight unless it produces 
change. Insight which doesn't result in relevant change is labelled 
by them as "false", "incomplete", "intellectual", etc. But this either 
begs the question or implies that there is a logical, as opposed to 
empirical, connection between therapeutic change and insight. Since they 
in fact believe that there is a causal connection between insight and 
cure (at least Freud did), they need some independent criteria, apart 
from the relevant change, to establish that insight has indeed occurred. 
In other words, for this argument to be sound empirically, Premise 2 
should be established independently from Premise 1. How this can be 
done poses some difficult problems. But there is an even more serious 
problem facing the Argument from Insight, namely, whether Premise 2 
is tenable at all in the light of recent findings. 
The thesis that the patient's acquisition of that veridical insight 
which only analytic treatment can mediate is a causally necessary 
condition for the therapeutic change that counts has been challenged 
both by philosophers and psychologists. According to Eysenck, for 
example, the hypothesis of the therapeutic efficacy of various forms 
of psychotherapy in general, and analytic therapy in particular, is 
empirically unfounded. What are his grounds for reaching such a 
conclusion? He takes into account some figures produced by analysts 
about the effectiveness of psychoanalytic therapy. These figures 
show that about 46 per cent of the total number of 760 patients 
benefited from the psychoanalytic treatment, i, e. were repotted as 
"cured". "much improved" and "improved". If we take into account a 
large number of patients treated by other forms of psychotherapy and put 
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them together, the rate of cure and improvement reaches about 64 per cent 
of the total number of about 7,400 cases. Now, in order to show that 
psychotherapy in general, and psychoanalysis in particular, did in fact 
help these patients, as the psychotberapistsclaim it did, we have to 
compare the rate of success achieved by the psychotherapeutic methods 
with a matching control group, who didn't receive psychotherapy of any 
kind. To do that Eysenck appeals to two surveys of large samples of 
cases reported by Denker and Landis, and argues that they can serve 
as a control group, or at least an approximation to it. Landis reported 
that approximately two thirds of the patients diagnosed as psychoneur6tic 
in New York State hospitals in 1914 and in United States hospitals in 
1933 were discharged as recovered or improved within one year. 
34 
Denker's report indicated similar findings. He made a survey of the 
decrease in life-insurance disability claims from the patients treated 
by general practitioners, diagnosed as psychoneurotic, and found that 
over a two-year period about 72 per cent of these patients withdrew 
their insurance claims. 
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If we now compare these figures with the 
rate of recovery and improvement reported by the psychoanalysts 
they "show that roughly two-thirds of a group of neurotic patients 
will recover or improve to a marked extent within about two years 
of the onset of their illness, whether they are treated by means of 
psychotherapy or not" says Eysenck. 
36 
If Eysenck's conclusion that 
psychoanalysis doesn't produce better, if not actually worse, results 
than no treatment at all is correct, Freudian oriented psychotherapists 
are wrong in believing that insight is a necessary condition for cure. 
Despite its attractiveness, Eysenck's argument 
I 
has'been subjected to severe criticism. It is possible to argue, firstly, 
that his study doesn't meet the requirements of a proper controlled 
study. The group he used for comparison with the psychotherapeutic 
patients wasn't really the group which received no treatment at all. 
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The patients from both Landis' and Denker's surveys received some 
kind of help after all, either from general practitioners or other doctors. 
So the Denker-Landis figures can at best be used to assess the effectiveness 
of psychoanalytic therapy against different forms of therapy. Secondly, 
a comparison only makes sense if the patients' characteristics relevant 
to the outcome of recovery or improvement, such as severity of disturbance, 
age, etc., are similar in both cases. There is good reason for suggesting 
that the patients from both studies used by Eysenck in his comparison, 
insurance claimants in one case and hospitalized neurotics in another, 
were different in important respects from the patients the psychoanalysts 
usually deal with. Psychoanalysts usually deal with severe cases, whereas 
the category of people from Denker's survey in particular seemed to 
represent less severe types of disorder. Differences between the types 
of patients in both cases makes Eysenck's conclusion rather doubtful. 
Thirdly, the criteria of improvement used by Denker and Landis are not 
comparable to those used by the psychoanalysts. In Landis' case the 
discharge of the patient from hospital was regarded as a sign of recovery 
or improvement. The criterion used by Denker was withdrawal of the 
insurance claim. The latter especially doesn't resemble in any way 
the criterion used by the psychoanalyst in their assessment of successful 
outcome of psychotherapy. The different criteria of outcome used in 
both groups make them Incomparable to one another, despite Eysenck's 
attempt to do so. In other words Eysenck's conclusion is ill-founded 
because it is reached on the basis of heterogenecusdata which vary 
in respect to the type of patients, criteria of outcome and the group 
used for comparison. But even if Eysenck's conclusion is doubtful, 
his general argument is still valid. It is meaningful to compare the 
results of psychoanalytic therapy, or indeed therapy in general, with 
the rate of nontreated improvement, because such comparison can tell 
us something about the effectiveness of the psychoanalytic therapy, 
j 
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provided that it is a properly devised control study. Are there such 
reliable control inquiries available to us at the moment which can throw 
some light on the effectiveness of psychoanalysis as compared to 
non-treatment? S. Fisher and R. P. Greenberg in their work The Scientific 
Credibility of Freud's Theories and Therapy quote six studies which are a 
better approximation to a proper control inquiry. 
37 
On the basis of 
these studies they argue that "while we cannot conclude that the studies 
offer unequivocal evidence that analysis is more effective than non- 
treatment, they do indicate with consistency that this seems probable 
with regard to a number of analysts and their nonpsychotic, chronic 
patients. , 
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It is possible to criticise these inquiries for their 
methodological shortcomings, as Fisher and Greenberg themselves did, 
and therefore to regard the above conclusion as too optimistic, but we 
cannot say so far, despive Eysenck, that it has been positively 
demonstrated that Freudian therapy produces no better results than no 
treatment at all. 
What about the effectiveness of psychoanalytic therapy vis a vis 
other kinds of therapy which are based on entirely different therapeutic 
principles and assumptions, such as behavioural therapy for example? 
Freud was convinced that unless insight is achieved, the removal 
of symptoms would result in symptom substitution, i. e. other forms 
of maladaptive behaviour, and therefore he regarded other ways of dealing, 
especially with chronic cases, as less satisfactory than psychoanalysis. 
This view is still held by some of his followers who look with scepticism 
and suspicion at rival methods of treatment of the neurotic disfunctions. 
Yet therapists practising these rival methods claim that the results 
they produce are as good as those achieved by the psychoanalysts, if not 
actually better in, some cases. If they are right, the psychoanalytic 
assumption that veridical insight is a necessary condition for the alleviation 
of chronic neurotic disorders is untenable. To solve this dispute we 
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need an adequate control inquiry into the outcomes of psychoanalytic 
therapy vis a vis results produced by alternative methods. We have 
been able to learn already what constraints are necessary for such an 
inquiry to be acceptable. As in the case of a control study of the 
analytic outcome in contrast with no-treatment, in this case too the 
two groups taken for comparison have to match for the nature and degree 
of disorder, the type of patient, the same criteria for the evaluation 
of the outcomes and possibly for other factors such as the length of 
treatment, etc. The arrangement of such an inquiry is not, however, 
as straightforward a matter as it might seem. It faces empirical 
difficulties and (more seriously) conceptual problems. It is 
important to learn something about these problems in order to avoid the 
danger of accepting some statistical categories before we even know 
what they exactly show and also what they cannot show. Take, for 
example, the concept of cure or successful outcome of psychotherapy. 
Some psychotherapists wouldequate cure with the removal of symptoms. 
If a phobic subject, for example a child frightened by dogs, stops 
avoiding them, they might regard him as cured. But there are different 
degrees of alleviation of symptoms. One therapist may rest content 
if the dog-phobic subject doesn't run away at the sight of a dog, as 
a result of therapeutic intervention. Another might not be happy until 
the subject is able to approach the feared animal. The psychoanalyst 
might not be even content with the latter, because in his view it is a 
mere removal of the symptoms, whereas his aim is to produce a dynamic change, 
i. e. change in the person's feelings as well as the particular behaviour- 
pattern. These, feelings can be the cause of other behaviour. ' There 
is a difference, for example, between the person being able to approach 
a feared object even if he is still terrified by it, and the person 
who doesn't experience such fear any more. He who is still afraid 
7 
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may allow himself to be approached by dogs only if it is necessary to 
do so, while the one who is not afraid doesn't pay any attention to them. 
So although both of them do not exhibit avoidance behaviour, their mental 
states and other behaviour-patterns are quite different. And while the 
analyst takes into account the mental state of the subject as well as 
his behaviour in his assessment of the outcome, the behaviouristically 
oriented therapist rests content with the change of the behaviour alone. 
For that reason he is accused by the psychoanalyst of dealing merely 
with symptoms instead of being concerned with the roots or underlying 
causes of the problem. Why can't the therapists of rival schools make 
some kind of compromise? The psychoanalyst could lower, whereas the 
behaviourist could raise, his standards of cure in order to meet at 
some common point. Such a thing would be possible if the assessment 
of the effectiveness were a mere matter of taste of the particular 
psychotherapist, which is not the case. What counts as cure depends 
on the understýnding of the mental disorder itself. In the behaviourist's 
view phobia is a disfunction of behaviour. Behaviour itself is looked 
upon as a function of stimuli. If the stimulus acquires a negative value 
for the subject, for some reasons, an avoidance behaviour takes place. 
Such avoidance behaviour. usually reduces fear (out of sight out of mind 
so to speak). The reduction of fear reinforces in turn this very 
behaviour. If we look at phobia in this way the following implications 
for its treatment can be deduced. In order to stop avoidance behaviour, 
i. e. to break the circle of the negative reinforcement, we should try to 
elicit from the subject a different response in the presence of the feared 
stimulus. The phobic subject might be encouraged to expose himself 
gradually to the object he fears. If he succeeds, with the therapist's 
help, in doing so the negative reinforcementcis put to an end and 
positive reinforcement can take place. Thus if a child acquired a 
phobia of dogs, because a big dog barked angrily at him once when he 
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was on a walk with his father, he might be encouraged to approach 
toy dogs first, then real but small and friendly looking dogs and maybe 
at the end big ones, similar to the one he has been frightened by 
originally. The psychoanalytic account of the same or similar case 
of phobia might look quite differently. Suppose that when the child 
expressed his fear of the dog in the 6riginal circumstances his father 
teased him and laughed at him and this made the child very angry with him. 
Meantime this anger was forgotten or even repressed while the fear of 
dogs still persisted. For the analyst the anger with the father expressed 
by the child on the original occasion may be as important as the fear 
of the dog itself. Because it could be the case that the sight of the 
dogs reminds the child of his anger and his love for his father makes 
it very difficult for him to reconcile these two feelings. So it is not 
only the fear of the dogs which has to be dealt with but also the child's 
anger and the conflict it produces, in the psychoanalyst's view. 
Mere dealing with the fear of dogs, as the behaviourist tries to do, is 
a superficial solution, if at all, according to him. But this 
accusation is unjust, because the behaviourist tries to deal with the 
causes of the phobia too, although he understands them in a different 
way. It is clear now that the disagreement between the two is not about 
the standards, i. e. the behaviouristic therapist dealing with the symptoms 
merely, whereas the psychoanalyst with roots or underlying causes of the 
problem, as some would like to thinki both of them try to remove the cause 
of the phobia, although their understanding of it and the nature of the 
phenomena itself is quite different. 
But in a different society, some primitive tribes fQr example, a 
fear of some animals can be looked upon in an entirely different way. 
Certain members of such a society adopt a particular species of animal 
as their totem. There are various taboos connected with the totemic 
animal. The violation of these taboos is regarded as a crime which has 
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to be punished, sometimes by death. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the totemic animal often becomes the object of fear and elicits 
behaviour very similar, if not phenomenologically the same, to what we 
call phobia. Are we justified in applying our standards to this 
phenomenon and regard it as phobia too? Some might argue that since the fear 
of the totemic animal also incapacitates the person and makes his life 
miserable, just as phobia of an ordinary animal does, it has to be looked 
upon and dealt with in the same way. But what if everybody in a tribe 
is incapacitated in the same way? It might not be felt any more as 
incapacity but as a way of life. And anyway, our western therapies 
would be entirely helpless in dealing with such a phenomenon. It would 
be useless to encourage the person who suffers from the fear of a totemic 
animal to expose himself gradually to it in order to stop the negative 
reinforcement, as the behaviourist does, because the taboos he believes 
in and, (his entire way of life tells him to do just the opposite. So 
whatconstitutes a "symptom" can vary from society to society, and even 
in the same society very similar behaviour can be called sometimes a 
religious inspiration and sometimes madness. If we cannot agree about 
the causes of phobia, or even whether it should be regarded as such, 
an attempt to fix a cure rate at some agreed level is difficult if not an 
impossible enterprise. Quite often the elegance of statistical categories 
merely hushes up these problems. 
But in some cases at least such comparison should be possible. Although 
the behaviourists and psychoanalysts disagree about the mechanism of 
phobia, and therefore-Adopt different methods for dealing with it, they 
at least agree that it is a kind of disfunction which incapacitates the 
person and thus requires their therapeutic intervention. This level 
of agreement might not be much but it enables us to establish some 
starting point for the comparison at least. But they have to agree about 
something else as well. The psychoanalyst wants to change the behaviour 
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of the phobic subject as well as the structure of his personality. 
And he cannot claim that he succeeded in achieving his goal if the subject 
still avoids the phobic object. In other words the disappearance of 
the avoidance behaviour is an important criterion for the assessment of 
the outcome of his therapy. And this is also the criterion used by 
the behaviourist in his evaluation of the result of the treatment. If 
that much is common to both of them, whatever else the psychoanalyst 
is trying to achieve in his view, the comparison of the outcomes is 
not an impossible thing, although it might be still difficult. Are 
there some control inquires into the outcome of the rival schools of 
psychotherapies? An overview of such studies is offered again by Fisher 
and Greenberg. They quote Cartwright (1966a), Ellis (1957), Dudek (1970), 
Berendreyt (1961) and other studies. What follows from all these studies, 
according to them, is that "there is at present no justification for 
a patient to assume that he will achieve a greater degree of improvement 
in a therapy called psychoanalysis than in a therapy given another label 
as analytically oriented, client-centered, or behavioura 1 ." 
39 If cure 
can be achieved by methods not based on psychoanalytic insight, and 
we have good reasons to believe that it is the case, Freud and his 
followers cannot claim any longer that veridical insight is a necessary 
condition for any kind of cure which couhts. And if the Premise 2 of 
the Argument from Insight is undercut in this way the whole argument 
collapses. However, there is still some kind of defence left to the 
psychoanalyst. Instead of claiming that veridical insight is a necessary 
condition for any kind of cure of neurosis he can adopt a more modest 
claim, namely, that veridical insight is necessary for the psychoanalytic 
kind of cure only. So although several rival therapies can succeed 
in the alleviation of neurosis, the conquest of neurosis iný'the patients 
treated by the psychoanalytic methods might still depend on veridical 
insight. A possibility of the same disorder being treated successfully 
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by different methods can be also found in physical medicine. A cancer, 
for example, can be treated by surgical and chemo-therapeutic methods. 
And although anaesthesia is not a necessary condition for any kind of cure 
of cancer it is necessary, however, for the cure based on surgical 
intervention. What we have to do now is to examine in turn this 
modified version of the Argument from Insight. 
According to some critics of psychoanalysis, even the modified 
version of the Argument from Insight wouldn't do. They are convinced 
that psychoanalysts, or indeed psychotherapists in general, unwittingly 
influence their patients to behave and talk in ways which validate 
their interpretation. In other words the "insight" achieved by the 
patient is not a result of his veridical self-discovery but reflects 
his conversion to the psychoanalyst's interpretation, i. e. he produces 
the very evidence which confirms the psychoanalyst's hypotheses. 
M. Martin, for example, writes 
"In the light of a recent and ever-growing body 
of experimental literature, it is becoming 
increasingly implausible to maintain that 
psychoanalysts do not produce in their patients 
the very evidence that confirms the psychoanalytic 
interpretation. This literature, moreover, 
makes it understandable why rival schools of 
psychotherapy find confirmation only within 
their own therapeutic session: each school's 
theories are confirmed by its own practitioners 
in their own practice by producing in their 
patients the very behaviours that are supposed 
to be confirming. , 
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Thus a well known joke that analysts of Freudian orientation transform 
their patients into a Freudian type of person, Jungian into a Jungian type 
of person, etc., isn't a joke any more but a fact in the critic's eyes. 
Is there any justification for making such a claim? The critics argue 
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that the main therapeutic force of psychoanalysis is embodied not in the 
patient's acquisition of veridical insight by means of psychoanalytic 
interpretations (as Freud and his followers believe), but in non-analytic 
factors, which are independent of the contents or processes of the therapy 
rendered. 
What are these factors and do they really occur in the process of 
psychoanalysis? Firstly, even before the proper analysis starts, 
a therapist, because of his professional status or reputation, is believed 
by the patient to have help-giving potential. The patient usually 
comes not only with some motivation for change, but also with hope and 
expectation that help will be forthcoming from the psychoanalyst. There 
might be an initial period during which the patient reveals his problems 
to the empathetically listening person. Regardless of whether the 
psychoanalyst chooses to make any interpretation at this stage the 
very opportunity to discuss the problem with a person from whom the 
patient has hope and expectancy of receiving help produces some release 
of tension in him and thus may improve his general condition. Also such 
a subtle factor as acceptance for treatment by a prestigious psychoanalyst 
can maximize the patient's response to psychotherapy. Because of the 
technical emphasis on suitability for psychoanalysis, many patients 
interpret acceptance for such treatment as evidence of favourable 
prognosis, not being seriously 111,! etc., which contributes to their 
improvemept. Freud himself was aware that in some cases the patient 
merely by being able to verbalize his feelings to the empathetic 
psychoanalyst can experience an initial release of tension. In his early 
period he referred to this phenomenon as "catharsis" or "abreaction" 
and ascribed to it quite an important role in the psychoanalytic treatment. 
His latter practice convinced him, however, that the initiaiý release 
of tension has only a temporary effect, and if the patient was not given 
any interpretation his condition usually returned to its original stage. 
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Secondly, in all psychotherapies, including psychoanalysis, apart 
from the talk of the therapist such as interpreting the patient's 
behaviour, something else takes place also. This is usually non-verbal 
behaviour of the therapist, of which he himself might not be fully 
aware, but which can influence the outcome of his therapeutic 
intervention. Judd Marmur describes such behaviour as follows. 
"Facial reactions of the therapist to the patient's 
behaviour or speech, a questioning glance, a look of 
approval, a barely perceptible frown or lift of the 
eyebrows, a faint nod of the; i. head or shrug of the 
shoulders, a posture of involvement or detachment, 
all served as cues to patients whose "antennae" 
were obviously alerted to the slightest indications 
of approval or disapproval, interest or disinterest, 
from the therapist. Even for those therapist 
who practiced behind a couch, the tonal means of 
their mm-hmms, the patterns of their silences, 
or the sounds of their shifting movements acted 
as similar cues. It has been demonstrated experimentally 
that such non-verbal signals can not only influence 
the direction and content of patient's communications, 
but also have an operant conditioning effect on 
thought and behaviour, reinforcing what is perceived 
as approved and discouraging that which is perceived 
41 
as disapproved". (my italics) 
Non-verbal behaviour of this kind is characteristic of human interactions 
in general and there is no reason for thinking that the patient-psycho- 
therapist interaction could be an exception to it. However, as we cannot 
claim that such non-verbal behaviour has More effect upon us than 
speech in general, we haven't yet got reason to believe that it is the 
opposite in the case of psychoanalytic interaction. So although a'certain 
degree of "operant conditioning" may well occur during psychoanalysis, 
its effects might be less significant than those produced by the use of 
characteristically analytic procedures. 
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Thirdly, the psychoanalytic situation has some peculiar features 
which contribute to'the suggestibility of the patient. The Analyst 
behaves in such a way that he becomes an indeterminate figure for the 
analysand. He doesn't show his attitude towards the issues the patient 
raises and the feelings he expresses, in order to avoid the danger of 
inhibiting him in some ways. This situation, combined with the rule of 
free associations, produces a feeling of anxiety and uncertainty in the 
patient and he develops a cognitive hunger for guidance. As a result 
he becomes emotionally involved with the psychoanalyst (the transference 
phenomenon) and therefore very suggestible. 
The possibility of influencing the patient by means of suggestion , 
produces the biggest challenge to the objectivity of the clinical data, 
because if it were indeed the case, as critics believe, it would imply 
that the patient accepts interpretations merely because of his conversion 
to the analyst's perhaps imaginary story and not because it is in 
fact true. Was Freud aware of the devastating consequence of this 
objection for his Argument from Insight, even in its modified version, 
and if so what was his reply to it? The following passage from Freud's 
writings shows his deep appreciation of the problem. 
"This is the objection that is most often raised 
against psychoanalysis, and it must be admitted that, 
though it is groundless, it cannot be rejected as 
unreasonable. If it were justified, psychoanalysis 
would be nothing more than a particularly well- 
disguised and particularly effective form of 
suggestive treatmentand we should have to attach little 
weight to all that it tells us about what influences 
our lives, the dynamics of the mind or the unconscious. - 
That is what our opponents believe; and in particular 
they think that we have 'talked' the patients into 
everything relating to the importance of sexual 
experiences - or even into those experiences themselves - 
after such notions have grown up in our own depraved 
42 imagination". 
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And what was his reply to this objection? There are occasions when 
Freud simply denies the occurance of suggestion in the process of analysis, 
as in the following: 
"The danger of our leading a patient astray by 
suggestion, by persuading him to accept things which we 
ourselves believe but which he ought not to, has 
certainly been enormously exaggerated. I can assert 
without boasting that such an abuse of 'suggestion' 
has never occurred in my practice". 
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But on other occasions he takes the danger of suggestion more seriously 
and tries to argue against it in a more systematic way, rather than just 
dismissing it dogmaticilly. He was quite aware that certain phenomena 
which take place in the process of therapy produce a fertile ground for 
suggestion and therefore the possibility of influencing the patient 
by means other than this acquisition of veridical insight into his problems. 
The biggest danger of suggestion comes, in his view, from the 
phenomenon of transference, when the patient develops a strong feeling 
of affection for the psychoanalysts reftred to as a positive transference. 
We are told': that when a positive transference has developed 
"the patient, who ought to want nothing else but to 
find a way out of his distressing conflicts, 
develops a special interest in the person of 
the doctor. Everything connected with the doctor 
seems to be more important to him than his own 
affairs and to be diverting him from his illness. 
For a time, accordingly, relationi with him become 
very agreeable; he is practically obliging, tries 
wherever possible to show his gratitude, reveals 
refinement and merits of his nature which we should 
not, perhaps, have expected to find in him... 
If the doctor has an opportunity of talking 
to the patient's relatives, he learns to his 
satisfaction that the liking is a mutual one. 
The patient never tires in his home of praising 
the doctor and. of extolling ever new qualities 
M- 
-lq6- 
in him. 'He's enthusiastic about you', say his 
relatives, 'he trusts you blindly; everything 
you say is like a revelation to him'. Here 
and there someone in this chorus has sharper 
eyes an; d says: 'It's becoming love, the way 
he talks of nothing else but you and has your 
name on his lips all the time". 
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Freud is quite open here about the possibility of the interpretation 
being accepted by the patient because the transference, operating like 
suggestion, confers a special authority upon the analyst, and not 
because what he is told by the psychoanalyst is in fact true. Being aware 
of this fact, how could he claim nonethe less that the psychoanalytic 
session is a good ground for validating clinical hypotheses? Freud 
was convinced that there is a solution to this problem available to 
the psychoanalyst. Although it might be true that suggestions are 
transmitted in the transference situation, the analyst tries to resolve 
the transference phenomenon by interpreting the patient's behaviour 
and feelings towards himself, just as he interprets the rest of his 
behaviour, such as symptoms, dreams and errors. By doing so he 
removes the irrational affective bond of the patient towards himself, 
from which suggestion gains its power. In other words because of the 
resolution of transference, psychoanalysis is capable of freeing 
itself from the power of suggestion. However, the transference is not 
the only phenomenon in which the danger of suggestion is inherent. It 
is not only the patient who develops certain attitudes towards the 
authority figure, the psychoanalyst too may develop some attitudes, 
of which he might not be fully aware, but which are unwittingly influenced 
by the patient. Thus constitutes what is called "counter-transference" 
reaction)of which Freud wrote 
m 
"Other innovations in technique relate to the 
physician himself. We have become aware of 
the 'counter-transference', which arises in him 
as a result of the patient's influence on his 
unconscious feelings, and we are almost inclined 
to insist that he shall recognise this counter- 
transference and overcome it,,. 
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So the psychoanalyst is far from being an objective impersonal mirror; 
what he communicates to the patient by verbal and non-verbal means is 
influenced by his own attitudes and personality. Since acting upon 
these influences, is repeated for months or even years the response 
he-gets from his patient is inevitably influenced by these factors. 
In the extreme case he may merely elicit confirmation of evidence 
he himself has introduced. Is there any solution to this problem? 
According to the orthodox view, counter-transference can be eliminated 
by means of personal analysis of the psychoanalyst himself. Such 
of personal analysis" is an important part of the analytic training which 
enables the analyst to acquire a resistance towards the phenomenon 
of counter-transference and thus to prevent his subjective influence 
upon the patient from taking place. In other words, neither transference 
noT counter-transference exert their influence in practice, thanks 
to the safeguards adopted against them, according to Freud. 
But the assumption that both transference and counter-transference 
phenomena could be entirely resolved and the force of suggestion entirely 
eliminated raises some doubts. In fact it has been questioned by 
some of Freud's own followers. E. Glover, for instance, was convinced 
that "despite all dogmatic and puristic assertions to the contrary, 
we cannot exclude the transference effect of 'suggestion through 
interpretation' ,. 46 L. S. Kabie had similar doubts about the possibility 
I 
of the entire resolution of counter-transference, when he wrote 
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O'no therapist can be a wholly detached and objective 
person. In analysis we strive to achieve an attitude 
which Ernest Jones characterised as one of 
'benev6lent curiosity', but I doubt that any analyst 
can spend months and years with his few patients 
without investing in each of these therapeutic 
odysseys an enormous amount of hope and eagerness 
as well as deep feelings. If he claims that the 
out-come is a matter of indifference to him, 
he either fooled himself or else should not be 
an analyst, because such indifference would 
indicate a pathological withdrawal of feeling 
from the fate of his patients and from years of 
effort. Therefore, in spite of efforts to be I 
objeetive, the good therapist will always be in 
some measure anax grinder. " 
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It is interesting that Freud too, despite his denial on many occasions of 
the presence of suggestion in*the analytic treatment, admitted at the end 
that. a certain degree of suggestive influence might be allowed to take 
place after all. In Lines' of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy we read: 
"It is very probable, too, that the large-scale 
application of our therapy will compel us to alloy 
the pure gold of analysis freely with the copper 
of direct suggestion; and hypnotic influence, too, 
might find a place in it again, as it has in the 
treatment of war neurosis. But, whatever form 
this psychotherapy for the people may take, 
whatever the elements out of which it is compounded, 
its most effective and most important ingredients 
will assuredly remain those borrowed from strict 
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and untendendious psychoanalysis" . (my italics). 
So far we are left with the conclusion, with which Freud himself 
would seem to agree, that suggestion is very likely to have some share 
in the therapeutic transformation of the patient, although its influence 
doesn't exceed that which can be expected from the characteristically 
psychoanalytic techniques. But this is hardly a satisfactory solution to 
-lqg- 
our problem. There are important questions still to be answered. What 
degree of suggestion would disqualify psychoanalysis from being an 
acceptable method of validation of psychoanalytic hypotheses? Might 
it not be the case that the influence by means of suggestion could be 
much bigger than Freud himself thought it was, if not actually being 
the essence of what provides a successful therapeutic outcome? In 
order to achieve an adequate understanding of these difficulties, it 
is useful to appeal to the notion of placeb . Originally, the term 
'placebo' has been applied to inert drugs, such as sugar pills, given 
to the ignorant patient instead of a real drug, in order to see whether the 
reaction is similar to that produced by non-inert drugs, such as aspirin. 
In medical dictionaries placebo is usually equated with the psychological, 
as opposed to physical, mechanism of action. However, when the notion of 
placebo is introduced to psychotherapy, which operates through psychological 
mechanism only, the method of defining placebo in terms of psychological 
mode of-action couldn't be satisfactory any longer. Various attempts to 
provide a better definition of placebo, applicable also to psychological 
treatment, has been made recently. A. K. Shapiro and L. A. Morris, 
for example, propose the following definition "A placebo is defined 
as any therapy or component of therapy that is deliberately used for 
its nonspecific, psychological, or psychophysiological effect, or that 
is used for its presumed speiýific effect, but is without specific activity 
for the condition being treated". In turn, "The placebo effect is defined 
as the psychological or psychophysiological effect produced by placebos', . 
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The key concept in this definition of placebo is that of "specific 
activity", which is understood as "the therapeutic influence attributable 
50 
solely to the contents or processes of the therapies rendered". But 
this definition of placebo was criticised by A. GrUnbaum, according 
to whom, the generic distinction between placebos and non-placebos 
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has nothing to do with the contrast between specificity and non- 
specificity, for the following reasons. The placebo can have an effect 
on a particular disorder as sharply specified as that of non-placebo. 
For example, a patient who is given a sugar pill for the treatment7ý 
of his headache can have as complete headache relief as he would have 
if, for instance, aspirin, was put into his food without his knowledge. 
And if both sugar pill and aspirin can produce the same effect, it is 
rather misleading to describe it as nonspecific in one case while 
calling it specific in another. Secondly, often certain factors a 
given theory is referring to are labelled as nonspecific just because 
of the inability of that theory to spell out a causal mechanism through 
which they operate. Thus the term "nonspecific" becomes synonymous 
with "unknown". In order to avoid confusions generated by such usage 
of these terms GrUnbaum gives instead the following generic definition 
of placebo: "With respect to the target disorder D, the treatment 
modality t belongs to the genus placebo if, and only if, its characteristic 
constituents fail to be remedial for D. " 
51 The constituents of treatment 
different from characteristic ones are referred to in turn as "incidental" 
rather than "nonspecific" by him. Thus the key notion of this definition 
of placebo is that of "characteristic activity" and any treatment 
which operates through incidental rather than characteristic factors, 
independent of whether it is administered to the patient wittingly or 
unwittingly, qualifies objectively as placebo in Grbnbaum's view. 
However, there is a difference between a case where the doctor believes 
that he is giving the placebo treatment to his patient and he is 
right in believing so, and a case where he is convinced that nonplacebo 
is being given but he is in fact mistaken. In order to preserve this 
difference GrUnbaum makes a distinction between the two species of 
placebo, namely, intended placebo in the former case and inadvertent 
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placebo in the latter. Intended placebo is characterised by him as 
f ol lows: 
"A treatment process t characterised as having 
constituents F, but also posessing other, perhaps 
unspecified, incidental constituents C, will be said 
to be an intended! )placebo with respect to a target 
disorder D and a dispensing practitioner P if and only 
if the following conditions are jointly satisfied: 
(a) none of the characteristic treatment factors F 
are remedial for D, (b) P believes that the factor F 
indeed all fail to be remedial for D, ' but (c) P also 
believes that t is nonetheless therapeutic for D by 
virtue of containing some perhaps even unknown, 
incidental factors C different from F, and (d) P abets 
or at least acquiesces in the patient's belief that 
t has remedial efficacy for D by virtue of some 
constituents that belong to the set-of characteristic 
factors F in t". 
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An inadvertent placebo is on the other hand specified as follows: 
"A treatment process t characterised by having 
constituents F, wlll be said to be an inadvertent 
placebo with respect to a target disorder D and a 
dispensing practitioner P if and only if each 
of the following three conditions is satisfied: 
(a) none of the characteristic treatment factors F 
are remedial for D, but(b)P credits these very factors F 
with being therapeutic for D and indeed deems at least 
some of them to be causally essential to the remedial 
efficacy of t, and (c) the patient believes that t derives 
remedial efficacy for D from constituents belonging 
to t's characteristic factors". 
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How can we determine whether a particular form of treatment is 
placebo or not? It can be done on the basis of the relevant controlled 
experiments, which in the case of chemotherapy are quite a straightforwarU 
matter. it is useful to give an example of such a controlled study. 
We can quote here a study made by Cole (1964) concerning the effects 
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of phenothiazines, known also as antipsychotic drugs, on schizophrenic 
disorders. 54 In this study the patients, diagnosed as schizophrenic, 
who were newly admitted to nine different hospitals were randomly 
assigned to take one of four drugs. Three of the drugs were different 
types of phenothiazine, which is believed to be effective in managing 
schizophrenic disorder because of its ability to block impulse 
transmission in the dopaminergic pathways of the brain, and the fourth 
was a placebo. The experiment was conducted on a double-blind basis, 
i. e. both the patient and the doctor administrating the drug being 
ignorant of its real nature. It is quite important for the control 
study to be conducted in this way, because a single-blind approach faces a 
danger of the physician contributing to the effectiveness of the therapy 
because of his knowledge that the patient is given a real drug or 
reducing its effectiveness if he is aware that the patient is receiving 
a mere placebo. Now, as far as the drug dosage is concerned the 
physicians in charge were allowed to adjust it to meet each patient's 
need. During and after six weeks of treatment, three different measures 
were made of each patient: daily observations by ward personnel, a 
comprehensive rating by physician and nurse of the severity of mental illness 
and improvement, and a one-hour diagnostic interview. These measurements 
concerned twenty-one variables such as social participation, confusion, 
irritability, auditory hallucinations, etc. The ratings of improvement 
were as follows. None of the patients on any of the phenothiazines was 
rated as worse, 5 perGent were rated as having shown no change, and 95 per 
cent were rated as improved, with 75 per cent of them considered much 
qr very much improved. Of the patients on the placebo, 15 per cent 
were rated as worse, 25 per cent as having shown no change, and 60 per 
cent as having improved, but only 10 per cent of those who improved 
were in the "very much" category. Since the fruitful effects produced 
by the use of the phenothiazine drugs were significantly bigger than 
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those produced by the placebo drug we have good reasons bo believe 
that phenothiazine has some characteristic features which are remedial 
for schizophrenia and therefore isn't an inadvertent placebo with respect 
to this disorder. 
Let us apply now the concept of placebo to psychoanalytic therapy. 
Suppose that psychoanalysis is a combination of characteristic and -- 
incidental factors, i. e. apart from the interpretations there are other 
factors, most of all suggestion which contribute to the cure or 
improvement of the patient's condition, a possibility which Freud himself 
was prepared to accept at the end. Does this imply that psychoanalytic 
treatment is placebo? It depends on how broadly the notion of placebo 
itself is defined. In the literature, a distinction is sometimes made 
between pure and impure placebos. A treaiment which-is devoid of any 
characteristic components is called a pure placebo, whereas therapy that 
contains a combination of incidental and characteristic factors is 
referred to as impure placebo. This distinction is based on a very 
broad definition of placebo, according to which any contribution from 
the incidental factors is enough to qualify a treatment as placebo. 
GrUnbaum, on the other hand, suggests a much more restrictive definition 
of this term, according-to which, a treatment belongs to the genus placebo 
when none of its characteristic factors are remedial for the given 
treatment. Therefore any therapy whose characteristic factors comprise 
at least some that are therapeutic for the relevant disorder wouldnl, t 
qualify as placebo, in his view. And there are good reasons for accepting 
his, rather than a very broad definition of placebo, because of the 
following. Very often the therapeutic efficacy of a nonplacebo, such as 
the treatment of schizophernia by antipsychotic drugs, is enhanced by 
the incidental factors such as the physician's enthusiastic attitude 
and the patient's positive expectations, contributing in this way 
to the conquest of schizophrenia. If a very broad definition of placebo 
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were accepted then this and other kinds of chemotherapy would qualify 
as placebo, even if only impure. What's more, since the presence of the 
incidental factors cannot be excluded from any kind of medical treatment, 
the whole of medicine would be placebo (either pure or impure). And 
thus the notion of placebo instead of helping to clarify the whole 
issue would make it even more obscure, while GrUnbaum's definition of 
placebo can serve better our purposes. Now, if it is indeed the case 
that psychoanalytic interpretations comprise at least some factors 
which are therap. eutic for neurosis, as the psychoanalysts think they do, 
psychoanalytic treatment is not placebo, according to Grunbaum, however 
big the contribution from incidental factors, such as suggestion, might 
be. 
Suppose, however, that the psychoanalysts are entirely mistaken 
about how they score their successes and that what provides a good 
therapeutic outcome is in fact reducible to the incidental factors 
alone, a possibility which couldn't be ruled out a priori. If this 
were indeed the case the psychoanalytic treatment would be a placebo, strictly 
speaking, an inadvettent placebo in relation to Freud's therapeutic claims. 
The logical consequence of the analytic success being placebogenic for 
the Argument from Insight is obvious. It is sufficient to discredit 
even the modified version of this argument for the following reasons. 
According to the modified version of the Argument from Insight, the 
cure of neurosis in the patient receiving psychoanalytic therapy depends 
causally on veridical insight reached by means of interpretations. 
But the placebo hypothesis implies that psychoanalysts are entirely 
mistaken in attributing remedial potency to yeridical insight, because 
what is responsible for the successful outcome of psychoanalysis 
has nothing to do with insight and interpretations but with 't incidental 
factors, such as suggestion or some other such factors. Thus contrary 
to the psychoanalysts' conviction, veridical insight is not a necessary 
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condition for the conquest of neurosis by means of psychoanalytic 
therapy. And if so, even the most successful outcome of the psychoanalytic 
treatment wouldn't show anything about the actual truth of the 
interpretations given to the patient. To face this challenge the 
psychoanalyst cannot simply deny that what they practice is not placebo, 
even if they do it in good faith; what is needed is a proper control 
study, like that used in chemical therapy. Can such a study be arranged? 
We have learned how it was done with respect to phenothiazine drugs 
used for the treatment of schizophrenia. Can an analogous control study 
be arranged with respect to psychoanalytic therapy as well? In Cole's 
study a control group of schizophrenic patients instead of being given 
a phenothiazine drug received a fake pill, a fact they themselves and 
the physicians in charge were entirely ignorant about. In the 
psychoanalytic control study something analogous would be providing 
the patient with a pseudoinsight, looking true to him and thus accepted 
by him, despite its falsity. Since it could be the case that the analyst 
practising Freudian therapy in the presumably mistaken belief that what is 
therapeutic about it is the patient's acquisition of veridical 
insight is more convincing, and therefore more successful than his 
colleague who knows that he is administrating a placebo, a double-blind 
approach is needed, just as in Cole's study. So far so good. We have a 
close analogy to the control study in chemotherapy, but the question 
is whether something of this kind can indeed be arranged with respect 
to psychoanalysis. In the chemotherapy case it is possible to keep 
the physician ignorant about the nature of the treatment he is providing, 
because a fake pill and real drug look exactly alike. The difference 
can only be established by examining the chemical compositiop of both 
substances, which can be done by an independent party. In the 
psychoanalytic case the situation is quite different. If an "insight" 
looks genuine to an independent observer it is very likely to look the sarae, 
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to the psychoanalyst in charge of the case, or if it is obviously 
false the psychoanalyst would be able to tell it as easily as the 
independent party. There isn't, therefore, any way in which the 
psychoanalyst in charge can be kept ignorant of the nature of the "insight" 
he is giving to his patient. For this reason, the double-blind approach, 
so important in control studies, doesn't seem to be possible here. 
What's more, even a single-blind control study faces some difficulties. 
Suppose the psychoanalyst tries his best to give his patient false 
interpretations, in order to provide him with pseudoinsight for control 
purposes. To do that he cannot, however, tell him any sort of nonsense 
because the patient simply wouldn't believe it. In order for the 
interpretations to be acceptable to the patient they have to look 
verisimilar and have some significance for him., But how can you tell 
a person something which sounds verisimilar and significant, and yet 
avoid giving him some true interpretations, or at least interpretations 
getting at the truth. We cannot be entirely sure, therefore, that 
despite the psycho analyst's attempt to the contrary,. some true 
interpretations may not be transmitted to the patient after all and may 
make some difference to the outcome of his treatment. A control study 
in psychoanalysis, or indeed in psychological treatment in general, 
is so difficult to arrange, if it can be arranged at all, because there 
are too many variables involved which cannot be manipulated and isolated 
as in the-case of physi4aal treatment, and we are still quite ignorant 
about which factors within the incidental and characteristic class 
are remedial for the disorder in question. All this explains why despite 
various attempts to introduce control studies into psychoanalysis we are 
still left in doubt about whether psychoanalytic therapy is a placebo 
or not and we cannot be sure that futdre: ýattempts will dis'el our p 
doubt in a definite manner. So any successful outcome of psychoanalysis 
cannot be used as an evidence that the interpretations given to the 
0 
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patient were in fact true. As one of Freud's followers had himself 
observed "therapeutic success or failures do not provide dependable 
evidence for the accuracy or inaccuracy of a theory... there is no constant 
or easily predictable correlation between the accuracy of a theory and the 
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therapeutic results achieved by its application" . 
The view that if psychoanalysis works, there must be some truth 
in it (or none if it fails) is still quite widely accepted despite all 
these difficulties. What is responsible for this seems to be the 
following. The assumption is made that since psychoanalysis is a treatment 
for mental disorders, it must be similar to medical treatments in general. 
The theories of general medicine usually postulate certain aetiologies 
of disorders, and on the basis of these aetiologies suggest what type 
of treatment should be adopted. For instance, if a particular disease 
is believed to be caused by a bacteria,, - the theory might suggest that 
those bacteria can be got rid of, and thus the disease cured, by means 
of some antibiotic, such as penicillin. If the treatment works, we 
have good reason to believe that the causes of the disease were identified 
correctly. The situation in psychoanalysis, or indeed in psychotherapy 
in general, seems to be very similar. Psychoanalytic doctrine also 
postulates a certain aetiology of neurotic disorders'and suggests what 
type of treatment should be adopted for their cure. By analogy with 
general medicine, therefore, it seems plausible to suggest that if 
psychoanalytic treatment is successfxkl there must be some truth, or 
approximation to it, in the psychoanalytic account of the causes of 
the neurotic disorder. 
However, this analogy might not be as close as it seems to be. 
In fact there is some reason to believe that certain situations from 
ordinary life milght provide a better analogy for psychoanalysis, than 
those from general medicine. Our experience teaches us that sometimes 
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some entirely false beliefs can change our mental state and behaviour, 
while the truth might leave us entirely uneffected. For example, a 
false belief that a certain animal is harmless may stop a person's 
fear of it entirely, whereas being told truly on another occasion that 
something is not dangerous may leave the person entirely unaffected, 
even if it is still the case in general that what is true might be more 
acceptable or convincing to the person and, therefore, more effective 
in some cases at least. If's likely that a similar situation can occur 
in psychoanalysis. True interpretations might on some occasions leave 
the patient entirely unchanged, whereas false ones might make a big 
difference to his mental state and behaviour, even if on balance 
true interpretations, because of their being more convincing, might be 
more often effective than false ones. Because of all this, it is very 
important to make a distinction, as J. 0. Wisdom does, between the 
"6nactivity" of the interpretation and its truth, where enactivity 
is understood as the power to bring about some relevant changes. 
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Since enactivity and the truth of the interpretation do not always 
go hand in hand, the successful outcome of psychoanalysis, although 
a good test for the former, is not so good for the latter. To test 
the correctness of the interpretations we still have to discriminate 
between interpretations that are enactive and true, and interpretations 
that are enactive and false. But to do that we have to appeal to 
something independent of the successful outcome itself, such as the 
coherence or dissonance of particular interpretations with other 
interpretations -of the same kind, as suggested earlier. When symptoms, 
or other pieces of behaviour, have reasonably clear content we can 
sometimes arrive at plausible interpretations of them independently 
of the psychoanalytic therapy, as Freud himself occasionally did. 
If these interpretations enable the psychoanalyst afterwards to cure 
the patient, when they are later applied in psychotherapy, their 
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successful outcome can be used in turn to reinforce his original 
claim. But a successful outcome alone, contrary to some beliefs, doesn't 
give much evidential support for the correctness of the relevant 
interpretations. 
(B) Experimental Ways of Testing the Hypotheses of Unconscious 
Mental Processes. 
The commonsense way of validating interpretations in terms of 
unconscious mental processes, or the attempý to validate them by successful 
therapeutic outcomes are not, however, the only alternatives available 
to us. Since the beginning of this century a large body of non-clinical 
experimental inquiry into unconscious phenonenon has been accumulated. 
It is interesting to see whether experimental methods are more reliable 
than the traditional case-study method, and what kind of implications 
follow from them. Freud himself, however, seemed to be quite critical 
of the experimental approach to psychoanalysis. When he was informed 
by a psychologist called Rosenzweig about the latter's experimental 
work concerning the hypothes of repression, despite the fact that this 
experiment was claimed to have favourable implications for his doctrine 
of repression, he replied as follows: 
"I have examined your experimental studies for the 
verification of the psychoanalytic assertions with 
interest. I cannot put much value on these con- 
firmations because the wealth of reliable observations 
on which these assertions rest make them independent 
of experimental verification. Still, it can do no harm. " 
Although Freud doesn't give much argument here for rejectin' an experimental 9 
approach to psychoanalysis, it is very likely that he, or at least some 
of his followers, did so on the ground that the phenomena occurrinf, 
Nor- 
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during the psychoanalytic session cannot be reproduced in experimental 
conditions. It is indeed difficult, not just in psychoanalysis but in 
psychology in general, to reproduce in the experimental setting 
phenomena which occur naturally. But if something approximating to the 
natural phenomenon can be reproduced we shouldn't dismiss it. In fact 
Freud himself was very impressed by Charcot's demonstrations of hypnotic 
phenomena, which were claimed to be an artificial creation of an 
experimentally induced neurosis, and accepted their relevance for the 
investigation of neurotic symptoms which occur naturally. What's more 
he once said of his followers, not with condemnation but quite clearly 
with approval, that "In this manner Bleuler and Jung built the first 
bridge from experimental psychology to psychoanalysis". 
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This suggests 
that, despite some assertions to the contrary, Freud didn't dismiss 
the experimental approach to psychoanalysis altbgether; but even if he 
had done so, we don't have to follow him, because properly arranged 
experiments are not only relevant to psychoanalytic inquiry but can also 
help to clarify the problems in question. The number of experimental 
studies concerning the hypothesis of unconscious mental processes 
is enormous and a systematic survey of them can be found in P. Kline's 
book Fact and Fantasy in Freudian Theory, 
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in a paper by C. W. Eriksen 
and J. Pierce "Defense Mechanisms , 
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and elsewhere. What we are going 
to do here, however, is to concentrate on those experiments, which in 
our view best satisfy the requirements of scientific inquiry, and are most 
relevant to the psychoanalytic doctrine of unconscious mental processes. 
Experiments often quoted in the literature es relevant to the 
hypothesis of unconscious mental processes, and to, the concept of 
repression in particular, are studies in perceptual defence. The concept 
was first introduced by Bruner and Postman to refer to a phenomenon 
revealed on the basis of the following experiment described in their 
paper "Emotional selectivity in perception and reaction". 
60 They presented 
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the subjects with two kinds of words visually by means of a tachistoscope. 
One kind were emotionally disturbing words and the other kind consisted 
of neutral words. They found that the perceptual threshold for the 
disturbing stimuli was much higher than for neutral ones, i. p. it took 
longer for the subjects to recognize emotionally disturbing words. 
Since then the concept of perceptual defence has been used to refer to 
such raising of the perceptual threshold for anxiety-provoking stimuli. 
It goes without saying that for this kind of experiment to have any 
empirical value, the two kinds of words have to match in relevant ways, 
such as familiarity, word length and anticipation. Although Bruner- 
Postman's experiment satisfied some of these conditions it was unable 
to avoid some other methodological difficulties. Firstly, it didn't 
eliminate the danger of voluntary suppression of anxiety-provoking 
verbal stimuli. It could be the case that the subject was able to recognize 
these words as easily as neutral ones, but was reluctant to say them 
immediately. Secondly, the study also failed to eliminate the so-called 
effect of set, i. e. when the subject is presented with taboo or embarrassing 
words he requires greater certainty that he is correct before reporting 
them and thus his recognition-threshold could increase, but not directly 
because of the anxiety-provoking nature of the relevant verbal stimuli. 
But the work of Bruner and Postman inspired further experiments of 
greater methodological sophistication, like that of Dixon for example. 
In his experiments Dixon used a special method, known as a closed 
loop control, in order to avoid the methodological difficulties faced 
by his predecessors, although the rationale behind his experiments 
was much the same. The subjects from his experiments were looking through 
a stereoscope at a screen divided into two parts, each part visible to 
one eye only. The left eye of the subject was presented with two 
spots of light - one brighter than the other. The subject could control 
the brightness of the two spots and he was asked 
bar-- 
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11 to press the button until the dim spot of light 
has completely disappeared, releasing it again as 
soon as the bright spot begins to disappear. 
When the bright spot reappears, press the button 
down again before the dim spot appears. In other 
words by pressing and releasing the button you 
should so contrive it that you can just see the 
61 brighter of the two spots but never the dimmer one" 
Simultaneously the right eye was subliminally presented with words. The 
purpose of all this was to maintain a r, -. ore or less constant level of 
subliminality despite fluctuations in the awareness threshold. So if 
the perceptual threshold of the subject rises after the subliminal 
appearance of a word he increases the brightness of the spot, if on the 
other hand the threshold falls he lowers it. All the threshold differences 
are measured by the kymograph. Such a method avoids the danger of a 
voluntary suppression of words by the subject, since he is not required 
to jive any verbal responses. The problem of set doesn'tarise here either, 
thanks to the subliminal presentation of material. Using this method 
Dixon conducted a series of experiments. In one of them a group of 
subjects consisted of 10 males and 10 females. The neutral words 
presented to them were 'rider' and 'weave', whereas 'whore' and 'penis' 
were supposed to be anxiety-provoking words. These words were presented 
in a different order for each group. The experiment was supposed to 
test some of the following hypotheses: that the differential visual 
threshold for the left eye would be raised when an "emotional" as opposed 
to neutral stimulus was presented to the right eye at subthreshold 
intensities, and also the hypothesis that threshold changes brought 
about by "emotional" stimulus material would to some extent be a function 




"Generally higherý. - threshold tended to coincide with 
the presentation of the taboo words and lower threshold 
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with neutral words. The direction of threshold 
change tended to be consistent for any one subject... 
Similarly we have seen a significant and from 
a commonsensical point of view, comprehensible 
difference between the response of men and women 
to a word such as 'whore' whose emotional 
connotations are obviously different for the 
two sexes". 
62 
For women the word 'whore' tended to coincide with higher perceptual 
threshold. Since these effects were predicted by the perceptual defence 
hypotheses, the results of the experiment were regarded as providing 
conclusive evidence for perceptual defence. Further, more recent, 
experiments by Dixon suggested a similar conclusion. 
How is all this relevant to the Freudian concept of repression and 
his hypotheses of the unconscious mental processes? Bruner and Postman, 
who first introduced the concept of perceptual defence, argued that 
repression serves to keep emotionally disturbing words out of consciousness. 
Such a! 2 observational inference was never made by Freud himself from 
his doctrine, however. He merely suggested that becoming unconscious 
of certain impulses leads to distortion and blind spots in the memory 
traces of the subject. It also produces an inability to understand 
the meaning of the symptoms and other piices of behaviour, as well 
as inability to associate freely whenever the unconscious material 
becomes activated. This suggests that becoming unconscious of something 
has some perceptual concomitants and, therefore, the phenomenon of 
perceptual defence is relevant in some general way to the hypotheses 
of unconscious mental processes and that of repression. Can we say 
that experiments in perceptual defence provide conclusive support 
for the psychoanalytic hypotheses? It would be too strong to claim that. 
The observable consequences shown in perceptual defence don't really 
follow from Freudian doctrine. Itýis also arguablethat although 
emotionally disturbing words, such as 'whore' and 'penis' might indeed 
or 
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generate some anxiety in the subjects, this anxiety is not equivalent 
to that experienced by neutoric patients, where the integrity of the whole 
personality is usually at stake and thus the reaction is much stronger. 
But it would be too dismissive to suggest that Dixon's findings al, 
entirely irrelevant to Freud's claims. They provide weak support for 
hypothesis of the unconscious mental processes and the doctrine of 
repression, because they suggest that some kind of internal control 
mechanism, similar to the one postulated by Freud, is switched on when 
the person is faced with an anxiety-provoking situation. 
A different interesting contribution to the investigation of 
unconscious mental processes by experimental methods was made by the 
Russian psychologist A. Luria, and described in his work The Nature of 
63 Human Conflicts. He studied human behaviour under conditions of acute 
psychological affects and introduced techniques for detecting disturbances 
in such behaviour. Among the different conditions he examineddwere the 
states of acute affect in students before examination, the affect of 
the situation connected with "cleansing" or "purgation" in the higher 
schools after the revolution, and affects in criminals. These were 
examples of affective states created by real life situations. Then 
he examined affects produced under hypnosis by means of suggestion, 
and artificially created conflicts in waking subjects. These experiments 
were designed to show a reciprocal relationship between normal and 
disturbed verbal behaviour and its connection with voluntary and 
involuntary motor responses. To do that he introduced the following 
method. The subjects in different experiments were asked to react to 
the situation connected with affect either bygiving a single association 
to each word spoken by the experimenter or by producing a 
chain of free associations and at the same time squeezing a pneumatic 
bulb with the right hand. Simultaneously they had to maintain a quiet 
posture with the left hand. The active motor responses of one hand 
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and the postural responses of the other hand as well as respiratory changes 
were registered on a kymograph. The verbal responses of the subjects 
were also recorded and examined in a systematic way. The reason for 
combining speech response with motor and respiratory reaction was to 
obtain a complete representation of the structure of the affective process 
which cannot be revealed by examining one system only. 
The part of Luria's study which is directly relevant to the problem of 
unconscious mental processes is his investigation of unconscious complexes 
produced by means of suggestion in the hypnotized subjects. lie hoped 
that by artificially creating an affective complex under hypnosis he 
can produce "a model of an unconscious complex' occurring naturally 
in the neurotic patients Freud and his followers were faced with 
in their daily practice. A study of an artificially implanted strong 
affective state gives the experimenter various advantages because he 
knows it in detail, he can better control it and therefore it is easier 
for him to record and examine all the factors forming the affective 
reaction. In order to create the feelings of important intensity 
and stability, like those occurring in real life, the person under the 
test, while in a sufficiently deep hypnotic state, was given a 
disagreeable suggestion in which he was playing a role irreconciblb with 
his moral standards and contrary to his usual behaviour. The hypnotic 
session was followed either by spontaneous or suggested annesýa, 
One subject, for instance, a 20 year old student of obstetrics, was 
given the following suggestion: 
"You have graduated in obstetrics and started to work 
in an maternity hospital. You are at home and a 
woman comes to see you and asks you to produce in her 
an abortion so that nobody should know it. She offexs 
you money for this. You hesitate, because this is 
against the law. The woman implores you with tears 
in her eyes. You feel sorry for her and you agree. 
You take your instruments, put them in a suitcase, 
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and proceed to the sick bed. You ascend a narrow 
staircase, ring a bell, and an old woman opens the door. 
You are very excited and start the operation. But 
immediatelya. haemorrhage begins and you cannot stop it. 
You see a pool of blood on the floor. The sick 
woman is very weak, you have made an error in your 
operation and you fear for her life... " 
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That this suggestion was indeed able to produce in the sublect a very 
strong affective state, similar to the emotional conflict experienced 
by the neurotic subjects or to the traumatic situation experienced 
by people in general, was indicated in the following way. She 
received it with active objections and was unwilling to accept it at once, 
just as other subjects in these experiments did. Some went even further 
by refusing to accept the suggestion altogether and their reaction was 
later compared with the behaviour of those who accepted it at the end. 
She also showed some restless defensive movements and trembling during 
the hypnotic sleep when the suggestion was given to her, and there were 
subjects who reacbed to the suggestion with tears. After waking up 
from the hypnotic state the subject declared that she didn't feel 
very well, although she was unable to explain this change in her 
feelings. All that implies that in spite of the strong affective nature 
of the suggestion it appears to be entirely disconnected from the person's 
consciousness just as in the neurotic states described by Freud. 
The test in each case in these experiments consisted of three 
parts. Firstly, before the suggestion was made, the subject was 
presented with a number of word-stimuli, a part of them having a direct 
bearing on the complex to be introduced later, and his verbal as well 
as motor reactions were recorded. Then the subject was asked to produce 
free associations and these-were recorded too. In the second part the 
same operation was repeated after the suggestion has been made to the 
person under test. And finally, he was hypnotized again and the original 
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suggestion removed. Foliowing the resolution of suggestion he was tested 
again inýthe same way. The experiment was designed in this way in 
order to have control data before and after the suggestion. Now, 
two kinds of associations have been used in this experiment. One 
consisted in presenting the subject with verbal stimuli and asking him 
to react to them, while in another he was asked to associate freely. 
Both of them are used in psychoanalysis. The former, known as a word 
association test, was introduced and regularly used by Jung, although 
he never combined it wiuh motor reactions as in Luria's case. The word 
association test, apart from other stimuli, usually contains critical 
stimuli, directly connected with the affective complex, which are 
deliberately used by the experimenter to provoke the subject's reaction. 
However, it is possible to introduce critical stimuli only if the observer 
knows or at least has some idea what the complex in question is., In 
Luria's experiment this could be easily done because it was the experimenter 
himself who introduced the complex and therefore knew which stimuli 
were critical. In natural conditions such knowledge might not be 
available, however, and the best we can do is to ask the subject 
to associate freely, hoping that this would reveal his complex somehow. 
This is precisely the situation which faces the psychoanalysts in 
their work. In order to make his experiment as close as possible 
to the real situation in psychoanalysis, i. e. to construct an 
if experimental psychoanalysis' as Luria himself put it, he asked his 
subjects to produce free assoiiations before and after the suggestion. 
Let us see now what happened when the student of obstetrics, quoted 
earlier, was tested. 
Before the suggestion of performing an illegal abortion was 
made to her she produced the following series of free associations: 
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I night 2 door 3 quarrel 4 room 
5 wall 6 picture 7 8 
9 grass 10 river 11 forest 12 mountain 
13 balcony 14 garden 15 flowers 16 lilacs 

















(Only a part of that series is quoted here). A simultaneousmotor 
reaction of the subject is expressed by this figure. 
the curve of the passive left hand 
fluctuating with the tremor 
the curve of the active right hand 
the line of speech reaction 
It represents a normal picture of the associative process with steady 
fluctuation of the reactive time. The curve of the right hand is 
smooth in the latent period, giving a regular rise associated with the* 
speech reaction. The left hand of the subject doesn't show any sharp 
fluctuations either. 
After the suggestion the subject produced the following chain of 
free associations: 
1 night 2 staircase 3 table 4 book 
5 clay 6 rain 7 icicle 8 pool 
9 month 10 building 11 garden 12 river 
--------- ------------- ----------- ------------ 
20 glass 21 ? 22 operation 23 instruments 
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24 woman 25 street 26 lamp 
28 room 29 cupboard 
32 chrysanthemum 33 piano 
36 girl friend 37 father 
40 sick woman 41 nurse 






38 old woman 39 mother 





The figure representing the motor reaction was as follows: 
This test shows, according to Luria, that "The affective complex constructed 
bý us, though not yet being conscious, creates an affective state and 
determines the flow'of free associative series. " 
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Although the chain 
of free associations started in the usual way as previously, an active 
affect becoming potential, soon the subject without her knowledge and 
quite unintentionally started to reconstruct the parts of the complex 
present in her. The affective state showed an insistent tendency to 
creep into the speech series. despite the attempts to suppressit; 
i. e. the subject after producing the number of association connected 
with it (operation, instruments, woman), then produced a series of neutral 
words, but after a while words connected-with the affect crept into her 
speech again with considerable persistence (old woman, mother, sick woman, 
nurse). At one stage, when the affect nearly reached the point of becoming 
conscious, the subject made an even clearer attempt to supress it by 
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saying "I don't know what to say". This phenomenon was very familiar 
to Freud, to which he referred as resistance. His practice taught him 
that whenever the unconscious material of his patient came to the point 
of becoming conscious some inhibition or barrier was set up preventing 
this material from reaching the subject's awareness. It was manifested 
by the patient's inability to produce further associations, changing 
the course of associations entirely, his refusal to cooperate and by 
other such phenomena. Another interesting thing which was zevealed by 
this test is that "The removal of the insulation of the affect from the 
consciousness and its overt appearance is followed by an acutt motor 
storm, by a model of an affective fit, which breaks down the normal course 
of the reactive process. " 
66 A distinct tremor of the right hand was 
observed whenever the words, acting as the catalysts, connected with 
the suggested situation occurred in the subject's sDeech, the excitement 
of the right hand was soon switched over to the left hand showing sharp 
and disorderly movements. 
In the third test, after the removal of the complex by means of 
countermanding it by the hypnotist in the following hypnotic sleep, 
the subject was able to pass into a considerably more stable chain of 
reaction than he had before, although some of the symptoms characteristic 
of the second stage didn't disappear entirely, which suggests, according 
to Luria, that although the complex was implanted into the subject's 
personality artificially, the conflict he was going through was felt 
by him with the same intensity as he would experience in real life. 
In real life when people go through a strong emotional state, a change 
in the situation responsible for this state doesn't usually result 
in an immediate and complete disappearance of the person's feelings either. 
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Luria's experiments demonstrate quite convincingly that in certain 
special cfurcumstances connected with hypnosis, there are unconscious 
complexes which exhibit observable influence on human behaviour. But what 
is the precise bearing of all this on the verification of Freudian theory? 
Although Luria's material seems to be very relevant to Freud's claims 
about unconscious mental processes, it is possible to imagine somebody 
being impressed by the results of these experiments, but sceptical hbout 
psychoanalysis, and who could argue that they have not much bearing, if 
any, on psychoanalytic claims. Such a sceptic might argue, in particular, 
that they do not support any Freudian hypothesis about the specific 
unconscious complexes which are supposed to show up in symptoms, dreams 
and errors, nor indeed the more general claim that these phenomena are 
results of naturally occurring non-hypnotic unconscious complexes. The 
argument could go as follows. 
The critics of psychoanalysis often argue that psychoanalytic therapy 
is nothing more than a particularly effective and well-disguised form of 
suggestive treatment which "talks" the patient into believing in the 
importance of some experiences such as sexual ones, or even producing 
those experiences themselves, In other words the psychoanalysts on this 
view produce by means of suggestion the very behaviour they are trying 
to confirm. Luria's experiments show that it is indeed possible to produce 
unconscious conflicts by means of suggestion. But doesn't that give 
support to the critics'accusation that psychoanalysts produce the relevant 
behaviour, and that for this reason we shouldn't believe in their claims 
about unconscious complexes? However, if both Luria and the psychoanalysts 
can produce unconscious complexes by means of suggestionthat means that 
there is at least one kind of unconscious complex, i. e. conflicts produced 
in this very way. So the psychoanalysts are not mistaken when they say 
that there are unconscious processes; where they might be mistaken is in 
claiming that such processes occur spontaneously in their patients. But 
this latter accusation is questionable too, because the kind of suggestion 
which might take place in the course of psychoanalystic therapy is quite 
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diffeient from that used by Luria, and therefore is unlikely to produce 
the same results, i. e. to bring about the unconscious complex itself. 
What are the differences then between the kind of suggestion used 
in hypnosis and that which might occur in psychoanalysis? Firstly, the 
psychoanalyst, in contrast to Luria, doesn't tell his subject a story which 
is obviously false and then try to make him believe in it. Neither does 
he try to make his patient forget everything that has taken place during 
the session, as Luria did in order to make his suggestion effective. What 
the psychoanalyst does is to encourage his patient to talk about himself 
and his experience, while he listens carefully. So even to start with 
there is an asymmetry between the two situations. In the hypnotic situation 
it is the hypnotist who does the talking and the subject listens, while 
in the psychoanalytic situation there is a reversal of roles. so while 
the hypnotic subject is entirely passivethe psychoanalytic subject 
is quite active. The latter is active not merely in the sense that he is 
allowed to talk, but he can also talk about whatever he wants to or feels 
like. The psychoanalyst listens to whatever the patient wants to tell him 
and never asks him to talk about something else; that is one of the 
rules of psychoanalytic therapy. 
So when is suggestion likely to take place in the psychoanalytic 
therapy, if it occurs at all? The psychoanalyst, although he listens 
carefully to the patient, "s free associations, doesn't keep silent all 
thetime. From time to time he makes some comments, and he usually does 
so when he thinks that the patient said something important. But what 
the psychoanalyst believes to be important or significant is usually 
influenced by his theoretical views, for instance, the view that sexual 
experience has a bigger share in shaping people's personalities than other 
kind of experience. Thus by making comments about certain kind 
of free associations and not reacting to others he might unwittingly influence 
his patient to produce more associations of a certain kind. This sort of 
- ---: J--flT__r_____flC_____________J-_J_- ------- 
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influence doesn't have to be verbal. The psychoanalyst's shifting movements 
or other noises he makes when the patient says certain kind of things can 
have a similar influence on directing his communications. As a result 
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it might appear to both of them that A5 ertain kind of experience is more 
important than others, simply because the patient talks more about it. 
This is an example of how suggestion can come about in the course of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy. But it is quite clear that this kind 
of suggestion, if it takes place, is very different from that used by 
Luria. Although it might produce in the patient a false belief in the 
importance of some experience, it is difficult to see how it could produce 
the experience itself, as Luria's suggestion did. 
Secondly, an unconscious complex IS supposed to occur when the person 
experiences intolerable anxiety because he has a certain impulse which is 
incompatible with the standards of his personality. Thus in order to create 
an unconscious complex we have to make the person feel similar anxiety, 
and to achieve that;, Luria gave his subjects in the state of hypnotis 
disagrbeable suggestions, incompatible with their usual mode of behaviour. 
So the anxiety experienced by hypnotic subjects, revealed by their reactions, 
was produced in them quite deliberately by the experimenter. But when 
neurotic patients come to see the psychoanalyst they are already suffering 
from anxiety, and often it is the main reason why they seek help in the first 
place. And the psychoanalyst knows that if he doesn't help his patient 
to overcome his anxiety at the end of the process he has failed. Of course, 
during the process of psychotherapy he sometimes cannot avoid generating 
some anxiety in his patient when he has to tell him some unpleasant truth, 
which might make the patient feel anxious at the time. But even then the 
psychoanalyst tries to heýp the patient to come to terms with this feeling 
by giving him reassurance, holding back further interpretation until the 
patient is more relaxed, etc., instead of provoking anxiety deliberately, 
as Luria did. So what the hypnotist and the psychoanalyst do in relation 
to anxiety is quite different, and therefore the results they produce 
are quite different too. While the hypnotised subjects in Luria's experiments 
became-very anxious as a result of what happened to them during hypnosis, 
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successful Psychoanalytic therapy makes its subjects less anxious than 
they were originally. If the psychoAnalyst were, like Luria, creating 
unconscious complexes in-his subject we should have similar results, 
but this isn't the case. So however else the psychoanalyst might influence 
his subjects unwittingly it's quite clear that he isn't creating unconscious 
complexes in them. 
Thus the sceptic who dismisses the relevance of Luria's experiments 
to psychoanalysis cannot be right. Luria's work does provide contribution 
to psychoanalysis, even if it is difficult to be clear about what kind 
of contribution it is. What seems to be beyond doubt is the fact that by 
creating a hypnotic model of naturally occuning unconscious complexes, 
Luria was able to show that Freud's claims about them are plausible 
and could be true, even if his experiments have less to offer on the 
question whether Freud's spocific hypotheses are in fact true. Even if this were 
all Luria could offer to psychoanalysis, he still would have made a good 
case for taking Freud's claims seriously and not dismissing them out 
of hand, because what Freud postulates is certainly empirically possible 
in the light of these experiments. But it is arguable that Luria's 
contribution to psychoanalysis is more important than that. He provides 
us with controllable and unambiguous examples of phenomena which are 
in some important ways like those described by Freud. Freud didn't 
merely claim that there are unconscious mental processes influencing 
human behaviour, he also hypothesized about their important features, 
as did Luria too. It is important to ask, therefore, what bearing 
experimentally demonstrated features of unconscious complexes have on 
those described by Freud. 
Can they be said to be similar in all important respects, or do they 
have only some features in common but not others? One of the differences 
which is noticable immediately is that of contents. The complexes created 
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by Luria have nothing to do with sexual motives, whereas Freud seemed 
to believe in the omnipresent role of sexual complexes in neurosis, as Is 
clear from the following passage, for example. "No one, probably, will 
be inclined to deny the sexual function the character of an organic factor, 
and it is the sexual'function that I lookupon as the foundation of hysteria 
and of psychoneurosis in general". Luria's reasons, if he had 
any, for not implanting his subjects with sexual complexes are unknown 
to us, but I don't see why he couldn't have done so in principle. Thus 
it should be possible to eliminate this difference, if it is important. 
However, Freud's claim about the invariably sexual character of 
unconscious contents shouldn't . be swallowed uncritically. It goes beyond 
the scope of our immediate interests here to discuss his reasons for 
holding this view. But what is important to realise is the fact that this 
belief was far from being derived from empirical observation alone. As 
his critics often point out, his observations were restricted in important 
respects, because he was able to analyze systematically only a very small 
group of patients who were recrifed from one kind of social and cultural 
background. Thus his observation was too limited to justify any such 
general conclusion. What's more, Freud himself made no secret, on some 
occasions at least, that although the onmipresent role of sexual complexes 
in neurosis couldn't be infered from their frequency or from their 
intensity, his insistence on them was "influenced by another motive as 
well, which for the moment is of merely subjective value. In the sole 
attempt to explain physiological and psychological mechanism of hysteria 
which I have been able to make in order to correlate my observations, I have 
come to regard the participation of sexual motive forces as an indispensable 
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presmiss". He needed this premiss because of his-ambitious attempt to 
provide psychoanalysis with biological or even physiological foundations, 
and he was convinced that the sexual instinct could enable him to do just 
that. What we should think of such an attempt is a different matter, 
but what is inun diately clearýis that Freud's claim wasn't justified by 
empirical facts alone. For this reason he has been challenged by some 
of his own followers, such as Jung, in whose view sexual complexes cannot 
be said to be the sole specific cause of every neurosis, although they 
seem to be responsible for some cases. Despite often being dogmatic 
on this point in his theoretical speculations, Freud was more flexible 
when it came down to actual practice. He seemed to be well aware from his 
practical experience that remorse and psycholocjical pain arOU"'Sed by some 
nonsexual emotions such as hatred of one's child for instance, tan be 
as distressful as emotions aroused by sexual matters. And when confronted 
with such cases in practice, as in Frai4 EMmy von N's instance discussed 
earlier, he didn? t try to appeal to sexual motives to explain the person's 
symptoms. But even in his theoretical writings Freud wasn't always entirely 
happy with his bi6logical justification of the role of sexuality as BL 
neurotic "toxin", and this dissatisfaction became Particularly apparent 
when he tried to revise his original theory of anxiety, to which we will 
pay attention later on. Thus the apparent difference in contents between 
the complexes created by Luria and those which Freud was interested in is 
not as serious as it might seem to be. 
But there are other important features of unconscious complexes 
hypothesized by Freud. In his view, such complexes aren't merely charged 
with strong affects, i. e. being capable of provoking intense anxiety, 
but they are also irreconcilable with the standards of the subject's 
personality and would be a threat to his personal integrity if he was fully 
aware of them. In other words there is usually a conflict between an unconscious 
impulse and the person's typical mode of behaviour, and it is precisely 
this conflict with is responsible for the impulse becoming unconscious 
in the first place, according to Freud. In order for the artificially 
created complexes by means of hypnosis to be a good approximation to those 
occurring naturally it is important that the)ýhould satisfy this condition 
too. Was Luria aware of this condition? What he said on several occasions 
clearly suggests that he was well aware of the differences between mere 
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external traumas and those resulting from an internal conflict. Thus 
he wrote., 
"However, there are often cases distinctly different 
from these as to their psychological structure; often 
we do not obtain such a reaction of the personality 
to the suggestion made. The suggestion is not accepted 
by the subject, who feels its contents as an external 
trauma, and does not bring it into the system of his own 
behavibur, and does not react to it with a conflict, 
which is born inside of that behaviour. The psychological 
picture, which is obtained in these cases, is of 
considerable interest for the differentiation of the 
complex from the trauma". 61 
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And in order for the suggestion to produce a complex rather than a simple 
trauma in each case he tried to suggest something which was irreconcilable 
wi, th the subject's habits and contrary to his usual behaviour, as in 
psychoanalytic cases. 
If there is a real difference between the complex and the external 
trauma, as both Luria and Freud seemed to believe, we should be able to 
observe it in a relevant control study. In one of Luria's experiments 
there was a subject in whose case suggestion given under hypnosis didn't 
work. When he suggested to her, as he did to several other subjects, 
that she was going to steal some money from her close friend and that her 
deed was going to be discovered, she declared that she wouldn't do any such 
thing, and if she needed any money she would ask for a loan. By sa*ing 
that in her case suggestion didn't work, Luria means that she didn't 
come to believe that she had stolen, in contrast to other subjects 
who despite strong attempts to resist the suggestion couldn't help taking 
it as their own deed. But although the suggqstion failed to produce 
an actual ccmplex in her case, she was still experiencing it as something 
traumatic. The suggestion was acting here as an "external violence to the 
psyche" as Luria puts it. And it is also interesting that her trauma, 
just like the internal trauma characteristic of the ccmplex, persisted into 
her waking state, as was revealed by her later reactions, although the 
picture of her responses was different frcm that of the subjects with whom 
Luria was more successful. Her case was used by Luria for control purposes 
in order to compare her reactions with those of the subjects who were unable 
to resist suggestion and who came to accept it as a part of their own deed. 
The comparison revealed the following differences. In her series of free 
associations after waking up from hypnotic trance she openly reconstructed 
the elements of the suggested situation, without any attempts to retard the 
answers or to inhibit them with neutral reaction, as was the case with 
those who were unable to resist suggestion. Also the motor reactions 
of this subject remained entirely normal, in contrast to the accute 
motor disorganization exhibited by other subjects. However, in her case 
there was a noticable disturbance in the pattern of breathing, which was 
quite striking. Every time when the associations reconstructed the element 
of the suggested situationthe breathing was first retarded and then 
followed by a sharp impulsive sigh, from two to two-and-one half times 
deeper than her usual respiration. So the ccmplex produced by internal 
conflict and a mere external trauma can provoke quite different neurodynamic 
reactions, which can be summarised as follows. 
"We may suppose that if the disturbances in the 
behaviour, which are connected with the active affect 
and affective complex, find their place within the 
system of the active behaviour, directly connected 
with the motor field; that then the feeling of the 
trauma has an entirely different psychophysiological 
structure; the reaction of the human system to it is 
featured by a greater participation of the vegetative 
system which is more distinct from the psychological 
activity of the personality". -)0. 
Thus Luria was not only aware of the difference between trauma resulting 
from a conflict and mere external trauma, a difference so important to 
Freud, but was also hble to spell out a precise difference between the two 
in terms of observable behaviour, improving in this way on Freud himself 
and confirming the view that certain kind of unconscious processes, very 
similar to those postulated by Freud, can produce observable effects upon 
human behaviour. 
What's more, Freud arrives at his conclusion that symptoms, dreams 
and errors are the results of unconscious complexes by using the method 
of free associations. By applying the sam method to artificially induced 
complexes, which the experimenter knows are there because he implanted 
them, Luria was able to demonstrate that these ccmplexes shoW. themselves 
in behaviour in the way Freud said natural ones do. For example, Freud 
came to the conclusion that it was possible for the person to be in a state 
of a strong affect and yet be ignorant of the nature of his feelings 
or how they came about. In Lurial: s experiments it was possible to observe 
systematically a severe disturbance of the motor reaction, a sign that 
the affect became active, whenever the words connected with the 
distressful situation crept into the subject's speech, although he was 
ignorant of their connection with the suggested complex as well as the 
complex itself. Secondly, Freud has learned from his experience with 
neurotic patients that asking the person about his feelings directly 
was of no help whatsoever and that a better clue to the content of his state 
was provided by his free associations. Luria was able to confirm that free 
associations do indeed express the content of the hidden complex, while the 
subject when asked directly can say nothing about it. A number of words 
given by the subject in Luria's experiment were directly connected with the 
suggested situation, which was known in detail by the experimenter, so that he 
would see the connection quite clearly. And finally, Freud's hypothesis 
of resistance is also consistent with Luria's finding that whenever the 
affect reaches the point of becoming conscious, an inhibition is set up which 
prevents the subject from becoming fully aware of it. When, on the other hand, 
the inhibition is removed, either by countermanding the suggestion or 
by interpreting and working through resistances as in the psychoanalytic 
case, some changes in the subject's behaviour become observable. It can 
be said, therefore, that Luria's work provides some kind of validation 
for the inferential Procedure used by Freud and his followers. By giving 
us greater reason for trusting Freud's method it also increases our trust 
in Freud's conclusiomwhich this method helped him to arrive at. Because 
if psychoanalytic methods can provide us with the right answers about the 
existence and content of artificial complexes, which require little in 
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the way of interpretation and which we know to be there because we 
implanted them, we can now have stronger reasons to believe that it 
can also provide us with the right answers when applied to natural 
complexes. 
Psychoanalysts of different persuasion also speculate about the nature 
of the content of these complexes. Freud, as we have seen, often 
emphasized the sexual character of the unconscious processes, even if 
at the end he was prepared to modify slightly his views about the 
omnipresent role of sexuality in neurosis. His followers, such as Jung 
and Adler, didn't put such strong an emphasis on the sexual nature of 
the unconscious processes. Unfortunately, Luria's experiments cannot 
help to solve these internal disputes, because artificially created 
complexes can have all sorts of contents, dependent on the content 
Of the relevant suggestion. This cannot help us to decide whether in 
naturally occu37ing complexes certain kinds of contents might be more 
important or more'frequent that others. But although Luria's experiments 
cannot provide support for a particular iprientation within psychoanalysis, 
they still give strong support to the claims that are basic to all psycho- 
dynamic theories, by confirming the view that unconscious processes involving 
certain internal conflicts can indeed produce observable effects upon 
human behaviour in the way the psychoanalysts say they do, as well as 
providing some validation for the kind of inferential procedures used by 
all of them. For these reasons Luria's contribution to psychoanalysis 
in general and Freud in particular is invaluable. 
But explanatory scientifio theories do more than assert that 
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something, for instance bacteria, exist. They also claim that this 
something has certain properties, powers or functions, for example 
that bacteria have the power of producing some changes in the living 
organisms under certain conditions, and try to explain how such 
observable effects come about. Freudian doctrine too, apart from asserting 
that there are unconscious mental processes which influence human 
behaviour, contains some further claims, such as how it comes about that 
people cannot become conscious of their motives under certain circumstances, 
and what is the role or function of unconscious mental processes in human 
adaption to certain situations. We will discuss these claims in detail 
in subsequent chapters. These further claims go beyond the findings 
provided by Luria's experiments, and for this reason we cannot say that 
these experiments provide good support for the whole of Freudian doctrine. 
But the claim that there are unconscious mental processes which c-aA 
produce observable effects upon human behaviour is the foundation on which 
the whole doctrine is erected, and since Luria was able to show that 
experimentally, his contribbtion to psychoanalysis is very important 
indeed. 
Luria's experiments can be used to answer certain philosophical 
questions which have arisen in the course of our argument before, but which 
we are now in a better position to answer. As a result of Freud's analysis, 
many of his patients were capable of avowing their previously unconscious 
feelings, wishes, etc. Such an avowal was often used by Freud as a criterion 
for saying that these feelings and wishes were present in the patients 
all, along .A sceptic who doesn't believe in unconscious mental processes 
may make the following objection to this kind of move, however. Suppose 
it is indeed the case that the patient admits after analysis that he had 
an unconscious fear of his father, and suppose that he is sincere. The 
psychoanalyst wants to take this later avowal of his feeling as a ground 
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for saying that he was afraid of his father all along, even if he was 
unaware of it before. But the analyst does so because he already 
presupposes, according to the sceptic, that there are such things as 
unconscious feelings; but this presupposition can be questioned. Whatever 
went on in the subject before, the present avowal of his feeling merely 
justifies us in saying that he has it now as a conscious feeling. In 
order to answer any such objection, we can appeal to Luria's experiments 
and suggest that the subject's behaviour, such as his free associations 
and motor reactions, prior to his acknowledgement of his feeling, or even 
in the complete absence of such acknowledgement, can provide independent 
ground for ascribing an unconscious feeling to him. That shows that the 
presupposition in the argument can be defended, contrary to the sceptic's 
accusation. But he might further object, however, that the kind of things 
Luria observed in his experiments are not the kind of things ordinary 
people would usually appeal to in order to ascribe mental states and 
processes to other people, so that Luria was using different criteria 
and changing the concept itself. 
This kind of argument was used by N. Malcolm in his discussion 
of dreams. The purpose of his argument was to show that dreaming is not 
an event which takes place during the night. The discovery of Rapid Eye 
Movement, quoted by some psychologistsas evidence that dreaming does 
occur in the state of sleep, was dismissed by him on the ground that the 
man in the street doesn't appeal to any physical process when he uses 
the word "dreaming", he appeals to the dreamer's waking expressions only. 
Thus people who were trying to appeal to a new criterion were changing 
the concept of dreaming itself, contributing in this way to unnecessary 
confusions. Although Malcolm doesn't apply this argument to the 
psychoanalytic case, we can imagine a disciple of his arguing along some 
such lines as described above. Malcolm's argument about dreams has been 
1. 
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challenged by H. Putnam and others, and there is no need to discuss it here. 
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We are merely interested in whether the analogous objection is a good 
argument against the psychoanalytic claim. 
Unlike the case of dreaming, where the dreamer's waking testimony is, 
according to Malcolm, the only ground for ascribing to him a dream, the 
subject's avowal is not the only ground for ascribing to him feelings 
or wishes, however. Both conscious and unconscious feelings, wishes, etc., 
can be ascribed to a person on the ground of how he behaves and what he 
happens to say on other occasions, apart from the actual avowal made by 
the subject himself, and sometimes despite such an avowal. For instance, 
when we doubt somebody's sincerity in telling us about his feelings, we appeal 
to his behaviour in the relevant circumstances rather than to his own 
testimony. But even if his sincerity is not under doubt, people might 
still prefer to take the person's behaviour, and not what he himself says, 
as a better guide to his feelings, in some situations anyway - as earlier 
quotations from common-sense psychology show. That means that when 
Luria (and the psychoanalysts), instead of appealing to the subject's 
own testimony, appeal to free associations instead, they are not violating 
ordinary criteria. The critic might say that free association is still 
not exactly the kind of behaviour an ordinary man would appeal to. It's 
true that the common man doesn't systematically use free associations, but 
often the kind of behaviour by which he judges, like the flow of topics 
in casual conversation, are very similar to free associations. What about 
the other criterion used by Luria, i. e. motor reactions? It too doesn't 
seem to be very different from the kind of thing used by common sense 
psychology. Trembling of the hands, shaking of the body, stammering, etc., 
are taken to be the signs of the person's emotional state in everyday 
life. Thus if we see a person trembling, having a frightened look, and 
showing other signs of fear we don't have to wait for his avowal to learn 
that he is frightened. So in no way was Luria using criteria fundamentally 
different from common-sense ones. Thus the argument analogous to that 
given by Malcolm about dreaming isn't any good in this case, because 
there is independent access to unconscious mental processes, apart 
from the subject's later testimony, which still rests on ordinary criteria. 
Luria's experiments, to which we paid so much attention because of their 
relevance to psychoanalytic claims, make systematic use of hypnotic 
phenomena.. Such phenomena also played an important role in shaping Freud's 
views concerning unconscious mental processes, because of his observation 
that there was some analogy between post-hypnotic response and hysterical 
symptoms. From what we have learned about hypnosis so far it seems 
that it usually operates through changing the person's beliefs and memories. 
Thus Luria was able to create unconscious complexes by telling his subjectS. 
stories under hypnosis which they came to accept as true, but didn't remember 
in their waking state, although they still had observable effects on their 
behaviour. - If a hypnotist can be quite successful in changing the hypnotized 
subject's beliefs and memories by telling him what to believe and what 
to remember it is tempting to take hypnotic cases as showing that people 
can,. in certain circumstances, alter their beliefs and memories at will, 
in compliance with request. When a neurotic person becomes unconscious 
of his impulse there is also a relevant change in his beliefs and memories. 
In our view, and apparently in Freud's views too when interpreted carefully, 
this change isn't brought about intentionally, but happen to a person. 
To become unconscious of a dangerous wish is not like putting it out of mind; 
it just passes out of mind. However if unconscious processes created 
by means of hypnosis seem to involve intentional changes in the person's 
beliefs and memories, as some people believe, and there is a similarity 
between them and naturally occurring unconscious phenomena, is it 
consistent to claim that these latter processes are not intentional but 
are more like automatic responses? 
But can hypnotic subjects really be said to be in a position to change 
their beliefs and memories at will, because they are asked to do so by 
the hypnotist? Current psychological theories of hypnosis don't provide 
us with a clear answer to this question. According to some students of 
hypnosis, especially those who support a role-playing account of the 
phenomenon, hypnotic behaviour should indeed be looked upon as compliance. 
But in the view of an alternative theoretical orientation, however, often 
referred to as the state-oriented account of hypnosis, hypnotic response is 
largely outside the subject's volitional control, is quasi-automatic, and 
carried out compulsively. Those who support this latter position often- 
understand hypnosis as an altered state of awareness which produces 
qualitative changes in the conditidn of the organism, and makes peculiar 
hypnotic responses possible. Since what really happens to the subject 
when he successfully enters a hypnotic state under which he is given 
a suggestion is still basically an unknown area, and because no intergrated 
account of hypnosis is available to us yet, it is difficult to decide between 
these two rival theories. 
But although it is difficult to reach a definite conclusion about the 
case in question, at this stage anyway, we can still consider which appears 
to be more plausible in the light of available evidence. From what we already 
know about hypnosis it is quite clear that the subject's attitude towards 
the hypnotist plays an important role in his initial response. Obviously, 
if the person had a negative attitudd and decided to resist being hypnotized, 
the hypnotist wouldn't be able to get any response from him. So at least 
to start withthe subject has to agree to follow the hypnotist's instructions, 
to 
such as4try to relax completely, close his eyes, concentrate carefully 
on the hypnotist's voice, etc., which'-are a part of the standard hypnotic 
induction procedure. And when the subject does that, he can quite correctly 
be said to be acting in compliance with the hypnotist's instructions. If 
that is all that is meant by compliance here, there isn't any real disagreement 
between the two rival theories. 
However, the subject's positive attitude isn't enough for him to enter 
a hypnotic state. It is quite a well known fact that, however positively 
the person might feel about the test and however hard he might try 
to do what he is told, the hypnotist might still be unable to hypnotize 
him. Some people are just unhypnotizable, because they seem to lack the 
appropriate aptitude. What this amounts to is largely a matter of speculation 
so far, but there are some indications that it may depend on such factors 
as personality traits, age, or even physical constitution, but all these 
can hardly be said to be under the voluntary control of the person. So it 
takes a combination of a positive attitude, which the subject can decide 
to adopt, and adequate aptitude, which is apparently a matter of the person's 
make-up rather than choice, to be able to experience hypnosis. This suggests 
that even to start with, compliance alone is not enough. - 
What happens to the subject when he successfully enters a hypnotic 
s-Lute--; under which he is given a suggestion, is still basically an unknown 
area. According to the state-oriented account, he is supposed to be in a 
special kind of state, quite different from both the waking and the sleeping 
states, which enables the hypnotist to elicit relevant responses from him, 
impossible to achieve under normal conditions. However, various attempts 
to find a physiological correlate-., of hypnotic trance per se have not been 
very successful. They showed that subjects who are categorized as deeply 
hypnotized differ from each other on physiological measures, such as EEG, 
cor,:, tical potentials, skin resistance, etc., as much as the subjects 
who are awake differ from each other. Hore recent physiological studies 
on hypnosis seem to imply that hypnotizable subjects, before they are 
hypnotized, show different EEG activities from the less hypnotizable 
subjects. 
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This may well be an important underlying feature of capacity 
is 
to experience hypnosis, but k not a hypnotic state as such. Thus there 
isn't any physiological evidence which can help us to decide between the 
two rival theories, so far anyway. 
An attempt to find clinical correlates of hypnotic state; based 
on the subject's own reports of his experience of hypnosis, has been 
more successful. Some of these reports are very striking indeed. For 
example, in the complete absence of any hypnotic instructions to this effect, 
a subject may report an experience under hypnosis of a radical alteration in 
the size of his whole body or A part of it. Others report an experience 
of "disappearance" of an arm, a leg, or a loss of awareness of the entire 
body. Another frequent kind of spontaneous change is in the experience 
of equilibrium. Generalized sensations of dizziness and giddiness are 
also quite common. Some subjects report a loss of contact with the 
environment and with reality. The room in which the test is carried out 
may look as if covered by a veil and everything might seem shadowy and 
dreamlike. Since this kind of experience is quite common under hypnosis 
and is entirely spontaneous, i. e. it appears in the absence of the 
relevant hypnotic instructions, hypnosis seems to be indeed a special 
kind of state, which is different at least psychologically from other 
kinds of states. All this is taken by some authors as more evidence in 
favour of the state-oriented account of hypnosis. But this evidence 
should be taken with caution, however. According, to the culturally-defined 
implications of the word C hypnosis', it often means having some unusual 
experience. Thus the subject's "unusual" experience under hypnosis may 
be influenced by his pre-experimental conception of what hypnosis is supposed 
to involve, and nottbecause he is in a special state. Experiments with subjects 
who are entirely ignorant of what hypnosis is about, such as children, can 
help to decide the claim about hypnosis being a peculiar kind of state, 
but as far as we know such experiments haven't been arranged yet. 
However, there are already some experimental studids which directly 
address the question whether post-hypnotic response is a species of 
compliance, or whether it is quasi-automatic and beyond voluntary control. 
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If post-hypnotic response is a case of compliance, as is suggested by the 
role-playing account, then it is possible to argue that it should be restricted 
to a specific context only, namely, to the situations where the subject 
perceives that the hypnotist expects that the relevant behaviour should occur. 
The Alternative view would, on the other hand, predict that post-hypnotic 
response may occur in a context which is not directly connected with the 
experimental situation and isn't interpreted by the subject to be so connected. 
An experiment designed to test these very hypotheses directly has been 
arranged by M. T. Orne and his colleagues. Two groups of subjects were asked 
to participate in a 2-day experiment. One group consisted of excellent 
hypnotic subjects, while another was selected from poor hypnotic subjects 
who were told to simulate hypnosis. To start with, all subjects were 
introduced to the Experimenter I who conducted a preliminary study which 
investigated the effect of motivating instructions on strength of grip. 
He told them that the next experiment would examine the effects of hypnosis 
on a variety of tests. The simulators were instructed additionally to 
simulate hypnosis to the best of their ability in the next study and behave 
in the way they thought the hypnotic subjects would do. They were told 
that the Experimenter 2 knew that both simulators and real hypnotic subjects 
were participating in the study, but that he was ignorant about which 
were which, as was indeed the case. A variety of independent studies have 
shown that simulators cannot be detected in their simulation of hypnosis 
when tested by an experimenter who is ignorant of their real identity. 
The reason for keeping the experimenter ignorant was to reduce the danger 
of him unwittingly influencing the hypnotic subjects to respond outside 
the experimental setting. Thus Experimenter 2 conducted the main experiment 
which consisted of two hypnotic sessions carried out within a 48-hour interval. 
On the lst day all subjects were given a suggestion that for the next 48 hours 
they were to respond by touching their forehead each time they heard the 
word 'experiment'-. The Experimenter 2 tested the suggestion in the experimental 
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setting, but the crucial test came in the waiting room, which was designed 
not to be perceived by the subjects as a part of the experiment, and was 
carried out by the secretary-receptionist. On the first day, after the 
session with the Experimenter 2, the secretary met each subject and 
confirmed the time which he was dcheduled "to come for the next part of 
the experiment". Later she asked the subject whehher he would like 
her to pay him "now for today's experimentland for the next part of the 
study tomorrow". on arrival the following day she met each subject with 
the question: "Are you here for Dr. Sheehan's experiment? " The subject's 
responses to these these cues were observed by the secretary and were 
recorded by her after the subject had left the room. Nour if the simulators, 
who are motivated to simulate the hypnotized subjects' behaviour as well as they 
can, and who often can be even more alert than hypnotic subjects themselves 
to subtle and informal testing of the suggestion by the experimenter, because 
they don't. want their real status to be revealed, don't perceive the experimental 
context to be extended to the secretary, it is plausible to assume that 
the hypnotized subjects don't perceive it as so extended either. 
This experiment revealed that a significant statistically number (pC. 05) 
of the hypnotic subjects responded consistently away from the experiment 
while no simulating subjects showed a comparable behavioural response. It 
also turned out that for the hypnotic group extraexperimental response 
was correlated with the depth of the hypnotic trance. When the 
experiment was over some hypnotic subjects were also reported responding 
to the suggestion away from the laboratory on the night following the 
first session and on the next day, but this wasn! t the case with simulators. 
The authors of this study draw the following conclusion: "The differences 
in performance between the hypnotic subjects and the motivated group 
of simulators indicate that, for at least some hypnotic subjects, posthypnotic 
behaviour cannot be attributed to compliance or-conscious role-playing and 
is not wholly dependent on the subjects; perceptions of the expectations 
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of the hypnotist ... it would seem that hypnotic subjects do not respond 
only when they think that the hypnotist expects that they should. The 
posthypnotic response can be influenced by the experimenter, and by the 
subject's expectations of what the experimenter wants, but it is. also 
able to exist independently of the context in which it originates. 
This seems inconsistent with the view that the hypnotic subject is engaged 
in an interpersonal game with the hypnotist, and is playing a role in a 
quasi-conscious fashion. In some subjects, hypnosis is able to produce 
an enduring response which is automatically instigated by an appropriate 
signal". 
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Another way of deciding whether posthypnotic behaviour is voluntary 
action in compliance with the hypnotist's requestor whether it is a 
compulsive response,. is to give the subject some suggestion under hypnosis 
and then give him a conflicting instruction to do something else when he 
wakes up (by one and the same hypnotist). If the subject still responds 
to the original suggestion, even if the person who gave it to him asks 
to do something else now, which gives the subject a good reason not to 
follow the first instruction, it seems sensible to argue that his response 
is compulsive and automatic and that he isn't acting in compliance any more, 
unlike k person following someone's orders consciously. An experiment which 
a- 
can help us to solve this problem was arranged by Luria himself, although 
he didn't design it with this specific purpose in mind. A group of 
hypnotized subjects was given a suggestion that after awakening they would have 
a desire to think of the names of different birds. When they woke up they 
were asked to produce a series of free assocations by saying any word 
they thought of. This series was then compared with free associations 
obtained in a normal state before any suggestion was given. In a number 
of subjects in a hypnotized group Luria made the suggestion to name the 
birds conflict with a waking instruction to associate in another 
direction, namely to give without interruption names of fish or trees. 
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And it is precisely the response of these subjects which is directly relevant 
to our problem. In Luria's view, their response is very significant. 
Although in more than sixty percent of the cases, the instruction given 
in the waking state because dominant, the associative-series was always 
attained with considerable difficulty. This difficulty was revealed by 
the character of speech reactions, as in the following case: "subject Ip., 
sturgeon -crew ... ach a crow is not a fish ... dtick- sparrow - what kind of 
a fish is this! ... titmouse -carp... '. 
74 
Also the accompanying motor 
reactions always indicated an extremely severe disturbance, i. e. quite 
an Wute motor storm, very different from a normal course of reactive process. 
Thus in Luria's view, "The experiments with4suggested tendency plainly 
show that the state of compulsion (my italics) easily provokes a conflict 
with the fundamental setting of the personality; even though having been 
deprived of the affective contents, they easily provoke a spread of the 
excitation and affect, which is manifested precisely in the attempts to 
-overcome these tendencies by inhibition. The more imperative the excitement 
and the tension, the more foreign its setting for the subject, the greater 
the disturbance of behaviour we may expect as a result of the collision with 
the regulating systems of personality. " 
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The results of these experiments are incompatible with the view that 
the hypnotized subjectsact in compliance with the hypnotist. '; s orders, and 
seem to support the view that hypnotic response is compulsive and quasi- 
automatic, as has always been argued by, those who accept the state-oriented 
account of hypnotic phenomena. And this agrees with the claim, also put 
forward here, that what takes place in naturally occurring unconscious phenomena 
isn't brought about by the subject intentionally either, but is something 
that happens to him. 
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Ch. 4 THE FREUDIAN THEORY OF REPRESSION 
A) Why are certain mental states unconscious? 
Freud doesn't merely assert that human behaviour is influenced by 
unconscious mental processes, he also gives some account of why they 
are unconscious. This account can be found in his theory of repression 
which will be the subject matter of this chapter. The psychoanalytic 
doctrine of repression postulates a hypothetical process, referred to as 
defence or repression, which is said to be responsible for preventing some 
mental processes from reaching consciousness. In this respect Freud is 
unlike literary writers who mer4ly talk about the unconscious motives of 
their characters without giving any account of why they are unconscious; 
he is more like a scientist who appeals to a hypothetical entity or process 
in order to explain his observations. Freud defines this hypothetical 
process as follows: "the essence of repression lies simply in turning 
something away and keeping it at a distance from the consciousness". 
1 
This means that everything that is repressed remains unconscious. But it 
is not the case that everything that is unconscious is the consequence of 
repression. Hypnotic and subliminal phenomena (which we discussed earlier) 
could be unconscious without being repressed. And the process of 
repression itself is unconscious (as we will discuss in detail soon), which 
also implies that being unconscious and being repressed don't coincide. 
Thus it is untrue to say that repression accounts for all unconscious mental 
states, it only explains some of them, and our interest here is restricted 
to the latter. 
The very-term 'repression', used throughout the psychoanalytic literature, 
unfortunately suffers from various terminological and conceptual confusions 
which require some clarification before we can proceed further. In Freud's 
early writings it is used interchangeably with 'defence'. In 
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Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, however, he makes an explicit distinction 
between these two terms: 
It will be an undoubted advantage, I think, to revert 
to the old concept of 'defence', provided we employ it 
explicitly as a general designation for all the 
techniques the ego makes use of in conflicts, which may 
lead to a neurosis, while we retain the word 'repression' 
for the special method of defence. 
2 
But in his later works Freud uses these two concepts interchangeably again. 
For example, in Construction in Analysis, which is much later than 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, we read: 
it is familiar ground that the work of analysis aims 
at inducing the patient to give up the repressions 
(using the word in the widest sense) belonging to his 
early development and to replace them by reactions 
of a sort that would correspond to a psychically mature 
condition. 3 
And what's more, the definition of repression quoted earlier can equally 
well be employed to define the notion of defence. If the term 'repression' 
is replaced in it by 'defence' the same meaning would be preserved. It 
seems, therefore, that the distinction between these two terms which Freud 
tried to make at one stage is purely verbal and doesn't carry with it 
any real difference. 
Although the process of repression is so important to Freud, the way 
in which he characterizes it seems to be inconsistent. In some of its 
earlier uses, in Studies on Hysteria in particular, the term 'repressed' 
is systematically accompanied by the adverb 'intentionally', as in the 
following passage: 
Now I already knew from the analysis of similar cases 
that before hysteria can be acquired for the first time, 
one essential condition must be fulfilled: an idea must 
be intentionally repressed from consciousness. 4 
However, in the same work when he talks about the mechanism of 
conversion, which is a typical method of defence in hysteria, we are told: 
m 
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lt is obviously not carried out in the same way as 
intentional and voluntary action. It is a process 
which occurs under the pressure of the motive of 
defence in someone whose organization - or a temporary 5 
modification of it - has a proclivity in that direction. 
How are we to take these incompatible claims? Some of Freud's interpreters 
prefer to look at repression as a kind of intentional act or strategy 
used by a person whenever he has a wish or feeling he strongly disapproves 
of - Fingarette for example. According to him, "the defensive process 
is a splitting of the ego which is not something that 'happens' to the 
ego but something the ego does, a motivated strategy". 
6 W. D. Hart takes 
a similar view: "Since it is an adequacy condition of any account of 
repression that it be an intentional action, I shall reexpress McGinn's view 
as saying that the inhibiting desire is one's motive for performing 
an act of repression. " 
7 But there are also those who take the opposite 
view, and R. S. Peters is one of them. He thinks that "repression is 
different from denial or conscious suppression. It is something that seems 
to happen when confronted with a dangerous wish. It is not like putting 
a thought out of mind; the thought just passes out of mind. " 
8 
Whether repression could be an intentional strategy depends on whether 
or not the person is in a position to bring about the results which Freud 
attributes to repression. One way in which it achieves its goal is by 
producing a total amnesia of the relevant experience. Thus if a person 
represses some traumatic experience from his childhood, there is a total 
blank in his memory concerning this very experience. Another way in which it 
achieves its results is by changing the cognitive aspect of the subject's 
wish or emotion, i. e. his belief about how he feels or what he wishes. 
For instance, a person who is afraid of his father becomes, thanks to 
repression, convinced that he is afraid of some animal, as often happens 
in animal phobia by the mechanism of displacement (Little Hans, and the 
Wolf Man). When a homosexual man represses his sexual wishes he ends up 
believing that it is not he but other people of the same sex who have 
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sexual desires, i. e. he projects his sexual wishes on others. In other 
words, repression doesn't block the wish or emotion itself, or as Freud 
puts it, doesn't destroy the energy of the mental process, but transforms 
the person's beliefs about its object. Suppose repression is something 
the person can do at will, as some of Freud's interpreters think. 
That would mean that people who repress their motives are in a position 
to change at will their beliefs and memories. But can they really do 
any such thing? 
A belief doesn't seem to be something we can decide to have or not have, 
although we can decide to express it or not. This passivity of beliefs 
was stressed by Hume. He regarded it as a. contingent fact that beliefs 
are beyond our voluntary control, like shivering with cold, or blushing 
out of embarrassment. But this view has been criticized by B. Williams. 
9 
Although he agrees with Hume about the passive nature of beliefs he 
argues that this isn't merely a contingent fact about them. Take a 
perceptual belief, for example that there is a cat in front of me; such 
a belief is a function of the environment and its influence on my sense 
organs. And if those organs are working properly, I cannot help but believe 
that there is a cat in front of me. If a belief was something that could 
be produced at will, there wouldn't be a regular connection between the 
perceptible environment and what the person believes, and thus we couldn't 
have a concept of empirical belief. Something similar is true of non- 
perceptual beliefs. All beliefs aim at truth; in contrast to other 
psychological states such as sensations, emotions, etc., we assess them 
in terms of truth and falsity. To believe p is to believe that p is true. 
But if I could acquire a belief at will I could. acquire it whether or not 
I thought it true. But this could hardly count as a belief, if by 
'belief' we understand what the person thinks or holds to be the case. 
So unlike shivering and other passive phenomena, it is not a contingent 
fact that we cannot decide to believe something. Therefore, the change 
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in someone's belief about the object of his mental state, which takes 
place in repression, doesn't seem to be something the person can bring about 
at will either. 
Memory is another mental process which doesn't respond to our will. 
Remembering or forgetting something just happens to us, often despite 
strong efforts to the contrary. Like beliefs in general, memory-beliefs 
aim to be veridical. We say that people remember something only if we think 
that their memory claims are true. If someone hasn't met me before, 
I can't say that he remembers being introduced to me, only that he seems to 
remember. But there are some differences between remembering and believing. 
Sometimes a person says he knows something, although he cannot recall 
it at this particular minute. If it is a name he is trying to recall, 
he can already tell what it isn't, for instance that it isn't x, y, or z, 
but something else. In this respect memory may involve only recognition. 
I might be able to recognize something when I see it even if I cannot 
describe it now. Similarly, when the correct name is presented to me, 
1 may immediately recognize that it is the one I was looking for. Despite 
this difference, it is still the case that neither recall nor recognition 
are subject to our will. But then repressing something by means of 
forgetting it entirely cannot be something the person is in a position 
to decide to do either. To view repression as a kind of intentional 
act or strategy doesn't seem to be right. 
There are, however, cases of involuntary phenomena which can be 
influenced by people in an indirect or roundabout way. For example, 
although I cannot speed up the beating of my heart just by deciding 
to do so, I can decide to run and thereby cause my heart to beat faster. 
In the case of memory and beliefs there are also various causal factors, 
unconnected with correctness or truth, which can influence them - for 




With memory, I can also try to influence it by concentrating on something 
else, which usually brings about at least momentary forgetting. So 
memory and beliefs can apparently be influenced by a deliberate strategy 
of manipulating them by appropriate causal factors. 
But can such a strategy be coherent? In the case of believing, 
it depends on what kind of motive I have for trying to make myself believe 
something. According to Williams, we have to distinguish between wanting 
to believe as a 'truth-centered motive' and as a 'non-truth-centered' 
one. The following example makes clear what be means. Suppose there 
is overwhelmingly good evidence that a man's son has been killed in war, 
but the man understandably wants t-o believe that his son is alive. 
What he wants is the truth of his belief, i. e. his son to be alive; 
this is a truth-centered motive. Taking a drug or alcohol or being 
hypnotized cannot change the facts about his son, so the father cannot 
coherently adopt such strategies for making his desired belief true. 
Similarly, suppose someone is unwilling to believe that he is an illegitimate 
child. If he has a truth-centered motive, what he wishes is that he were 
not illegitimate. But neither repression nor anything else can change 
that, and it wouldn't be coherent for him even to try to alter his parentage. 
When someone has a non-truth-centered motive for believing something, 
he doesn't care whether his belief is true or false, all that matters 
is what makes him happier. In this case, a conscious strategy to change 
one's belief doesn't seem incoherent. Thus it would be coherent for the 
father to try to make himself believe that his son is alive, if all he 
wants is to reduce his own distress regardless of the facts. This is 
trying to forget some unpleasant fact, which one knows isn't in a position 
to change, in order merely to gain some relief. Unfortunately such a 
strategy isn't usually very successful, particularly in the case of memory. 
Suppose the father tried to reduce his distress by concentrating his mind 
on something else: this is likely to produce only momentary forgetting, 
m 
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not permanent amnesia. As soon as his concentration relaxes, the painful 
memory creeps into his mind again, and there is no end to the attempts 
to suppress it. In the case of belief we have a similar problem: even 
if he gets rid of the belief that his son is dead, there remain other 
beliefs that strongly imply that his son is dead, and there will be no end 
to the beliefs that need getting rid of. 
So a conscious strategy of changing one's belief is either incoherent 
or unsuccessful. For this reason repression too, which operates by 
changing memory and beliefs, would be either incoherent or unsuccessful 
if it were a kind of conscious strategy. This fact is worth stressing, 
because the psychoanalysts, although usually quite explicit about why 
repressed contents are prevented from becoming conscious, are less so (with 
very few exceptions) about why the repressing force itself has to be 
unconscious. 10 
There is a further reason why the repressing process can hardly be 
a kind of intentional or conscious strategy. If the person uses a strategy 
he has to be aware of what he is trying to achieve, even if he is 
unsuccessful in his attempt. Thus if he is trying to concentrate on 
something else in order to forget some painful fact about himself or 
his situation, he has to be aware of what that fact is. The process of 
repression, on the other hand, is often put into motion before the person 
is even capable of realizing what his motives to be repressed are. This 
was also the case with the perceptual defence revealed by Dixon's experiment 
(reviewed above). The subjects in that experiment exhibited the rise 
in their perceptual threshold whenever they were confronted with 
anxiety-provoking words, without being aware what these words were, even 
to start with. But if a person is unaware of what he is trying to achieve 
by using a certain strategy, it is doubtful whether we can still attribute 
that strategy to him. 
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However, if we regard repression as something that happens to the 
subject rather than something he consciously does, we also seem to get 
into trouble. It has been argued by some philosophers that in order 
to explain why some mental processes are unconscious Freud postulates 
another kind of unconscious process, repression, which looks like explanation 
of ignotum per ignotum. Such criticism would be fair if the use of 
the notion of unconscious motives could not be understood and justified 
independently of the hypothetical process of repression, but in 
previous chapters Freud's reasons for introducing the notion of unconscious 
motives, independently of any notion of repression, have been discussed 
in detail. To recapitulate, he gave the following justification. 
Firstly, some behaviour which shows all the characteristics of motivated 
action except for the conscious avowal of the motive by the subject, 
would remain unintelligible without the ascription to him of an unconscious 
motive. And secondly, the notion of unconscious motives has been 
systematically used by literary writers quite independently of 
psycho-analytic theory, often before the doctrine of repression had even 
been formulated. But all this doesn't rule out the possibility of the 
theory of repression having little or no explanatory force. For it to be 
genuinely explanatory, we need some independent evidence that this hypothetical 
process, and not some other, is the one at work when some mental item 
becomes unconscious. Whether this can be done requires separate discussion. 
A different criticism of the notion of repression was given by 
J. P. Sartre. In Being and Nothingness he argues that in order to explain 
how it is possible that a person cannot become aware of something, 
e. g. that he. has a "taboo" wish, Freud postulates a "censorship", that is 
some kind of repressing agency, which prevents the subject from realizing 
that he has that wish. But, Sartre asks, how are we to conceive the status 
of this censorship itself? If the work of the censor is conscious (to 
the censor) then we have an agency within the person who knows better 
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than the person himself what his motives are - which is hardly acceptable. 
But if, on the other hand, the censor in unconscious of its activity 
then it is not clear how it can perform the function ascribed to it, since 
the censor in order to apply its activity with discernment 
must know what it is repressing... (We) are compelled 
to admit that the censor must choose and in order to 
choose must be aware of so doing. How could it happen 
otherwise that the censor allows lawful sexual 
impulses to pass through, that it permits needs 
(hunger, thirst, sleep) to be expressed in clear 
consciousness? And how are we to explain that it 
can relax its surveillance, that itcan even be 
deceived by the disguises of the instinct? But 
it is not sufficient that it discern the condemned 
drives, it must also apprehend them as to be repressed, 
which implies in it at the very least an awareness 
of its activity. In a word, how could the censor 
discern the impulses needing to be repressed without 
being conscious of discerning them? ll 
So, according to Sartre, the notion of censorship is incoherent. 
(In Freud's later writings, the notion was replaced by that of unconscious 
Ego, which of course doesn't make any difference to Sartre's argument, 
because if §ound that argument will apply to any postulated internal 
agency. ) 
Before criticizing Freud's notion of censorship, it is important 
to realize that it is a part of his metapsychology and stands or falls 
with that doctrine. Since metapsychology will be discussed later, at this 
stage we can merely point out in a general way where Sartre's criticism 
goes astray. He seems to be taking the notion of censorship too literally 
(a misinterpretation which Freud himself invites) by describing it in 
the way be does, like a person acting as a censor. On some occasions 
at least, Freud's writings make it clear that when he talks about 
censorship what he is referring to is a hypothetical mechanism responsible 
for the process of repression. But if this is the case, the question 
of it itself being conscious or unconscious, which Sartre presses, 
is misconceived. A mechanism is neither conscious nor unconscious of 
anything in the way a whole person is. The person may be said to be 
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unconscious of the process of repression, but the censorship cannot. 
Before criticizing this notion of censorship we should first understand 
what status it has, and what role it plays in the psychoanalytic 
doctrine as a whole. But (Sartre could reply) if the censorship is just 
a mechanism, why does Freud describe it in such an anthropomorphic way, 
picturing it as a kind of homunculus within the person? 
This is an interesting problem which faces not only psychoanalysis 
but other areas of psychology as well. In the study of Artificial 
Intelligence (A. I. ) especially, we come across such homunculi. The 
detectors, buffers, etc., postulated in A. I. can read signals, understand 
messages, compare information and do all sorts of intelligent things, 
and thus are very similar to the psychoanalytic homunculi. The use of 
such postulates looks like a question-begging strategy in theorizing 
about psychological functions and the mechanisms responsible for them. 
However, as some philosophers have pointed out, although introducing 
a "little man" can indeed be a temporarily question-begging theoretical 
formulation, it can nevertheless play a useful heuristic role, and therefore 
should not be dismissed out of hand. For example, when the A. I. theorist 
postulates a little man to represent some psychological faculty, such 
as the ability to perform mathematical calculations, this homunculus 
makes explicit the theorist's inability so far to produce an account 
of the mechanism that performs that function. But if if helps him to 
formulate a relevant computer programme, and to make the computer solve 
such problems in the way that people do, the relevant homunculus can be 
discharged from his theory. As D. C. Dennett has argued in his book 
Brainstorms: "The A. I. programmer uses intentional language fearlessly 
because he knows that if he succeeds in getting his programme to run, 
any question he has been begging provisionally will have been paid back. 
The computer is more unforgiving than any human critic; if the progr 
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works then we can be certain that all homunculi have been discharged 
from his theory., '12 Whether psychoanalytic homunculi such as censorship 
can play a similarly useful role is of course a question which requires 
independent analysis. But Sartre, instead of helping to clarify this 
issue, makes it more obscure. 
There is a further problem to be faced if pepression is viewed 
as a passive process, which the person undergoes rather than does. Is it 
consistent to assume that such a process can be influenced by the person 
gaining understanding of what he is repressing, i. e. attaining insight 
into his unconscious motives, as is assumed in psychoanalytic therapy? 
Passive phenomena, such as shivering with cold, usually happen to us 
irrespective of whether we understand why they happen. If they can be 
influenced at all, it is by some causal factor, such as having a hot drink, 
which has nothing to do with understanding. Repression may seem to be 
similar, so how can it be susceptible to rational influence? However, 
it is not the case that all passive phenomena are resistant to rational 
influence, and happen to us irrespective of any understanding. Believing 
is a good example. We have learned that a belief is something the person 
often cannot help having, despite a strong wish to the contrary. When a man 
sees what he realizes to be clear evidence for something, he cannot help 
but believe the relevant proposition, even if he might prefer to believe 
the opposite. So although we say both that the person cannot help shivering 
and cannot help believing, the two cases are quite different. He who cannot 
help believing in the face of overwhelming evidence is precisely the one 
who understands the evidence for what he believes, whereas shivering 
has nothing to do with understanding. Since believing is connected with 
recognizing evidence or reasons, it can also be modified by rational 
argument. For example, if the believer is shown that what he took to be 
evidence is not so good after all, or is not evidence at all, his belief 
may well change. But can repression be influenced in similar rational ways? 
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What is usually made unconscious in repression are the person's 
emotions and wishes. These states are in general logically connected with 
relevant beliefs. Thus if a person is frightened of a snake, it may be 
because he believes that the snake is dangerous. If, this belief is based 
on good evidence, his emotion is rational because the belief connected 
with it is rational. Thanks to this connection of emotions with beliefs - 
their "cognitive core", emotions too can be influenced by rational argument, 
although they are passive phenomena. For instance, if a person is afraid 
of a harmless snake because of a belief that it is poisonous, then by 
convincing him that it is not really poisonous, we may influence not just 
his belief but also the emotion. As suggested earlier, however, neurotic 
fears, unlike ordinary fear, are usually quite irrational, even unintelligible. 
This doesn't mean merely that the relevant beliefs are based on poor evidence; 
often they seem to be totally unfounded, so that although the person has 
no factual belief at all which would justify his feelings, he cannot help 
having those feelings nonetheless. Phobic subjects who are afraid of 
spiders, dogs, or cats, even if they are persuaded that these creatures 
are harmless, still cannot help being afraid of them. Can we influence such 
irrational emotions? Forcing the subject to face what he is afraid of, 
as behavioural therapy sometimes does, or giving him an electric shock, 
is one way of influencing them. But this is not to treat the subject as a 
rational agent, whose feelings and actions should be modified by rational 
means. 
Unlike such therapies, psychoanalysis is based on the assumption that 
even irrational fears can be influenced by rational means, unless the subject 
is so confused that he doesn't even understand the force of rational 
argument, and thus isn't a rational agent any more. This approach, although 
more acceptable morally, might not be workable however. From various 
examples of symptoms discussed in the previous chapter we have learned 
that the person's fear (or other emotion) was originally unsusceptible 
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to rational argument because he was confused about the very object of 
his emotion, i. e. the object was different from what he thought it was, 
as in the case of the girl who was afraid to go out because she thought 
she couldn't control her bladder in public pla-c-es. By making her understand 
that what she was really afraid of was having an erotic sensation, while 
her mistrust of her bladder was only a substitute, Freud enabled her to 
gain almost complete control over her phobia (for detailed discussion, 
see Chapter II, pp. 51-3). So understanding as a means of influencing 
the irrational emotions is possible at least in principle, even if it is 
not a sufficient or the most economical way of changing them. And if 
we can in this way modify emotions and wishes which are responsible 
for repression, there is no reason why we cannot influence repression 
itself; thus there is no incompatibility between the assumptions of 
psychoanalytic therapy and the fact that repression is a passive process. 
B) Why are certain mental states repressed? 
We have learned that certain mental states are unconscious because 
they are prevented from becoming conscious by a hypothetical process 
called repression. But is the term 'repression' just a name for whatever 
it is that does the job postulated by Freud, or can something more specific 
be said about the process to which it refers? Freud doesn't just name 
the process, he makes an attempt to explain what is achieved by it, or 
what effects it produces. Although psychoanalytic accounts of the effects 
of repression are not always very systematic, the following passages provide 
an unmistakable clue to what it is that repression is supposed to achieve. 
In Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis we read "systems of defence 
are in use against the possible generation of anxiety". 
13 In a different 
work, Freud says "It was not the repression that created the anxiety; 
the anxiety was there earlier; it was the anxiety that made the repression". 
14 
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His followers, Anna Freud in particular, said similar things about the 
relation between the process of defence, and anxiety. In her book 
The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence we are told that "defence is motivated 
by super-ego anxiety" 
15 
and also, "it is the anxiety which sets the defensive 
process going". 16 It is clear that psychoanalysts in general, and Freud 
in particular, see a close connection between the defensive process and anxiety. 
But when we try to understand the nature of this connection, we are not 
given a clear answer. We are faced instead with expressions like those 
just quoted. But we have nevertheless some clue as to what sort of explanation 
is intended. The expressions 'in use against', 'made', and 'motivated by' 
strongly suggest some form of teleological explanation. 
When we look at what-Freud said about the manifestations of the 
process of defence, namely symptoms, it becomes even more apparent that 
the psychoanalytic explanation of repression is in fact a functional 
explanation. A clear instance is found in the following passage: 
"all symptom formation would be brought about solely in order to avoid 
anxiety; the symptoms bind the psychic energy which otherwise would be 
discharged as anxiety", 
17 
which is another way of saying that the function 
oi the symptoms is to reduce anxiety. To prove that the process of defence 
has indeed this function, Freud appeals tofacts like the following. 
When during psychotherapy the analyst tries to*undo the process of defence 
by making the patient aware of his unconscious affects, the patient 
starts to feel an overwhelming anxiety. Such anxiety also breaks out 
if the patient's symptoms, for example a washing ritual, are somehow 
prevented from occurring. So, concludes Freud, "symptoms are only formed 
in order to escape an otherwise unavoidable generating of anxiety". 
18 
Let us now look at some examples of the application of functional 
analysis. In one of his case histories, Freud gives an explanation of an 
animal phobia suffered by a little boy called Hans. Hans was afraid 
of being bitten by a horse, and therefore refused to go out; by staying 
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at home he could avoid seeing horses and thus avoid anxiety. What puzzled 
Freud in Hans's case was thatthis otherwise intelligent boy had this 
irrational fear. During discussions with the boy and with his father, 
Freud discovered that the father used to play at being a horse for Hans; 
the boy also told Freud that he saw some similarities between his father 
and a horse, namely, that his father's "widdler" was as large as a horse's. 
There were also some striking facts about Hans's fear of horses - he was 
particularly afraid of horses which had muzzles and blinkers on their heads. 
According to Freud, these symbolized for Hans his father's moustaches 
and eye-glasses. On the basis of these and other facts Freud concluded 
that for Hans a horse represented his father, and that what he was really 
afraid of was his father. The father used to threaten him with castration 
as a punishment for masturbation, so the fear of being bitten by a horse 
was really a fear of being castrated by his father. 
Whether Freud was justified in drawing this conclusion requires 
of course a more careful analysis of the whole case history, which we are 
not going to attempt here. What interests us at the moment is the more 
general explanation of the boy's phobia which Freud offers. According to 
Freud, it was difficult for the boy to cope with his anxiety that his 
father might. castrate him, and therefore it became repressed. The mechanism 
of defence at work in this case was displacement, the fear of the father 
was "displaced" onto a different object, namely horses. Can we say then 
that in Hans's case the function of this process of defence was the 
avoidance of anxiety? Hardly, the critic may say, for anxiety was still 
there, it just took the form of 4 fear of horses. Actually, Freud himself 
said that "such a repression as that which takes place in an animal phobia 
must be described as radically unsuccessful. All that it has done is to 
remove the idea and set another in its place; it has not succeeded in its 
aim of avoiding pain. "19 If we cannot therefore assert that the function 
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of repression is to avoid anxiety, we may however claim that it is to keep 
anxiety within tolerable bounds, i. e. to reduce it to an acceptable level. 
To show that repression has this function, at least, Freud argues as follows: 
For the anxiety belonging to a phobia is conditional; 
it only emerges when the object of it is perceived - 
and rightly so, since it is only then that the danger- 
situation is present. There is no need to be afraid 
of being castrated by a father who is not there. 
On the other hand, one cannot get rid of a father; 
he can appear whenever he chooses. But if he is 
replaced by an animal, all one has to do is to avoid 
the sight of it - that is, its presence - in order to 
be free of danger and anxiety. "Little Hans", therefore, 
imposed a restriction upon his ego. He produced the 
inhibition of not leaving the house, so as not to come 
across any horse. 20 
Since anxiety plays such a vital role in the process of repression, 
the question arises what are the factors which contribute to its generation? 
There is a widespread view that Freud held that the source of all anxiety 
is the frustration of sexual desire, but this doesn't do justice to the 
evolution of his ideas on anxiety. In his earlier period, Freud did indeed 
hold such a view: in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality he wrote: 
One of the most important results of psychoanalytic research 
is this discovery that neurotic anxiety arises out of libido, 
that it is a transformation of it, and it is thus related 
to it in the same kind of way as vinegar is to wine. 21 
In other words, he believed that the accumulation of undischarged sexual 
tension is transformed into anxiety. But he soon changed this view. in 
lnhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety we read: 
Formerly I regarded anxiety as a general reaction of the 
ego under conditions of unpleasure. I always sought 
to justify its appearance on economic grounds and I assumed, 
on the strength of my investigation into "actual" 
neurosis, that libido (excess excitation) which was 
rejected or not utilized by the ego found direct discharge 
in the form of anxiety. It cannot be denied that these 
various assertions did not go well together, or at any 
rate did not follow from one another. 22 
From now on, anxiety was not perceived as the transformation of undischarged 
libido, but as a person's emotional reaction to a situation of danger. 
Of course, the expression of sexual wishes in certain situations can be 
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perceived by the subject as dangerous, and may therefore become a source 
of anxiety and repression, but this is quite different from saying 
that all anxiety is a result of undischarged libido. To talk about 
anxiety in the latter way is to look at it from the "economic" point of 
view, i. e. in terms of Freud's Metapsychology, which is concerned not 
with the person's experiences but with the machinery of his mind. 
Freud's second theory of anxiety, on the contrary, stresses the 
importance of psychological aspects of anxiety, i. e. the person's subjective 
perception of a danger and his emotional reaction to it. What's more, 
according to the later view, not only a real danger but also an anticipated 
one can provoke an outbreak of anxiety. This notion of anxiety as a signal 
became central to Freud's later theory of it. And it broadened his 
conception of the motives for defence, because an anticipated as well 
as a real danger could become a source of repression. As G. S. Klein said: 
The importance of this new view of anxiety can hardly 
be overemphasized. It brought into the foreground 
an anticipatory capacity in the schema of regulation. 
Effective regulation meant functioning guided by 
anticipated danger. The anxiety signal is more than a 
realistic response of fear to actual danger. It reflects 
a regulatory system capable of initiating defensive 
action on the basis of a premonition; it initiates a 
system capable of the developmental feat of turning 
passively experienced, full-blown anxiety into a 
finely-tuned means of anticipatory defence. Moreover, 
the anxiety signal is capable of mobilizing a great 
variety of defences in this fashion. 23 
Freud's theory has taught us so far about the relationship between 
unconscious mental processes and repression or defence. He has provided 
us with a functional account of the role of repression in reducing anxiety, 
and from his theory of anxiety we have learned about the factors which 
generate it. Now we wish to concentrate on how repression operates. 
In Freud's view, repression isn't a single event but a continuous process 
with several stages. The first stage is called 'primal repression', 
and "consists in a denial of entry into consciousness, to the mental 
24 (ideational) presentation of the instinct". The primal repressiont 
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however, does not withold from consciousness all the derivatives of what 
was primarily repressed. If these derivatives are sufficiently far removed 
from the repressed contents they have free access to consciousness, 
because they are not perceived as dangerous by the subject. In 
psychotherapy, by using a method of free associations, the analyst tries 
to get the patient to produce such derivatives of what has been repressed. 
But it can happen that they become so closely associated with the repressed 
content that there is a danger of it becoming conscious. When that happens, 
the derivatives have to be repressed too, and thus the second stage, the 
so-called 'repression proper', is needed. This "affects mental derivatives 
of the repressed representation, or such trains of thought as, originating 
elsewhere, have come into associative connection with it,,. 
25 So the 
process of repression doesn't take place once and for all, but has to be re- 
established again and again. It is also clear that the repressed contents 
cannot be wholly stopped from getting into consciousness through their 
derivatives, for the latter can manifest themselves in various ways. 
As we already noted, in the process of therapy they find expressions 
in an inability to produce free assocations, and in inexplicable lapses 
of memory. In everyday life they can show themselves in fantasies, 
dreams, and various slips and errors. According to Freud, these are not 
accidental events, but the manifestation of unconscious motives, and it 
is thanks to them that the original motives can be unveiled or reconstructed 
at all. 
There are also different types of operations through which defence 
may be achieved. In the psychoanalytic literature they are usually 
referred to as the mechanisms of defence. 
26 We remember that in the case 
of little Hans it was by displacement that defence was achieved. Projection, 
identification, reaction-formation, regression, undoing, sublimation, are 
further examples of the mechanisms of defence. Since the list of mechanisms 
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is impressive in its length, even when restricted to those commonly 
mentioned in the literature, only a few of them will be discussed here. 
Let us look, for example, at the mechanism called 'projection'. It consists 
in the attribution to another person or thing of those feelings, attitudes, 
etc., which the subject refuses to recognize in himself. Freud uses 
the notion of projection to account for a variety of phenomena in pathological 
as well as in normal psychology. It takes a pathological form in paranoia, 
for example; a paranoic projects his feelings onto another person whom 
he regards as his persecutor. An example can be found in the case-history 
of Schreber, whose feeling of hatred towards his doctor became transformed 
into the thought "The doctor hates and persecutes ke, and therefore I feel 
justified in hating him". Projection is also present in some cases 
of racism, in which the racist projects his negative feelings onto the 
members of a different race; as a result, he is convinced that they 
dislike him, and therefore it is quite natural for him to dislike them too. 
Freud also gives examples of projection operating in mythology and superstition 
in mythology human passions and qualities are projected onto the objects 
and forces of nature, so that nature may be seen as full of spirits 
and demons which have very human qualities. So Freud recognizes projection 
in very diverse areas, and thus the meaning of the word becomes rather vague. 
A different type of defensive mechanism is "identification". In this 
case the properties and attitudes of others become assimilated by the 
subject and are regarded as his own. This mechanism is thus in some ways 
the opposite of the process of projection, in which the subject's own 
feelings and attitudes are attributed to other people or things. The notion 
of identification appears in Freud's writings in various contexts. Sometimes 
it plays an important part in the psychoanalytic theory of child development. 
According to Freud, the socialization of children takes place through 
identification with their parents who represent the values of the society 
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they live in. As a result, the superego of the child is developed, 
and the social attitudes of the parents he identifies with become an 
important part of his personality. But on other occasions Freud and 
other psychoanalysts use the notion of identi-fication in a more specific 
way. The most cited example of this specific mechanism to be found 
in the psychoanalytic literature is identification with an aggressor. 
This was described by Anna Freud in her work The Ego and the Mechanisms 
of Defence. 
27 
The behaviour of some prisoners in concentration camps 
is an example. According to accounts of life in the camps,, some prisoners 
started to identify with the Nazis - they wore whatever pieces of Nazi 
clothing they could get, and when put in a position of authority would treat 
other prisoners in a cruel way. By identifying himself with the aggressor, 
the person can better master his anxiety, not feeling that he is a victim 
of aggression which he cannot control, but rather a master of it because 
he is now an aggressor himself. The prisoners' identification with the 
Nazis seemed to have this function. Identification can appear after 
aggression, or can be a reaction to anticipated aggression. An example of 
the latter is a child punishing himself before he is punished by his parents. 
However, the notion of aggression suffers from vagueness, like the notion 
of projection. In the psychoanalytic literature in general, and in Freud's 
writings in particular, there is no clear distinction between identification 
and imitation, although they would seem to be quite different. Identification 
seems to involve an unconscious following of the model, while simple 
imitation is a conscious act. Neither Freud nor his followers provide 
us with clear criteria for the distinction. The notion of identification 
is often used by psychoanalysts interchangeably with such notions as 
introjection or incorporation, and it is not clear whether this use is 
due to carelessness, or whether they regard them as synonymous. 
I -. 
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Another example of defensive mechanisms is reaction-formation. This 
consists in adopting a psychological attitude which is diametrically 
opposed to the real feeling or desire experienced by a person. As 
Freud wrote: 
The exaggerated degree and compulsive character 
of the affection alone betray the fact that it is not 
the only one present but is continually on the alert 
to keep the opposite feeling under suppression, and 
enables us to postulate the operation of a process which 
we call repression by means of reaction-formation. 28 
React ion-f ormat ion may manifest itself in specific behaviour or may 
become a habitual form of reaction, to the point of forming a character- 
trait, as in obsessional neurosis. An example of reaction-formation at 
work is a person who has strong sexual impulses which he cannot or is 
afraid to satisfy adopting a very strict moral code towards sex, and 
feeling disgust and shame over sexual matters. The obsessional 
neurotic's character traits such as feelings of shame or guilt, overconscient- 
iousness, etc., is, according to Freud, a defence against sexual impulses 
which usually takes place in childhood and becomes a habitual form of 
reaction. In other cases feaction-formation doesn't constitute a 
character-trait, but is confined to a particular relationship. For example, 
a woman who hates her child may adopt the attitude of a very caring mother 
who is compulsively preoccupied with the welfare of her child, who is fussy 
about material things, but who hardly kisses or cuddles her child. 
Undoing is a further example of defeasive mechanisms. It consists 
in an attempt to reverse something, a thought or action, which has 
already taken place. It is a typical form of defence in obsessional 
neurosis. An obsessional neurotic may, for example, wash his hands 
repeatedly, in order to undo previous thoughts or actions he is ashamed 
of and feels guilty about. A nice example of the mechanism of undoing 
was given by Freud in his case-history of the "Rat Man". One day the 
Rat Man, when walking, kicked his foot against a stone lying in the road; 
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he was struck by the idea that his girl-friend's carriage could come 
along that way and might be overturned by the stone, so he felt obliged 
to remove it. But a few minutes later, he felt obliged to go back and 
replace the stone in its original position in the middle of the road, 
thinking that his first action had been absurd. In other words, he thought 
that he could undo the absurdity of the first action by performing 
the opposite one, which was of course equally absurd. According to 
Freud, undoing has an unmistakably pathological character because it aims 
at reversing something which has already taken place, as if time were 
reversible. He wrote: 
The first of these (i. e. undoing) has a wide range 
of application and goes back very far. It is, as it 
were, negative magic, and endeavours, by means of motor 
symbolism, to "blow away" not merely the consequences 
of some event (or experience or impression) but the 
event itself ... This endeavour to undo shades off into normal behaviour in the case in which a person 
decides to regard an event as not having happened. 
But whereas he will tAe no direct steps against 
the event, and will simply pay no further attention 
to it or its consequences, the neurotic person will 
try to make the past itself non-existent. 29 
It may be interesting to ask whether some cases of magic which aim at 
influencing certain past events might have some psychological connection 
with the mechanism of undoing. 
Psycho-analysis is not-of course the only area in which functional 
terms are used. We also find functional propositions in biology - for example, 
that the function of the heart in vertebrates is to circulate the blood. 
Another area of application is to artefacts - for example, to say that 
the function of the hands in a clock is to tell the time. The social 
sciences in general, and anthropology in particular, are wont to make use 
of functional terms. Some anthropologists have suggested, for example, 
that the rain-making ceremonies of the Hopi fulfil the function of reinforcing 
group identity by providing a periodic occasion ori which the scattered 
members of a group assemble to engage in a common activity. Philosophers 
are naturally interested in the meaning of such functional statements. 
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C. C. Hempel and E. Nagel try to provide a unified account of functional 
statements, the former in terms of the adequate working of a given system, 
and the latter in terms of the goal to which a given system is directed. 
30 
P. Achinstein, in contrast, makes a distinction between various kinds 
of function - such as design, use and service function, and argues that there 
are correspondingly different kinds of functional statement which cannot 
be subjected to one type of analysis. 
31 
But to go into the details of these 
doctrines and attempt to review a large and expanding literature on the 
notion of function would take us too far away from our main topic here. 
We can only point out that psychoanalytic claims about the function of 
repression cannot easily be analyzed in a simple and unified fashion; 
thus Achinstine's account of functional statements seems to be most appropriate 
in their case. 
From what Freud said on many occasions about the process of defence, 
it seems to follow that this process can perform several functions. We 
remember from the previous discussion that its main function is the 
reduction of anxiety; Freud noticed, howeverj- that in some cases although 
the dangerous situation which was the main source of anxiety had ceased 
to exist, i. e. the precipitating cause of the illness was no longer present, 
the process of repression still operated. He asked, therefore, whether the 
process has some further function apart from reducing anxiety, and if so, 
what could it be? His answer was that neurosis, which is the consequence 
of the process of defence, can sometimes turn out to the patient's advantage. 
He wrote that "there can scarcely fail to be occasions when it (i. e. illness) 
proves once again useful and expedient and requires, as it were, a secondar 
function which strengthens its stability afresh". 
32 
Consider, for example, 
a woman who is roughly treated and ruthlessly exploited by her husband. 
Her illness might become, according to Freud, 
U 
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a weapon in her battle with her dominating husband 
-a weapon which she can use for her defence and 
misuse for her revenge. To complain of her illness 
is allowable, though to lament her marriage was 
probably not. She finds a helper in her doctor, 
she forces her usually inconsiderate husband to-4ook 
after her, to spend money on her, to allow her at 
times to be away from home and so free her from 
married oppression. 33 
Wartime neurosis provides us with a further example of the secondary 
function of neurosis and defence. The "war neurosis" from which some soldiers 
of the first world war were in fact suffering turned out to their advantage 
by keeping them away from further fighting. Such a secondary function of 
the process of defence may be called its "use function", while the 
function for which the defence was produced in the first place, i. e. to 
keep anxiety within tolerable bounds, may be called its "maintenance function". 
In psychoanalysis these distinctions can have important implications. 
The realization that defence and symptoms can acquire a secondary or "use" 
function can affect the therapeutic outcome; the psychoanalyst has to deal 
with an additional factor which contributes to the patient's problems. 
Let us concentrate now on the explanatory import of the functional 
analysis of repression. To support the claim that repression does have the 
effect of reducing anxiety, Freud appeals to the following facts, mentioned 
earlier. If the patient is suddenly told about the content of his repressed 
material there is, as a rule, a considerable increase in his feeling of 
anxiety, as expressed in his behaviour or as reported by himself. Other 
psychologists, such as Grinker and Spiegel, who systematically studied 
war neurosis in the form of total amnesia of the traumatic experiences of 
combat, reported similar findings. They say "As a rule, the recovery 
of the forgotten experiences is attenddd with increasing anxiety, and the 
memory of the actual traumatic event produces intense anxiety. , 
34 
A similar 
observation was made by Dollard and Miller, who report that 
-27-- 
Such patients (i. e. soldiers suffering from war 
neurosis) can often be observed struggling to 
remember and produce a logical account for themselves. 
Often they report that this struggle makes them anxious, 
produces headaches or dizziness so that they have 
to stop trying. When an interviewer motivates them to 
try harder, they report symptoms of distress, especially 
when they seem to be on the verge of remembering. 
Similarly, when the memories are revived by pentothal 
(a barbiturate which can produce a temporary retrieval 
of memory) they elicit strong fear. 35 
To support his claims about repression, Freud also appeals to less direct 
evidence, such as the fact that if the symptoms of the postulated process 
of repression, for example a hand-washing ritual, are interrupted by a 
command or by physical restraint, the subject experiences a marked increase 
in anxiety, whereas as soon as the compulsive behaviour is resumed, the level 
of anxiety decreases. Usually the relief is only temporary, however; after 
a relatively short time, anxiety starts to rise again, and the patient is 
motivated to repeat the compulsive act. This observation of Freud's was 
later confirmed by his followers such as Fenichel. All these facts suggest 
that there is indeed some connection between the hypothetical process 
of repression and the variation in level of anxiety. But are they enough 
to show conclusively thatiit is repression, and not some other thing, 
that does the job of reducing anxiety? To answer this question we had 
better first look at the general problem of the explanatory import of 
functional analysis, and the logic of the argument thus invoked. 
It has been argued by philosophers that functional propositions would 
certainly have an explanatory import if they answered the question "Why 
does item i occur in system S in condition c? " For instance, the 
proposition "The function of the heart in vertebrates is to circulate 
the blood" would be explanatory if it answers the question "Why is a heart 
present in a vertebrate in some condition c? " Whether this answer can in 
fact be provided depends on the logic of the argument it invokes. Suppose 
we represent this argument as follows: 
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If a heart is present, then the vertebrate's blood is circulated. 
The vertebrate's blood is circulated. 
Therefore the vertebrate'has a heart. 
In the psychoanalytic case we can argene by analogy that 
If a process of repression is present, then the individual's level 
of anxiety is reduced. 
The individual's level of anxiety is reduced. 
Therefore a process of repression is present. 
But this form of argument won't do in either case, because it commits the 
fallacy of affirming the consequent. Let us, therefore, reformulate it in 
the following way: 
If the vertebrate's blood is circulated, then the vertebrate has 
a heart. 
The vertebrate's blood is circulated. 
Therefore the vertebrate has a heart. 
Similarly 
If the individual's level of anxiety is reduced, then a process 
of repression is present. 
The individual's level of anxiety is reduced. 
Therefore a process of repression is present. 
Although these latter arguments are logically valid, they do not account 
causally for the presence of the relevant items. In the argument about the 
heart, in the first premise the circulation of the blood is not an 
antecedent condition for the presence of the heart. Some other item, for 
example, an artificial device, could perform the same function. But even 
if some artificial device is excluded ex hypothesis there is still a 
possibility of there being some functional alternative or functional 
equivalent, which can perform the same function as the given item. For this 
reason, biologists accept the "principle of multiple solution" to the 
problem of adaptitiola within living organisms, and thus the first premiss of the 
second argument above is usually empirically false. Psychologists, just 
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as much as biologists, are aware of functional equivalents. They are 
familiar with the fact that if some structure of the brain is destroyed, 
for example, its function may be taken over by a different one. Given 
these facts, we have good reason to suspect that there could also be some 
functional equivalents to repression (of which we will hear more soon). But 
if so, the first premiss in the second argument about repression is empirically 
questionable, just as the first premiss in the argument about the heart was. 
What these two second premisses allow us to conclude is merely that 
the blood in a vertebrate is kept circulating in some way or other, and 
that the level of anxiety in an individual is reduced for some reason or 
another, conclusions which are rather trivial. That means that functional 
analysis in psychoanalysis doesn't prove deductively the presence of 
repression in a given individual under certain conditions, because we cannot 
rule out a priori the existence of some functional equivalent for it. 
The effect which a particular functional item brings about is not the 
only way, however, to establish its presence, even if it is the most 
obvious way to do so. For example, in order to establish whether a particular 
organism has a heart we can open up its body and see whether the heart 
is there, quite independently of the effects it produces. This ran easily 
be done when the functional item in question is a physical organ whose 
properties, such as bodily position, shape, colour, etc., are known to 
biologists. But this second approach might be more difficult when the item 
in question is not a physical object but a process, such as photo-synthesis, 
for instance, However, if the chemical properties of such a process are 
known in some detail, the second approach might still be possible. Repression, 
on the other hand, is a hypothetical process whose real properties, 
whatever they ate, aren't really known as yet. The psychoanalysts identify 
this process through the alleged effects it produces, and thus an independent 
access to it is not available in this case. 
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A deductive argument is not the only argument used by scientists, 
however. Sometimes scientific explanation have the form of inductive 
argument. Can, therefore, functional analysis be constructed as inductive 
argument of the following form: 
If the system S performs function F, then there is at least one 
of a class I of items present. 
System S performs function F. 
Therefore (probably) item i, which is one of the items 
included in class 1, is present. 
This argument, unlike a deductive one, doesn't allow us to deduce that 
the particular item is present, but only that it is probable. For this argument 
to have a real explanatory force, however, the class I should be divided 
into some finite number of items with a ratio of probability assigned 
to each of them. In psychoanalysis, as in other areas, we don't know how 
to ascribe a probability to each item in a non-arbitrary manner, moreover 
we cannot even divide the class I into some finite number of items, because 
the knowledge of all possible items is not available yet. And secondly, 
it makes sense to talk about functional equivalents within the class 1 if 
we are in a position to characterize precisely the external and internal 
conditions of the given system, i. e. the range of the situations within 
which this system is claimed to develop traits that will satisfy its functional 
requirements. But can this be done in psychoanalysis? 
We know that the presence of anxiety doesn't always lead to repression. 
For example, experience of anxiety by two individuals in a similar situation, 
such as two soldiers in the front line, may lead to repression in one case 
but not in the other. - Does that mean that a non-repressive way of coping 
with anxiety, whatever that involves in practice, is functionally equivalent 
to'dealing with it by means of repression? How we answer this question 
depends, of course, on how we specify all the relevant variables. The 
psychoanalyst may argue that people's ability to tolerate a particular level 
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of anxiety can differ quite considerably, and other differences in 
personality and biological makeup between the two individuals might be 
relevant too. Thus he may suggest that we are dealing here with two 
different systems and that coping with anxiety by means of repression iný 
one individual is not functionally equivalent to coping with it in a nondefensive 
way in another. This situation in psychoanalysis can be compared with analogous 
cases in other areas, such as anthropology. Anthropologists have been 
known to claim that some ceremonials characteristic of primitive groups, 
such as the rain-making ceremonial, fulfil the function of reinforcing the 
group identity, by providing a periodic occasion on which the 
members of the group assemble to engage in a common activity. Religious 
ceremonials in Western society are said to reinforce group identity too. 
Does that mean that the rain-making ceremonial in primitive society is 
functionally equivalent to some religious ceremonials in Western culture. 
A negative answer, analogous to the answer in the psychoanalytic case, 
might be justified on the ground that differences in economic, political 
and social structure between the two cultures are so big that we are faced 
here with two different systems, and thus the two items are not functionally 
equivalent. 
But what about the same individual before and after psychoanalytic therapy? 
A successful psychoanalytic therapy is capable of reducing anxiety as well as, 
if not better than, repression does. It looks, therefore, as if reduction 
of anxiety by means of such therapy is functionally equivalent to the original 
way of coping with it by means of repression in the same individual. But 
the psychoanalyst might again argue that such psychotherapy transforms 
the system by introducing changes into the external as well as internal 
conditions of the patient. The external situation changes because the 
patient is now given moral support, and understanding of his problemsp 
by a sympathetic person, i. e. the psychoanalyst, which might not have 
been the case in his original circumstances when anxiety was dealt with 
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by means of repression. There is also an internal change, namely such 
therapy provides the patient with insight into his problems which he 
lacked originally, and might even transform his whole personality. Thus 
we seem to be faced with a different system, which makes possible an 
alternative way of coping with anxiety, while it could still be the case 
that in the original situation repression-was the only means available. 
But it is important to notice, however, that a systematic use of this 
argument would make the functional indispensibility of repression a 
definitional fiat rather than an empirical hypothesis, and functional 
alternatives, would be ruled out by definition. To avoid this, what is needed 
is a systematic specification of all the relevant variables which determine 
the difference between the two individuals, or between the same individual 
before and after psychoanalytic psychotherapy, as well as the range of 
external conditions relevant to their situation. But to do that, we 
require a theory in which the possible states of the person and his 
environment could be characterized by the values of certain psychological 
and possibly physical variables, and in which theoretical principles would 
permit us to determine the range of those conditions within which some 
items but not others would perform the function of reducing anxiety. 
In his developmental and personality theory Freud made an attempt 
to do just that. According to that theory, the level of anxiety which 
can be tolerated by a particular individual, and his ways of coping with 
it in certain situations, depend on such factors as the developmental 
stage reached and on characteristics of the individual personality, such 
as the strength of his ego, his childhood experience, his biological makeup 
and other factors. But because there are still many gaps in the psychoanalytic 
knowledge of these factors we are not in a position to say that, at this 
stage at least, the psychoanalytic theory provides us with a satisfactory 
specification of the range of conditions under which a particular individual 
develops a disposition towards repression as a means of reducing anxiety,. 
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rather than coping with it in a different way. That means that functional 
analysis of repression cannot be considered as a successful inductive 
argument, at this stage of the development of the psychoanalytic doctrine 
anyway. But this doesn't imply, however, that it cannot become a successful 
argument at some future time, when the sketch of the argument already 
present could be filled out with the relevant empirical data. 
The fact that the hypothetical process of repression doesn't possess 
much explanatory value at the moment seems to discredit it in the eyes 
of some critics altogether. But this attitude is harmful, both in respect 
of scientific strategy in general, and the psychoanalytic strategy in 
particul. Ar. An appeal to a hypothetical entity, whether it is repression or 
something else, to account for some regularity in observable phenomena 
can often serve scientific purposes when it is looked upon as a potential 
explanation, which can give stimulation and direction to further research 
and thus play a useful heuristic role in further discoveries. To 
substantiate this claim we can appeal to the classical notion of gene, which 
is analogous in some ways to that of repression, and whose role in the 
development of modern genetics is beyond doubt. 
Classical genetics begins with Mendel. He was the first to discover 
a statistical law capable of explaining and predicting the distribution 
of observable inheritance traits in the successive generations of individuals. 
He was also the first to conduct control experiments with plants concerning 
the distribution of such traits. The essence of Mendel's theory consists 
in understanding inheritance as a segregation of underlying units, callcid 
elements, each of which determines the segregation of observable traits. 
Inheritance, according to him, is govgrned by the principles, such as 
the following. In the case of crossing double hybrids with one another, 
each possessing dominant and recessive traits, involving two forms of 
a given trait, such as tall and short (represented accordingly by the 
letters 'A' dominant and 'a' recessive), the following types of germ cells 
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are expected to occur: AA, Aa, aA, aa, and two types of individuals, 
in a 3: 1 ratio, are produced. In order to account for this underlying 
&rder in the patterns of inheritance Mendel postulated the existence of 
hypothetical entities called elements, whose distribution determines 
the relevant distribution of observable traits. Later, when it had been 
discovered that the simple pattern of inheritance found by him had 
some exceptions, namely, that it was only one of a number of types of 
inheritance, Mendelian principles were refined and the term 'element' 
was replaced by 'gene'. It is important to realize that in classical genetics 
the concept of gene or element stands for a purely hypothetical structure, 
free from any assumption concerning its material composition. The gene 
is a functional concept, because it is specified in terms of the role it 
plays in the process of inheritance. It is said to have two functions. 
One is the function of self-reproduction (known as autocatalytic function), 
and its other function is that of directing embrionic development (sometimes 
referred to as heterocatalytic function). 
Although Mendel himself and his immediate associates weren't really 
concerned with the nature of genes, their followers engaged in various 
speculations concerning their material composition. Spencer, for example, 
suggested that they are physiological units,, having the capacity to arrange 
themselves into special structures that serve both as transmitters of 
inheritance and directors of the development. Darwin speculated that they 
have the form of genetic particles (geumules), which are supposed to be 
generated by the body tissues and then sent to the reproductive ones by means 
of the circulating fluids. According to Nigeli, heredity is transmitted 
by a substance called 'idioplasm', which is carried by germ cells and also 
diffuses throughout all the cells; and there were other such speculations. The aim 
of all these suggestions was to understand the real composition of the 
hypothetical structure postulated by Mendel. But since the knowledge of 
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such composition wasn't really available to be biologists at that stage, 
there wasn't any way to decide between these rival accounts. 
There is an interesting analogy between the concept of gene in classical 
genetics and the concept of repression in contemporary psychoanalysis. 
Although 'repression' refers to an underlying process, while 'gene' to an 
underlying structure, both concepts stand for a hypothetical entity, 
introduced for the purposes of explaining some regularity in observable 
phenomena. Secondly, both concepts are specified in functional terms, i. e. 
in terms of a relevant job they do, genes in self-reproduction and embrionic 
development, and repression in reduction of anxiety, accordingly. Thirdly, 
the real nature of genes, which has been assumed by some biologists to 
have physiological basis, wasn't really known to scientists until much 
later. Also the real nature of repression, which Freud originally believed 
to have a physiological basis, i. e. some kind of neural mechanism, but 
which he later characterized in psychological terms, is hardly known to 
the psychoanalysts. (Discussion of Freud's speculation concerning the 
real nature of repression has to wait until our next chapter). This general 
analogy suggests that the concept of repression might play as useful 
a role in the further development of psychoanalysis as the concept of gene 
did in the development of modern genetics, whose subsequent course proceeded 
along the following lines. 
Since the end of the last century biologists have observed that there 
was some parallelism between the distribution of chromosomes and genes, 
which suggested that genes could be located in chromosomes. But this couldn't 
be understood theoretically until Morgan put forward a chromosome theory 
of heredity. He constructed the chromosomeiý "maps", whereby series of genes 
could be arranged on the basis of crossing-over frequencies in the linear 
order of individual chromosomes. This theory was capable of explaining 
the distribution of the inheritance traits discovered by Mendel and his 
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followers, and has been confirmed by subsequent discoveries. Thus the 
discovery that the hypothetical entities postulated by Mendel distribute 
themselves in ways that parallel the distribution of chromosomes enabled 
biologists to identify chromosomes as the physiological basis of genes. in 
turn, the chromosome theory paved the way for the discovery of the chemical 
basis of inheritance. Nothing specific was known about the chemical basis 
of heredity, however, until it was shown that DNA (dioxyribonucleic acid) 
is the chemical substance that determines inheritance, in some species 
at least. The knowledge of the composition of the DNA molecule then became 
available to the biologists when Watson and Crick produced a model of its 
structure, whose subsequent predictive success showed that the postulated 
structure was correct. So the discovery of the structure of the DNA molecule 
36 finally provided biologists with a solution to the chemical basis, of heredity. 
The birth of molecular genetics wouldn't have been possible, however, 
without the discoveries of classical genetics and its hypothetical notion 
of gene introduced in order to account for these discoveries. The concept 
of gene referred originally to some unknown structure, which was supposed 
to be responsibie for the distribution of the observable traits, discovered 
by Mendel and his followers. But to start with, biologists were quite 
unable to explain how this hypothetical entity could do the job attributed 
to it, and there wasn't any way available to them to decide between rival 
accounts of what it really was that did the job in the process of inheritance. 
So the classical notion of gene hadn't much explanatory value. But, as 
we have observed, it played a useful beuristic role in the discovery 
of the physiological and th6n chemical basis of inheritance. That means 
that the strategy of postulating a hypothetical entity, whose real nature 
is unknown to the scientists at a given time, can pay off very well in guiding 
future research and by doing so contribute to some new discoveries. In 
the case of the concept of gene we know that it has in fact played su ch 
a useful role, because we can judge it post factum. In the case of the concept 
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of repression we can only argue by analogy that it might play a similarly 
useful role. We cannot predict in advance whether the notion of repression 
will help the psychoanalysts discover a physiological or even a chemical 
basis involved in-the regulation of anxiety, as in thtý case of inheritance, 
or rather some psychological mechanism, similar to the mechanism of reinforcement 
discovered by behaviourists, for example. Because although it is true that 
contemporary psychologists almost universally accept that in order to understand 
fully a psychological phenomena one has to find an underlying meurophysiological 
mechanism, it cannot be ruled out that some psychological phenomena could be 
successfully explained by a purely psychological theory. But whatever 
kind of explanation for repression, psychological, physiological or even 
chemical, might be found in the future, if it is found at all, there are 
good reasons to believethat the observations made by Freud and his 
followers and their concept of repression are very likely to contribute 
to such findings, and for this reason we should look at this concept as 
potentially explanatory. 
A person with a less charitable view of the concept of repression might 
suggest, however, that although there is indeed some analogy between this 
concept and that of gene, the latter has been so useful heuristically 
because it was a clearly defined concept to start with, which is not the case 
with the concept of repression, and thus he might be sceptical about its 
possible usefulness. This difference between the two concepts cannot be 
denied, as it was indeed the case that classical genetics was the first portion 
of biology, but so far the only one, to be completely axiomatized, a fact 
which has no doubt contributed a lot to the spectacular development of 
modern genetic theory. Since the notion of repression lacks the clarity 
characteristic that of gene, we seem unlikely to observe in the foreseeable 
future a similarly spectacular development in the psychoanalytic doctrine 
of repression. But that doesn't imply that the notion of repression is 
devoid of any heuristic merits whatsoever, it only means that its 
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heuristic role might be more limited than that of gene. It is also important 
to realize that not all functional concepts in biology are as clearly 
defined as that of gene; but that doesn't st6p them playing a useful role 
in the development of biological theories. Looking at some of these concepts 
and understanding the difficulties which they pose to biologists in their 
attempt to define them precisely can also shed some light on similar difficulties 
which the concept of repression poses for the psychoanalysts. 
Some of the functional concepts of morphological biology, such as 
heart, kidney and others, can serve as examples for our purposes as well. 
How can biologists define them? lf they want to define the concept 
of kidney, for instance, they can try to appeal to the various physical 
properties of the structure, such as its shape, colour, spatial position, 
etc. However, these properties are usually not logically necessary for 
being a kidney. We can imagine an atypical individual of a given species 
whose kidney may lack some of these properties, and thus a precise definition 
of the concept, in terms of necessary conditions, would arbitrarily 
rile out an abnormal kidney. What is also very important is that all 
morphological concepts in biology shouldn't be restricted to a particular 
species, i. e. they must be general enough to include not only kidneys 
of such diverse organisms as manmals, fish, and various invertebrates 
as well. Otherwise the concept would have a limited value for the purposes 
of comparative morphology, description of phylogenctic changes, and finally 
the general theory of evolution. But the physical properties of kidneys 
in various species could be quite different. Moreover, the judgement 
as to what constitutes a significant proportion of them is not just a matter 
of deciding how many of the properties ought to be represented, for in 
practice some properties will admit of degree and some will carry more 
weight than others. For example, the bodily position of a kidney may 
carry more weight than its shape or colour. Suppose in all species, known 
to biologists so far, a kidney occupies the same bodily position and thus 
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biologists decide to regard this property as a necessary criterion for 
the structure being a kidney. But even if actual exceptions to the 
kidney having this particular property are not found so far, we can still 
imagine a possible case, not yet known, where a structure may lack this 
necessary property and yet might still be sufficiently like kidney in other 
respects so that biologists may come to regard itas akidney after all. 
But a decision to regard a given property as necessary at any given point 
would arbitrarily rule out such cases. The same also applies to a property 
which might be claimed to be logically sufficient for something being a 
kidney. A property would be regarded as logically sufficient for being 
kidney if an item possessing this property is correctly classifiable as 
a kidney, no matter what other properties it has. Thus the matter should 
be settled if the property is known to be possessed by the structure. But 
this claim too, like the one for logical necessity, rests on an appeal 
to imaginary as well as actual cases, and we can always imagine a structure 
which possesses this property, but yet lacks a large number of others, 
and thus wouldn't be classified asa kidney. All this means that the concept 
of kidney has an open texture with respect to the set of properties that 
constitute relevant grounds f or regarding a structure as a kidney 
?7 
This is so because the structure may possess each property of a given set 
of properties, and still not be a kidney; or may lack one or more of the 
properties in each distinct set of properties, and still be a kidney. 
A different example of open texture concepts is biology are 
ethological ones, such as 'escape reaction', 'reproductive behaviour', 
etc., which cannot be defined in a precise way either. For example, the 
concept of escape reaction applies to a great variety of responses found 
in different species, such as swimming towards open waters, heading for rocks. 
withdrawing into a shell, gathering under the mother, zigzagging, etc. It 
would be difficult to try to specify a set of characteristics, just as in 
the case of morphological concepts, other than functional property, i. e. the 
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property of avoiding damage and death to an animal, which all these 
responses and no other possess. This difficulty has not merely to do with 
the question of time and patience because of the existence of an almost 
unlimited member of tests, but as in the case of the kidney, we cannot foresee 
in advance all possible conditions in which the concept is to be used. 
Thus the class of eseape reactions is fully open texturee. with respect to 
those features of behaviour which are observable in the single response. 
But a single response itself can have an open texture also, for the 
following reason. Ethologists often find it very useful to divide a single 
response into behavioural units, which they then arrange in a hierarchical 
form. They do so, because such a behavioural hierarchy can play a useful 
role in describing a corresponding hypothetical neural hierarchy and also 
because lower level units usually possess a relatively simple 'releaser', 
which might not be the case with the instinctive behaviour specified at the 
top level of the hierarchy. Such an approach to animal behaviour can be 
illustrated by the ethologists'treatment of the reproductive behaviour 
of the fish called 's. tickleback'(Gasterosteus aculeatus), for example. :: s 
Tinbergen divides it into four categories: 'fighting', 'building', 'mating', 
'care for young'. Eabh of those categories can be divided in turn into 
further units. For instance, care for young includes: 'fanning' (ventilating), 
'the egg-clut'ch', 'rescuing eggs', 'removal of infected eggs' . 
38 It i8 
quite clear now that when reproductive behaviour is divided into such 
hierarchical units it becomes an open texture itself. This is so, because 
the possibility of some new form within this hierarchy being discoijered 
is always present, and in order to accommodate it the notion of reproductive 
behaviour cannot be specified too tightly to start with. 
If morphological and ethological concepts (possibly some other biological 
concepts as well) have open texture, i. e. can be specified only loosely, 
how do biologists decide how to apply them in a particular instance? According 
to M-0. Beckner, these decisions 
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to are brought to bear within biological thinking 
through the agency of the biologist, who has 
achieved his skill, judgement and flair in the 
course of an apprenticeship with biological 
materials. He is familiar with, or once studied 
and has forgotten, a range---x)f paradigms, 
collections of similar and disimilar cases, rules 
together with typical sorts of exceptions, abnormal 
and pathological specimens, and so forth. We are 
not merely making the uninteresting point that a 
biologist can learn his trade, or that there is 
such a thing as skill and flair. We are saying 
that skill and flair are the necessary prerequisites 
for attaching to biological theories whatever sense 
they do in fact possess". 39 
The concept of repressive behaviour, just as that of escape reaction discussed 
above, can apply to a great variety of responses in human beings, both internal 
and external. Thus it can manifest itself in forgetting some painful 
experience, having one's limb paralyzed as in conversion hysteria, compulsive 
performance of some ritual, displacing one's emotion from one object or 
person into something else, identification with an aggressor, etc. Can this 
variety of repressive responses be summarised in some rule or definition? 
It's clear that it would be difficult to try to specify a set of characteristics, 
just as in the case of morphological concepts, which all these responses 
and no others possess. For example, not every forgetting of a painful 
experience is a repressive response. Also the repeated performance of some 
ri-tual, such as that performed by a very religious person, doesn't have to 
be a repressive response, and yet can have similar behavioural properties, 
and so on. That means that a repressive reaction may possess each property 
of a given set of properties and still not be a case of repressive 
behaviour, just as a given structure could possess each property of a 
given set of properties, such as shape, colour, bodily position, and still 
not be a kidney. 'Another difficulty, which any attempt to tighten up the 
notion of repressive behaviour would inevitably face, has to do with the 
fact that psychoanalysts are not in a position to determine in advance 
all the patterns of repressive behaviour. There always might be a pattern 
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not known to them yet, which a precise specification of the concept 
would rule out arbitrarily. For these reasons the class of repressive 
behaviour is fully open textured with respect to those features of behaviour 
which could be observed in a single response. 
But what about single responses themselves? They too seem to suffer 
from having the open texture, just as the general notion of repression 
does. This can be illustrated on the basis of the method of defence called 
'regression. '. The concept of regression when it refers to a behavioural 
pattern means adopting behavioural responses characteristic of early stages 
of development, by a person who is disturbed emotionally. An example could 
be a teenager screaming in a temper-tantrum, like a little baby, when 
disturbed. Thus any situation where an older person behaves like a small 
child could be regarded as an instance of regression. But there are 
infinitely many ways of behaving like a small child, and the psychoanalyst 
who would like to specify all the responses which regression, but not other 
cases of behaviour possess, runs the risk of excluding genuine instances 
arbitrarily. It might also be the case that all the patterns of behaviour 
characteristic of a particular method of defence are not yet known. For 
example, when the notion of undoing was formulated originally it wasn't 
realized that it exhibits a behavioural pattern very similar to that 
of primitive magic. Such magical ritual aims at influencing certain past 
events in order to prevent their harmful influence on the present conditions, 
which is what neurotic undoing tries to achieve too. Suppose that 
contemporary psychoanalysts decide to regard this primitive magic as an 
instance of undoing behaviour. The open textured character of this concept 
enables them to do that quite easily, which wouldn't be the case if it. 
were specified quite tightly to start with. But the price they have to pay 
for that is to operate with open texture concepts. However, the lack of 
any clear rule or a precise definition of this and other psychoanalytic 
concepts can be compenstated for by the psychoanalyst's professional training 
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and experience which alerts him and enables him to decide whether 
a particular pattern of behaviour in a given situation is an instance 
of a given concept or not. 
The imprecision, both of the general concept of repression and 
particular concepts referring to various methods of defence, which is 
due to their open texture, and which they share with some biological 
concepts, should be distinguished from another kind of vagueness 
characteristic of them, however, This other kind of vagueness is due 
to their fluctuating use by the psychoanalysts. Take, for instance, such 
psychoanalytic concepts as identification, introjection and incorporation. 
They don't seem to carry any real difference with them and are often used 
interchangeably with one another, which seems to suggest that the 
distinction is purely verbal. But on other occasions they are qu6ted 
by the psychoanalysts as quite different methods of defence, without 
any systematic statement which clearly differentiates between them. 
The same applies to other notions, such as reversal and reaction formation. 
Anna Freud, for example, notoriously quotes them as different methods of 
defence, without giving any characteristics whatsoever to differentiate 
them, whereas the contexts in which they occur seem to suggest that they 
are really the same. This-kind of vagueness is not a serious threat 
to psychoanalysis, however, because it can be got rid of quite easily, 
unlike open texture. In fact there are various attempts among the 
contemporary followers of Freud to make the use of these concepts more precise. 
The work of P. Suppes and H. Warren called "On the generation and classification 
of defence mechanisms" can be quoted as an example of such an attempt. 
40 
The open textured character of the concept of repression and other 
related concepts stands in contrast with the precisely defined notion of 
gene in classical genetics. But this fact alone doesn't undermine the 
general analogy between the two concepts, which suggests that the concept 
of repression may play as useful a heuristic role in the future development 
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,. of psychoanalysis as the concept of gene 
did in modern 
genetics. The lack of precision characteristic of the concept 
of repression is likely to make its role less spectacular than that of gene 
but, contrary to some criticism, doesn't make it a useless concept. 
Other biological concepts, such as the morphological and ethological ones 
discussed here, are also imprecise in the same way. That doesn't mean, 
however, that biologists cannot reach any agreement as to how to apply them 
in relevant circumstances. The psychoanalysts too can reach some agreement 
about how to apply the concept of repression and other related concepts 
in a given instance, despite their open texture. This is not a perfect 
situation to be sure, but as Freud himself put it 
"We have often heard it maintained that sciences 
should be built on clear and sharply defined 
concepts. In actual fact no science, not even 
the most exact, begins with such definitions... 
They [i. e. such concepts) must at first necessarily 
possess some degree of indefiniteness; there can 
be no question of any clear delimination of their 
content. So long as they remain in this condition, 
we come to an understanding about their meaning 
by making repeated references to the material 
of observation from which they appear to have been 
derived, but upon which, in fact, they have been 
imposed. Thus, strictly speaking, they are in the 
nature of conventions - although everything depends 
on their not being arbitrarily chosen, but determined 
by their having significant relations to the empirical 
material, relations that we seem to sense before we 
can clearly recognize and demonstrate them. It is 
only after more thorough investigation of the field 
of observation that we are able to formulate its 
basic scientific concepts with increased precision, 
and progressively to modify them that they became 
serviceable and consistent over a wide area. Then, 
indeed, the time may have come to confine them in 
definitions". 41 
Do Freud's suggestions about a possible mechanism for repression take us 
any nearer that time? To answer this question we have to look at the 
last part of his doctrine., i. e. metapsychology. 
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Ch. 5 IMETAPSYCHOLOGY 
Freud's "metapsychology" deals with the mechanisms underlying psychological 
functions. The main source for this is his posthumously published work 
called Project for a Scientific Psychology; another source is the seventh 
chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams. But since that chapter was 
written in the context of a book mainly about dreams, its emphases are 
slightly different, and thus the Project still remains the most balanced 
presentation of Freud's metapsychological doctrine, and will be used as 
the main point of reference here. 
In the Project, Freud declares that his intention "is to furnish a 
psychology that shall be a natural science: that is, to represent psychical 
processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material 
particles". 
1 The "specifiable material particles" are identified by him 
as neurones, whereas the quantitative aspect, i. e. Q, has to do with 
quantities of excitation or energy, whose flow through the network of 
neorones is governed by the general laws of motion. The theory is a working 
out of the relationship between the neurones and Q. The system controls 
the quantity of excitation in accordance with certain principles. In 
particular, it functions so as to divest itself of accumulated excitation, 
i. e. it follows the "principle of inertia. ". However, this principle 
requires serious modification. An organism, apart from being subjected 
to external stimuli, receives stimuli from the somatic element itself - 
endogenous stimuli - which cannot be discharged so easily. They only cease 
when the relevant conditions in the external world, such as supply of 
nourishment, are realized. Accordingly, the system is obliged to 
abandon its original trend to inertia, and must put up with keeping the 
quantity constant. under some circumstances, i. e. it has to follow the 
"principle of constancy'. The principle of inertia finds expression in the 
hypothesis of excitation being transmitted as current (Q), and the principle 
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of constancy in the hypothesis of stored excitation (Qn), often referred 
to as cathexis. 
2 
Freud's distinction between current in flow and cathexis 
can be compared with the distinction between impulse transmission and 
graded potential change made by-contemporary neurophysiologists. 
This doctrine is then related to the t, heory of neurones. To start with, 
Freud makes a binary distinction between the system of neurones called 
phi (ý) and another system referred to as psi W, corresponding to a system 
for the reception of external stimuli and a system for the retention of 
internal stimuli respectively. They are characterized as follows: 
thus there are permeable neurones (offering no resistance 
and retaining nothing), which serve for perception, and 
impermeable ones (loaded with resistance, and holding 
back Qn), which are the vehicles of memory and so probably 
of psychical processes in general. 3 
Thus the difference between the two systems has to do with their 
permeability, more precisely, the permeability of their contact- 
barriers, which have become known as synapses since Sherrington. 
ý-neurones function as though there were no contact-barriers between 
them, but the contact-barriers of *-neurones resist the flow of energy 
to some degree or other. The degree of resistance depends on the 
quantity, and more importantly, on the frequency of excitation, which is 
responsible for lowering the resistance between the contact-barriers. Thanks 
to this "facilitation" the system acquires a form of memory. Thus according 
to the metapsychological theory "memory is represented by the facilitation 
4 
existing between *-neurones" . 
So far the theory postulates the existence of neurones, and various 
conditions of quantity of excitation. Freud felt, however, that: 
every psychological theory, apart from what it achieves 
from the point of view of natural science, must fulfil 
yet another major requirement. It should explain to us 
what we are aware of, in the most puzzling fashion, through 
our "consciousness"; since this consciousness knows nothing 5 
of what we have so far been assuming - quantities and neurones. 
In order to accommodate the phenomenon of. consciousness into his theory, 
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Freud postulated a third system of neurones called omega (w). An essential 
attribute of consciousness or awareness is that it is sensitive to qualities, 
while the two former systems deal only with quantities of excitation. But 
what precisely is this mysterious quality, which is responsible for the 
generation of consciousness? We are told that "the w-neurones are 
incapable of receiving Qn, but instead they appropriate the period of the 
excitation, and this state of theirs, of being affected by period while 
they are filled with the minimum of Qn is the fundamental basis of 
consciousness". 
6 Quality then is a periodic property of excitation, as 
opposed to a monotonous character of quantity. Sense organs act not only 
as Q-screens, but also as sieves; for they allow through only the stimuli 
with a particular frequency. When these stimuli reach w from 0, their 
registration in w corresponds to a conscious perception. But apart from 
being sensitive to the periodicity of neural excitation coming from 0, 
the system is also sensitive to the rhythm of excitation coming from *, which 
generates the series of states called "pleasure and unpleasure", depending 
on the character of the rhythm itself". 
7 The terms as used in this context 
have nothing necessarily to do with actual feelings of pleasure of dis- 
pleasure. What Freud is referring to is a hypothetical neurological 
mechanism, analogous in some ways to the mechanism of positive and negative 
reinforcement in behaviouristic psychology. 
The above is just a very general picture of the nervous system. It 
doesn't explain yet how this system is modified by experience or "the 
exigencies of life", as Freud puts it. The experience of the hit-an organism 
leads to differentiation of various structures in the nervous system. 
One of them is a "memory-motive structure". We remember that memory 
corresponds to the level of facilitation between the *-neurones. Such 
facilitation is not random; every neurone has several paths or contact- 
barriers, which enable facilitation to take one course rather than another. 
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In other words, it can be selective. This selectivity of memory is 
responsible in turn for the selectivity of the corresponding behaviour; 
and this is another way of saying that behaviour is motivated (partly by 
previous experience). Freud thus calls our attention to the intimate 
linkage of memory and motive. Memory can be seen as a retrospective aspect 
of the selective facilitation, which reflects the experience of the individual, 
whereas motive is a prospective aspect, which directs the course of behaviour. 
Each memory trace is at least doubly determined, by internal and external 
stimuli. To demonstrate this, Freud gives an example of a newborn infant 
being in a state of hunger, a state characterized by high cathexes 
and an experience of unpleasure by the infant. To terminate this state 
there has to be an alteration in the external world (supply of nourishment), 
which can be brought about only by a specific action. At first the baby 
is incapable of any such action, and requires the intervention of some 
caretaking person to satisfy his need. When this has been done, the total 
event then constitutes an experience of satisfaction. According to Freud, 
an essential component of this experience of 
satisfaction is a particular perception (that of 
nourishment in our example) the mnemic image of 
which remains associated thenceforward with the 
memory trace of the excitation produced by the 
need. As a result of the link that has thus been 
established, next time this need arises a psychical 
impulse will at once emerge which will seek to 
recathect the mnemic image of the perception and 
to re-evoke the perception itself, that is to say, 
to-re-establish the situation of the original sat- 
isfaction. An impulse of this kind is what we call 
a wish; the reappearance of the perception is the 
fulfilment of the wish, and the shortest path to 
the fulfilment of the wish is a path leading direct 
from the excitation produced by the need to a 
complete cathexis of the perception. 8 
However, if this shortest path is actually traversed, wishing ends in 
hallucination. This "hallucinatory wish-fulfilment" is characteristic 
of the "primary'mode of functioning of the neural apparatus. When the 
apparatus is not yet properly developed, as in the infant, such "'primitive" 
functioning is quite normal. But even in a well-developed nervous 
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apparatus it can survive under some conditions, for example in dreams. 
It also plays a vital role in pathological processes, when the system 
breaks down for some reason, as we shall see later on. 
It is clear that this way of coping with internal stimulation doesn't 
lead to any real satisfaction of the infant's need. The build-up of the 
endogenous stimuli continues and the corresponding level of unpleasure 
increases. In these circurhstances a different kind of attempt to bring 
about the experience of satisfaction can take place. The organism may 
try to discharge the accumulated excitation through motor pathways, 
by random innervation of the muscular system, which induces screaming. 
But this attempt is successful only if the scream attracts the attention 
of a caretaking person whose specific action can see to the infant's 
needs (as usually happens). Siince the experience of satisfaction becomes 
associated with the perception of a caretaking person, such a person 
acquires an emotional significance for the infant, and thus becomes a source 
of interpersonal relationship, which is so important for the further 
development of the individual in Freud's view. 
This different attempt to satisfy a need through motor discharges, 
even if successful in attracting some external help, doesn't avoid 
the generation of a large amount of unpleasure, however. The apparatus 
must take on a Vet more complex mode of operation in order to keep 
unpleasure at a minimum level. It must learn how to "inhibit" a large 
flow of quantity (and hence discharge), before the object capable of 
satisfying the relevant need is actually present. An "indication of reality" 
comes from the sense organs; we remember that when stimuli of certain 
periodicities coming from ý reach w they discharge, and this discharge 
is then received by * and thus is an indication of reality to *-9 When 
the registration of external stimuli is congruent with that corresponding 
to the memory cathexis triggered by internal stimuli such as hunger, 
the inhibition is relaxed and discharge takes place. But when there is a 
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mismatch between the two settings the system continues a series of operations 
or trial runs until the match is produced. This is clearly a feedback- 
like mechanism. Basically, it operates according to the same principles 
as a thermostat, for example. Thus if the temperature of a room is 
incongruent with the setting of a thermostat, a furnace is turned on or off 
until match is established. The part of the nervous system that does 
this job is referred to as the "inhibitory defence structure" or simply 
as 1tego 
10 This structure performs yet another job apart from inhibition, 
namely that of "attention". The mechanism of attention described in the 
Project is another feedback mechanism. When original perception occurs, 
the act of perceiving leads to a discharge which results in a stimulus 
which in turn affects this very act of perceiving, reinforcing the 
original perception, as it were. 
The Project provides us with a detailed account of neural machinery 
which makes inhibition possible and allows a match between the excitation 
initiated in memory structure and that initiated in the sense organs. It 
is sufficient to mention here that quantity can be inhibited or bound by 
channeling it into collateral neurones, off the main paths of facilitation 
and into side cathexes. A notion which plays a key role in understanding 
the detailed neurological mechanism of attention is that of "hypercathexis". 
When the system is regulated by the inhibitory defenee structure it is said 
to be functioning according to the "secondary process". This mode of 
functioning of the neural apparatus, by avoiding the hallucinatory 
wish-fulfilment characteristic of the primary mode of functioning, enables 
a better adaptation to the requirements of the environment. So the two 
ways of functioning are often contrasted with each other. 
A still further advance in the working of the apparatus is achieved 
when the acquisition of language takes place. In Freud's view, speech 
plays a vital role in thinking, and is a necessary condition for thought 
to become conscious. As we were reminded already, consciousness is 
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sensitive only to qualities, by registering the excitation of certain 
periodic patterns in w, reaching it from the ý-system. But where do the 
qualities which make conscious thinking possible come from? According 
to the Project: 
This purpose is fulfilled by speech associations. This 
consists in linking of'Pneurones with neurones which 
serve sound-presentation and themselves have the closest 
associations with motor speech-images. These associations 
have an advantage of two characteristics over the others: 
they are limited (few in number) and exclusive. In any 
case, from the sound-image the excitation reaches the 
word-image and from it reaches discharge. Thus, if the 
mnemic images are of such a kind that a part-current 
can go from them to the sound-images and motor-word 
images, then the cathexis of the mnemic images is accompanied 
by information of discharge, which is an indication of 
quality and also accordingly an indication of the 
consciousness of the memory. If now the ego precathects 
these word-images as it earlier did the images of 
discharges, then it will have created for itself the 
mechanism which directs the cathexis to the memories 
emerging during the passage of Qn. This is conscious, 
observant thought. 11 
Thus conscious thoughts correspond to motor (kinaesthetic) discharges 
associated with verbal images. But we don't necessarily speak whenever 
engaged in thinking, a critic might object. Freud points out that if 
thought becomes intense, some people may speak out loud. More often, 
however, the current of speech-innervation during thinking is very small 
and there is only a slight motor expenditure, an apparently quite well 
known fact. Speech not only makes cognition possible, it also enables 
the recording of thoughts. So thoughts, as well as perceptions, can be 
remembered. What is recorded here are motor discharges associated with 
speech, and their repetition leads to facilitations between *-neuranes, 
which is what constitutes memory according to the metapsychological 
hypotheses. 12 The adaptive value of thinking and the ability to remember 
it is obiious. Freud himself stresses the fact that thought enables not 
merely a more successful satisfaction of the immediate needs, but also 
produces "a piece of practical knowledge, which can be used for a subsequent 
real occurrence. For in fact it proves expedient not to have set the 
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process of practical thought going only when it is needed in the face 
of reality, but to have it ready in advance. 
13 
After completing the Project, Freud announced in a letter to Fliess 
"everything seemed to connect up, the whole worked well together, and one 
had the impression that the thing was now really a machine and would soon 
go by itself". 
14 However, Freud was well aware that the "machine" doesn't 
always run as smoothly as has been presented so far, and indeed sometimes 
seems to break down. This he knew from his observation of pathological 
phenomena. Inevitably he was interested in understanding what takes place 
in the neural apparatus when the person is suffering from neurosis. In 
fact the whole Project, despite its preoccupation with the normal working 
of the nervous system, is an attempt to understand the underlying mechanism 
of pathological phenomena. This is so because, as he himself once put 
it "it is in fact impossible to form a satisfactory general view of neuro- 
psychotic disorders unless they can be linked to clear hypotheses upon 
normal psychical processes". 
15 Since we are now familiar with the normal 
functioning of the nervous system, we should be in a better position to 
understand what happens when such functioning breaks down. The clinical 
theory has taught us that what is responsible for the pathological phenomena 
such as various neurotic symptoms is the process of repression which has 
the function of reducing the anxiety associated with painful or distressing 
experiences and their memories. We have also learned that when repression 
takes place, such memories become unconscious. What interests us now is 
what takes place in the nervous apparatus itself when repression occurs. 
In the Project itself Freud devoted less attention to the underlying 
mechanism of repression, as one would expect. But he came back to this 
problem again on several occasions, in the seventh chapter of The Interpretation 
of Dreams, and in his two classic papers called ", Repression. " and "The 
Unconscious". Unfortunately, in these latter papers his metapsychology 
has already undergone serious modifications since the time of the Project 
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(as we will soon learn). He was now referring not to a neural but 
to a mental apparatus, describing it in psychological terms rather than 
the physical terms employed in the Project. But despite this shift in 
terminology Freud's view of the mechanism seems to remain basically the 
same, as is suggested by the following quotations. In the Project he 
wrote "we have seen that hysterical compulsion originates from a peculiar 
kind of Qn motion (symbol formation), which is probably a primary process, 
since it can be demonstrated in dreams; (and we have seen) that the 
operative force of this process is defence on the part of the ego, which 
here, however, is performing more than its usual function". 
16 
A few years 
later, in The Interpretation of Dreams, we are told: 
We have already found empirically that the irrational 
processes we have described are only carried out with 
thoughts that are under repression. We can now see our 
way a little further into the whole position. The 
irrational processes which occur in the psychical apparatus 
are the primary ones. They appear wherever ideas are 
abandoned by the preconscious cathexis, are left to 
themselves and can become charged with the uninhibited 
energy from the unconscious which is striving to find 
an outlet. Some other observations lend support to 
the view that these processes which are described as 
irrational are not in fact falsifications of normal 
processes - intellectual errors - but are modes of 
activity of the psychical, apparatus that have been 
freed from an inhibition. 17 
Here, Freud makes the same point as in the Project, namely, that repressed 
processes are governed by the primary mode of functioning, even if this 
functioning is ascribed now to a psychical rather than a physical apparatus. 
After introducing the topographical conceptions into his metapsychology, 
when the system unconscious (Ucs), which is the locus of the repressed 
is chafacterized, we are again told that "exemption from mutual contradiction, 
primary processes (mobility of cathexes), timelessness, and the replacement 
of external by psychical reality these are the characteristics which 
we may expect to find in processes belonging to the system Ucs,,. 
18 All this 
suggests very strongly that the primary mode of functioning is, in Freud's 
view, the main characteristic of the repressed processes, as of unconscious 
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mental states generally. 
Originally, the distinction between primary and secondary modes of 
functioning referred to two different stages in the development of the 
nervous apparatus. The former was characteristic of the stage in which 
inhibitory structure is not yet differentiated. In its absence the system 
exhibits a tendency towards an "undelayed discharge" whenever there is a 
build-up of the internal excitation corresponding to biological needs 
such as hunger. Thus we might witness a hallucinatory rather than a real 
attempt to satisfy a need, as in the case of the infant discussed earlier. 
But a similar situation can also occur in a well-developed neural apparatus 
under certain conditions. One set of such conditions seems to be present in 
the case of sleep, when activated memory traces can lead to peremptory 
discharge, which corresponds to dreaming. Thus according to Freud, "dreaming 
is a piece of infantile mental life that has been superseded". 19 But even 
in waking life the system might be forced to return to its early way of 
functioning. This usually happens when there is an imbalance between 
internal and external conditions. The system might try to cope with this 
by way of undelayed discharge of rising excitation, which is what takes 
place in repression. So repression too is a way of functioning that has been 
superseded, but is now forced to recur in a state of emergency. There is 
of course a difference between the emergencies facing an infant, which 
usually have to do with delays in the satisfaction of his biological 
needs, and the emergencies facing an adult. The grown-up has to cope 
with emergencies created by social or interpersonal situations, but these 
too can become sources of imbalance and lead to premature discharge of 
excitation. In the Project Freud is quite explicit that the discharge 
he is referring to is a neural discharge. We are told that it can take 
three different routes, which seem to correspond very well with the three 
kinds of symptom distinguished earlier. One route is through the motor 
system, which would lead to behavioural symptoms such as those 
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characteristic of obsessive behaviour. Discharge into a neighbouring 
neural system would seem to be responsible for obsessive thoughts - 
which we have called symptoms of the state of consciousness. And 
finally, discharge into the interior of the body, i. e. through the 
biochemical system, seems to be characteristic of somatic symptoms such 
as those of conversion hysteria. When, by way of contrast, a neural 
discharge is delayed thanks to the mechanism of inhibition, further 
regulated by the mechanism of attention and speech associations, we find 
the secondary mode of functioning, synonymous for Freud with the non- 
pathological or normal way of working of the nervous system. Thus 
according to the Project, an undelayed discharge of neural excitation is 
the mechanism of pathological processes, whereas inhibited discharge is 
the mechanism of normal processes. Metapsychology provides us with a 
further criterion for distinguishing between repressed (and hence unconscious) 
processes and conscious processes, in that the former are governed by the 
primary, and the latter by the secondary, modes of functioning. 
However, Freud quite soon became aware that the above distinction 
between pathological and normal processes faced various difficulties. 
Firstly, it posed a theoretical problem, namely how in the presence of the 
inhibitory structure, i. e. the ego, the system can nevertheless return to a 
purely primary mode of functioning, even under special conditions. This 
kind of functioning seemed to be possible only in the absence of inhibitory 
structure. In the Project Freud admitted that "we need an explanation of 
the fact that in the case of an ego-process (i. e. in the absence of 
inhibition) consequences follow to which we are accustomed only with 
primary processes". 
20 But although he was aware of this problem, he 
was unable to give a satisfactory answer to it. Secondly, his theoretical 
views seemed to run into a contradiction with some observable phenomena - 
which is even more significant. One of these phenomena is phantasy. What 
Freud had in mind here is not just any phantasy, but those which usually 
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become a preliminary stage in the formation of symptoms, like the phantasy 
of being seduced in childhood. Originally, he mistook these for memories 
of real experiences, and made them the foundation of his first clinical 
theory of pathogenesis. But he soon realized that 
on the one hand, they are highly organized, free 
from self-contradiction, have made use of every 
acquisition of the system Cs and would hardly be 
distinguished in our judgement from the formulations 
of that system. On the other hand, they are 
unconscious and are incapable of becoming conscious. 
Thus qualitatively they belong to the system Pcs, 
but factually to the Ucs. 21 
Thus such phantasies can follow the secondary mode of functioning and 
yet be dynamically unconscious, which contradicts Freud's original 
view that unconscious processes always follow the primary mode of 
f un. ct i on ing. 
Another phenomenon which posed a difficulty for Freud's original 
view was dreaming. There are dreams which express the dreamer's wish 
in a straightforward manner, i. e. their meaning is given by their manifest 
content, as is usually the case with dreams triggered by hunger or thirst. 
The dreamer, after waking up, is usually aware of such a wish behind 
his dream, in contrast to the unconscious wishes expressed by other dreams. 
But despite the fact that such wishes can become conscious quite easily, 
they nevertheless follow the primary mode of functioning, according to 
Freud's original assumption about the primary nature of all dream- 
processes. So once again, being a primary process and being unconscious 
do not coincide. 
There is a third difficulty, having to do with the nature of the 
repressed, which is in effect the consequence of the two previous ones. 
According to the original view all repressed contents are unconscious. 
But if there are such phenomena as phantasies which can be organized according 
to the secondary process and yet be repressed, it follows that the repressed 
is not always organized in the primary way. Thus undelayed discharge 
of neural excitation looks like too simplistic a picture of the underlying 
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mechanism of phantasies. Similarly, since some phenomena organized according 
to the primary processes can nevertheless have access to consciousness, 
we must again conclude that functioning in the primary way doesn't 
necessarily coincide with being repressed. This third difficulty 
became the biggest blow to Freud's original view, and despite his various 
attempts to cope with it, such as his revision of the topographical point 
of view in his later metapsychology, the difficulty was never solved 
successfully. The reason seems to be that when Freud realized at last that 
there seems to be a way of functioning which looks like a mixture of both 
primary and secondary processes, it was too late to reconcile this with 
his original assumption that there was such a sharp contrast between the 
two that each excludes the other. 
We have to conclude, therefore, that Freud's ambitious attempt in 
the Project to provide a mechanism for repression didn't really succeed. 
The hypothesis of two modes of functioning failed to give a criterion 
for distinguishing between consdious and unconscious processes. But this 
does not imply that metapsychology failed to provide any distinction 
between these two kinds of process. There is a further criterion available, 
to do with the qualitative aspect of neural processes. We remember that 
for Freud becoming conscious corresponds to a temporal characteristic, as 
opposed to the intensity, of neural excitation - its periodicity, in fact. 
In the Project. he makes a distinction between the two kinds of quality. 
One kind has to do with a neural excitation reaching the system through 
the perceptual apparatus, which acts as a sieve for the stimuli with a 
characteristic frequency. For Freud, perceptual processes automatically 
involve consciousness, and they can never become unconscious in the dynamic 
sense of the word. So in order to make the contrast between conscious 
and unconscious processes we are interested in, we have to turn our 
attention to another kind of quality. This quality is "associated in human 
beings with verbal memories, whose residues of quality are sufficient to 
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draw the attention of consciousness to them and to endow the process 
of thinking with a new mobile cathexis from consciousness". 
22 
Thus thanks 
to speech resid6es, i. e. to a registration of verbal motor discharges, 
thought-processes and memories of them can become conscious too. This 
was Freud's view in the Project, and despite some other changes in his 
metapsychology, he stuck to it firmly all along. Unconscious mental 
processes, on the other hand, are those that fail to become associated 
with speech residues. In "The Unconscious" we are told very clearly 
that "what it (i. e. repression) denies to the presentation is translation 
into words which shall remain attached to the object. A presentation which 
is not put into words, or a psychical act which is not bypercathected, 
remains therefore in the Ucs in a state of repression". 
23 
Thus unconscious 
mental processes are the ones which fail, for some reason or other, to 
become associated with speech residues, which allows them to proliferate 
according to rules quite different from those which govern conscious processes. 
Association with speech residues - or lack of it - is therefore another 
metapsychological criterion for distinguishing between conscious and 
unconscious states. 
It is interesting to note that this criterion, derived from Freud's 
theoretical considerations, corresponds very well with the behavioural 
criterion mentioned earlier. This behavioural criterion lay in the subject's 
ability or inability to express some of his mental states in words; conscious 
processes are capable of avowal by the subject, whereas unconscious ones 
are not, at least under normal conditions. This behavioural criterion 
is now given a theoretical justification. If unconscious mental processes 
are. those which fail to become associated with speech residues, we can 
understand why the subject isn't in a position to avow them. The 
metapsychological considerations about speech residues also seem to provide 
a theoretical ground for adopting a "talking cure", which is what 
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psychoanalysis as a therapeutic procedure is about. The practical 
justification for such a procedure was the clinical observation that 
patients could be cured, other conditions being satisfied, if they could 
be brought to put into words their traumatic experience. Freud's theoretical 
considerations suggest that the presence or absence of a connection between 
a memory trace and speech residues makes a difference to the way this 
memory trace behaves. Establishing such a connection makes the memory 
trace available to the person, while lack of connection makes it inaccessible, 
which in turn makes a difference to the relevant behaviour. So there is 
both empirical and theoretical justification for the therapeutic procedure 
of making the patient say whatever comes into his mind. 
The picture of metapsychology presented here, derived mainly from the 
. 
KE2ject, didn't survive intact into Freud's later writing. The neurological 
terms of the Project were replaced by psychological concepts. But whatever 
Freud's reason for this change, the later version of metapsychology still 
appears to be based on the original assumptions. In fact, there is a 
close parallel between the two, as the following examples clearly show. 
The neural apparatus consisted of three kinds of system of neurones, and 
the later psychical apparatus has three topographical systems, the 
Unconscious, Preconscious-and Conscious (later still, replaced by three 
structural systems - Ego, Super-Ego, and Id - the first of which has an 
explicit precursor in the Project). Neural energy undergoes a similar 
transformation into psychic energy, and the properties of the latter, such 
as being bound or free, are parallel to the "current in flow" and "stored 
energy" referred to in the Project. The two ways of operation of the neural 
apparatus, one based on peremptory discharge and the other on inhibition 
of neural excitation, turn into the "reality principle" and "pleasure 
principle" governing the psychical apparatus; and so on. It is obvious, 
then, that despite Freud's frequent declarations in his later works that he 
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"will remain upon psychological ground", clear traces of his early 
neurological theorizing remain. As Strachey once put it: "the Project, 
or rather its invisible ghost, haunts the whole series of Freud's 
24 
theoretical writings to the very end". For this reason the Project 
remains the main source of Freudian metapsychology. What is more, it throws 
light on otherwise unintelligible or arbitrary-seeming assumptions behind 
his later views. Another reason for discussing here the metapsychology 
of the Project rather than its later versions is that it contains explicit 
empirical hypotheses, while the later work offers only a metaphorical 
picture of the nervous system. 
In fact Freud himself seemed to look at his later metapsychology in this 
way. In The Interpretation of Dreams he referred to it as a "fiction of 
a primitive psychical apparatus". In An Autobiographical Study he called 
it "a useful facon de parler, to be rejected as soon as we find something 
better". But he never spoke of his early metapsychology in this way, 
even though he became dissatisfied with it. We may well wonder what were 
his reasons for abandoning the neurological theory in favour of metaphorical 
pictures. Probably there were several. He was well aware that his 
attempted solution to the neurological explanation of repression - the 
most central problem for him - was far from being satisfactory, for the 
reasons discussed above. He also seems to have felt that the knowledge 
of the nervous system available to him was very incomplete, and so, as he 
himself once said about his theory of instincts, since it could not 
wait for neurophysiology to come up with final conclusions, "it is far more 
to the purpose that we should try to see what light may be thrown upon 
this basic problem of biolop by a synthesis of the psychological phenomena". 
Freud expected, however, "that all our provisional ideas in psychology 
25 
will presumably some day be based on an organic sub-structure" . 
AMIL 
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It is possible to look at Freud's later metapsychology as a kind 
of psychological model, which although not stated in neurological 
language, is compatible with the picture of the nervous system presented 
in the Project. In employing such a model, Freud didn't introduce 
any new kind of tool into the scientific enterprise. Contemporary 
psychology is full of such models. 0. Selfridge's "pandenomonium" model of 
pattern-recognition is just one example. Similar models can also be found 
in the physical sciences - the solar system model of atDmic structure 
is an example. Models can play various roles in the scientific enterprise, 
such as heuristic, pedagogical, and others. We are told by philosophers 
of science that 
thinking of scientific theories by means of models 
is always "as-if" thinking; hydrogen atoms behave 
(in certain respects) as if they were solar systems 
each with an electronic planet revolving round a 
protonic sun. But hydrogen atoms are not solar 
systems; it is only useful to think of them as if they 
were such systems if one remembers all the time that 
they are not. The price of the employment of such models 
is eternal vigilance. 26 
It is important, therefore, that a model for a scientific theory shouldn't 
be confused with the theory itself. To propose something as a model of x 
is to suggest that it is a useful way of representing x, but also to admit 
the possibility of alterndtive representations of x, whereas to propose 
something as a theory of x is to say that x is governed by such and 
such principles, not just that it is useful to think so. In other words, 
one can accept alternative models of x as equally useful for various purposes, 
but one cannot accept that alternative theories of x are equally true. 
This distinction applies to the psychoanalytic metapsychology. The later 
version of it, being a model, is neither true nor false, but may be useful 
for some purposes. The earlier version is a theory, not just a "facon 
de parler", and will be true or false, depending on its compatibility with 
the empirical observations of the nervous system. 
p lk 
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The next question to be considered, therefore, is how Freud's earlier 
theory stands up to empirical test. There is a good literature available 
on this topic. The most systematic attempt to examine Freud's ! ýýo ect 
in the light of contemporary neurological and behavioural knowledge can 
be found in the work of Pribram and Gill called Freud's Project Re-assessed, 27 
on which we will rely heavily here. Let us look at some examples of 
Freud's hypotheses and see what remains of them when confronted with 
contemporary data and theories. Consider the principle of inertia, the first 
postulate of the Proj , according to which the nervous system has 
a passive reflex-like nature, remaining in a state of rest until stimulated, 
when it functions so as to rid itself of the incoming exogenous excitation. 
This function is modified later by "exigencies of life", but the basic 
trend still remains. (Inertia is similar in many respects to what is 
today known as homeostasis. ) This was the current view of 19th century 
neurology, held by outstanding neurologists of the time, such as Ernst 
Brucke, Theodor Meynert and others, and in this respect Freud was their 
faithful pupil. 
28 But this view of the nervous system is no longer tenable, 
being incompatible with neurological and behavioural data available now. 
Electro-encephelographic data have shown that even in sleep or in coma 
the brain doesn't cease its activity. The nerve cells periodically fire, 
producing a spike potential, and the brain's non-transmitted activity 
waxes and wanes without any outside stimulation. The behavioural. data, 
obtained by quite different techniques, suggest a similar conclusion. 
Experiments on perceptual deprivation show that an organism has a positive 
need for stimulation and that there seems to be an optimal, mid-range 
leVel of cortical activation which the organism tends to seek. This clearly 
contradicts Freud's view that the nervous system tries to get rid of 
stimulation entirely and return, by the principle of interia, to an 
entirely unstimulated condition. 
29 
Thus the hypothesis of inertia doesn't 
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survive present-day test, but precisely in virtue of being a testable 
hypothesis in the first place. 
The next problem we are going to look at is Freud's hypothesis of a stored 
excitation or cathexis, which he distinguishes from current in flow. This 
looks similar to the distinction between impulse transmission and graded 
potential change, the first being a rapid discharge along a nerve, and 
the second being slow changes in potential difference in the nervous tissue. 
But is it actually the same as this modern distinction? We know that 19th 
century neurophysiologists had just become familiar with the phenomenon 
of propagated nerve impulse. That Freud himself was aware of this discovery 
is indicated by the fact that even before writing the Project he made 
a comparison between a precursor of Q and electric discharge. A reason 
why he didn't identify quantity of neural excitation with electric 
discharge in the Project is that the former is neurochemical in nature, 
and electrical discharge is only its observable manifestation. Contemporary 
neurologists don't identify them either, for the same reason. There isn't 
much doubt, therefore, that the "current in floie' he is talking of is the 
impulse transmission of modern theory. But what about the hypothesis 
of stored excitation, or cathexis? According to Pribram, Freud's 
emphasis on cathe)eis is one of those strokes of 
luck or genius which in retrospect appears uncanny, 
for only in the past decade have neurologists 
recognized the importance of the graded non-impulsive 
activities of neural tissue-graded mechanisms such 
as those of the dendric network whose functions are 
considerably different from those of the transmitted 
impulsive activity of axons. 30 
It does indeed look as if Freud was anticipating by about half a century 
a new scientific discovery. But careful examination of the 19th century 
meurophysiological literature again suggests that this anticipation didn't 
take place in a complete vacuum. Freud's contemporaries, such as duBois- 
Reymond and Pfluger, described local potential (electronic) changes of 
peripheral nerves. All Freud did, therefore, was to extrapolate this discovery 
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from the periphery into the brain itself. Thus his distinction between 
cathexis and current in f low is, despite changes in terminology, very 
much up to date. What's more, his conception of cathexis, i. e. 
the graded response mechanism, as having a function of delay of discharge, 
can become a source of new experiments, in Pribram's view. What is known 
so far is that graded response is an indication that discharge has failed 
to take place, but its function, if there is one, is unknown. Freud's 
hypothesis that it has a function of delay still poses a challenge to 
contemporary neurology, and it's not surprising, therefore, that some 
present-day writers look at his Project "as a document of value for 
our time and not just an historical oddity of closely packed interlacing 
31 ideas jotted down with urgency and then forgotten" . 
The Project's emphasis on different systems of neurones is another 
example of hypotheses which can be testable. Freud's theory demands that 
there be at least two different systems, and suggests a functional 
localization of them in the central nervous system. According to the 
Project: 
The system 0 would be the group of neurones which 
receive the external stimuli, the system * would 
contain the neurones which receive the endogenous 
excitation. In that case we should not have invented 
the two [classes] O-and *, we should have fou"nd them 
already in existence. It still remains to identify 
them with something known to us. In fact we know from 
anatomy a system of neurones (the grey matter of the 
spinal cord) which is alone in contact with the external 
world, and a superimposed system (the grey matter of 
the brain) which has no peripheral connections but to 
which the development of the nervous system and the 
psychical functions are attached. The primary brain 
fits pretty well with our characterization of the system, 
if we may assume that paths lead directly, and 
independently of from the brain to the interior of 
the body. Now, the derivation and original biological 
significance of the primary brain are not known to 
anatomists; according to our theory, it would, to put 
it plainly, be a sXýpathetic ganglion. Here is a first 
possibility of testing our theory upon factual material. 32 
And how did it pass such a test? The primary brain, especially the 
diencephalic limbic formations, and mesencephalic reticular, have indeed 
I[--- 
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become known since Sherrington to serve as the "head ganglia of the 
autonomic nervous system" and to be especially sensitive to a variety 
of hormones such as adrenergic neurochemicals. And more recent scientific 
advances in the area suggest that some of these formations are Involved 
in an important way in human memory, which is compatible with Freud's 
idea that the *-system is a vehicle of memory, or that these neurones 
are "mnemic cells", as he sometimes put it. The requirements of Freud's 
ý-system are in turn fulfilled by the classical sensory-motor projection 
systems, with their rapid topologically organized conduction paths of long 
fibre trails interspersed with-few synapses. So this aspect of Freud's 
theory has passed the test pretty well. 
The third system of neurones, i. e. w, unlike the other two, is 
much more difficult to test, and appears more controversial. It is-said 
to be sensitive to the periodicity of neural excitation, and to be responsible 
for the phenomenon of consciousness. What does contemporary neuropsychology 
have to say about the possibility of the mechanism of periodicity? Gill 
and Pribram suggest that some contemporary works, like that of J. Z. Young, 
provide some supporting evidence for such a mechanism. We are told that "this 
work has shown (in cats and man) that each muscle group determines the 
specific fibre diameter size spectrum of its innervation. Fibre diameter 
is, of course, correlated with size of nerve cell and speed of conduction 
of impulses. A specific anatomical spectrum is therefore suggestive of a 
specific distribution of arrivals and departures of nerve impulses - 
specifically of periodicities. 
33 
It is important to stress, however, 
that the mechanism of periodicity, as discussed by contemporary writers, 
has nothing to do with consciousness, whereas. for Freud it is a basic 
mechanism for generating conscious awareness. So the status of his third 
system of neurones, unlike the other two, is still unclear. 
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-These are just a few examples, but quite representative ones, of 
how the hypotheses of the Project can be related to the contemporary state 
of the relevant discipline. Some of the hypotheses turn out to be false - 
the principle of inertia, for example. Others, such as the functional 
localization of the two systems of neurones, appear to be corroborated. 
Others, for instance, about the delaying function of a graded potential 
mechanism or cathexis, might become a source and stimulus for new research. 
So although Freud failed to provide. us with a mechanism underlying 
repression, the Project as a whole still appears to be a remarkable achievement. 
It is easier to understand how this was possible when we recall that Freud, 
before he became the first psychoanalyst, spent about twenty years of his 
scientific career studying the nervous system, working with the then 
world authorities in this area such as Br"%LCke and Meynert, and had also 
acquired a reputation of his own, particularly for his work on aphasia 
(a language disorder due to brain damage). These facts are worth 
remembering, because it is clear that these twenty years of mental 
investment in the study of the nervous system couldn't possibly be put 
aside'and entirely forgotten, even after Freud's move from the experimental 
laboratory to the psychoanalytic consulting room. And the fact that his 
later metapsychology, which guided his clinical observations to the end 
of his working life, reveals clear traces of the old neurological background, 
shows that his early training had not been forgotten. It is a pity, therefore, 
that some contemporary followers of Freud overlook this fact entirely, 
and by so doing shield his theoretical considerations from the critical 
and constructive influence of contemporary science, an infllience which 
might be beneficial to psychoanalysis itself. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
It has been argued by some writers that Freud was the first person 
to discover unconscious mental processes, a discovery which has revolutionized 
our entire way of looking at ourselves and understanding each other. But 
a brief look at 19th century psychology, some pre-Freudian philosophical 
doctrines, and above all Western literature, has convinced us that the 
idea of unconscious determinants of human behaviour, very similar to those 
postulated by Freud, was part of our intellectual heritage all along, even 
if some of us had to be reminded of that heritage by him. As Thomas Mann 
once said, 
"Indeed, it would be too much to say that I came to ý 
psychoanalysis. It came to me. Through the friendly 
interest that some younger*workers in the field had 
shown in my work, from Little Herr Friedmann'to 
Death in Venice, The Magic Mountain, and the Joseph 
novels, it gave me to understand that in my way I 
"belong"; it made me aware, as probably behoved it, 
of my latent, preconscious sympathies; and when I 
began to occupy myself with the literature of 
psychoanalysis I recognised, arrayed in the ideas and 
the language of scientific exactitude, much that had 
long been familiar to me through my youthful mental 
experience". 1. 
If there was something new about the psychoanalytic concept-of unconscious 
mental processes, it was its wider range of application, a more systematic 
use, and the role it came to play in analytic psychotherapy. 
Analysis of Freud's typical explanations in terms of unconscious 
mental processes, such as his accounts of symptoms, dreams and errors, 
shows that what he offered us is basically the same kind of explanation 
as that of common sense psychology in similar circumstances. This suggests 
that talk of Freud's radical departure from the common sense conceptual 
scheme, said by some philosophers to leave no room for the application of 
unconscious reasons and motives, is totally unjustified. Those who express 
this view seem to ignore the whole of Western literature, folklore, popular 
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jokes, etc., thus do injustice to common sense itself as well as to psychoanalysis. 
What about Freud's alleged radical extension of the concepts of unconscious 
processes, applying them to phenomena such as hysterical paralysis, which the 
ordinary man wouldn't perceive as being influenced either by conscious 
or unconscious mental processes? Phenomena such as vomiting induced 
by the mere idea of having eaten something unusual, or a phantom pregnancy, 
are very similar to some of the somatic symptoms discussed by Freud, and are 
indeed commonly explained in terms of conscious and unconscious reasons, 
quite independently of psychoanalysis; so this doesn't suggest any such 
radical departure either. What seems to stop the ordinary man from applying 
a similar kind of explanation to some of the phenomena discussed by Freud, 
is his ignorance of them and how they come about. For example, his 
ignorance that the extent of hysterical paralysis doesn't correspond to the 
anatomy of the nervous system, but to a common sense conception of the 
human body. And so he mistakes it for an ordinary paralysis, and fails to 
notice that it can be an expression of the person's feelings, like other 
phenomena he is more familiar with. Thus it is not the kind of phenomena 
which are explained in terms of both conscious and unconscious mental 
states, but the particular instances of them, which distinguishes psychoanalysis 
from common sense psychology. By pointing to these similarities between 
psychoanalysis and common sense we are neither trying to diminish Freud's 
achievements, nor to elevate the wisdom of common sense, but merely to do 
justice to both of them. 
When looking at various examples of behaviour explained by Freud in 
terms of unconscious reasons and motives the question of their validation 
arises. It is not an uncommon practice that when such a question is 
asked it is often restricted to one method of'validation only. But there 
are quite different ways available to us in which we can try to test 
explanations of behaviour, and some of them are better than others. 
Failure to realize this might lead to a conclusion (as it did in some 
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quarters) which might be true about one method, but quite unjustified in 
respect to others, a mistake which we tried to avoid here by discussing 
all the methods available so far. One such method is that also used by 
common sense psychology, in which the ascription of motives and reasons9 
both conscious and unconscious, to a piece of behaviour is justified by 
appealing to the rest of the person's behaviour, to his general situation, 
and to the kind of person he is. Thus we accept one such explanation because 
it is compatible or coherent with other similar explanations, while 
incompatibility provides a ground for rejecting it. When Freudian accounts 
of behaviour are judged by the standards of this method, some cases 
were regarded as being successfully validated, others as potentially 
capable of being successfully tested if more information was available, 
but there were also instances of explanations which didn't stand up to 
this kind of test. So only some instances of explanations in terms of 
unconscious mental processes could be regarded as being sutcessfully 
tested, by this particular method anyway. 
The psychoanalyststhemselves, however, in order to justify their 
claims about their patients' behaviour, appeal to what ha#pens in analytic 
psychotherapy, in particular to its outcome. Freud's justification for 
his claim about the evidential value of therapeutic success for the validity 
of the psychoanalytic interpretations was given in his "Argument from Insight". 
According to that argument, a patient's veridical insight into the unconscious 
determinants of his behaviour is causally necessary for the relief of his 
neurosis, and only psychoanalytic interpretations can mediate such 
insight. Thus if the analysis of the patient was therapeutically successful 
we can conclude that the psycho#nalytic interpretations given to him were 
veridical. However, this argument has been challenged, although not 
always for the right reasons. Eysenck, for instance, questioned it on the 
ground that psychoanalysis doesn't produce better results than no 
treatment at all, and if so the insight given to the patient aannot be 
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said to be a necessary condition for cure. But since Eysenck's conclusion 
is based on an empirical study which failed to meet the basic requirements 
of a proper controlled study, while better-devised studies suggest the 
opposite conclusion, i. e. that Freudian therapy in particular, and 
psychotherapy in general, produce results over and above no treatment at all, 
the psychoanalysts don't have to accept his criticism. But when the 
effectiveness of the psychoanalytic therapy is examined vis a vis outcomes 
of other kinds of therapies, such as behavioural therapy, there is good 
evidence available which suggests that it doesn't produce better outcomes. 
This contradicts Freud's original assumption that veridical insight is 
a necessary condition for any kind of cure which counts, and so the whole 
argument is sometimes rejected. But although several rival therapies 
can succeed in the alleviation of neurosis, the conquest of it in the patients 
treated by the psychoanalytic methods might still depend on veridical. 
insight. So this kind of evidence doesn't destroy the Argument from Insight 
altogether, although it requires its modification. The original premise 
about insight being a necessary condition for any kind of cure has to 
be replaced by a more modest claim, namely, that it is necessary for the 
psychoanalytic kind of cure only, and this modified argument may still 
appear to be valid. 
A final way in which the Argument from Insight could be challenged 
is by showing that psychoanalytic psychotherapy is an inadvertent placebo, 
i. e., that its effects are due to some incidental factors, such as suggestion, 
while its characteristic procedures, such as providing the patient with 
insight, have no remedial value whatsoever, contrary to the beliefs 
of the psychoanalysts themselves. To demonstrate that, we need an experiment 
conducted on a double-blind basis in which both parties are ignorant 
of the real nature of the treatment, as was the case in Cole's study. 
Unfortunately, in the case of psychoanalytic treatment such an approach 
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doesn't seem to be possible, as far as we could judge, for the following 
reasons. There isn't any way in which the psychoanalyst in charge can 
be kept ignorant of the nature of the "insight" he is giving to his patient. 
But even keeping the patient ignorant, a requirement of a single-blind 
control, poses similarly insuperable difficulties. Thus we cannot show 
conclusively, or at least nobody can see how we could, whether psychoanalytic 
treatment is a placebo treatment or not. However, this very ignorance 
undermines entirely the probative value of successful outcome of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy in validating relevant interpretations. 
This is because we are not in a position to make a systematic discrimination 
between interpretations that are effective and true, and interpretations 
that are effective even though false. What a successful outcome can do 
at best is to reinforce our acceptance of the interpretations whose 
plausibility have been already established by some other methods, such as 
the first one for example. But as an independent method of validation 
of psychoanalytic interpretations, psychoanalytic therapy, however successful, 
isn't much good. All this doesn't necessarily undermine the value of psy- 
cboanalytic. therapy as a treatment. 
A third attempt to test the hypothesis of unconscious mental processes 
is provided by the experimental method. Although there are countless 
experiments designed to provide such a test, they don't measure up to 
the ingenuity of Luria's experiments, in our view. However, although 
Luria's relevant work The Nature of Human Conflicts was actually translated 
into English, his name is hardly mentioned by Angl6-Saxon writers, when 
they consider the experimental approach to psychoanalysis, an omission 
which we tried to repair here. Since his experiments are crucial to our 
argument about the testability of the hypothesis of unconscious mental 
processes, it might be useful to summarise in some detail their relevance 
to the psychoanalytic case once more. By implanting strong unconscious 
complexes into his subjects Luria was able to create experimental conditions 
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very similar to the real life situations faced by psychoanalysts, in contrast 
to other experiments where such conditions had only a remote resemblance 
to real life, as in the case of merely presenting subjects with 
supposedly anxiety-provoking words. By asking his subjects to produce 
a series of free associations, as well eliciting motor reactions, in various 
stages of his experiments, Luria was able to reproduce a real situation 
in psychoanalysis as closely as possible. This kind of "experimental 
psychoanalysis", unlike actual analysis, enables a researcher to control 
a crucial variable and gives him various advantages. Being in a position 
to implant and then remove the unconscious complex, as well as influence 
its content by means of an appropriate suggestion, he acquires an independent 
access to it, which enables him to make systematic observation of the relevant 
variations in free associations produced by the subject, an unsolvable 
difficulty for the psychoanalyst faced with naturally occuring complexes. 
What Luria's experiments have shown beyond any doubt, in our view, is that 
it is possible for the subject to be in a strong affective state, expressed 
by his free associations and motor reactions as well as by physiological 
changes such as respiration, and yet the subject himself can be entirely 
ignorant of the nature of his affect and how it came about. This surely 
confirms Freud's general hypothesis that human behaviour can be 
influenced by unconscious states and processes, of which the subjects 
know nothing themselves. Some other relevant hypotheses, such as that the 
content of unconscious process determines what kind of free associations 
are produced by the subject, can be said to be successfully confirmed too. 
This means that the psychoanalytic technique of free association still 
appears to be the best method available for studying such unconscipus 
processes. Luria's method cannot be used, however, to test Freud's claims 
about particular instances of unconscious mental processes occurring 
spontaneously, which would be a great improvement on the first method, 
because such processes cannot usually be controlled and manipulated in 
I 
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the relevant way, a difficulty facing scientists in other areas of 
inquiry too. But for a scientific hypothesis in general, and the hypothesis 
of the unconscious processes in particular, to be testable, it 
doesn't have to be tested successfully on every possible occasion, although 
it has to be tested on some. That the psychoanalytic hypothesis can be 
thus tested (to say nothing of the first method) has been demonstrated 
quite clearly by Luria's experiments. 
Since Freud offers us a further kind of scientific theory in order 
to explain why certain mental processes are unconscious, in contrast 
to the lack of any such attempt in common sense psychology, this theory 
needs to be examined in turn. According to this theory, what is responsible 
for preventing some mental processes from becoming conscious is a hypothetical 
process of repression. Unfortunately, Freud himself doesn't give us a 
clear clue what kind of process is that of repression itself, i. e. whether 
it is something the person does or something which happens to him, a notorious 
source of disagreements among his critics. In order to clarify the matter, 
an appeal can be made to B. Williams' distinction between a truth-centered 
motive and a non-truth centered one in trying to make oneself believe 
something, a distinction which is very useful in this context, but which 
is missing in most discussion of the problem. When this distinction is 
applied to repression, which operates through changing the person's beliefs 
and memories, it becomes obvious that if it were a kind of intentional 
strategy, as some writers think it is, it would be either incoherent 
or totally unsuccessful. In our view, therefore, repression cannot 
be regarded as an intentional strategy, but is rather something that happens 
to a person, a passive phenomenon. In order to reconcile this with Freud's 
view that repression can be influenced or modified by a rational argument, 
which is what is supposed to happen in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, 
a distinction was made between two kinds of passive phenomena. One kind, 
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such as shivering from cold, happens to people irrespective of their 
understanding of why it happens, whereas other kinds of passive phenomenon, 
such as believing, involve understanding evidence for one's beliefs. 
Since mental states, such as emotions and wishes, also involve some 
beliefs on the part of the subject who has them, it is not inconsistent 
to claim that they too can be modified by a rational argument by influencing 
the relevant beliefs, as indeed Freud was able to do in some cases. 
The hypothetical process of repression was in turn explained by 
Freud in terms of the function it performs, which is that of reducing 
anxiety, referred to by us as its maintenance. function. Sometimes it is 
said to have a secondary function, i. e. a use function, as in war neurosis, 
where by keeping a soldier away from combat it can provide him with a 
further advantage and might even save his life. Freud's evidence for his 
claim about the functional role of repression in the reduction of anxiety 
merits discussion in turn. One kind of evidence was an observation that 
when the patient was suddenly told about the content of his repressed 
material, there was a considerable increase in his feeling of anxiety. 
Similar observations were also quoted by psychologists who studied war 
neurosis. Another, less direct evidence, was the fact that when the symptoms 
of the postulated process of repression, such as an obsessional action, 
were interrupted, there was again a marked increase in anxiety. In 
our view, such evidence would be conclusive if we could somehow show 
that it is indeed a hypothetical process of repression, and not some other 
item, that has this effect of reducing anxiety. Since this is a more 
general problem, facing any empirical claim about the functional role of 
some item in a given system, the explanatory import of functional propositions 
in general, and then in respect to the psychoanalytic claim in particular, 
needs discussion. The upshot is that functional analysis in psychoanalysis, 
as indeed in general, cannot be expressed as a valid deductive argument, 
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because we can never rule out a priori the possibility of functional 
alternatives which can perform the same job as repression. The presence 
of repression cannot be proved inductively either, because we are not 
in a position, so far anyway, to divide the relevant class of items into 
a finite number, with a ratio of probability assigned to each item, or 
to give a specification of the conditions under which a clearly defined 
system can be said to develop traits whose functional requirements, i. e. 
reduction of anxiety, can be said to be satisfied by some of the items, 
for instance repression, but not by others. Freud's developmental and 
personality theory is not precise enough, as yet, to do this job although 
if further improved and developed it might be more successful. 
We suggest that the hypothetical process of repression, despite its 
lack of explanatory value so far, can be looked upon as a potential 
explanation, which can give stimulation to further research and might 
even help to make some new discoveries. This was the case with the 
hypothetical notion of gene in classical genetics, analogous in some 
ways to that of repression. When the notion of gene was introduced originally, 
in order to explain the distribution of inheritance traits, it hadn't 
much explanatory value. But its heuristic role in the further development 
of genetic theory and its contribution to new discoveries turned out to 
be unquestionable. This suggests that other hypothetical entities, or 
processes including repression, might be similarly useful, and it would 
be a mistake to dismiss them out of hand. We were of course aware 
that the notion of repression is not as precise as that of gene, in 
virtue of being an-open-texture concept. But this fact alone doesn't 
discredit it yet, because many other scientific concepts such as 
morphological and ethological concepts in biology have similar open-texture. 
As long as scientists can agree how to apply them in particular instances, and 
both biologists and psychoanalysts seem to be able to reach such agreement, 
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they can be still useful scientific concepts. 
Our discussion of Freud's doctrine of unconscious mental processes 
wouldn't be complete without mentioning his metapsychology, where he deals 
with the mechanisms underlying psychological functions in general, and 
the function of repression in particular. According to the hypothesis 
of the Project, repressed processes are governed by the primary mode 
of working of the nervous system, which consists in undelayed discharge 
of neural energy, as opposed to the mechanism of inhibition in the secondary 
mode of working, characteristic of non-repressed processes. But this 
hypothesis, as Freud himself seemed to be aware, leaves unsolved a theoretical 
problem, namely, how can a nervous system with an already differentiated 
inhibitory structure, as in a grownup human being, still work in a 
primary way, even if under special conditions only. In our view, this 
hypothesis also contradicts Freud's other assumptions and flies in the face 
of some observations. One such phenomenon is a special case of phantasies, 
usually occuring in a preliminary stage of symptom formation, which can 
be organised according to the secondary mode of functioning and yet be 
dynamically unconscious. That suggests that not all unconscious processes 
follow the primary mode of functioning and, therefore, contradicts Freud's 
original assumption that repressed, and therefore unconscious material, 
is always governed by the primary mode. Another phenomenon which creates 
a similar difficulty for him are cases of dreams expressing the dreamer's 
mental states in a straightforward manner, of which he can become easily 
aware after waking up. Thus some processes working in a primary way, 
as all dreams are said to be, can nevertheless become easily conscious, 
which is incompatible with Freud's original assumption that conscious, 
and therefore non-repressed processes, follow only the secondary mode. 
So despite his ambitious attempt to provide us with the underlying 
mechanism of repression, Freud didn't really succeed. But some other 
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related hypotheses of the Project, such as the one about stored excitation 
and discharge of neural energy, or the hypothesis of three systems of 
neurones, turned out to be more plausible and have stood up quite well 
to contemporary test. 
Our review of the standing of the psychoanalytic doctrine of unconscious 
mental processes suggests that it is not an accomplished theory, but one 
which is still in a state of fermentation. This prevents us from forming 
a more definite view of its final product, which has to wait until some 
future time. But we are already in a position to judge that it is not an 
adhoc story, like astrology for example. Freud's generalization about 
the unconscious determinants of human behaviour, on which this theory 
is erected, can be and has been successfully tested, even by the most 
advanced standards of such test. We can be confident, therefore, that at 
least the ground on which this theory is built is firm enough to take it 
seriously. Unfortunately, the further we move from this ground, the more 
our uncertainty increases. That doesnvt mean, however, that further 
generalizations are mere products of Freud's fertile imagination, 
unjustified by any observation. There are some observations available which 
speak in their favour, like the evidence quoted by Freud in order to 
support his claim about the functional role of repression in reducing 
anxiety. We are merely saying that they are not strong enough to prove 
his claims beyond reasonable doubt. Freud's unsuccessful attempt to find 
an underlying mechanism of repression shouldn't surprise us when we learn 
that he was running far ahead of the development of the relevant discipline, 
and that the mechanisms underlying basic psychological functions are 
still largely unknown to neurophysiologists even now. 
This state of the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious mental 
processes might not impress those who are accustomed to dealing with 
the precise and powerful theories to be found in physical sciences. 
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When compared with such theories, psychoanalytic theory looks very 
unimpressive indeed. But when we compare it with theories on its own 
ground, however, such as Piaget's, or behavioural theory, the impression 
changes completely. It is as good as any other attempt of this kind 
which can be found in contemporary psychology. Aristotle's insight 
is still worth remembering in this context. At the beginning of his Ethics 
he said: 
"In studying this subject we must be content if we 
attain as high a degree of certainty as the matter of 
it admits. The same accuracy or finish is not to be 
looked for in all discussions any more than in all the 
productions of the studio and the workshop ... Such being 
the nature of our siibject and suchour wav of arstuinit in 
our discussionsof it, we must be satisfied with a rough 
outline of the truth, and for the same reason we must 
be content with broad conclusions. Indeed we must 
preserve this attitude when it comes to a mote detailed 
statement of the views that are held. It is a mark of 
the educated man and a proof of his culture that in every 
subject he looks for only so much precision as its 
nature permits". 2 
If Aristotle's words are true of this work too its author's goal 
can be said to be fulfilled. 
REFERENCES 
1. T. Mann, "Freud and the Future", p. 48, in P. Meisel (ed), Freud, A 
Collection of Critical Essays, op. cit. 
2. Aristotle, Ethics, p. 27-8,1955, Penguin Books. 
